Michael Lee Martin v. the State of Texas
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Opinion
TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN
NO. 03-25-00075-CR
Michael Lee Martin, Appellant
v.
The State of Texas, Appellee
FROM THE 20TH DISTRICT COURT OF MILAM COUNTY NO. CR27,645, THE HONORABLE JOHN YOUNGBLOOD, JUDGE PRESIDING
ORDER AND MEMORANDUM OPINION
PER CURIAM
Michael Lee Martin was charged with aggravated sexual assault of a child, which
is a first-degree felony. See Tex. Penal Code § 22.021. After being charged, Martin agreed to
plead guilty to the offense of indecency with a child by contact, which is a second-degree felony.
See id. § 21.11. The plea paperwork reflected that the State agreed to proceed only on the lesser-
included offense of indecency with a child, that Martin agreed to enter an open plea for the lesser
offense, and that he agreed to waive several rights, including his right to appeal. See Shankle v.
State, 119 S.W.3d 808, 813 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003) (describing “charge-bargaining,” including
cases in which defendant pleads guilty to lesser or related offense, as one type of plea bargain);
see also Ochoa v. State, 955 S.W.2d 389, 393 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1997) (explaining that
indecency with child can be lesser-included offense of aggravated sexual assault of child), aff’d, 982 S.W.2d 904 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998). During the plea hearing, Martin pleaded guilty “to the
lesser included second degree felony charge” of indecency with a child. The trial court later
sentenced Martin to nineteen years’ imprisonment. See Tex. Penal Code § 12.33.
The trial court issued a certification regarding Martin’s right to appeal and
initially certified that this case was a plea-bargain case and that Martin had no right to appeal.
See Tex. R. App. P. 25.2 (setting out defendant’s right to appeal and requiring certification of
defendant’s right of appeal). The trial court later issued another certification stating that the case
was not a plea-bargain case and that Martin had the right to appeal his sentence. Following that
certification, Martin filed a motion requesting permission to appeal the case in which he stated
that the punishment assessed by the trial court “did not exceed that recommended by the
prosecutor and agreed to by . . . Martin and . . . Martin’s attorney.” Further, Martin explained
that “[i]n order to perfect an appeal” in this “plea bargain case,” he needed “permission of the
Court to appeal” his sentence. The trial court granted the motion and authorized Martin to
appeal. However, no new certification concerning Martin’s right to appeal was issued.
Although the more recent certification specified that Martin had the right to
appeal because this is not a plea-bargain case, the record, as summarized above, shows that the
certification may be defective. A certification is defective if, among other reasons, it appears
“correct in form but which, when compared with the record before the court, proves to be
inaccurate,” Dears v. State, 154 S.W.3d 610, 614 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005), and appellate courts
are obligated “to examine a certification for defectiveness, and to use Rules 37.1 and 34.5(c)
to obtain another certification, whenever appropriate,” id.; see Tex. R. App. P. 34.5(c)(2)
(authorizing appellate court to require trial court to prepare certification of defendant’s right to
2 appeal), 37.1 (requiring appellate clerk to inform parties when there is defect in certification of
defendant’s right to appeal in criminal case).
In order to resolve any potential defects in the certifications, we abate this appeal
and instruct the trial court to prepare and file with this Court an amended certification specifying
whether this was a plea-bargain case, whether Martin has a right to appeal, and if applicable,
whether the trial court gave Martin permission to appeal. See Tex. R. App. P. 34.5(c)(2), 37.1;
see also Lockett v. State, No. 03-23-00736-CR, 2024 WL 79861, at *1 (Tex. App.—Austin
Jan. 5, 2024, no pet.) (order & mem. op., not designated for publication) (per curiam) (abating
case where there was discrepancy between certification and trial court’s later granting permission
to appeal). In addition, the trial court is instructed to prepare findings of fact and conclusions of
law explaining how it made the determinations listed above. The supplemental clerk’s record
containing the amended certification and the findings and conclusions are ordered to be
forwarded to this Court within fifteen days of the date reflected in this opinion.
It is so ordered on April 24, 2025.
Before Justices Triana, Theofanis, and Crump
Abated and Remanded
Filed: April 24, 2025
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