Michael Lertchitvikul v. Andrew Saul

• Court: District Court, C.D. California
• Decided: March 29, 2022
• Docket: 2:20-cv-08310
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

Case 2:20-cv-08310-SP Document 19 Filed 03/29/22 Page 1 of 13 Page ID #:644

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 MICHAEL L., ) Case No. 2:20-cv-08310-SP ) 12 Plaintiff, ) ) 13 v. ) MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ) ORDER 14 ) KILOLO KIJAKAZI, Acting ) 15 Commissioner of Social Security ) Administration, ) 16 ) Defendant. ) 17 ) ) 18 19 I. 20 INTRODUCTION 21 On September 10, 2020, plaintiff Michael L. filed a complaint against 22 defendant, the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration 23 (“Commissioner”), seeking a review of a denial of a period of disability and 24 disability insurance benefits (“DIB”). The parties have fully briefed the issues in 25 dispute, and the court deems the matter suitable for adjudication without oral 26 argument. 27 Plaintiff presents two disputed issues for decision: (1) whether the 28 1 Case 2:20-cv-08310-SP Document 19 Filed 03/29/22 Page 2 of 13 Page ID #:645

1 Administrative Law Judge’s (“ALJ”) residual functional capacity (“RFC”) 2 determination was consistent with her findings; and (2) whether the ALJ resolved a 3 conflict between the testimony of the vocational expert (“VE”) and the Dictionary 4 of Occupational Titles (“DOT”). Plaintiff’s Memorandum in Support of the 5 Complaint (“P. Mem.”) at 2-9; see Memorandum in Support of Defendant’s 6 Answer (“D. Mem.”) at 1-3. 7 Having carefully studied the parties’ memoranda on the issues in dispute, the 8 Administrative Record (“AR”), and the decision of the ALJ, the court concludes 9 that, as detailed herein, the ALJ’s RFC determination was consistent with her 10 findings, and the ALJ properly relied on the VE’s testimony. Consequently, the 11 court affirms the decision of the Commissioner denying benefits. 12 II. 13 FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 14 Plaintiff, who was 29 years old on the alleged disability onset date, attended 15 at least four years of college. AR at 88, 182. Plaintiff has past relevant work as a 16 stamps or coins salesperson. Id. at 54. 17 On May 16, 2017, plaintiff filed an application for a period of disability and 18 DIB, alleging on onset date of December 1, 2015, due to Parsonage Turner 19 Syndrome. Id. at 88. The Commissioner denied plaintiff’s application initially, 20 after which he filed a request for a hearing. Id. at 99-105. 21 On February 26, 2019, plaintiff appeared without counsel at a hearing before 22 the ALJ. Id. at 64-87. The ALJ rescheduled the hearing in order to provide 23 plaintiff time to submit additional medical evidence, undergo a consultative 24 examination, and obtain counsel. Id. at 82-86. 25 On May 8, 2019, plaintiff, again appearing without counsel, testified at a 26 hearing before the ALJ. Id. at 29-63. The ALJ also heard testimony from Bonnie 27 Drumwright, a vocational expert. Id. at 52-60. On July 10, 2019, the ALJ denied 28 plaintiff’s claim for benefits. Id. at 15-25. 2 Case 2:20-cv-08310-SP Document 19 Filed 03/29/22 Page 3 of 13 Page ID #:646

1 Applying the well-known five-step sequential evaluation process, the ALJ 2 found, at step one, that plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity 3 since January 1, 2016. Id. at 17-18. 4 At step two, the ALJ found plaintiff suffered from the severe impairment of 5 Parsonage Turner Syndrome (brachial plexus neuritis). Id. at 18. 6 At step three, the ALJ found plaintiff’s impairment did not meet or 7 medically equal one of the listed impairments set forth in 20 C.F.R. part 404, 8 Subpart P, Appendix 1. Id. at 19. 9 The ALJ then assessed plaintiff’s RFC,1 and determined he had the RFC to 10 perform light work as defined by 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(b), with the limitations that 11 plaintiff: could lift and carry 10 pounds occasionally and five pounds frequently; 12 could not reach overhead bilaterally; could occasionally push and pull bilaterally; 13 could occasionally engage in the operation of hand controls bilaterally; and could 14 not climb ladders, ropes, and scaffolds. Id. The ALJ also precluded plaintiff from 15 concentrated exposure to vibration and workplace hazards such as unprotected 16 heights and dangerous moving mechanical parts. Id. 17 The ALJ found, at step four, that plaintiff was unable to perform his past 18 relevant work as a salesperson of stamps or coins. Id. at 23-24. 19 At step five, the ALJ found there were jobs that existed in significant 20 numbers in the national economy that plaintiff could perform, including cashier II, 21 telephone solicitor, and document specialist. Id. at 24-25. Consequently, the ALJ 22 concluded plaintiff did not suffer from a disability as defined by the Social 23 Security Act. Id. at 25. 24 1 Residual functional capacity is what a claimant can do despite existing 25 exertional and nonexertional limitations. Cooper v. Sullivan, 880 F.2d 1152, 1155- 26 56 n.5-7 (9th Cir. 1989). “Between steps three and four of the five-step evaluation, the ALJ must proceed to an intermediate step in which the ALJ assesses the 27 claimant’s residual functional capacity.” Massachi v. Astrue, 486 F.3d 1149, 1151 28 n.2 (9th Cir. 2007). 3 Case 2:20-cv-08310-SP Document 19 Filed 03/29/22 Page 4 of 13 Page ID #:647

1 Plaintiff filed a timely request for review of the ALJ’s decision, which was 2 denied by the Appeals Council. Id. at 1-3. The ALJ’s decision stands as the final 3 decision of the Commissioner. 4 III. 5 STANDARD OF REVIEW 6 This court is empowered to review decisions by the Commissioner to deny 7 benefits. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The findings and decision of the Social Security 8 Administration must be upheld if they are free of legal error and supported by 9 substantial evidence. Mayes v. Massanari, 276 F.3d 453, 458-59 (9th Cir. 2001) 10 (as amended). But if the court determines the ALJ’s findings are based on legal 11 error or are not supported by substantial evidence in the record, the court may 12 reject the findings and set aside the decision to deny benefits. Aukland v. 13 Massanari, 257 F.3d 1033, 1035 (9th Cir. 2001); Tonapetyan v. Halter, 242 F.3d 14 1144, 1147 (9th Cir. 2001). 15 “Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla, but less than a 16 preponderance.” Aukland, 257 F.3d at 1035. Substantial evidence is such 17 “relevant evidence which a reasonable person might accept as adequate to support 18 a conclusion.” Reddick v. Chater, 157 F.3d 715, 720 (9th Cir. 1998); Mayes, 276 19 F.3d at 459. To determine whether substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s 20 finding, the reviewing court must review the administrative record as a whole, 21 “weighing both the evidence that supports and the evidence that detracts from the 22 ALJ’s conclusion.” Mayes, 276 F.3d at 459. The ALJ’s decision “‘cannot be 23 affirmed simply by isolating a specific quantum of supporting evidence.’” 24 Aukland, 257 F.3d at 1035 (quoting Sousa v. Callahan, 143 F.3d 1240, 1243 (9th 25 Cir. 1998)). If the evidence can reasonably support either affirming or reversing 26 the ALJ’s decision, the reviewing court “‘may not substitute its judgment for that 27 of the ALJ.’” Id. (quoting Matney v. Sullivan, 981 F.2d 1016, 1018 (9th Cir. 28 1992)). 4 Case 2:20-cv-08310-SP Document 19 Filed 03/29/22 Page 5 of 13 Page ID #:648

1 IV. 2 DISCUSSION 3 A. The ALJ’s RFC Determination Was Consistent With Her Findings 4 Plaintiff argues the ALJ’s RFC determination was not supported by 5 substantial evidence. P. Mem. at 2-6. Specifically, plaintiff contends the RFC 6 determination was inconsistent with the ALJ’s own lifting and carrying findings 7 that reflected plaintiff could only perform sedentary work, and failed to include all 8 of the consultative examiner’s opined limitations.2 Id. at 4-5. 9 Residual functional capacity is what one “can still do despite [his or her] 10 limitations.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)(1). The Commissioner reaches an RFC 11 determination by reviewing and considering all of the relevant evidence. Id. Here, 12 the ALJ determined plaintiff had the RFC to perform light work as defined by 20 13 C.F.R. § 404.1567(b) with certain limitations, including lifting and carrying ten 14 pounds occasionally and five pounds frequently, and occasional operation of hand 15 controls bilaterally. AR at 19. In reaching her RFC determination, the ALJ 16 considered the medical evidence and plaintiff’s daily activities. 17 1. The RFC Determination Reflected the Lifting and Carrying 18 Limitations 19 Plaintiff argues her lifting and carrying limitations fall under sedentary work 20 and therefore, the ALJ’s determination plaintiff had the RFC to perform light work 21 was inconsistent with her own findings. P. Mem. at 4-5. 22 “Light work involves lifting no more than 20 pounds at a time with frequent 23 lifting or carrying of objects weighing up to 10 pounds” while “[s]edentary work 24 involves lifting no more than 10 pounds at a time and occasionally lifting or 25 carrying articles like docket files, ledgers, and small tools.” 20 C.F.R. 26 2 Plaintiff also contends the ALJ presented an incomplete hypothetical to the 27 VE because she failed to expressly include standing and walking limitations. Id. at 28 6. The court discusses this argument in part B below. 5 Case 2:20-cv-08310-SP Document 19 Filed 03/29/22 Page 6 of 13 Page ID #:649

1 § 404.1567(a)-(b). The regulations further explain that with regard to light work, 2 “[e]ven though the weight lifted may be very little, a job is in this category when it 3 requires a good deal of walking or standing.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(b). Indeed, 4 “the full range of light work requires standing or walking, off and on, for a total of 5 approximately [six] hours of an [eight]-hour workday,” while sedentary work 6 generally limits standing or walking to no more than two hours out an eight-hour 7 workday. See Social Security Ruling (“SSR”) 83-10.3 Thus, the primary 8 difference between sedentary work and most light work is the amount of walking 9 or standing required. Id. 10 The ALJ’s RFC determination was consistent with her findings. As an 11 initial matter, plaintiff does not argue he is unable to stand or walk for six hours 12 out of an eight-hour day. Plaintiff’s argument that the ALJ should have found he 13 only had the RFC to perform sedentary work rests solely on the ALJ’s lifting and 14 carrying limitations. But light work and sedentary work are not defined by lifting 15 and carrying limitations alone, and the ALJ determined plaintiff could not perform 16 the full range of light work. Instead, the ALJ determined plaintiff had the RFC to 17 perform light work as defined by 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(b), which meant plaintiff 18 had the ability to stand or walk six hours out of an eight-work day, but the range of 19 jobs was eroded by, among other things, the ability to lift and carry only ten 20 pounds occasionally and five pounds frequently. These restrictions fall within the 21 parameters of light work. 22 To the extent that the ALJ erred by not reaching a sedentary work RFC 23 24 3 “The Commissioner issues Social Security Rulings to clarify the Act’s implementing regulations and the agency’s policies. SSRs are binding on all 25 components of the SSA. SSRs do not have the force of law. However, because 26 they represent the Commissioner’s interpretation of the agency’s regulations, we give them some deference. We will not defer to SSRs if they are inconsistent with 27 the statute or regulations.” Holohan v. Massanari, 246 F.3d 1195, 1202 n.1 (9th 28 Cir. 2001) (internal citations omitted). 6 Case 2:20-cv-08310-SP Document 19 Filed 03/29/22 Page 7 of 13 Page ID #:650

1 determination, the error was harmless. See Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1115 2 (9th Cir. 2012). The ALJ clarified to the VE that so long as the lifting and carrying 3 restrictions were met, it did not matter if the jobs the VE identified were classified 4 as light work or sedentary work. AR at 57. Two of the jobs identified by the VE 5 not only met the lifting and carrying restrictions, but were categorized as sedentary 6 work. See id. at 57-58. Plaintiff contends the error cannot be harmless because 7 sedentary work coupled with hand limitations “can result” in a finding of 8 disability, but as discussed below, the ALJ did not find the “hand limitations” 9 plaintiff claims. See P. Mem. at 4. 10 Accordingly, the ALJ’s RFC determination was consistent with her findings 11 and any error was harmless. 12 2. The RFC Determination Incorporated the Consultative 13 Examiner’s Opinion 14 Plaintiff contends the ALJ found the opinion of Dr. Sarah L. Maze, a 15 consultative examiner, to be persuasive but then failed to incorporate all of her 16 limitations. P. Mem. at 5. Specifically, plaintiff argues the ALJ did not adopt Dr. 17 Maze’s standing, walking, sitting, handling, and fingering limitations. Id. 18 Among the evidence an ALJ relies on in an RFC assessment is medical 19 evidence and opinions. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)(3). An ALJ will consider the 20 persuasiveness of the medical opinions and findings based on five factors: (1) 21 supportability; (2) consistency; (3) relationship with the claimant; (4) 22 specialization; and (5) other factors that tend to support or contradict the medical 23 opinion. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(b)-(c); see Sylvester G. v. Saul, 2021 WL 24 2435816, at *2 (C.D. Cal. June 15, 2021). The most important of these factors are 25 supportability and consistency. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(b)(2). The ALJ may, but is 26 not required to, explain how she or he considered the other three factors. Id. 27 In reaching her RFC determination, the ALJ found Dr. Maze’s opinion to be 28 persuasive and the opinion of Dr. F. Wilson, the state agency physician, partially 7 Case 2:20-cv-08310-SP Document 19 Filed 03/29/22 Page 8 of 13 Page ID #:651

1 persuasive. AR at 22-23. Dr. Maze examined plaintiff on March 26, 2019 and, in 2 a detailed neurological evaluation, diagnosed plaintiff with episodic shoulder pain 3 and opined plaintiff had the RFC to lift ten pounds occasionally and five pounds 4 frequently, stand and walk for six hours out of an eight-hour workday with normal 5 breaks, and sit for six hours out of an eight-hour workday with normal breaks, but 6 could not perform overhead reaching, pulling, or pushing. Id. at 570. Dr. Maze 7 did not identify any limitations regarding the use of plaintiff’s hands. See id. But 8 in a check-off Medical Statement of Ability to Do Work-Related Activities 9 (Physical) form (“Medical Statement”) from the same date, Dr. Maze checked that 10 plaintiff could never reach overhead with the left hand and was limited to: 11 frequently reaching in all directions, handling, fingering, feeling, pushing, and 12 pulling with the right hand; occasionally reaching in other directions, handling, 13 pushing, and pulling with the left hand; and frequently fingering and feeling with 14 the left hand. Id. at 573. Dr. Maze did not identify any medical findings to support 15 her use of hands limitations. See id. 16 Dr. Wilson reviewed plaintiff’s medical records and opined the same 17 standing, walking, and sitting limitations as Dr. Maze. Id. at 93-94. Dr. Wilson 18 also opined, in relevant part, that plaintiff had the ability to: lift and carry 20 19 pounds occasionally and ten pounds frequently; occasionally push, pull, and 20 engage in the operation of hand controls; and occasionally reach, handle, and 21 finger bilaterally. Id. at 93-95. 22 The ALJ found Dr. Maze’s opinion to be persuasive but only discussed the 23 functional limitations listed in the neurological evaluation. See id. at 23. The ALJ 24 found Dr. Wilson’s opinion to be partially persuasive and specifically noted 25 handling and fingering limitations were unwarranted because they were 26 inconsistent with plaintiff’s computer usage. Id. at 22. 27 Plaintiff’s claim that the ALJ failed to adopt Dr. Maze’s standing, walking, 28 and sitting limitations is without merit. The ALJ determined that plaintiff had the 8 Case 2:20-cv-08310-SP Document 19 Filed 03/29/22 Page 9 of 13 Page ID #:652

1 RFC to perform light work as defined by 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(b), which is 2 consistent with Dr. Maze’s opined standing, walking, and sitting limitations. See 3 SSR 83-10. The ALJ also limited plaintiff to occasional bilateral pushing, pulling, 4 and operation of hand controls, and precluded plaintiff from overhead reaching 5 bilaterally, consistent with or more restrictive than Dr. Maze’s opinion. As for Dr. 6 Maze’s handling and fingering limitations, it appears the ALJ relied on the 7 neurological evaluation, which did not include any handling and fingering 8 limitations, and assumed the opinions in the Medical Statement were identical. To 9 the extent the ALJ erred by not discussing and reconciling Dr. Maze’s inconsistent 10 handling and fingering limitations, the error was harmless. As mentioned above, 11 the ALJ specifically noted that plaintiff’s ability to spend all day on the computer 12 was inconsistent with handling and fingering limitations. See AR at 22. 13 In sum, the ALJ’s RFC determination was supported by substantial evidence 14 and consistent with her findings. Any error was harmless. 15 B. The ALJ Posed a Complete Hypothetical and Properly Relied on the VE 16 Testimony 17 Plaintiff contends the ALJ failed to resolve conflicts concerning the VE 18 testimony. P. Mem. at 6-8. Specifically, plaintiff argues: (1) the ALJ posed an 19 incomplete hypothetical to the VE, who then failed to resolve the conflict between 20 the hypothetical and RFC determination; and (2) despite the VE’s testimony that 21 her testimony was consistent with the DOT, her identification of jobs that required 22 frequent reaching, handling, or fingering appeared to conflict with the ALJ’s 23 determination that plaintiff should be limited to the occasional operation of hand 24 controls. Id. 25 At step five, the burden shifts to the Commissioner to show that the claimant 26 retains the ability to perform other gainful activity. Lounsburry v. Barnhart, 468 27 F.3d 1111, 1114 (9th Cir. 2006). To support a finding that a claimant is not 28 disabled at step five, the Commissioner must provide evidence demonstrating that 9 Case 2:20-cv-08310-SP Document 19 Filed 03/29/22 Page 10 of 13 Page ID #:653

1 other work exists in significant numbers in the national economy that the claimant 2 can perform, given his or her age, education, work experience, and RFC. 20 3 C.F.R. § 404.1512(b)(3). The Commissioner may satisfy this burden through the 4 testimony of a VE. Lounsburry, 468 F.3d at 1114. 5 In response to a hypothetical by the ALJ that includes the limitations the 6 ALJ found credible, a VE may testify as to “(1) what jobs the claimant, given his 7 or her [RFC], would be able to do; and (2) the availability of such jobs in the 8 national economy.” Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1101 (9th Cir. 1999). “A 9 VE’s recognized expertise provides the necessary foundation for his or her 10 testimony.” Bayliss v. Barnhart, 427 F.3d 1211, 1218 (9th Cir. 2005). The VE is 11 not required to provide the underlying data for her numbers or explain the 12 methodology of how she reached these numbers. Ford v. Saul, 950 F.3d 1141, 13 1158-59 (9th Cir. 2020); see Xiong v. Colvin, 2014 WL 3735358, at *9 (E.D. Cal. 14 Jul. 28, 2014). VE testimony is substantial evidence. See Johnson v. Shalala, 60 15 F.3d 1428, 1435 (9th Cir. 1995) (“‘[T]he ALJ was within his rights to rely solely 16 on the vocational expert’s testimony.’”) (quoting Conn v. Sec’y, 51 F.3d 607, 610 17 (6th Cir. 1995)); see also Bayliss, 427 F.3d at 1218, n.4 (Federal Rules of Evidence 18 do not apply in social security hearings). But where the VE testimony is 19 fundamentally flawed, remand is appropriate. See, e.g., Farias v. Colvin, 519 Fed. 20 Appx. 439, 440 (9th Cir. 2013) (remand required where VE provided employment 21 data for a different occupation than the one he opined claimant could perform). 22 ALJs routinely rely on the DOT “in evaluating whether the claimant is able 23 to perform other work in the national economy.” Terry v. Sullivan, 903 F.2d 1273, 24 1276 (9th Cir. 1990) (citations omitted); see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1566(d)(1) (DOT 25 is a source of reliable job information). The DOT is the rebuttable presumptive 26 authority on job classifications. Johnson, 60 F.3d at 1435. An ALJ may not rely 27 on a VE’s testimony regarding the requirements of a particular job without first 28 inquiring whether the testimony conflicts with the DOT, and if so, the reasons 10 Case 2:20-cv-08310-SP Document 19 Filed 03/29/22 Page 11 of 13 Page ID #:654

1 therefor. Massachi, 486 F.3d at 1152-53 (citing SSR 00-4p). 2 At the May 8, 2019 hearing, in response to a hypothetical person with 3 plaintiff’s limitations at either a light or sedentary level, the VE testified plaintiff 4 could perform the jobs of telephone solicitor, document specialist, and cashier II – 5 food cashier. AR at 57-59. The VE testified that the jobs of telephone solicitor 6 and document specialist were classified as sedentary work and the job of cashier II 7 was classified as light work. Id. To account for plaintiff’s specific limitations, the 8 VE eroded the number of telephone solicitor jobs by 50% and the number of 9 cashier II jobs by 95%. Id. The VE stated her testimony was consistent with the 10 DOT. Id. at 59. 11 1. The ALJ Posed a Complete Hypothetical 12 Plaintiff contends the ALJ failed to expressly include his standing and 13 walking limitations in his hypothetical to the VE and the VE was therefore unable 14 to reconcile any conflicts. P. Mem. at 5-6. 15 The ALJ did not initially include standing and walking limitations in his 16 hypothetical, but later clarified that so long as the lifting and carrying limitations 17 were met, the VE could consider both light or sedentary work. See AR at 57; see 18 also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(b) (if someone can do light work, they can do sedentary 19 work). Stating light work or sedentary work in the hypothetical was sufficient for 20 the VE to understand the standing and walking limitations. In a recent case 21 addressing the same argument that an ALJ may not rely on VE testimony when the 22 ALJ only posed a hypothetical stating light work but did not expressly include a 23 six-hour standing and walking limitation, the Ninth Circuit found that “‘light work’ 24 has a well-established meaning, and ‘the expert’ [] would have understood the 25 ALJ’s question to imply a 6-hour standing and walking limitation.’” Guillermina v. 26 Kijakazi, 2021 WL 6116636, at *1 (9th Cir. 2021) (citing Terry v. Saul, 998 F.3d 27 1010, 1014 (9th Cir. 2021) (the ALJ’s hypothetical of a person with the RFC to 28 perform medium work was sufficient for the VE to understand standing and 11 Case 2:20-cv-08310-SP Document 19 Filed 03/29/22 Page 12 of 13 Page ID #:655

1 walking limitations of six hours because “medium work” has a well-established 2 meaning)); see Mitzi D. v. Saul, 2019 WL 8112507, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 13, 3 2019) (“Given that SSR 83-10 has been in play for over thirty years, there is no 4 reason to think the VE understood light work to encompass anything other than 5 approximately six hours of standing or walking.”); James T. v. Saul, 2019 6 3017755, at *2 (C.D. Cal. July 10, 2019) (referencing medium work rather than 7 express standing and walking limitations was not error because VEs understand 8 medium work requires the ability to stand and walk six hours). 9 As such, the ALJ posed a complete hypothetical to the VE. 10 2. The VE Testimony Was Consistent With the DOT 11 Plaintiff acknowledges the ALJ inquired whether the VE’s testimony was 12 consistent with the DOT, but argues the VE’s testimony was inaccurate. See P. 13 Mem. at 8. The sole basis of plaintiff’s argument is his own contention that it is 14 unclear whether operation of hand controls includes reaching, handling, and 15 fingering. See id. at 7-8. Although plaintiff correctly notes the VE and ALJ 16 disagreed on whether a steering wheel constituted a hand control, the operation of 17 hand controls is distinct from reaching, handling, and fingering. See AR at 58. 18 Hand controls are a set of controls in a machine that allow a person to operate it 19 with their hands such as handles or levers in a vehicle that allow a person to 20 operate the gas and brake pedals.4 Plaintiff does not contend, nor do the DOT 21 descriptions state, that the jobs of telephone solicitor, document specialist, and 22 cashier II require the operation of hand controls. The fact that plaintiff speculates 23 operation of hand controls is broader than the VE’s definition is not a sufficient 24 basis to challenge her testimony. Moreover, as discussed above, the ALJ properly 25 excluded handling and fingering limitations from her RFC determination. 26 27 4 See https://www.collinsdictionary.com/us/dictionary/english/hand-controls 28 and https://nmeda.org/hand-controls/ . 12 Case 2:20-cv-08310-SP Document 19 Filed 03/29/22 Page 13 0f13 Page ID #:656

1 Accordingly, plaintiff fails to show the VE’s testimony was inconsistent 2 || with the DOT. The VE’s testimony therefore constituted substantial evidence, on 3 || which the ALJ properly relied. 4 V. 5 CONCLUSION 6 IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Judgment shall be entered 7 || AFFIRMING the decision of the Commissioner denying benefits, and dismissing g || the complaint with prejudice. 10 | DATED: March 28, 2022 Re Ml SHERIPYM 12 United States Magistrate Judge 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 13