Rel: March 13, 2026
Notice: This opinion is subject to revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern Reporter. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-0650), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA OCTOBER TERM, 2025-2026
_________________________
SC-2025-0372 _________________________
Michael Jerome Jennings
v.
Christopher Smith, Justin Gable, Jeremy Brooks, and the City of Childersburg
Certified Question from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama, Eastern Division
(1:22-cv-01165-RDP)
SELLERS, Justice.
The United States District Court for the Northern District of
Alabama, Eastern Division ("the district court"), has certified to this SC-2025-0372
Court a question pursuant to Rule 18, Ala. R. App. P. This Court
accepted and answers the question.
I. Certified Question
"Under [Ala. Code 1975,] § 15-5-30, when a law enforcement officer asks a person for his name, address, and explanation of his actions, and the person gives an incomplete or unsatisfactory oral response, does the statute prohibit the officer from demanding or requesting physical identification?"
II. Ala. Code 1975, § 15-5-30
Section § 15-5-30, the statute referenced in the certified question,
is often referred to as Alabama's "stop and identify" statute. That section
provides:
"A sheriff or other officer acting as sheriff, his deputy or any constable, acting within their respective counties, any marshal, deputy marshal or policeman of any incorporated city or town within the limits of the county or any highway patrolman or state trooper may stop any person abroad in a public place whom he reasonably suspects is committing, has committed or is about to commit a felony or other public offense and may demand of him his name, address and an explanation of his actions."
(Emphasis added.)
III. Factual Background and Procedural History
On May 22, 2022, Officers Christopher Smith, Justin Gable, and
Jeremy Brooks of the Childersburg Police Department responded to an
2 SC-2025-0372
emergency-911 call in which a female had requested that someone check
on her elderly neighbors' house. The caller conveyed that her neighbors
had gone out of town and that she had observed an unfamiliar vehicle
and a "younger black male" around their house. Officer Smith, who
arrived at the house first, saw a black male watering flowers with a
garden hose. In relevant part, Officer Smith asked the man if he lived at
the house, and the man responded that he did not. Officer Smith
explained that someone had called about a vehicle and a person being on
the property who was not supposed to be there. The man replied that he
was supposed to be there, that his name was Pastor Jennings, that he
lived across the street, that he was looking out for the house while the
neighbors were gone, and that he was watering their flowers. Officer
Smith then asked the man if he had any identification, at which time the
man became very agitated and stated that he would not provide any
identification. Officers Gable and Brooks subsequently arrived at the
house, at which time the conversation between the officers and the man
escalated. After repeatedly refusing to talk to the officers and to properly
identify himself, the man was placed under arrest and charged with
obstructing a governmental function in violation of Ala. Code 1975, §
3 SC-2025-0372
13A-10-2(a)(2).1 The man arrested was subsequently identified as
Michael Jerome Jennings.
After the obstruction charge against Jennings was dismissed, he
commenced in the district court an action against the officers under 42
U.S.C. § 1983, alleging unlawful and retaliatory arrest, among other
things.2 He also sued the officers and the City of Childersburg ("the
City") under Alabama law, alleging false arrest. The officers moved for a
summary judgment, and the City moved to dismiss. Citing immunity,
the district court granted both motions. The district court found that, by
refusing to give his complete name, Jennings violated § 15-5-30, thus
intentionally preventing the officers from performing a governmental
function. See § 13A-10-2(a)(2).
Jennings appealed. The United States Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit ("the Eleventh Circuit") entered an order reversing the
1Section 13A-10-2(a)(2), Ala. Code 1975, makes it a crime to "[i]ntentionally prevent[] a public servant from performing a governmental function." A violation of that provision is a Class A misdemeanor.
2Section 1983 imposes liability on a "person" who, under color of
law, deprives another "of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws" of the United States. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 4 SC-2025-0372
decision of the district court. In doing so, the Eleventh Circuit relied on
Edger v. McCabe, 84 F.4th 1230 (11th Cir. 2023) (interpreting § 15-5-30
as prohibiting law-enforcement officers from requesting physical
identification from a suspect). On remand from the Eleventh Circuit, the
district court expressed its concern regarding an unpublished opinion
issued by the Eleventh Circuit that, the district court felt, created
uncertainty concerning how § 15-5-30 should be interpreted. See Metz v.
Bridges, No. 23-11275, Dec. 12, 2024 (11th Cir. 2024) (not reported in
Federal Reporter) (interpreting § 15-5-30 as giving probable cause to
arrest a suspect for his failure to comply with a law-enforcement officer's
request for identification during a lawful stop initiated under Terry v.
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968)). Thus, the district court certified its question
regarding the interpretation of § 15-5-30 to this Court pursuant to Rule
18(a), which provides that this Court may answer questions from federal
courts only when "there are no clear controlling precedents" and the
answer to the question is "determinative of said cause."
IV. Discussion
Under § 15-5-30, an officer may request a person's "name, address
and an explanation of his actions" when the officer reasonably suspects
5 SC-2025-0372
that the person "is committing, has committed or is about to commit a
felony or other public offense." In Hopkins v. State, 661 So. 2d 774, 778
(Ala. Crim. App. 1994), the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals stated
that § 15-5-30 is a codification of the principles announced in Terry,
supra. In Terry, the United States Supreme Court established the
constitutional framework for brief investigatory stops, commonly known
as Terry stops. Under Terry, an officer is permitted to detain a person
for a brief investigatory stop if the officer has reasonable suspicion that
the person is engaged in, or is about to be engaged in, criminal activity.
Terry, 392 U.S. at 10. The officer's actions in briefly detaining a person
must be "justified at its inception" and "reasonably related in scope to the
circumstances which justified the interference in the first place." Terry,
392 U.S. at 20. See also Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500 (1983) (noting
that, in analyzing the scope of a Terry stop, it is clear that "an
investigative detention must be temporary and last no longer than is
necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop" and that "the
investigative methods employed should be the least intrusive means
reasonably available to verify or dispel the officer's suspicion in a short
period of time").
6 SC-2025-0372
In Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial District Court of Nevada, Humboldt
County, 542 U.S. 177 (2004), the United States Supreme Court applied
the principles of Terry in determining whether a Nevada statute, Nev.
Rev. Stat. 171.123, requiring a suspect to identify himself or herself
during a lawful Terry stop, was consistent with the Fourth Amendment
prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures. In relevant part,
the Nevada statute permits a law-enforcement officer to detain a person
"only to ascertain the person's identity and the suspicious circumstances
surrounding the person's presence abroad." Nev. Rev. Stat. 171.123(3).
According to Hiibel, the Nevada Supreme Court has interpreted the
statute as requiring only that a person disclose his or her "name" to an
officer when reasonable suspicion exists to detain the person. Hiibel, 542
U.S. at 185.
The central question in Hiibel was whether Larry Hiibel, a suspect
detained during a valid Terry stop, could be arrested and prosecuted for
refusing to identify himself as required by the Nevada statute.3 The
3The Court recounted the following pertinent facts in Hiibel:
"The sheriff's department in Humboldt County, Nevada, received an afternoon telephone call reporting an assault. The caller reported seeing a man assault a woman in a red and 7 SC-2025-0372
Hiibel Court began its analysis by explaining that "questions concerning
a suspect's identity are a routine and accepted part of many Terry stops."
542 U.S. at 186. The Court specifically noted that obtaining a suspect's
identity during a Terry stop serves important government interests:
"Obtaining a suspect's name in the course of a Terry stop serves important government interests. Knowledge of identity may inform an officer that a suspect is wanted for another offense, or has a record of violence or mental disorder. On the other hand, knowing identity may help clear a suspect and
silver GMC truck on Grass Valley Road. Deputy Sheriff Lee Dove was dispatched to investigate. When the officer arrived at the scene, he found the truck parked on the side of the road. A man was standing by the truck, and a young woman was sitting inside it. The officer observed skid marks in the gravel behind the vehicle, leading him to believe it had come to a sudden stop.
"The officer approached the man and explained that he was investigating a report of a fight. The man appeared to be intoxicated. The officer asked him if he had 'any identification on [him],' which we understand as a request to produce a driver's license or some other form of written identification. … The officer asked for identification 11 times and was refused each time. After warning the man that he would be arrested if he continued to refuse to comply, the officer placed him under arrest."
542 U.S. at 180-81. Hiibel was charged and convicted under a Nevada statute for obstructing a public officer in discharging or attempting to discharge his duties; Hiibel challenged his conviction on Fourth and Fifth Amendment grounds.
8 SC-2025-0372
allow the police to concentrate their efforts elsewhere. … Officers called to investigate [suspected criminal activity] need to know whom they are dealing with in order to assess the situation, the threat to their own safety, and possible danger to the potential victim."
Hiibel, 542 U.S. at 186. See also Hiibel v. Sixth Jud. Dist. Ct., 118 Nev.
868, 874, 59 P.3d 1201, 1205-06 (2002) ("Additionally, if suspects are not
legally required to identify themselves, what could an officer do if a
suspicious person were loitering outside a daycare center or school?
Perhaps that person is a sex offender. How are officers to enforce
restraining orders? Or, how are officers to enforce curfew laws for minors
without a requirement to produce identification? In these situations, it is
the observable conduct that creates a reasonable suspicion, but it is the
requirement to produce identification that enables an officer to
determine whether the suspect is breaking the law.").
The Hiibel Court went on to explain that, although it well
established that an officer "may ask a suspect to identify himself in the
course of a Terry stop, it has been an open question whether the suspect
can be arrested and prosecuted for refusal to answer." 542 U.S. at 186-
87. Hiibel confirmed that, although "the Fourth Amendment itself
cannot require a suspect to answer questions," id. at 187, in Hiibel's case,
9 SC-2025-0372
the source of the obligation to respond arose from the Nevada statute,
which, like § 15-5-30, is often referred to as a stop-and-identify statute.
See Hiibel, 542 U.S. at 183 ("Stop and identify statutes often combine
elements of traditional vagrancy laws with provisions intended to
regulate police behavior in the course of investigatory stops. The statutes
vary from State to State, but all permit an officer to ask or require a
suspect to disclose his identity."). In discussing whether the Nevada
statute satisfied the "reasonableness" standard for searches and seizures
under the Fourth Amendment, the Hiibel Court explained that
"reasonableness" is determined by balancing the degree of intrusion upon
a person's constitutionally protected rights against the statute's
promotion of legitimate government interests. 542 U.S. at 187-88. The
Hiibel Court reasoned that the public interest in police and public safety
outweighed Hiibel's interest in refusing to identify himself. The Court
further explained that a "request for identity" under the Nevada statute
has "an immediate relation to the purpose, rationale, and practical
demands of a Terry stop" and that "[t]he threat of criminal sanction helps
ensure that the request for identity does not become a legal nullity." 582
U.S. at 188. On the other hand, the Court noted that the Nevada statute
10 SC-2025-0372
did not alter the nature of a Terry stop, because the statute did not
change the nature or scope of the stop itself. Id. See also Royer, 460
U.S. at 500 (noting that "an investigative detention must be temporary
and last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop"
and that "the investigative methods employed should be the least
intrusive means reasonably available to verify or dispel the officer's
suspicion in a short period of time"). Thus, the Hiibel Court concluded
that a state law requiring a suspect to disclose his or her name in the
course of a valid Terry stop is consistent with Fourth Amendment
prohibitions against unreasonable searches and seizures:
"It is clear in this case that the request for identification was 'reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified' the stop. Terry [v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1,] 20 [(1968)]. The officer's request was a commonsense inquiry, not an effort to obtain an arrest for failure to identify after a Terry stop yielded insufficient evidence. The stop, the request, and the State's requirement of a response did not contravene the guarantees of the Fourth Amendment."
542 U.S. at 188-89. Although the Hiibel Court concluded that the Nevada
statute was consistent with Fourth Amendment prohibitions against
unreasonable searches and seizures, it left open the question whether a
request for identifying information beyond a name would be a violation
11 SC-2025-0372
of the Fourth Amendment or would be beyond the scope of the statute.4
See Hiibel, 542 U.S. 185 ("As we understand it, the [Nevada] statute does
not require a suspect to give the officer a driver's license or any other
document. Provided that the suspect either states his name or
communicates it to the officer by other means -- a choice, we assume, that
the suspect may make -- the statute is satisfied and no violation occurs.").
Based on the analysis provided in Hiibel, we conclude that § 15-5-
30 does not exclude from its purview a request for physical identification
when a suspect provides an incomplete or unsatisfactory response to an
officer's demand to provide his or her name and address and an
explanation of his or her actions. Obtaining a person's identity is a
crucial part of a Terry stop. See United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221,
229 (1985) ("[T]he ability to briefly stop [a suspect], ask questions, or
check identification in the absence of probable cause promotes the strong
government interest in solving crimes and bringing offenders to justice.");
INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 216 (1984) ("[I]nterrogation relating to
4See Douglas v. City of Jeannette (Pennsylvania), 319 U.S. 157, 163
(1943) (noting that, with respect to state law, "state courts are the final arbiters of its meaning and application, subject only to review by this Court on federal grounds appropriately asserted"). 12 SC-2025-0372
one's identity or a request for identification by the police does not, by
itself, constitute a Fourth Amendment seizure."); and Wright v. State,
601 So. 2d 1095, 1096 (Ala. Crim. App. 1991) ("Inherent in an officer's
right to stop a suspect and demand his name, address, and an
explanation of his actions is the right to detain him temporarily to verify
the information given or to obtain information independently of the
suspect's cooperation."). We also find persuasive the rationale stated in
City of Missoula v. Kroschel, 391 Mont. 457, 465, 419 P.3d 1208, 1217
(2018): "If not the functional or substantive equivalent of requesting a
person's name and current address, demanding available proof of
identification is typically likewise reasonably related to the purpose of an
investigative stop for Fourth Amendment purposes."5 Thus, although §
15-5-30 does not expressly authorize law-enforcement officers to request
information other than a person's name and address and an explanation
of his or her actions, nothing in the language or legislative history of the
statute indicates any legislative intent to prohibit officers from asking
5Much like § 15-5-30 at issue here, the statute in Missoula permitted "law enforcement officers [to] request a person's name, current address, and 'an explanation' of the person's conduct in relation to the officer's particularized suspicion for the stop." 391 Mont. At 465, 419 P.3d at 1217. 13 SC-2025-0372
questions regarding identity that would be permissible under the Fourth
Amendment within the limited scope of a valid Terry stop. The principles
of Terry presume that an officer's request for additional identifying
information will be reasonably related to the circumstances of the stop
and will not seek information unrelated to identifying the suspect.
In summary, Alabama law is clear -- once an officer has reasonable
suspicion to believe that a suspect is committing, has committed, or is
about to commit a felony or other public offense, § 15-5-30 empowers the
officer to demand that the suspect disclose his or her name and address
in a format that would allow the officer to affirmatively identify the
suspect. As indicated above, establishing a suspect's correct identity
furthers an important governmental function by allowing an officer to
confirm whether a suspect is violating the law or by eliminating the
suspect from suspicion. If the officer's demand for a name and address is
not heeded, then the officer is faced with choices. The officer can either
arrest the suspect for intentionally preventing the officer from
performing a governmental function in violation of § 13A-10-2(a)(2) or
delay the arrest and supplement the demand by asking for more
conclusive positive identification. Either way, the suspect bears the
14 SC-2025-0372
burden to completely identify himself or herself during a valid Terry stop;
thus, failing to provide sufficient identifying information when demanded
to do so violates Alabama law.
QUESTION ANSWERED.
Wise and Parker, JJ., concur.
Bryan and Cook, JJ., concur specially, with opinions.
Shaw, J., concurs in the result, with opinion.
Mendheim, J., dissents, with opinion, which Stewart, C.J., and
McCool, J., join.
15 SC-2025-0372
BRYAN, Justice (concurring specially).
Although I concur in the main opinion, I also agree with the
sentiments expressed in Justice Shaw's special writing.
16 SC-2025-0372
COOK, Justice (concurring specially).
I concur with the main opinion that § 15-5-30, Ala. Code 1975, does
not prohibit an officer from either "demanding or requesting physical
identification" when a suspect gives an "incomplete or unsatisfactory oral
response." (Emphasis added.)
I also agree with the main opinion that the statute authorizes an
officer to do so. While I recognize that this additional conclusion goes
beyond the strict bounds of the question that has been certified to us, the
parties have discussed this issue in the briefing, and I believe the textual
analysis for this question is interwoven with answering the certified
question before us, especially in light of the phrasing of an ancillary
question provided in a footnote by the federal court in this case.6
6I note that, in its order certifying the question now before us, the
United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama included the following related question in a footnote:
"Is the word 'demand' meaningfully different from a word like 'request' in that it allows an officer to both ask for the information specified in § 15-5-30 and take follow-up steps to verify the information if the suspect answers those questions in an incomplete or non-credible way."
Jennings v. Smith, No: 1:22-cv-01165-RDP, May 22, 2025 (N.D. Ala. 2025) (emphasis added). That question is the next logical step after determining whether a demand for identification is prohibited and, thus, 17 SC-2025-0372
I write separately to explain why a textual analysis supports the
main opinion's conclusions and to emphasize the precision of our answer.
I. Alabama Courts Construe Statutes According to Their Plain Language
When interpreting statutes, we " ' determine and give effect to the
intent of the legislature as manifested in the language of the statute.' "
Pruitt v. Oliver, 331 So. 3d 99, 111 (Ala. 2021) (quoting Ex parte State
Dep't of Revenue, 683 So. 2d 980, 983 (Ala. 1996)). "[T]he process of
ascertaining a law's intent is an objective exercise focused on the statute's
text, not a subjective one focused on lawmakers' unexpressed goals or
desires." Jay Mitchell, Textualism in Alabama, 74 Ala. L. Rev. 1089, 1101
(2023); see also Maxwell v. State, 89 Ala. 150, 161, 7 So. 824, 827 (1890)
(" ' The court knows nothing of the intention of an act, except from the
words in which it is expressed, applied to the facts existing at the time;
the meaning of the law being the law itself.' " (citation omitted)). This
is also before us. See, generally, Stewart Title Guar. Co. v. Shelby Realty Holdings, LLC, 83 So. 3d 469, 471 n.2 (Ala. 2011) (" ' [T]his Court will rephrase a question certified to it in order to address the "basic issue implicated by th[e] question" and "contemplated by the [court] in its certification." ' " (quoting Holcim (US) Inc. v. Ohio Cas. Ins. Co., 38 So. 3d 722, 726-27 (Ala. 2009), quoting in turn John Deere Co. v. Gamble, 523 So. 2d 95, 99 (Ala. 1988))). 18 SC-2025-0372
means that " ' the language of the statute is conclusive.' " Pruitt, 331 So.
3d at 111 (quoting State Dep't of Revenue, 683 So. 2d at 983). We will
thus give the words their " ' natural, ordinary, commonly understood
meaning' " and will bind ourselves to " ' interpret that language to mean
exactly what it says.' " Id.
Here, the language of § 15-5-30 says that an officer "may stop any
person abroad in a public place whom he reasonably suspects is
committing, has committed or is about to commit a felony or other public
offense and may demand of him his name, address and an explanation of
his actions."
A. An Officer Is Not Prohibited From "Requesting" Physical Identification
To begin with the easiest part of the question before us, the text of
the statute does not "prohibit" an officer from "request[ing]" "physical
identification," and it certainly does not do so if the officer has met the
reasonable-suspicion standard of Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).7 I do
7The reasonable-suspicion standard articulated in Terry mirrors the standard set forth in § 15-5-30. Under Terry, an officer may conduct a brief investigatory stop "where [he] observes unusual conduct which leads him reasonably to conclude in light of his experience that criminal activity may be afoot." 392 U.S. 1 at 30. Section 15-5-30 similarly authorizes an officer to "stop any person abroad in a public place whom 19 SC-2025-0372
not view this as a close question. First, the text of the statute says
nothing that could remotely be interpreted as prohibiting a request for
identification or anything else. Certainly, "the broad background rule is
that the police may ask members of the public questions and make
consensual requests of them." Edger v. McCabe, 84 F.4th 1230, 1239
(11th Cir. 2023) (citing Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 434-35 (1991));
see also T.D.F. v. State, 264 So. 3d 108, 117-18 (Ala. Crim. App. 2018)
("[U]nless the police have reasonable suspicion or probable cause to stop
an individual, the police may be ignored.").
And, if there was any doubt in this case, even Michael Jerome
Jennings agrees. During oral argument, his counsel expressly conceded
that the officer could "request" or "ask" for physical identification.8 His
he reasonably suspects is committing, has committed or is about to commit a felony or other public offense." Alabama courts have recognized this correspondence and have applied Terry's framework directly to the statute. See, e.g., Butler v. State, 380 So. 2d 381, 383 (Ala. Crim. App. 1980) (treating § 15-5-30's reasonable-suspicion requirement as coextensive with Terry).
8See Supreme Court of Alabama, Supreme Court O/A Montgomery,
Alabama, YouTube (January 7, 2026, 7:43-7:55) ("Well, [the officer] can ask for ID. The question is can they compel ID. And the officer can ask for ID initially when they -- when they approach the person. They can ask for it. But the question is not whether they can ask. The issue is not ask. The issue is demand." (emphasis added)) (at the time this decision 20 SC-2025-0372
counsel also expressly conceded during oral argument that the stop in
this case was a valid stop.9
Finally, while the statute does not use the word "request," it states
that an officer may "demand" certain information. "Demand" is certainly
stronger than "request." Thus, if the officer can "demand" the physical
identification, the officer can certainly "request" it.
B. An Officer Is Not Prohibited From Demanding Physical Identification Under These Facts
i. The Meaning of the Terms in § 15-5-30
As to whether an officer can "demand" physical identification under
§ 15-5-30, I start with the operative definitions of the key words in that
statute: "demand," "name," and "address."10
was issued, this oral-argument session could be located at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-U3qeHk2rFk). 9See Supreme Court of Alabama, Supreme Court O/A Montgomery,
Alabama, YouTube (January 7, 2026, 3:30-3:32) ("I would agree this was a valid Terry stop." (emphasis added)) (at the time this decision was issued, this oral-argument session could be located at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-U3qeHk2rFk).
10As I have written before: "I believe that we are required to apply
the 'original public meaning' of the words in a statute or our Constitution, thus ensuring that we do not apply our own subjective meaning to the words used." Ex parte Underwood, [Ms. SC-2024-0263, June 7, 2025] ___ So.3d ___, ___ n.4 (Ala. 2025) (Cook, J., concurring specially) (citing Ne w Prime Inc. v. Oliveira, 586 U.S. 105, 113 21 SC-2025-0372
A "demand" is the assertion of a legal right and in its verbal form
can mean "[t]o claim as one's due" or "to require." Black's Law Dictionary
516-17 (4th ed. 1951).11 It can involve "requiring [a person] to do or yield
something." Id. These definitions indicate that an officer may require
identifying information because he or she has an affirmative legal right
to it. The officer is not at the mercy of an unwilling suspect. Rather, the
officer must be able to receive that to which he or she has a right.
(2019) (" ' [I]t's a "fundamental canon of statutory construction" that words generally should be "interpreted as taking their ordinary ... meaning ... at the time Congress enacted the statute." ' " (citations omitted))); see also Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 82-83 (Thomson/West 2012) ("Originalism is the only approach to text that is compatible with democracy. When government-adopted texts are given new meaning, the law is changed; and changing written law, like adopting written law in the first place, is the function of the first two branches of government -- elected legislators and … elected executive officials and their delegates."); Jay Mitchell, Textualism in Alabama, 74 Ala. L. Rev. 1089, 1092 (2023) ("[T]he meaning of a law is its original public meaning, not its modern meaning.").
11I cite the fourth edition of Black's Law Dictionary here because it
is a contemporaneous dictionary to the original passing of this statute in 1966. See, e.g. Maxwell v. State, 89 Ala. 150, 161, 7 So. 824, 827 (1890) (emphasizing connecting the language of a statute to " ' facts existing at the time' " (citation omitted)); National Labor Rels. Bd. v. Canning, 573 U.S 513, 527 (2014) (citing founding-era dictionaries to determine the meaning of "recess"); Wisconsin Cent. Ltd. v. United States, 585 U.S. 274, 277-78 (referencing a 1942 dictionary in interpreting the meaning of "money" in a 1937 statute). 22 SC-2025-0372
Applying those definitions to the statute now before us, it seems clear to
me that the plain language of § 15-5-30 gives an officer the right to
receive the suspect's name and address.
Next, a "name" is "[t]he designation of an individual person, or of a
firm or corporation." Black's Law Dictionary 1174 (4th ed. 1951). This
consists of "one or more … given names and one surname or family
name." Id. Applying this definition to § 15-5-30, we must conclude that
an officer has the right to a given name and a surname.
As the Supreme Court has recognized, this reading "serves
important government interests." Hiibel v. Sixth Jud. Dist. Court of Nev.,
Humboldt Cnty., 542 U.S. 177, 186 (2004). Our appellate courts have
agreed and have acknowledged that the statute's purpose is investigatory
in nature. See, e.g., Manning v. State, 612 So. 2d 1262, 1264 (Ala. Crim.
App. 1992) ("The State of Alabama has codified the investigative stop at
§ 15-5-30 …." (emphasis added)); Scurlock v. State, 487 So. 2d 286, 289
(Ala. Crim. App. 1986) ("Under the authority of § 15-5-30 … a police
officer has authority to stop and question a person for investigatory
23 SC-2025-0372
purposes …." (emphasis added)).12 The only kind of name that can
affirmatively identify a person for the purposes of a police investigation
is at least a given name and a surname. Cf. Ex parte Jefferson Cnty. Bd.
of Educ., [Ms. SC-2024-0756, Apr. 4, 2025] ____ So. 3d ____, _____ (Ala.
2025) (recognizing that for civil-pleading purposes "a pleader who knows
only a person's partial name does not know that person's identity …."). A
suspect who says that his name is "Bob" or "Sparky" does not give an
officer the required information to which he or she has a right.
Finally, an "address" is a "[p]lace where mail or other
communications will reach [a] person" and is "[g]enerally a place of
business or residence." Black's Law Dictionary 60 (4th ed. 1951). Like a
name, the address must include enough information to allow an officer to
verify if the person is who he or she says. If you can write the suspect's
response on an envelope and it will make its way to the suspect's
12Speculating about a statute's legislative "purpose" is often hazardous, particularly when it would require divining the collective mental processes of 140 members of the Alabama Legislature. But no such speculation is necessary here. The statute's purpose is evident from its text. An "investigation" involves "examin[ing] and inquir[ing] into with care and accuracy." Black's Law Dictionary 960 (4th ed. 1951). By its very nature, asking a person for his or her name and address and an explanation of his or her conduct serves an investigatory function. 24 SC-2025-0372
residence, then that is good enough. However, like the hypotheticals
above, if a suspect were to give a vague response, such as his house is
"across from the grocery store" or is "the blue one down the street," the
response would not meet the demands of the statute. So, officers making
a valid stop under § 15-5-30 have not only the right to demand, but also
the right to receive, a full legal name and a mail-worthy address.
ii. The Plain Language of § 15-5-30 Answers the Question Before Us
But what happens when the suspect gives an incomplete name or
an imprecise address? What are the next steps that the officer can take?
The question as certified to our Court asks whether, under those
circumstances, the officer is "prohibited" from demanding, like the name
and address, physical identification to confirm the information. The
answer is no.
Jennings, in his brief, says that the statute, "by its plain text, does
not permit law enforcement to demand physical identification."
Jennings's brief at 14-15. He then proceeds to quote the statute without
further analysis, other than to cite Edger v. McCabe, 84 F.4th 1230, 1238-
39 (11th Cir. 2023), in which the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit determined that § 15-5-30 was "so clear that no 25 SC-2025-0372
reasonable officer could have interpreted it to permit [an] arrest for
failing to produce [physical identification]."
I interpret Jennings's argument, much like the Eleventh Circuit
Court of Appeals' decision, to be primarily based on the expressio unius
canon of statutory interpretation, also known as the negative-implication
canon. See Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The
Interpretation of Legal Texts at 107 (Thomson/Reuters 2012). The Latin
name from which the canon is derived means that the "expression of one
thing implies the exclusion of others." Id. Stated simply, it appears to me
that Jennings is arguing that because the statute expressly provides for
a demand for three things -- a name, an address, and an explanation of
actions -- an officer is permitted to demand nothing more. In other words,
because physical identification is not on the list, an officer is prohibited
from demanding it.
However, this canon only works to exclude other items in the same
category. When the statute in this case limits the demands to name,
address, and explanation of actions, it limits the officer to the types of
information he or she can demand, not how he or she can demand them.
So, an officer cannot demand the suspect's Social Security number or date
26 SC-2025-0372
of birth, but that does not mean that he or she cannot demand the name
and address in a verifiable form. As the main opinion makes clear, the
statute limits the information an officer can demand, but not the ways he
or she can demand it. Because this Court is the ultimate authority on the
interpretation of Alabama law, its decisions define how Alabama law is
applied and understood. See Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Alabama, Inc.
v. Nielsen, 116 F.3d 1406, 1413 (11th Cir. 1997) ("The final arbiter of
state law is the state supreme court, which is another way of saying that
Alabama law is what the Alabama Supreme Court says it is.").
As stated above, officers have a right to the information that the
statute lists when a suspect gives an incomplete or unsatisfactory oral
response. That right authorizes them to demand physical identification
of that information in at least these circumstances. It is of no matter to
say, as Jennings does here, that the physical identification contains
information that the suspect is not compelled to provide, like height,
weight, and organ-donor status. That is true. But the physical
identification contains the information that the suspect is compelled to
provide in verifiable form and that is sufficient. It is the presence of the
authorized information that makes the demand lawful. The presence of
27 SC-2025-0372
other information does not then make the demand unlawful.
Authorization to demand physical identification is also a correct
application of the predicate-act canon, which provides that, when a
statute authorizes an agent to perform specified acts, it also authorizes
the agent to employ reasonable and appropriate means necessary to carry
those acts into execution. See Riley v. Cornerstone Cmty. Outreach, Inc.,
57 So. 3d 704, 720 (Ala. 2010) (" ' " When a [provision of law] gives a
general power or enjoins a duty, it also gives by implication, every
particular power necessary for the exercise of the one or the performance
of the other." ' " (citations omitted)). It is no defense that an officer might
have pursued other methods of obtaining a suspect's full name. The
existence of alternatives does not negate implied authority to use a
reasonably adapted means of verification.13 Nor does the law require a
hierarchy of investigative baby steps, such as continued oral questioning,
13In fact, Jennings agreed at oral argument that "the statute is in
place here to give law enforcement the tools in order to ascertain the information …." See Supreme Court of Alabama, Supreme Court O/A Montgomery, Alabama, YouTube (January 7, 2026, 10:05-10:13) (emphasis added) (at the time this decision was issued, this oral- argument session could be located at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-U3qeHk2rFk). On this point, Jennings is correct. 28 SC-2025-0372
before requesting physical identification to confirm the information an
officer is statutorily authorized to demand.
Yet another canon counsels in favor of this Court's interpretation:
the presumption against change in the common law. See Scalia and
Garner, supra, at 318-19. Under that canon, "[a] statute will be construed
to alter the common law only when that disposition is clear." Id. at 318.
At common law, law-enforcement officers possessed limited
authority to stop and question individuals reasonably suspected of
criminal activity, which included an obligation on the part of the suspect
to provide his or her name. As the Supreme Court has explained, this
authority traces to early English law permitting officers to detain
suspicious persons unless they gave " 'a good Account of themselves.' "
Hiibel, 542 U.S. at 183 (quoting 15 Geo. 2, ch. 5, § 2 (1744)). Alabama
adopted this common-law framework.14 Nothing cited by Jennings draws
a distinction in that common-law tradition between oral identification
14See § 1-3-1, Ala. Code 1975, which reads:
"The common law of England, so far as it is not inconsistent with the Constitution, laws and institutions of this state, shall, together with such institutions and laws, be the rule of decisions, and shall continue in force, except as from time to time it may be altered or repealed by the Legislature." 29 SC-2025-0372
and other ordinary means by which identity might be conveyed. Absent
any indication that the Legislature intended a clear departure from this
background rule, the common-law supplies no presumption against
reading the statute to permit an officer to demand physical identification.
Jennings responds that traditional vagrancy and stop-and-identify
laws -- like the statute at issue in Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 358
(1983) -- raise constitutional vagueness concerns. He argues that
applying a test based on whether a response was "incomplete or
unsatisfactory" renders the statute void for vagueness. But Kolender
involved a materially different statute and a materially different judicial
construction. In that case, California courts construed their stop-and-
identify law to require "credible and reliable" identification -- an
interpretation that "contain[ed] no standard for determining what a
suspect has to do" to comply and "vest[ed] virtually complete discretion
in the hands of the police." Id. at 358.
We do not read § 15-5-30 so broadly. Our interpretation today
permits an officer to demand only identification containing the specific
information enumerated in the statute when the suspect provides an
incomplete or objectively insufficient oral response. An answer is
30 SC-2025-0372
"incomplete or unsatisfactory" not because an officer doubts its
truthfulness or plausibility, but because it fails to supply the information
the statute expressly requires or is nonresponsive to the inquiry posed.
Thus understood, the statute does not turn on an officer's subjective
assessment of "credibility" or "reliability," but on whether the required
identifying information has been provided at all.15
This construction is consistent with the constitutional framework
governing investigative stops under Terry that the main opinion explains
in detail. Whether a Terry stop may continue once a suspect provides
complete identifying information is a question addressed by Hiibel, and I
see nothing in § 15-5-30 -- or in the main opinion's interpretation of it --
that extends beyond what Hiibel permits. Properly construed, the statute
does not authorize enforcement based on whatever an officer might
subjectively deem "credible and reliable," and it therefore does not suffer
15For that matter, Jennings again conceded at oral argument that
it is "not [his] position that they could have ran his name with [the] information he originally provided." See Supreme Court of Alabama, Supreme Court O/A Montgomery, Alabama, YouTube (January 7, 2026, 9:16-9:20) (emphasis added) (at the time this decision was issued, this oral-argument session could be located at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-U3qeHk2rFk). In any event, whatever the statute requires, Jennings knew what information he was obligated to provide. 31 SC-2025-0372
from the vagueness defect identified in Kolender.
iii. What We Do Not Decide
In the last paragraph, the main opinion states: "In summary,
Alabama law is clear -- once an officer has reasonable suspicion to believe
that a suspect is committing, has committed, or is about to commit a
felony or other public offense, § 15-5-30 empowers the officer to demand
that the suspect disclose his or her name and address in a format that
would allow the officer to affirmatively identify the suspect." ____ So. 3d
at ____ (emphasis added). I understand the phrase "in a format that
would allow the officer to affirmatively identify the suspect" to mean that
the officer need not accept "an incomplete or unsatisfactory oral
response." Instead, under § 15-5-30, the officer may in that circumstance
take all proper investigatory means, consistent with Terry, to obtain
complete and satisfactory information allowing the officer to
affirmatively identify the suspect, including demanding physical
identification. See also Hiibel, 542 U.S. at 188-89 ("It is clear in this case
that the request for identification was 'reasonably related in scope to the
circumstances which justified' the stop." (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 20)).
I do not read the main opinion as reaching the question of whether an
32 SC-2025-0372
officer may "demand" physical identification after a suspect provides
complete and satisfactory responses regarding the three requested pieces
of information.
II. Conclusion
In sum, I agree with the main opinion that, when a suspect gives
an incomplete or unsatisfactory oral response, an officer is not prohibited
from requesting or demanding the suspect's name and address in the
form of physical identification and, in fact, is authorized to do so.
33 SC-2025-0372
SHAW, Justice (concurring in the result).
Section 15-5-30, Ala. Code 1975, provides that a law-enforcement
officer "may stop any person abroad in a public place whom he reasonably
suspects is committing, has committed or is about to commit a felony or
other public offense and may demand of him his name, address and an
explanation of his actions." This Code section does not provide that
officers may randomly demand identification. It instead provides that
certain officers, in certain places, in certain situations, may "demand"
certain information.
It is beyond cavil that the word "name" refers to a person's actual
name. Giving a false name, a nickname, or an occupational or
professional title in place of all or part of a person's actual name is not
answering with one's "name"; such answers do not respond to the
"demand" of a person's "name" under § 15-5-30 and are nonresponsive.
The Code section allows an officer to demand an "address." The
word "address" refers to a street name and number. A reference to a
general geographical location where one lives is nonresponsive.
34 SC-2025-0372
When a person refuses to answer following a demand under § 15-5-
30 or when that person's answer is nonresponsive, the person has not
responded to the demand.
The Code section does not specify the manner in which a person
may respond to the demand. While, in context, an officer engaging a
person in a public place would naturally imply an oral interaction,
nothing in the Code section requires that an answer be in the form of an
oral response. Indeed, a person might not be able to answer orally.
The Code section authorizes an officer to demand and obtain a
person's actual name and address. It does not allow nonresponsive
answers. The language in the Code section does not limit an officer to
demanding only an oral answer.
35 SC-2025-0372
MENDHEIM, Justice (dissenting).
I respectfully dissent. Regarding the answer to the certified
question, I agree with the main opinion that Ala. Code 1975, § 15-5-30,
does not prohibit a law-enforcement officer from demanding physical
identification when a person whom the officer reasonably suspects is
about to commit a felony or other public offense fails to provide an
adequate name, address, or explanation of his or her actions for purposes
of identification. Nevertheless, I dissented from the Court's decision to
accept the question before us and believe we should decline to answer the
question due to basic principles of comity with the federal courts.
Based on the materials before us, neither United States District
Court Judge R. David Proctor nor any party sought to certify a question
to this Court regarding the meaning or application of § 15-5-30 before
the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals' decision reversing the merits-
based judgment against Michael Jerome Jennings and in favor of the City
of Childersburg and police officers Christopher Smith, Justin Gable, and
Jeremy Brooks. See Jennings v. Smith, No. 23-14171, Sept. 27, 2024
(11th Cir. 2024) (not reported in Federal Reporter) ("Jennings II").
Instead, Judge Proctor initially addressed the meaning and application
36 SC-2025-0372
of that statute, expressly after considering the "decision in Edger v.
McCabe, 84 F.4th 1230 (11th Cir. 2023)," when entering the
aforementioned judgment. Jennings v. Smith, No. 1:22-cv-01165-RDP,
Dec. 21, 2023 (N.D. Ala. 2023) (not reported in Federal Supplement)
("Jennings I"). In Jennings II, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals
disagreed with the decision in Jennings I, specifically determining that
"this case falls within the purview of Edger[ v. McCabe, 84 F.4th 1230
(11th Cir. 2023)]," as to the meaning and application of § 15-5-30. Thus,
the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals has made its determination
regarding Alabama law for purposes of this case, and this Court is now
presented with a question that will require us to state or infer either that
the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals erred in Jennings II because Edger
v. McCabe, 84 F.4th 1230 (11th Cir. 2023), does not accurately reflect
Alabama law; that that court erred in Jennings II because Edger was
correctly decided but is distinguishable from or irrelevant to this case; or
that that court correctly understood and applied Alabama law in
Jennings II. In other words, this case is postured such that this Court
essentially is reviewing the decision of the Eleventh Circuit Court of
Appeals in Jennings II rather than entertaining a question from that
37 SC-2025-0372
court regarding Alabama law for purposes of prospective application to
the case. I do not believe that reflects a proper use of Rule 18, Ala. R.
App. P.
As counsel for Smith, Gable, and Brooks acknowledged in their
"Preliminary Brief in Support of Accepting the Certified Question" ("the
brief in support") filed with this Court, on May 19, 2025, Judge Proctor
entered "a memorandum opinion and order granting the motion of
[Smith, Gable, and Brooks] and their employer, the City of Childersburg,
to certify a question regarding Alabama Code § 15-5-30 to this Court."
The brief in support, p.6. The May 2025 order, a copy of which was
attached as Appendix B to the brief in support, states: "This matter is
before the court on [Smith, Gable, and Brooks's] Motion to Certify
Controlling Question to the Supreme Court of Alabama. … For the
reasons discussed below, the Motion … is GRANTED."
The motion to certify referenced in the May 2025 order was filed in
response to a March 4, 2025, order entered by Judge Proctor, a copy of
which was attached as Appendix F to the brief in support. The March
2025 order was entered after a status conference. We have no transcript
38 SC-2025-0372
of what was said at that conference, but Judge Proctor stated as follows
in footnote 1 of the March 2025 order:
"At the status conference, the court candidly acknowledged that it is not at all convinced that the Eleventh Circuit correctly interpreted Alabama Code § 15-5-30. But, that is of no moment. It is simply irrelevant what the undersigned, sitting as a lower court, thinks. After all, unless there is a change in controlling law or a presentation of new facts to the trier of fact, the Eleventh Circuit's holding is law of the case here. Piambino v. Bailey, 757 F.2d 1112, 1120 (11th Cir. 1985)."
In the March 2025 order, Judge Proctor then questioned whether the
Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals had properly relied on Edger, and he
proceeded to discuss exceptions to the law-of-the-case doctrine,
specifically noting that an exception to the application of the doctrine
existed " ' "when there has been a change in controlling authority.' " "
(Quoting Newman v. Ormand, 456 F. App'x 866, 867 (11th Cir. 2012),
quoting, in turn Jackson v. Alabama State Tenure Comm'n, 405 F.3d
1276, 1283 (11th Cir. 2005).) Judge Proctor then opined that the question
might be certified to this Court (which might generate a change in
controlling authority for purposes of establishing an exception to the law-
of-the-case doctrine), and he requested briefs on the issue whether to
certify a question to this Court and how that question should be framed.
39 SC-2025-0372
In response to the March 2025 order, Smith, Gable, and Brooks filed a
brief that included a motion for certification, which they attached as
Appendix D to the brief in support. As noted above, Judge Proctor
granted that motion.
I dissented from the Court's decision to accept Judge Proctor's
request that we answer the certified question, and I still believe that we
should decline to answer the question. In Palmore v. First Unum, 841
So. 2d 233 (Ala. 2002), this Court declined to answer a certified question,
noting that principles of comity weigh in favor of declining to answer a
question in circumstances similar to those before us:
"As stated above, on June 29, 2001, the district court issued a memorandum opinion in this case in which it held, based upon its previous opinion in Gilbert v. Alta Health & Life Insurance Co., 122 F. Supp. 2d 1267 (N.D. Ala. 2000), that Alabama's tort of bad faith was not preempted by ERISA. The Eleventh Circuit reversed this holding in its Gilbert decision, which was released on December 27, 2001. On January 17, 2002, the district court certified its question to this Court, noting the reversal but stating that the Eleventh Circuit's mandate in Gilbert had not yet been released. We accepted the certified question on February 15, 2002. However, after refusing to hear the Gilbert case en banc, the Eleventh Circuit issued its mandate to the district court on March 22, 2002. The issuance of this mandate (which, of course, binds the district court) raises a serious question regarding the propriety of the outstanding certified question, which is an apparent challenge to the Eleventh Circuit. To say the least, these events place this Court in an unenviable position -- a position 40 SC-2025-0372
that at least favors, if not demands, that we decline to answer the certified question."
841 So. 2d at 236 n.3; see also Gerber Prods. Co. v. Mitchell, Williams,
Selig, Gates & Woodyard, PLLC, No. CV-22-326, Mar. 2, 2023 (Ark. 2023)
(not published in South Western Reporter) (discussing a certified
question from the United States District Court for the Eastern District
of Arkansas, following remand, and stating: "This certified question
comes before us in an unusual procedural posture. As stated above, the
Eighth Circuit has directly addressed the issue involved in the certified
question presented to this court. Therefore, exercising our broad
discretion under Rule 6-8, [Ark. R. Sup. Ct.], we rescind our decision to
answer the certified question.");16 Broadview Sav. & Loan Co. v.
Riestenberg, 49 Ohio St. 3d 133, 134, 550 N.E.2d 949, 949 (1990)
(refusing to consider a certified question, following remand, and stating:
"Since the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals has given its answer, we believe
it would be inappropriate to intervene between the federal appellate and
16Pursuant to Rule 5-2(c), Ark. R. Sup. Ct., "[e]very Supreme Court
and Court of Appeals opinion issued after July 1, 2009, is precedent and may be relied upon and cited by any party in any proceeding." The Comments to Rule 5-2 state: “Subdivision (c) eliminates the distinction between unpublished opinions. All opinions issued after July 1, 2009, are precedent and may be cited in any filing or argument in any court." 41 SC-2025-0372
district courts. This decision does not preclude the Sixth Circuit Court of
Appeals from seeking our opinion should this case again reach it on
appeal.").
Although I understand that the decision whether to certify a
question generally is a discretionary one for the pertinent federal court,
certification after the receipt of an adverse decision on the merits is not
favored in the federal system, and the certification in the present case
has come only after a significant expenditure of federal judicial resources
in answering the question that has now been certified to this Court. See,
e.g., Boyd Rosene & Assocs., Inc. v. Kansas Mun. Gas Agency, 178 F. 3d
1363, 1365 (10th Cir. 1999) (rejecting a request for certification that was
made for the first time on rehearing, noting that the request was made
only after an adverse decision on the merits, and stating that granting
certification "at this late hour would be inefficient and wasteful of the
parties' and the federal courts' previously expended time, energy, and
resources"); see also City of Columbus v. Hotels.com, L.P., 693 F.3d 642,
654 (6th Cir. 2012) ("[C]ertification is disfavored where a plaintiff files in
federal court and then, after an unfavorable judgment, 'seek [s] refuge' in
a state forum. Local 219 Plumbing & Pipefitting Indus. Pension Fund v.
42 SC-2025-0372
Buck Consultants, LLC, 311 Fed. Appx. 827, 831 (6th Cir.2009). 'The
appropriate time to seek certification of a state-law issue is before a
District Court resolves the issue, not after receiving an unfavorable
ruling.' Id. at 832."). And I am particularly troubled by that prospect
when no judge on the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals' panel that
decided Jennings II, which included the judge who authored Edger,
Judge Charles R. Wilson, and who was on the panel for another case
pertinent to Judge Proctor's decision to certify, namely Metz v. Bridges,
No. 23-11275, Dec. 12, 2024 (11th Cir. 2024) (not reported in Federal
Reporter), even suggested that certification might be appropriate. See
Lehman Bros. v. Schein, 416 U.S. 386, 391-92 (1974) (noting that a
dissenting judge on the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals had urged that
court to certify the state-law question at issue to the Florida Supreme
Court and remanding the case to the Court of Appeals "so that that court
may reconsider whether the controlling issue of Florida law should be
certified to the Florida Supreme Court"); see also Hiji v. City of Garnett,
248 Kan. 1, 4, 804 P.2d 950, 952 (1991) (accepting a certified question
and noting that the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
had suggested that the federal district court, on remand, either certify
43 SC-2025-0372
the state-law question to the Kansas Supreme Court or reexamine
Kansas caselaw).
Stewart, C.J., and McCool, J., concur.