USCA11 Case: 20-13512 Date Filed: 06/22/2021 Page: 1 of 7
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT ________________________
No. 20-13512 Non-Argument Calendar ________________________
D.C. Docket Nos. 4:19-cv-00155-MHC, 4:18-cr-00001-MHC-WEJ-1
MICHAEL MCEARCHEN,
Petitioner-Appellant,
versus
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Respondent-Appellee.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia ________________________
(June 22, 2021)
Before WILLIAM PRYOR, Chief Judge, ROSENBAUM and LAGOA, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM: USCA11 Case: 20-13512 Date Filed: 06/22/2021 Page: 2 of 7
Michael McEarchen, a federal prisoner, appeals the denial of his motion to
vacate his sentence. 28 U.S.C. § 2255. McEarchen challenged his sentence of 120
months of imprisonment following his plea of guilty to using interstate commercial
facilities in the commission of a murder-for-hire. 18 U.S.C. § 1958(a). We granted
a certificate of appealability to address whether “trial counsel was ineffective for
failing to effectively engage in the plea negotiation process and accurately inform
McEarchen of the accurate legal sentence possible under the law.” The district
court ruled that McEarchen’s claim of ineffectiveness was “belied by the record.”
We affirm.
McEarchen executed a written plea agreement with the government. The
agreement stated that the government “agree[d] not to bring further criminal
charges against [McEarchen] related to the charge[] to which he [was] pleading
guilty” and to recommend that he receive “adjustment[s] for acceptance of
responsibility” and “be sentenced at the low end of the adjusted guideline range.”
The agreement also stated that McEarchen faced a “[m]aximum term of
imprisonment [of] 10 years” and that “[t]here [were] no other agreements,
promises, representations, or understandings between [him] and the Government.”
McEarchen also signed another form in which he certified that he had “read
the foregoing Plea Agreement and . . . carefully reviewed every part of it with [his]
attorney” and that he “underst[ood] the terms and conditions in the Plea Agreement
2 USCA11 Case: 20-13512 Date Filed: 06/22/2021 Page: 3 of 7
. . . [and] voluntarily agree[d] to them.” He also certified that “[n]o one has
threatened or forced me to plead guilty, and no promises or inducements have been
made to me other than those discussed in the Plea Agreement” and he was “fully
satisfied with the representation provided to me by my attorney in this case.”
During the change of plea hearing, McEarchen verified that he “still
want[ed] to go ahead with [his] guilty plea” even though the district court had
“authority to impose a maximum term of imprisonment of up to 10 years or a
maximum term of 10 years.” McEarchen authenticated his plea agreement and
certification. He said he understood that, if he went to trial, he could lose the
benefit of, among other things, “credit for acceptance of responsibility” [and] that
[could] substantially increase the severity of any sentence imposed . . . in [his]
particular case.” He also acknowledged that “the maximum term of imprisonment
in [his] case is up to and including 10 years,” the district court could impose the
maximum penalty, and no promises or inducements had been made to him other
than those identified in the plea agreement. After McEarchen agreed that the
government could prove he paid an informant to kill his former wife, the district
court accepted his plea of guilty.
The district court sentenced McEarchen to 120 months of imprisonment. The
district court determined that McEarchen’s statutory maximum sentence became
his sentence under the guidelines because it was less than his advisory sentencing
3 USCA11 Case: 20-13512 Date Filed: 06/22/2021 Page: 4 of 7
range of 121 to 151 months. See U.S.S.G. § 5G1.1(a). The district court rejected
McEarchen’s argument that his presentence investigation report overstated his
criminal history as category IV instead of category III, which increased the low
end of his sentencing range from 108 to 121 months of imprisonment. The district
court also rejected McEarchen’s request for a downward variance to 108 months of
imprisonment on the ground that imposition of the statutory maximum sentence
gave him “absolutely no benefit from accepting responsibility early and pleading
early.” As the prosecutor explained, McEarchen benefitted from pleading guilty
because the government agreed to forego prosecuting “other pending crimes,
including the drug” offense of possessing cocaine with intent to distribute and to
“let[] this case resolve all of his pending potential charges that are federal.”
Later, McEarchen moved to vacate his sentence on the ground that his trial
counsel was ineffective for misstating that he faced a sentence of life imprisonment
if convicted at trial. But the district court denied McEarchen’s motion because “the
record belied [his] claim that he would not have pled guilty if he had been correctly
advised about his sentencing exposure” and he had “not shown that it would have
been rational under the circumstances to reject the plea offer where the government
could have brought additional federal charges.”
The decision to deny McEarchen’s motion to vacate is subject to plenary
review. We review findings of fact for clear error and the application of the law to
4 USCA11 Case: 20-13512 Date Filed: 06/22/2021 Page: 5 of 7
those facts de novo. See Carmichael v. United States, 966 F.3d 1250, 1258 (11th
Cir. 2020), cert. denied, 141 S. Ct. 1755 (2021). A claim of ineffective assistance
of counsel presents a mixed issue of law and fact that we review de novo. See id.
A “high bar” exists for a postconviction movant to prevail on an argument
that trial counsel acted ineffectively. Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 371
(2010). Because counsel is presumed to have provided representation “within the
‘wide range’ of reasonable professional assistance,” for the movant to succeed on
an argument of deficient performance, he must establish that counsel’s errors were
“so serious that counsel was not functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed the
defendant by the Sixth Amendment.” Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687,
689 (1984). Even if counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness, the movant must also establish that, but for counsel’s error, he
would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial. Diveroli
v. United States, 803 F.3d 1258, 1262 (11th Cir. 2015). The movant must prove
that a decision to reject the plea bargain would have been rational under the
circumstances. Padilla, 559 U.S. at 372.
Even if we, like the district court, assume that counsel made a professional
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USCA11 Case: 20-13512 Date Filed: 06/22/2021 Page: 1 of 7
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT ________________________
No. 20-13512 Non-Argument Calendar ________________________
D.C. Docket Nos. 4:19-cv-00155-MHC, 4:18-cr-00001-MHC-WEJ-1
MICHAEL MCEARCHEN,
Petitioner-Appellant,
versus
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Respondent-Appellee.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia ________________________
(June 22, 2021)
Before WILLIAM PRYOR, Chief Judge, ROSENBAUM and LAGOA, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM: USCA11 Case: 20-13512 Date Filed: 06/22/2021 Page: 2 of 7
Michael McEarchen, a federal prisoner, appeals the denial of his motion to
vacate his sentence. 28 U.S.C. § 2255. McEarchen challenged his sentence of 120
months of imprisonment following his plea of guilty to using interstate commercial
facilities in the commission of a murder-for-hire. 18 U.S.C. § 1958(a). We granted
a certificate of appealability to address whether “trial counsel was ineffective for
failing to effectively engage in the plea negotiation process and accurately inform
McEarchen of the accurate legal sentence possible under the law.” The district
court ruled that McEarchen’s claim of ineffectiveness was “belied by the record.”
We affirm.
McEarchen executed a written plea agreement with the government. The
agreement stated that the government “agree[d] not to bring further criminal
charges against [McEarchen] related to the charge[] to which he [was] pleading
guilty” and to recommend that he receive “adjustment[s] for acceptance of
responsibility” and “be sentenced at the low end of the adjusted guideline range.”
The agreement also stated that McEarchen faced a “[m]aximum term of
imprisonment [of] 10 years” and that “[t]here [were] no other agreements,
promises, representations, or understandings between [him] and the Government.”
McEarchen also signed another form in which he certified that he had “read
the foregoing Plea Agreement and . . . carefully reviewed every part of it with [his]
attorney” and that he “underst[ood] the terms and conditions in the Plea Agreement
2 USCA11 Case: 20-13512 Date Filed: 06/22/2021 Page: 3 of 7
. . . [and] voluntarily agree[d] to them.” He also certified that “[n]o one has
threatened or forced me to plead guilty, and no promises or inducements have been
made to me other than those discussed in the Plea Agreement” and he was “fully
satisfied with the representation provided to me by my attorney in this case.”
During the change of plea hearing, McEarchen verified that he “still
want[ed] to go ahead with [his] guilty plea” even though the district court had
“authority to impose a maximum term of imprisonment of up to 10 years or a
maximum term of 10 years.” McEarchen authenticated his plea agreement and
certification. He said he understood that, if he went to trial, he could lose the
benefit of, among other things, “credit for acceptance of responsibility” [and] that
[could] substantially increase the severity of any sentence imposed . . . in [his]
particular case.” He also acknowledged that “the maximum term of imprisonment
in [his] case is up to and including 10 years,” the district court could impose the
maximum penalty, and no promises or inducements had been made to him other
than those identified in the plea agreement. After McEarchen agreed that the
government could prove he paid an informant to kill his former wife, the district
court accepted his plea of guilty.
The district court sentenced McEarchen to 120 months of imprisonment. The
district court determined that McEarchen’s statutory maximum sentence became
his sentence under the guidelines because it was less than his advisory sentencing
3 USCA11 Case: 20-13512 Date Filed: 06/22/2021 Page: 4 of 7
range of 121 to 151 months. See U.S.S.G. § 5G1.1(a). The district court rejected
McEarchen’s argument that his presentence investigation report overstated his
criminal history as category IV instead of category III, which increased the low
end of his sentencing range from 108 to 121 months of imprisonment. The district
court also rejected McEarchen’s request for a downward variance to 108 months of
imprisonment on the ground that imposition of the statutory maximum sentence
gave him “absolutely no benefit from accepting responsibility early and pleading
early.” As the prosecutor explained, McEarchen benefitted from pleading guilty
because the government agreed to forego prosecuting “other pending crimes,
including the drug” offense of possessing cocaine with intent to distribute and to
“let[] this case resolve all of his pending potential charges that are federal.”
Later, McEarchen moved to vacate his sentence on the ground that his trial
counsel was ineffective for misstating that he faced a sentence of life imprisonment
if convicted at trial. But the district court denied McEarchen’s motion because “the
record belied [his] claim that he would not have pled guilty if he had been correctly
advised about his sentencing exposure” and he had “not shown that it would have
been rational under the circumstances to reject the plea offer where the government
could have brought additional federal charges.”
The decision to deny McEarchen’s motion to vacate is subject to plenary
review. We review findings of fact for clear error and the application of the law to
4 USCA11 Case: 20-13512 Date Filed: 06/22/2021 Page: 5 of 7
those facts de novo. See Carmichael v. United States, 966 F.3d 1250, 1258 (11th
Cir. 2020), cert. denied, 141 S. Ct. 1755 (2021). A claim of ineffective assistance
of counsel presents a mixed issue of law and fact that we review de novo. See id.
A “high bar” exists for a postconviction movant to prevail on an argument
that trial counsel acted ineffectively. Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 371
(2010). Because counsel is presumed to have provided representation “within the
‘wide range’ of reasonable professional assistance,” for the movant to succeed on
an argument of deficient performance, he must establish that counsel’s errors were
“so serious that counsel was not functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed the
defendant by the Sixth Amendment.” Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687,
689 (1984). Even if counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness, the movant must also establish that, but for counsel’s error, he
would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial. Diveroli
v. United States, 803 F.3d 1258, 1262 (11th Cir. 2015). The movant must prove
that a decision to reject the plea bargain would have been rational under the
circumstances. Padilla, 559 U.S. at 372.
Even if we, like the district court, assume that counsel made a professional
error, McEarchen could not establish a reasonable probability that he was
prejudiced by his counsel’s statement concerning the length of his sentence.
McEarchen knew what sentence he faced when he changed his plea to guilty. His
5 USCA11 Case: 20-13512 Date Filed: 06/22/2021 Page: 6 of 7
plea agreement stated that he faced a statutory maximum sentence of ten years of
imprisonment, and he certified that “[n]o one . . . threatened or forced [him] to
plead guilty, and no promises or inducements [were] made . . . other than those
discussed in the Plea Agreement.” He acknowledged during his plea colloquy that
he had read and understood his plea agreement and the certification, and we
presume that those statements are true. See Winthrop-Redin v. United States, 767
F.3d 1210, 1216 (11th Cir. 2014) (quoting from Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63,
73–74 (1977), that “the representations of the defendant, his lawyer, and the
prosecutor at [a plea] hearing, as well as any findings made by the judge accepting
the plea, constitute a formidable barrier in any subsequent collateral
proceedings.”). And he twice affirmed that he wanted to plead guilty with the
understanding that the district court could impose the statutory maximum penalty.
McEarchen entered his plea of guilty with full knowledge that he might receive a
sentence of ten years of imprisonment.
McEarchen also cannot “convince [this Court] that a decision to reject the
plea bargain would have been rational under the circumstances.” Padilla, 559 U.S.
at 372. McEarchen accepted an advantageous plea arrangement. McEarchen does
not deny that he is guilty. And McEarchen’s plea arrangement eliminated the risk
that he would receive a sentence exceeding ten years because the government
6 USCA11 Case: 20-13512 Date Filed: 06/22/2021 Page: 7 of 7
agreed to forgo charging him for other federal crimes, including a serious drug
crime.
The district court did not err by denying McEarchen’s motion to vacate.
McEarchen failed to establish that, but for his counsel’s statement, there existed a
substantial likelihood that he would have insisted on going to trial. McEarchen
knew he could receive a sentence of ten years of imprisonment, and by pleading
guilty, he avoided prosecution for additional serious crimes for which, as a repeat
offender, he would have received a significantly longer sentence. He was not
prejudiced by heeding counsel’s advice to plead guilty.
We AFFIRM the denial of McEarchen’s motion to vacate.