Michael Lorusso v. Secretary of Florida Department of Families and Children Services

CourtDistrict Court, N.D. Florida
DecidedOctober 2, 2025
Docket1:25-cv-00282
StatusUnknown

This text of Michael Lorusso v. Secretary of Florida Department of Families and Children Services (Michael Lorusso v. Secretary of Florida Department of Families and Children Services) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, N.D. Florida primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Michael Lorusso v. Secretary of Florida Department of Families and Children Services, (N.D. Fla. 2025).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA GAINESVILLE DIVISION

MICHAEL LORUSSO, Petitioner,

vs. Case No.: 1:25cv282/AW/ZCB

SECRETARY OF FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF FAMILIES AND CHILDREN SERVICES, Respondent. _____________________________________/ REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION Petitioner has filed an amended pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. (Doc. 4). The habeas petition challenges Petitioner’s ongoing state criminal proceedings in the Sixth Judicial Circuit, Pinellas County, Florida. (Id.). Petitioner is currently confined in the North Florida Evaluation and Treatment Center in Gainesville, Florida, for competency restoration. (Id.). For the reasons below, this case should be dismissed because it is duplicative and abstention is warranted under Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971). I. Background Petitioner claims that he is being held in the NFETC in violation of his due process rights under the Fifth Amendment. (Doc. 4 at 3). Petitioner apparently wants this Court to intervene and review actions

taken in the pending state court prosecution. II. Discussion A. Petitioner’s habeas petition is duplicative.

The Court has reviewed Petitioner’s litigation history and determined that he is pursuing another habeas action in this Court that presents the same or substantially similar claims, Lorusso v. Sec’y, Fla.

Dep’t of Child. And Fams., Case No. 1:25cv108/MCR/MAF (N.D. Fla.). Petitioner’s claims are still pending review and disposition in that case. Because this habeas case is duplicative of the other pending habeas case,

this case should be dismissed. See I.A. Durbin, Inc. v. Jefferson Nat’l Bank, 793 F.2d 1541, 1551–52 (11th Cir. 1986) (noting that federal courts have inherent administrative power to dismiss duplicative litigation to

avoid wasting judicial resources); see also Martin v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Corr., No. 24-10677, 2024 WL 2853188, at *1 (11th Cir. June 5, 2024) (applying the same rule to a duplicative habeas appeal).1

1 See also, e.g., Lorusso v. State of Fla., No. 1:25cv160, 2025 WL 1909484, at *1 (N.D. Fla. July 10, 2025) (dismissing § 2241 petition seeking federal intervention in pending state criminal proceedings as duplicative and based on Younger abstention); Lorusso v. State Att’y Office, No. 1:25cv111, 2025 WL 1592302, at *1 (N.D. Fla. June 5, 2025) (same); B. Abstention is required under the Younger doctrine.

Dismissal is also warranted because of the abstention doctrine announced in Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971). Under the Younger abstention doctrine, “a federal court should not interfere with ongoing

state criminal proceedings where the state court conviction and/or sentence is not yet final.” Johnson v. Fla., 32 F.4th 1092, 1099 (11th Cir. 2022). Younger abstention is warranted when “(1) state proceedings,

judicial in nature, are pending; (2) the state proceedings involve important state interests; and (3) the state proceedings afford adequate opportunity to raise the constitutional issue.” Id. at 1099. There are

three “narrow exceptions” to Younger abstention: “(1) there is evidence of state proceedings motivated by bad faith, (2) irreparable injury would occur; or (3) there is no adequate alternative state forum where the

constitutional issues can be raised.” Id. Here, the requirements of Younger abstention are met. First, there is an active criminal case against Petitioner pending in the Pinellas

County Circuit Court. See State of Florida v. Lorusso, Case No. 2024-CF-

Lorusso v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Corr., No. 2:25cv27, 2025 WL 436358, at *1 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 17, 2025) (dismissing § 2241 petition seeking federal intervention in pending state criminal proceedings as duplicative). 06524 (Pinellas Cnty. Cir. Ct.). Second, a state criminal prosecution

involves important state interests. See Boyd v. Georgia, 512 F. App’x 915, 918 (11th Cir. 2013) (explaining that the state has an important interest in prosecuting criminal offenses). Finally, there is no reason to believe

that the Florida state court where the criminal action is pending will not afford Petitioner an adequate opportunity to raise the issues presented in his § 2241 petition.

Because the three requirements for Younger abstention are met, abstention is appropriate unless Petitioner has shown that an exception applies. See Leonard v. Ala. State Bd. of Pharm., 61 F.4th 902, 908, 912

(11th Cir. 2023) (recognizing that “the burden is on the plaintiff to show” that a Younger exception applies).2 None do.

2 Petitioner is aware of Younger abstention and its exceptions because he has filed numerous habeas cases that were dismissed on this basis. See, e.g., Lorusso v. Pinellas County Sheriff, No. 8:25-cv-00189 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 28, 2025) (dismissed on grounds of exhaustion and Younger); Lorusso v. Pinellas County Sheriff, et al., No. 8: 25-cv-00188 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 28, 2025) (same); Lorusso v. State Attorney Bruce Bartlett, No. 8:25-cv-00343 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 11, 2025) (same); Lorusso v. State Attorney Bruce Bartlett, et al., No. 8:25-cv-00345 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 11, 2025) (same); Lorusso v. Pinellas County Sheriff, et al., No. 8:25-cv-00355 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 20, 2025) (same); Lorusso v. Pinellas County Sheriff, et al., No. 8:25-cv-00356 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 14, 2025) (same); Lorusso v. Pinellas County Sheriff, et al., No. 8:25-cv-00357 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 14, 2025) (same); Lorusso v. Warden, Pinellas County Jail, No. 8:24-cv-02870 (M.D. Fla. Dec. 17, Looking first to the bad faith exception, the Supreme Court has held

that “bad faith in this context generally means that a prosecution has been brought without a reasonable expectation of obtaining a valid conviction.” Leonard, 61 F.4th at 911 (cleaned up). Here, Petitioner has

failed to show that the state prosecution was brought with no “reasonable expectation” of securing a conviction. He thus has not satisfied Younger’s bad faith exception.

The Court will now turn to the second exception. To show irreparable injury in the context of an ongoing state criminal prosecution, Petitioner must demonstrate that “the danger of irreparable loss is both

great and immediate.” Younger, 401 U.S. at 45. Petitioner has not made such a showing here. There is no reason for the Court to believe that abstaining will result in Petitioner suffering irreparable injury.

Moving finally to the third exception, Petitioner has failed to show that the Florida state courts are an inadequate forum for his constitutional challenges. “Adequacy in this context is not about the

quality of the state proceedings, but rather about whether the challenge

2024) (same); Lorusso v. Warden, Pinellas County Jail, No. 8:25-cv-00081 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 17, 2025) (dismissed on several grounds, including Younger). can be raised in the pending state proceedings at all.” Leonard, 61 F.4th

at 908 (cleaned up). Put another way, “what matters is whether the plaintiff is procedurally prevented from raising his constitutional claims in the state courts.” Id. (cleaned up). Petitioner has pointed to nothing

in Florida state law or procedure that would prohibit him from raising in state court the same issues he has raised in his § 2241 petition. For these reasons, abstention under Younger serves as an

additional basis for dismissal of this case. See Jackson v. Georgia, 273 F.

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