Michael Joseph Mueller v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.)

• Court: Indiana Court of Appeals
• Decided: May 18, 2016
• Docket: 87A01-1510-CR-1739
• Status: Published

Opinion

MEMORANDUM DECISION FILED May 18 2016, 7:38 am

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), CLERK this Memorandum Decision shall not be Indiana Supreme Court Court of Appeals and Tax Court regarded as precedent or cited before any court except for the purpose of establishing the defense of res judicata, collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Brett M. Roy Gregory F. Zoeller Roy Law Office Attorney General of Indiana Boonville, Indiana Richard C. Webster Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Michael Joseph Mueller, May 18, 2016 Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No. 87A01-1510-CR-1739 v. Appeal from the Warrick Superior Court State of Indiana, The Honorable Robert R. Appellee-Plaintiff Aylsworth, Judge Trial Court Cause No. 87D02-1503-F6-000089

Bailey, Judge.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 87A01-1510-CR-1739 | May 18, 2016 Page 1 of 5 Case Summary [1] Michael Joseph Mueller (“Mueller”) challenges the two-year sentence imposed

following his guilty plea to Auto Theft, a Level 6 felony. 1 He presents the sole

issue of whether the trial court abused its sentencing discretion by ignoring

appropriate mitigating circumstances. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History [2] On July 6, 2015, Mueller pled guilty to Auto Theft, after acknowledging that he

had stolen the vehicle of Carolyn Remfry on or about March 10, 2015. Mueller

was sentenced to serve two years in the Indiana Department of Correction, with

a recommendation that he be placed in a minimum security facility and be

evaluated for participation in a therapeutic communities program. Mueller

appeals.

Discussion and Decision [3] Upon conviction of a Level 6 felony, Mueller faced a sentencing range of

between six months and two and one-half years, with one year as the advisory

term. I.C. § 35-50-2-7(b). In imposing the two-year term, the trial court stated:

“I’m going to show that th[e] sentence is warranted and justified based upon

your prior record, including misdemeanor and felony record as dictated or

1 Ind. Code § 35-43-4-2.5(b)(1).

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 87A01-1510-CR-1739 | May 18, 2016 Page 2 of 5 disclosed by the July 14, 2015 report to the court.” (Tr. at 30.) Mueller now

argues that “the court failed to give proper weight to the mitigating factors in

this action[.]” Appellant’s Brief at 4. According to Mueller, the trial court

should have recognized his decision to plead guilty, his expression of remorse,

and his medical condition – severe seizures – to be mitigating circumstances.

[4] “So long as the sentence is within the statutory range, it is subject to review

only for abuse of discretion.” Anglemyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d 482, 490 (Ind.

2007), clarified on other grounds, 875 N.E.2d 218 (Ind. 2007) (Anglemyer II). This

includes the finding of an aggravating circumstance and the omission to find a

proffered mitigating circumstance. Id. at 490-91. When imposing a sentence

for a felony, the trial court must enter “a sentencing statement that includes a

reasonably detailed recitation of its reasons for imposing a particular sentence.”

Id. at 491.

[5] The trial court’s reasons must be supported by the record and must not be

improper as a matter of law. Id. However, a trial court’s sentencing order may

no longer be challenged as reflecting an improper weighing of sentencing

factors.2 Id. A trial court abuses its discretion if its reasons and circumstances

2 In addition to making an unavailable argument that the trial court failed to properly weigh sentencing factors, Mueller’s brief also references an improper and obsolete standard for appellate revision of sentences upon independent review. Mueller states that this Court “may revise a sentence if it is ‘manifestly unreasonable in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender.’” Appellant’s Brief at 7 (quoting Thacker v. State, 709 N.E.2d 3, 10 (Ind. 1999)). We remind counsel that, where independent appellate review and revision is sought pursuant to Indiana Appellate Rule 7(b), the standard is one of “inappropriateness.”

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 87A01-1510-CR-1739 | May 18, 2016 Page 3 of 5 for imposing a particular sentence are clearly against the logic and effect of the

facts and circumstances before the court, or the reasonable, probable, and actual

deductions to be drawn therefrom. Hollin v. State, 877 N.E.2d 462, 464 (Ind.

2007).

[6] An allegation that the trial court failed to identify or find a mitigating factor

requires the defendant to establish that the mitigating evidence is not only

supported by the record but also that the mitigating evidence is significant.

Anglemyer II, 875 N.E.2d at 220-21. The trial court is not obligated to explain

why it did not find a particular circumstance to be significantly mitigating.

Sherwood v. State, 749 N.E.2d 36, 38 (Ind. 2001).

[7] Mueller did not present to the trial court any argument upon a particular

mitigating circumstance. Nonetheless, Mueller’s guilty plea was readily

apparent. Although a trial court should be “inherently aware of the fact that a

guilty plea is a mitigating circumstance,” a guilty plea is not always a significant

mitigating circumstance. Francis v. State, 817 N.E.2d 235, 237 n.2 (Ind. 2004).

A guilty plea does not rise to the level of significant mitigation where the

evidence against the defendant is such that the decision to plead guilty is

“purely pragmatic.” Abrajan v. State, 917 N.E.2d 709, 713 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009).

Here, Meueller was found in possession of the stolen vehicle. His decision to

plead guilty could reasonably be considered pragmatic.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 87A01-1510-CR-1739 | May 18, 2016 Page 4 of 5 [8] As for the remaining claims of mitigation, the trial court will not be found to

have abused its discretion by failing to find a mitigator not advanced for

consideration. Anglemyer II, 875 N.E.2d at 221.

Conclusion [9] Mueller has not shown that the trial court abused its sentencing discretion.

[10] Affirmed.

Bradford, J., and Altice, J., concur.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 87A01-1510-CR-1739 | May 18, 2016 Page 5 of 5