Michael John Smith v. State

• Court: Court of Appeals of Texas
• Decided: August 1, 2003
• Docket: 10-01-00331-CR
• Status: Published

Opinion

Michael John Smith v. State

IN THE

TENTH COURT OF APPEALS

No. 10-01-331-CR

     MICHAEL JOHN SMITH,

                                                                              Appellant

     v.

     THE STATE OF TEXAS,

                                                                              Appellee

From the 54th District Court

McLennan County, Texas

Trial Court # 2000-14-C

MEMORANDUM OPINION

      A jury convicted Michael John Smith of felony driving while intoxicated and assessed his punishment at ten years’ imprisonment. Smith contends in his sole point that the court abused its discretion by permitting the State to impeach him with a felony conviction which was more than ten years old.

      The trial took place in October 2001. The prosecutor sought to impeach Smith with an April 1981 conviction for possession of methamphetamine. Smith objected under Rule of Evidence 609(b) and requested a mistrial because more than ten years had elapsed between the date of conviction and the present trial. See Tex. R. Evid. 609(b). The court sustained the objection, overruled the motion for mistrial, and instructed the jury to disregard the prosecutor’s question regarding “the papers where [he was] convicted in this courtroom . . . .”

      The prosecutor then asked Smith if he had been convicted of a felony within the ten years preceding the trial. He testified that he had a felony DWI conviction within that time period. Smith’s counsel requested a mistrial. The court overruled the motion for mistrial and excused the jury for the evening.

      Outside the presence of the jury, the prosecutor explained that she had to bench warrant Smith for his trial from the TDCJ substance abuse felony punishment facility. Smith had been sent there as a condition of his community supervision for a 2001 felony DWI conviction from Nueces County. Smith objected that this conviction could not be used for impeachment purposes because it was not a final conviction. The court recessed for the evening without resolving the issue.

      The court conducted a further hearing outside the presence of the jury the next morning. The prosecutor argued that the 1981 conviction should be admissible for impeachment purposes under Rule 609 because it is a prior felony conviction and, although remote, Smith has had several other misdemeanor and felony convictions since. The prosecutor also argued that the 2001 felony DWI conviction was admissible for impeachment purposes regardless of whether it was a “final” conviction.

      The prosecutor then reviewed the Theus factors for the court and argued that those factors support the admission of both prior convictions for impeachment purposes. The prosecutor also called a fingerprint expert and a records custodian to prove up the prior convictions outside the presence of the jury.

      At the conclusion of the hearing, the court advised the parties that it would permit the prosecutor to impeach Smith with both prior convictions.

APPLICABLE LAW

      Rule 609 provides in pertinent part:

(a) General Rule. For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness, evidence that the witness has been convicted of a crime shall be admitted if elicited from the witness or established by public record but only if the crime was a felony or involved moral turpitude, regardless of punishment, and the court determines that the probative value of admitting this evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect to a party.

(b) Time Limit. Evidence of a conviction under this rule is not admissible if a period of more than ten years has elapsed since the date of the conviction or of the release of the witness from the confinement imposed for that conviction, whichever is the later date, unless the court determines, in the interests of justice, that the probative value of the conviction supported by specific facts and circumstances substantially outweighs its prejudicial effect.

Tex. R. Evid. 609(a), (b).

      Generally, the State may impeach a testifying defendant with a prior conviction for a felony or a crime involving moral turpitude if the court determines that the probative value of the evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect. Id.; White v. State, 21 S.W.3d 642, 646 (Tex. App.—Waco 2000, pet. ref’d).

      The Court of Criminal Appeals has identified five factors which the court should consider in balancing probative value against prejudicial effect: (1) the impeachment value of the prior conviction; (2) the temporal proximity of the prior conviction; (3) the similarity between the past crime and the offense being prosecuted; (4) the importance of the defendant’s testimony; and (5) the importance of the credibility issue. Theus v. State, 845 S.W.2d 874, 880 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992); Jackson v. State, 50 S.W.3d 579, 592 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2001, pet. ref’d); White, 21 S.W.3d at 646.

      The trial court has “wide discretion” in determining the admissibility of a prior conviction under Rule 609. Theus, 845 S.W.2d at 881; White, 21 S.W.3d at 646-47. We will set aside the court’s ruling only if it “lies outside the zone of reasonable disagreement.” Id.

Impeachment Value

      A crime involving deception has a higher impeachment value than a crime involving violence. Theus, 845 S.W.2d at 881; Jackson, 50 S.W.3d at 592; White, 21 S.W.3d at 647. Crimes involving violence tend to be more prejudicial. Theus, 845 S.W.2d at 881; Jackson, 50 S.W.3d at 592. The Court in Theus noted that, in cases in which the impeachment value of the prior conviction is uncertain, evidence regarding the facts of the prior conviction can be considered by the court in determining whether the prior conviction should be admitted. See 845 S.W.2d at 881-82.

      Smith’s conviction for possession of methamphetamine does not necessarily involve deception. Cf. U.S. v. Hayes, 553 F.2d 824, 828 (2d Cir. 1977) (conviction for smuggling narcotics “has more probative value on credibility than, for example, a conviction for mere narcotics possession”); but see British Am. Ins. Co. v. Coffman, 574 S.W.2d 873, 873 (Tex. Civ. App.—Texarkana 1978, no writ) (“Possession of heroin is a crime involving moral turpitude.”). The State offered no evidence in the hearing outside the presence of the jury regarding the facts of the prior conviction. Cf. Theus, 845 S.W.2d at 882 (trial court should have considered facts surrounding prior conviction in determining its admissibility). Based on the limited record before us, we hold that this factor weighs against admissibility. See Jackson, 50 S.W.3d at 592.

Temporal Proximity

      Rule 609(b) renders a prior conviction presumptively inadmissible if it is one for which the witness had been released from custody more than ten years before trial. Tex. R. Evid. 609(b); Jackson, 50 S.W.3d at 591; Butler v. State, 890 S.W.2d 950, 954 (Tex. App.—Waco 1995, pet. ref’d). However, a trial court may nevertheless admit a conviction deemed too remote under this rule if the court determines that, under the “specific facts and circumstances,” the probative value of the conviction substantially outweighs its prejudicial effect. Id.

      The impeachment value of a “remote” prior felony conviction increases if the State offers “[e]vidence of the lack of reformation or subsequent felony and certain misdemeanor convictions.” See Lucas v. State, 791 S.W.2d 35, 51 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989); Jackson, 50 S.W.3d at 591.

      The State introduced evidence in the hearing outside the presence of the jury that Smith had misdemeanor DWI convictions in 1983, 1985, and 1992, and a felony DWI conviction in 2001. This constitutes “[e]vidence of . . . lack of reformation [and of a] subsequent felony . . . conviction[ ].” Accordingly, we hold that the facts and circumstances presented in this case tend to support the trial court’s determination that the probative value of the 1981 conviction substantially outweighs its prejudicial effect.

Similarity to Charged Offense

      The fact that a prior conviction is similar to the present offense weighs against its admissibility because the similarity might lead a jury to “convict on the perception of a past pattern of conduct, instead of on the facts of the charged offense.” Theus, 845 S.W.2d at 881; accord Jackson, 50 S.W.3d at 593. In Smith’s case, the 1981 conviction was for possession of methamphetamine. He was on trial for felony DWI. Thus, both are similar in that they involve an allegation of substance abuse. Accordingly, this factor weighs against the admissibility of the prior conviction.

Importance of Defendant’s Testimony/Credibility

      Appellant concedes that these factors favor admissibility.

Conclusion

      We must accord the trial court “wide discretion” in determining whether to admit a prior conviction for impeachment under Rule 609. Theus, 845 S.W.2d at 881; White, 21 S.W.3d at 646-47. Three of the five factors weigh in favor of admissibility. Two weigh against. Under these circumstances, we cannot say that the court’s decision “lies outside the zone of reasonable disagreement.” See id. Accordingly, we overrule Smith’s sole point.

      We affirm the judgment.

                                                                   REX D. DAVIS

                                                                   Chief Justice

Before Chief Justice Davis,

      Justice Vance, and

      Justice Gray

Affirmed

Opinion delivered and filed August 1, 2003

Do not publish

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