Case: 19-11372 Date Filed: 04/10/2020 Page: 1 of 6
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT ________________________
No. 19-11372 Non-Argument Calendar ________________________
D.C. Docket No. 1:14-cv-22508-JAL
MICHAEL LEON HALL,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
WARDEN P. SKIPPER, WARDEN REID, MARTIN CI WARDEN, DR. C. LE, Columbia Correctional Institution Annex, Physician, DR. C. GONZALEZ,
Defendants-Appellees,
DR. MORALES, Martin Correctional Institution, Physician, et al.,
Defendants. Case: 19-11372 Date Filed: 04/10/2020 Page: 2 of 6
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida ________________________
(April 10, 2020)
Before JORDAN, NEWSOM and DUBINA, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Appellant Michael Hall, a Florida prisoner proceeding pro se, appeals the
district court’s grant of the defendants’ motion for summary judgment and
dismissal of his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 civil rights action, raising a deliberate
indifference claim under the Eighth Amendment due to a bacterial infection
stemming from excessively high levels of disinfection byproducts in the water
supply of his place of confinement. 1 On appeal, Hall argues that the district court
erred in granting summary judgment by concluding that he failed to establish the
essential elements for a deliberate indifference claim under the Eighth
Amendment.
1 Hall specified in his notice of appeal that he also appealed the district court’s separate grant of summary judgment dismissing his claims against two doctors. Because Hall presents no issue on appeal as to the grant of summary judgment on his claims against the doctors, any issue he could have raised is deemed abandoned, and we affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment for the defendant doctors. See Timson v. Sampson, 518 F.3d 870, 874 (11th Cir. 2008). 2 Case: 19-11372 Date Filed: 04/10/2020 Page: 3 of 6
I.
“We review a district court order granting summary judgment de novo,
viewing the evidence and all reasonable inferences drawn from it in the light most
favorable to the nonmoving party.” Battle v. Bd. of Regents for Ga., 468 F.3d 755,
759 (11th Cir. 2006). A district court may grant summary judgment if “the movant
shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Shaw v. City of Selma, 884 F.3d 1093,
1098 (11th Cir. 2018) (internal quotation marks omitted). If the movant makes
such a showing, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to show that a genuine
issue of fact exists. Id. Summary judgment should be granted against a party who
fails to establish the existence of an essential element of his case for which he will
bear the burden of proof at trial. Melton v. Abston, 841 F.3d 1207, 1219 (11th Cir.
2016). “[U]nsubstantiated assertions alone are not enough to withstand a motion
for summary judgment.” Rollins v. TechSouth, Inc., 833 F.2d 1525, 1529 (11th
Cir. 1987). Further, a plaintiff cannot defeat a motion for summary judgment
through his own bare and self-serving allegations. See Stewart v. Booker T.
Washington Ins., 232 F.3d 844, 851 (11th Cir. 2000).
Section 1983 of Title 42 makes any person acting under color of state law
liable to an injured party for depriving the injured party of his rights under the
Constitution. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Eighth Amendment prohibits cruel and
3 Case: 19-11372 Date Filed: 04/10/2020 Page: 4 of 6
unusual punishment and imposes upon prison officials the duty to provide
prisoners with “reasonably adequate food, clothing, shelter, sanitation, medical
care, and personal safety.” U.S. Const. amend. VIII; Harris v. Thigpen, 941 F.2d
1495, 1511 (11th Cir. 1991) (quotation marks omitted). Where the prisoner
challenges his conditions of confinement, the relevant inquiry is whether the prison
officials involved acted with “deliberate indifference” to the prisoner’s health or
safety. Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 737–38, 122 S. Ct. 2508, 2514 (2002).
A deliberate-indifference analysis requires (1) an objective showing of a
deprivation that is serious enough to constitute the denial of the “minimal measure
of life’s necessities,” (2) a subjective showing that the prison officials involved
acted with deliberate indifference, and (3) causation. Thomas v. Bryant, 614 F.3d
1288, 1304 (11th Cir. 2010); Goebert v. Lee Cty., 510 F.3d 1312, 1326 (11th Cir.
2007). A variation of these requirements is that the prisoner must “produce
sufficient evidence of (1) a substantial risk of serious harm; (2) the defendants’
deliberate indifference to that risk; and (3) causation.” Hale v. Tallapoosa Cty., 50
F.3d 1579, 1582 (11th Cir. 1995). The second element requires that the prison
officials know that the inmate faces a substantial risk of serious harm and disregard
it by not taking reasonable measures to abate it. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825,
847, 114 S. Ct. 1970, 1984 (1994).
4 Case: 19-11372 Date Filed: 04/10/2020 Page: 5 of 6
II.
Hall argues on appeal that the district court erred in granting summary
judgment to the defendants because he established the elements to sustain a
deliberate indifference claim. He contends that it was known that the Martin
Correctional Institution’s (“MCI”) water contamination could cause long-term
health problems and that the defendants knew of the risk but failed to make
arrangements to provide the inmates with an alternative water supply or the option
of being transferred to another facility. He also proffers that he did not suffer any
ailment prior to his placement at MCI but contracted the bacteria while at MCI,
and this fact establishes causation. The defendants respond that the district court
properly granted summary judgment to them because (1) there was no unsafe
condition at MCI because it was in compliance with standards for the presence of
bacteria in the water; (2) the wardens were not deliberately indifferent because
MCI informed inmates of the excessively high levels of disinfection byproducts
and associated health consequences and ultimately changed the source of water
supply; and (3) Hall did not establish causation because he presented no evidence
to suggest that the bacteria Heliobacter Pylori (“H.P.”) was present in MCI’s water
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Case: 19-11372 Date Filed: 04/10/2020 Page: 1 of 6
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT ________________________
No. 19-11372 Non-Argument Calendar ________________________
D.C. Docket No. 1:14-cv-22508-JAL
MICHAEL LEON HALL,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
WARDEN P. SKIPPER, WARDEN REID, MARTIN CI WARDEN, DR. C. LE, Columbia Correctional Institution Annex, Physician, DR. C. GONZALEZ,
Defendants-Appellees,
DR. MORALES, Martin Correctional Institution, Physician, et al.,
Defendants. Case: 19-11372 Date Filed: 04/10/2020 Page: 2 of 6
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida ________________________
(April 10, 2020)
Before JORDAN, NEWSOM and DUBINA, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Appellant Michael Hall, a Florida prisoner proceeding pro se, appeals the
district court’s grant of the defendants’ motion for summary judgment and
dismissal of his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 civil rights action, raising a deliberate
indifference claim under the Eighth Amendment due to a bacterial infection
stemming from excessively high levels of disinfection byproducts in the water
supply of his place of confinement. 1 On appeal, Hall argues that the district court
erred in granting summary judgment by concluding that he failed to establish the
essential elements for a deliberate indifference claim under the Eighth
Amendment.
1 Hall specified in his notice of appeal that he also appealed the district court’s separate grant of summary judgment dismissing his claims against two doctors. Because Hall presents no issue on appeal as to the grant of summary judgment on his claims against the doctors, any issue he could have raised is deemed abandoned, and we affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment for the defendant doctors. See Timson v. Sampson, 518 F.3d 870, 874 (11th Cir. 2008). 2 Case: 19-11372 Date Filed: 04/10/2020 Page: 3 of 6
I.
“We review a district court order granting summary judgment de novo,
viewing the evidence and all reasonable inferences drawn from it in the light most
favorable to the nonmoving party.” Battle v. Bd. of Regents for Ga., 468 F.3d 755,
759 (11th Cir. 2006). A district court may grant summary judgment if “the movant
shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Shaw v. City of Selma, 884 F.3d 1093,
1098 (11th Cir. 2018) (internal quotation marks omitted). If the movant makes
such a showing, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to show that a genuine
issue of fact exists. Id. Summary judgment should be granted against a party who
fails to establish the existence of an essential element of his case for which he will
bear the burden of proof at trial. Melton v. Abston, 841 F.3d 1207, 1219 (11th Cir.
2016). “[U]nsubstantiated assertions alone are not enough to withstand a motion
for summary judgment.” Rollins v. TechSouth, Inc., 833 F.2d 1525, 1529 (11th
Cir. 1987). Further, a plaintiff cannot defeat a motion for summary judgment
through his own bare and self-serving allegations. See Stewart v. Booker T.
Washington Ins., 232 F.3d 844, 851 (11th Cir. 2000).
Section 1983 of Title 42 makes any person acting under color of state law
liable to an injured party for depriving the injured party of his rights under the
Constitution. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Eighth Amendment prohibits cruel and
3 Case: 19-11372 Date Filed: 04/10/2020 Page: 4 of 6
unusual punishment and imposes upon prison officials the duty to provide
prisoners with “reasonably adequate food, clothing, shelter, sanitation, medical
care, and personal safety.” U.S. Const. amend. VIII; Harris v. Thigpen, 941 F.2d
1495, 1511 (11th Cir. 1991) (quotation marks omitted). Where the prisoner
challenges his conditions of confinement, the relevant inquiry is whether the prison
officials involved acted with “deliberate indifference” to the prisoner’s health or
safety. Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 737–38, 122 S. Ct. 2508, 2514 (2002).
A deliberate-indifference analysis requires (1) an objective showing of a
deprivation that is serious enough to constitute the denial of the “minimal measure
of life’s necessities,” (2) a subjective showing that the prison officials involved
acted with deliberate indifference, and (3) causation. Thomas v. Bryant, 614 F.3d
1288, 1304 (11th Cir. 2010); Goebert v. Lee Cty., 510 F.3d 1312, 1326 (11th Cir.
2007). A variation of these requirements is that the prisoner must “produce
sufficient evidence of (1) a substantial risk of serious harm; (2) the defendants’
deliberate indifference to that risk; and (3) causation.” Hale v. Tallapoosa Cty., 50
F.3d 1579, 1582 (11th Cir. 1995). The second element requires that the prison
officials know that the inmate faces a substantial risk of serious harm and disregard
it by not taking reasonable measures to abate it. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825,
847, 114 S. Ct. 1970, 1984 (1994).
4 Case: 19-11372 Date Filed: 04/10/2020 Page: 5 of 6
II.
Hall argues on appeal that the district court erred in granting summary
judgment to the defendants because he established the elements to sustain a
deliberate indifference claim. He contends that it was known that the Martin
Correctional Institution’s (“MCI”) water contamination could cause long-term
health problems and that the defendants knew of the risk but failed to make
arrangements to provide the inmates with an alternative water supply or the option
of being transferred to another facility. He also proffers that he did not suffer any
ailment prior to his placement at MCI but contracted the bacteria while at MCI,
and this fact establishes causation. The defendants respond that the district court
properly granted summary judgment to them because (1) there was no unsafe
condition at MCI because it was in compliance with standards for the presence of
bacteria in the water; (2) the wardens were not deliberately indifferent because
MCI informed inmates of the excessively high levels of disinfection byproducts
and associated health consequences and ultimately changed the source of water
supply; and (3) Hall did not establish causation because he presented no evidence
to suggest that the bacteria Heliobacter Pylori (“H.P.”) was present in MCI’s water
supply or that the disinfection byproducts would cause an H.P. infection.
We conclude, based on this record, that the district court did not err in
granting summary judgment to the defendants. Hall did not present evidence
5 Case: 19-11372 Date Filed: 04/10/2020 Page: 6 of 6
demonstrating that his continued exposure to drinking water with excessively high
levels of disinfection byproducts exposed him to a substantial risk of serious harm,
much less caused his H.P. infection or gastrointestinal symptoms. The only
evidence of long term harm was Hall’s own self-serving allegation in his complaint
that exposure to these byproducts over several years could cause liver, kidney,
nerve damage, and increase the risk of cancer, of which he has no personal
knowledge or medical proof. In addition, the evidence established that his
symptoms were attributed to chronic constipation as noted by the institution’s
physicians, that high levels of disinfection byproducts were not indicators of the
presence of bacteria in the water supply, and that there were no studies suggesting
that exposure to disinfection byproducts increased the risk of an H.P. infection.
Because Hall presented no evidence demonstrating that (1) his continued
exposure to drinking water with excessively high levels of disinfectant byproducts
exposed him to a substantial risk of serious harm, and (2) the disinfection
byproduct levels did or could result in his bacterial infection, we hold that the
district court did not err in granting summary judgment for the defendants.
AFFIRMED.