Michael L Williams v. State of Indiana

• Court: Indiana Court of Appeals
• Decided: January 28, 2026
• Docket: 25A-CR-00687
• Status: Published
• Author: Judge Tavitas

Opinion

FILED Jan 28 2026, 8:57 am

CLERK Indiana Supreme Court Court of Appeals and Tax Court

IN THE

Court of Appeals of Indiana Michael L. Williams, Appellant-Defendant

v.

State of Indiana Appellee-Plaintiff

January 28, 2026 Court of Appeals Case No. 25A-CR-687 Appeal from the Boone Circuit Court The Honorable Lori N. Schein, Judge Trial Court Cause No. 06C01-2201-F4-40

Opinion by Chief Judge Tavitas Judges Bailey and Kenworthy concur.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-687 | January 28, 2026 Page 1 of 12 Tavitas, Chief Judge.

Case Summary [1] Following a jury trial, Michael Williams was convicted of child molesting, a

Level 4 felony, and sexual misconduct with a minor, a Level 5 felony. The trial

court sentenced Williams to an aggregate term of eleven years in the Indiana

Department of Correction (“DOC”). Williams appeals and argues that the trial

court erred by denying him credit time for the period he was on pretrial GPS

monitoring. We disagree and, accordingly, affirm.

Issue [2] Williams presents one issue, which we restate as whether the trial court erred by

denying Williams’ request for credit for the period he was on GPS monitoring

during his pretrial release.

Facts [3] On January 12, 2022, the State charged Williams with two felony counts:

Count I, child molesting, a Level 4 felony, and Count II, sexual misconduct

with a minor, a Level 5 felony. 1 On February 1, 2022, Williams posted bond;

he was required to remain on GPS monitoring and comply with specified

conditions of release during the pendency of the case. The trial court’s order

1 The conduct underlying Count I occurred in the summer of 2018, and the conduct underlying Count II occurred in the summer of 2016.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-687 | January 28, 2026 Page 2 of 12 further stated, “This is not an order for Home Detention, just monitoring.”

Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 38. Williams remained on GPS monitoring for

three years, from February 1, 2022, until his sentencing on February 19, 2025.

[4] In June 2024, a two-day jury trial was held, and Williams was convicted of both

counts. The trial court ordered Williams to “remain out on bond with the

GPS” monitoring until the sentencing hearing. Tr. Vol. III p. 228. On

February 18, 2025, the trial court held a sentencing hearing, and Williams’

counsel requested credit for the time he was on pretrial GPS monitoring.

Williams argued that, although Williams could not receive “official credit” for

pretrial GPS monitoring, the trial court should give “at least some due weight

for serving three plus years of GPS.” Tr. Vol. IV p. 5.

[5] The trial court denied credit time for the 1,114 days Williams was on pretrial

GPS monitoring and sentenced him to seven years on Count I and four years

on Count II. 2 The trial court ordered the sentences to run consecutively for an

aggregate sentence of eleven years, all executed in the DOC. Williams now

appeals.

Discussion and Decision [6] Williams challenges the trial court’s determination of his credit time. Williams

argues that he is entitled to credit for his pretrial GPS monitoring because it

2 The trial court credited Williams with one day for the time he was incarcerated.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-687 | January 28, 2026 Page 3 of 12 constitutes a form of “confinement” under the credit time statutes. 3 Appellant’s

Br. p. 6.

Standard of Review [7] “When calculating the pre-trial credit to which a defendant is entitled, that

number is dependent upon (1) pre-trial confinement; and (2) the pretrial

confinement resulting from the criminal charge for which the sentence is being

imposed.” Keene v. State, 202 N.E.3d 481, 483 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023) (citing

Bischoff v. State, 704 N.E.2d 129 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998), trans. denied). “Trial courts

have no discretion in awarding or denying that credit.” Id. (citing Glover v.

State, 177 N.E.3d 884, 886 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021), trans. denied).

[8] In calculating credit time a defendant is entitled to receive, two types of credit

must be considered: “‘(1) the credit toward the sentence a prisoner receives for

time actually served, and (2) the additional credit a prisoner receives for good

behavior and educational attainment.’” Maciaszek v. State, 75 N.E.3d 1089, 1092

(Ind. Ct. App. 2017) (quoting Purcell v. State, 721 N.E.2d 220, 222 (Ind. 1999)),

trans. denied. These two types of credit are referred to as “accrued time” and

“good time credit,” respectively.

3 Williams does not specify the number of credit days or the type of credit to which he was entitled; instead, he argues that he should be entitled to “an award of credit time” without further explanation. Appellant’s Br. p. 7.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-687 | January 28, 2026 Page 4 of 12 [9] This case involves interpretation of a prior version of our credit time statutes.4

“Matters of statutory interpretation present pure questions of law; as such, these

questions are reviewed de novo.” Rodriguez v. State, 129 N.E.3d 789, 793 (Ind.

2019). “[W]e begin with the statutory language itself, reading words in their

plain and ordinary meaning.” Harness v. State, 246 N.E.3d 1271, 1273 (Ind. Ct.

App. 2024) (citing Spells v. State, 225 N.E.3d 767, 772 (Ind. 2024)). “We

presume the General Assembly ‘intended for the statutory language to be

applied in a logical manner consistent with the statute’s underlying policy and

goals.’” Spells, 225 N.E.3d at 772 (quoting Town of Linden v. Birge, 204 N.E.3d

229, 237 (Ind. 2023)). Our efforts are directed at giving effect to the

“legislature’s intent” and avoiding a “selective reading of individual words”

that could lead to “irrational or disharmonious results.” Id.

[10] Indiana Code Section 35-50-6-0.5 (2016) provided,

(1) “Accrued time” means the amount of time that a person is imprisoned or confined. [ 5]

4 The crimes for which Williams was convicted occurred in the summer of 2016 and 2018. Accordingly, the version of Indiana Code Section 35-50-6-3.1 in effect from July 1, 2016, through June 30, 2020, governs. See, e.g., Harris v. State, 897 N.E.2d 927, 928-29 (Ind. 2008) (“The sentencing statute in effect at the time a crime is committed governs the sentence for that crime.”). Although the victim of Count II could not recall the precise date of the offense, the version of Indiana Code Section 35-50-6-3.1 in effect from July 1, 2015, through June 30, 2016, contains identical language. We therefore analyze the issue under the version in effect from July 1, 2016, through June 30, 2020. 5 Current Indiana Code Section 35-50-6-0.5 further specifies that the definition of “‘accrued time’ means the amount of time that a person is imprisoned, confined, on home detention as a condition of probation, or on home detention in a community corrections program. In determining the number of days a person has been imprisoned, confined, on home detention as a condition of probation, or on home detention in a community corrections program, a partial calendar day is considered to be one (1) calendar day.”

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-687 | January 28, 2026 Page 5 of 12 (2) “Credit time” means the sum of a person’s accrued time, good time credit, and educational credit.

(3) “Educational credit” means a reduction in a person’s term of imprisonment or confinement awarded for participation in an educational, vocational, rehabilitative, or other program.

(4) “Good time credit” means a reduction in a person’s term of imprisonment or confinement awarded for the person’s good behavior while imprisoned or confined.

(emphasis added).

[11] Indiana Code Section 35-50-6-3.1(b)-(d) (2016) 6 in relevant part provided, “A

person earns . . . good time credit for . . . days the person is imprisoned for a

crime or confined awaiting trial or sentencing,” and subsection (f) provided “A

person . . . earns . . . good time credit for . . . days the person serves on pretrial

home detention awaiting trial.”

Pretrial GPS monitoring does not fall within the statutory meaning of “confinement” under Indiana Code Chapter 35-50-6.

[12] Although the relevant statute provides for credit time for pretrial home

detention, here, the trial court made clear in its original bond and conditional

pretrial release order that Williams was placed on GPS monitoring and that this

6 Williams cites only the good-time credit statute in his brief to support his claim of entitlement to credit time. At its core, however, Williams’ argument is that pretrial GPS monitoring constitutes a form of confinement. Accordingly, we address both accrued time and good-time credit.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-687 | January 28, 2026 Page 6 of 12 was “not an order for Home Detention.” 7 App. Vol. II pp. 23-24. Williams

does not dispute that conclusion on appeal. The statutes do not specifically

provide for credit time for pretrial GPS monitoring. Instead, Williams argues

that pretrial GPS monitoring constitutes a form of confinement and that he

was, therefore, “entitled to credit time.” Appellant Br. p. 6. The issue before us

is, thus, whether GPS monitoring falls within the meaning of “confinement”

under Indiana Code Chapter 35-50-6 (2016) such that Williams is entitled to

accrued time and good-time credit for his pretrial GPS monitoring.

[13] Williams cites Hickman v. State, 81 N.E.3d 1083 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017), in support

of his argument. 8 In that case, Hickman violated the terms of his probation,

and the trial court revoked his probation and ordered him to execute the

7 Whether home detention should be credited toward a sentence has generated debate in both the General Assembly and in our courts. Before 2001, time served on home detention as a condition of probation did not earn credit toward a sentence. See Franklin v. State, 685 N.E.2d 1062 (Ind. 1997), overruled by Purcell v. State, 721 N.E.2d 220 (Ind. 1999). In Purcell, our Supreme Court interpreted the legislature’s use of the word “remainder” to reflect an intent to credit an offender with time served before revocation, rather than require service of the entire original sentence. Id. at 223. This Court later explained, however, that Purcell did not address whether pretrial home detention should be credited toward a sentence and held that it should not. Senn v. State, 766 N.E.2d 1190, 1200 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002) (“Absent legislative direction, we believe that a defendant is only entitled to credit toward sentence for pretrial time served in a prison, jail[,] or other facility [that] imposes substantially similar restrictions upon personal liberty.” (quoting Molden v. State, 750 N.E.2d 448, 450 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001))). In 2014, the legislature expressly amended the statute to provide that time served on home detention as a condition of probation earns credit toward a sentence, effective July 1, 2014. And in 2015, the legislature further provided that “[a] person . . . earns . . . good time credit for . . . days the person serves on pretrial home detention awaiting trial.” Ind. Code § 35-50-6-3.1 (2016). Here, Williams does not dispute that he was not on pretrial home detention. Rather, he raises a different issue and argues that GPS monitoring constitutes a form of confinement that should entitle him to credit toward his eventual sentence. 8 Although Hickman arose in the context of probation revocation and credit time for a community-based placement, we find its discussion of whether the defendant was “confined” in a halfway house relevant to our interpretation of the credit-time statute. 81 N.E.3d 1083.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-687 | January 28, 2026 Page 7 of 12 remaining four years of his suspended sentence. In that probation-violation

context, this Court undertook a detailed statutory-interpretation analysis of the

term “confinement,” which the statute did not define, and identified several

factors relevant to determining “whether a person is confined or imprisoned in

a placement and thus earns accrued time.” Id. Those factors include:

[W]hether the placement was requested by the person as a condition of probation or was otherwise voluntary; the degree of freedom of movement enjoyed by the person; the degree of direct supervision over the placement exercised by the Department of Correction, a court, or another state actor; and the degree of autonomy and privacy enjoyed by the person in the conduct of his everyday life.

Id. at 1086 (citations omitted). Our Court concluded that, although home

detention would “entitle” a detainee to accrued time, Hickman was neither on

home detention nor “confined or imprisoned.” Id. Placement in a halfway

house, as a nonpenal facility, did not fall within the meaning of being “confined

or imprisoned” under the statute because Hickman’s freedom was not

significantly restricted and most rules were not strictly enforced at the facility.

During his placement, Hickman was able to work, entertain guests, maintain

privacy, and even leave the facility for extended periods. Id.

[14] Similarly, here, we conclude that Williams’ pretrial GPS monitoring did not

constitute confinement because it was even less restrictive than the halfway

house placement in Hickman. Although Williams did not voluntarily request

GPS monitoring, he nevertheless retained a substantial degree of freedom of

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-687 | January 28, 2026 Page 8 of 12 movement. Williams was able to work, as reflected in the record and in his

counsel’s argument that he was “the sole financial provider” for his family. Tr.

Vol. III p. 250. Williams was monitored but was not restricted as to the places

he could go.9

[15] Williams argues that other limitations were imposed on his freedom, but those

limitations were standard conditions imposed on defendants during pretrial

release, such as refraining from committing new crimes and from using

controlled substances without a valid prescription. 10 Next, Williams points to

no part of the record—and we find none—showing that he was under direct

supervision by Boone County Community Corrections after the GPS device

was installed. Williams did not have daily, weekly, or monthly reporting

requirements. See App. Vol. II p. 39; see also Hickman, 81 N.E.3d at 1086

(concluding that a curfew was not a substantial imposition on the defendant’s

liberty where it was “not very zealously enforced in fact”). As for privacy and

autonomy, Williams does not argue, and the record does not show, that his

privacy or autonomy was invaded by the GPS monitoring. A GPS device

tracks only a person’s location and not the content of the person’s conduct.

9 Williams’ appellant’s brief refers to “exclusionary areas where he could not travel.” Appellant’s Br. p. 7. Other than the no-contact order between Williams and one of the victims, however, it is unclear from the record what exclusionary areas, if any, applied to him. Williams cites no record support for this claim. 10 Williams argues that he was not allowed to move his residence without notifying the court, travel outside Indiana, use alcohol or any controlled substance without a valid prescription, and that he was required to sign a Fourth Amendment waiver for purposes of drug testing. Because these are standard conditions imposed on pretrial release, they bear no relation to the issue of confinement. See App. Vol. II p. 39.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-687 | January 28, 2026 Page 9 of 12 [16] The only meaningful geographic restriction imposed on Williams stemmed

from the no-contact order between him and one of the victims in this case.

Williams was ordered not to be present at a location where he “knew [the

victim] to be located” while released on bond. Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 36.

That restriction was not imposed by GPS monitoring but was a precautionary

measure resulting from Williams’ offenses and designed to protect the victim

given the nature of the case. GPS monitoring itself did not exclude Williams

from any areas; the restriction flowed from his conduct toward the victim. 11

[17] GPS monitoring was a special condition of Williams’ pretrial release to which

he agreed. Williams did not agree to that condition merely to save “the State a

great deal of money” or to confer “a considerable benefit to the taxpayers,” as

he claims. Appellant’s Br. p. 7. Rather, Williams sought release so that he

could provide for his family and enjoy the freedom of being “out of custody,” as

his counsel argued at trial. Tr. Vol. III p. 250. Having accepted those

conditions to obtain his release, Williams cannot now recharacterize them as

“confinement” entitling him to credit toward his sentence. We, therefore, find

his argument unpersuasive. Accordingly, we conclude that Williams is not

entitled to accrued time under the statute.

[18] Next, regarding good time credit, Williams is not entitled to good time credit

because it is awarded for “the person’s good behavior while imprisoned or

11 Williams also argues that he was required to pay $100 per week for GPS monitoring and to charge the device daily, which is irrelevant to the issue of confinement.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-687 | January 28, 2026 Page 10 of 12 confined.” Ind. Code § 35-50-6-0.5. Since Williams was not confined under

GPS monitoring and did not accrue any time toward the sentence, he was not

entitled to good time credit. See Maciaszek v. State, 75 N.E.3d 1089, 1093 n.5

(Ind. Ct. App. 2017) (“As Maciaszek is not entitled to credit for actual time

served against his Indiana Sentence, he is also not entitled to good time credit,

which allows for extra days of credit based on the credit class of the offender

and the actual days the offender served. See Ind. Code § 35-50-6-3 (good credit

time statute).”).

[19] In summary, the trial court did not err when it denied Williams’ request for

credit for the time he spent on pretrial GPS monitoring.

Conclusion [20] Because the trial court did not err by denying Williams’ request for credit for

the time he spent on pretrial GPS monitoring, we affirm.

[21] Affirmed.

Bailey, J., and Kenworthy, J., concur.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT Allan W. Reid Foley Panszi Law, LLC Zionsville, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Theodore E. Rokita Attorney General of Indiana

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-687 | January 28, 2026 Page 11 of 12 J.T. Whitehead Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-687 | January 28, 2026 Page 12 of 12