IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA No. 16–1544
Filed April 12, 2019
MICHAEL JEFFERSON,
Plaintiff,
vs.
IOWA DISTRICT COURT FOR SCOTT COUNTY,
Defendant.
On review from the Iowa Court of Appeals.
Certiorari to the Iowa District Court for Scott County, Marlita A.
Greve, Judge.
The plaintiff seeks further review of a court of appeals decision
upholding the district court denial of his motion to correct an illegal
sentence and his application for appointment of counsel. DECISION OF
COURT OF APPEALS VACATED; WRIT SUSTAINED.
Les M. Blair III (until withdrawal) of Blair & Fitzsimmons, P.C.,
Dubuque, then Stuart G. Hoover of Blair & Fitzsimmons, P.C., Dubuque,
for plaintiff.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Sharon K. Hall, Assistant
Attorney General, and Michael J. Walton, County Attorney, for defendant. 2 CHRISTENSEN, Justice. A defendant filed a motion to correct an illegal sentence. He applied
for appointment of counsel. The district court not only denied
appointment of counsel, but also summarily dismissed his motion. The
defendant filed a petition for writ of certiorari. The court of appeals
annulled the writ. On further review, we find Iowa Rule of Criminal
Procedure 2.28(1) requires the court to appoint counsel when an indigent
defendant files a motion to correct illegal sentence under Iowa Rule of
Criminal Procedure 2.24(1). Therefore, we sustain the writ and remand the case for appointment of counsel.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings.
In 2007, Michael Jefferson, then twenty-one years old, engaged in
nonconsensual sexual contact with a fourteen-year-old female in a
Davenport motel alongside another adult male, Arnold Grice. Jefferson
forced the victim to have sexual intercourse with him against her will by
placing his penis into her vagina while Grice forced his penis into the
victim’s mouth. During this time, the victim was under the influence of
cocaine and alcohol. The victim later identified Grice from a photographic
line-up, and Grice’s girlfriend implicated Jefferson based on admissions made to her. Upon further investigation, law enforcement was able to lift
Jefferson’s fingerprints from a condom wrapper found in the motel room.
Consequently, the state charged Jefferson with sexual abuse in the second
degree in violation of Iowa Code section 709.3 (2007), a class “B” felony,
and sexual abuse in the third degree in violation of Iowa Code section
709.4(2)(c)(4), a class “C” felony.
Jefferson entered into a plea agreement in which he pled guilty to
third-degree sexual abuse based on his sexual assault of a fourteen-year-
old while he was twenty-one years old. As part of the plea agreement, 3
Jefferson agreed to testify against Grice, and the state agreed to dismiss
the charge of second-degree sexual abuse against Jefferson, file no
additional charges, and make no sentencing recommendation. In
conditionally accepting Jefferson’s guilty plea, the district court found that
there was a factual basis to support this plea and that Jefferson entered
into the plea knowingly and voluntarily.
Jefferson subsequently filed a timely motion in arrest of judgment
seeking permission to withdraw his guilty plea based on his alleged
innocence, fear of further prosecution due to his inadequate testimony
against Grice, and his belief that the district court failed to properly inform
him of the duration he would spend on the sex offender registry. The
district court denied Jefferson’s motion. The court of appeals affirmed
Jefferson’s conviction but vacated his sentence and remanded for
resentencing based on the state’s unauthorized sentencing
recommendation in breach of the plea agreement. Jefferson later
unsuccessfully raised similar claims in a postconviction-relief action.
The district court sentenced Jefferson to an indefinite term of
imprisonment not to exceed ten years and ordered his placement on the
sex offender registry for third-degree sexual abuse in violation of Iowa Code
section 709.4. The district court also imposed a special lifetime sentence
pursuant to Iowa Code section 903B.1, committing Jefferson into the
custody of the director of the Iowa Department of Corrections with parole
eligibility as set forth in chapter 906. Approximately two years after
Jefferson was discharged from prison, the board of parole filed a notice of
parole violation claiming Jefferson violated three conditions of parole. The
violations alleged Jefferson provided false information to the sex offender
registry, thereby failing to obey all laws and ordinances, and Jefferson
made verbal threats in a phone call to his former girlfriend. Following a 4
parole revocation hearing, a parole judge found the violations were correct,
revoked Jefferson’s parole, and ordered Jefferson be placed on the work
release list or at the work release center in Davenport. Soon thereafter,
another parole judge found Jefferson in violation of four parole conditions
and ordered Jefferson to serve up to five years in prison.
Jefferson filed a motion for correction of an illegal sentence on May
19, 2016, challenging the discharge date for his special lifetime sentence
under 903B.1 and claiming an ex post facto violation. The district court
denied Jefferson’s motion in its entirety, explaining Jefferson’s offense
required “the imposition of the special sentence of lifetime parole pursuant
to Iowa Code [s]ection 903B.1 . . . [and] this court has no control or
authority over when Defendant is to be released or when his parole should
end.” Jefferson filed a second motion for correction of an illegal sentence
on August 9, 2016, maintaining his lifetime special sentence was
unconstitutionally vague and the result of an illegal bill of attainder in
violation of the United States and Iowa Constitutions. Moreover,
Jefferson’s second motion claimed the lifetime special sentence violated
equal protection; the separation of powers doctrine; his constitutional
rights to freedom of association, to marry and have children, to be free
from bodily restraint, and to travel; as well as his right against self-
incrimination under the Fifth Amendment of the United States
Constitution. Jefferson also filed an application for appointment of
counsel on August 9, 2016.
The district court denied Jefferson’s second motion for correction of
an illegal sentence “for all the same reasons” the district court denied his
first motion for correction of an illegal sentence. The district court also
denied Jefferson’s motion to have counsel appointed. Prior to receiving
this denial, Jefferson mailed a motion to amend original filing of correction 5
of sentence that raised additional constitutional violations, including a
claim that his special lifetime sentence violated the prohibition against
cruel and unusual punishment under the United States and Iowa
Constitutions. The district court denied this motion, noting it was “denied
for all of the same reasons the previous two motions were denied.”
Jefferson filed a petition for writ of certiorari followed by a notice of
appeal from the district court’s denial of his second motion to correct an
illegal sentence “and from all adverse rulings and orders inhering therein.”
We denied Jefferson’s petition for writ of certiorari, noting he had a “related
appeal still pending before this court . . . in which” he had appointed
counsel to represent him.
We then determined Jefferson was not entitled to an appeal as a
matter of right from a denial of a motion to correct an illegal sentence. It
was proper for Jefferson to seek permission to appeal by filing a petition
for a writ of certiorari.
Jefferson filed a statement in support of granting certiorari review
on July 27, 2017, reasoning review was warranted because our “guidance
is necessary on the questions of whether and under what circumstances
a defendant may be entitled to counsel, a hearing, and/or a statement of
findings on a motion to correct illegal sentence.” Jefferson proclaimed we
also needed to provide guidance as to when a gross disproportionality cruel
and unusual punishment claim involving a section 903B.1 special
sentence “may lie, specifically including the question of whether the
threshold inquiry is satisfied under the circumstances of the present case.”
Pursuant to Iowa Rule of Appellate Procedure 6.108, we treated all
of Jefferson’s filings as a petition for a writ of certiorari. We granted
certiorari review. 6
The court of appeals annulled the writ of certiorari. It determined
Jefferson had no constitutional or statutory right to counsel in his
challenge to his alleged illegal sentence because the right to counsel does
not apply to “a collateral attack on the conviction that has been finalized
long ago.” Additionally, the court of appeals rejected Jefferson’s claim that
his sentence was cruel and unusual, noting Jefferson could not show an
inference of gross disproportionality between the gravity of his offense and
his challenged sentence. Jefferson sought further review, which we
granted.
II. Standard of Review.
We review questions of statutory interpretation for correction of
errors at law. State v. Coleman, 907 N.W.2d 124, 134 (Iowa 2018).
Moreover, “[w]e may review a challenge that a sentence is illegal at any
time.” State v. Zarate, 908 N.W.2d 831, 840 (Iowa 2018). Finally, “[t]hough
we typically review challenges to illegal sentences for correction of legal
errors, our standard of review for an allegation of an unconstitutional
sentence is de novo.” State v. Harrison, 914 N.W.2d 178, 187–88 (Iowa
2018).
III. Analysis.
Jefferson presents a number of claims. First, he argues the district
court violated his statutory right to counsel in denying his request for
court-appointed counsel to represent him on his motion for correction of
an illegal sentence. Next, Jefferson contends this denial of court-
appointed counsel violated his constitutional right to counsel under both
the Iowa and Federal Constitutions. Should we hold Jefferson does not
have a federal constitutional right to counsel, Jefferson maintains the Iowa
Constitution still provides him with a state constitutional right to counsel
because the Iowa Constitution should be interpreted broader than the 7
United States Constitution. Similarly, he argues he has a right to counsel
based on considerations of due process and fundamental fairness under
the Iowa Constitution. Jefferson also claims the district court violated his
procedural due process rights by summarily dismissing his motion for
correction of an illegal sentence without providing him an evidentiary
hearing or detailed findings. Finally, he asserts his lifetime special
sentence under Iowa Code section 903B.1 constitutes cruel and unusual
punishment under the State and Federal Constitutions.
A. The Right to Counsel on a Motion to Correct Illegal
Sentence. Jefferson contends the district court violated his statutory
right to counsel, as well as his constitutional right to counsel under the
State and Federal Constitutions, in declining his request for appointed
counsel to represent him on his motion to correct an illegal sentence.
Additionally, he argues this denial of appointed counsel violates his due
process rights as a matter of fundamental fairness under the State and
Federal Constitutions. Jefferson asks us to hold that a motion to correct
an illegal sentence is a stage of the criminal proceeding for which a right
to counsel applies.
Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 2.28(1) provides,
Every defendant who is an indigent person as defined in Iowa Code section 815.9 is entitled to have counsel appointed to represent the defendant at every stage of the proceedings from the defendant’s initial appearance before the magistrate or the court through appeal, including probation revocation hearings, unless the defendant waives such appointment.
Iowa R. Crim. P. 2.28(1). Additionally, Iowa Code section 815.10
states,
The court, for cause and upon its own motion or upon application by an indigent person or a public defender, shall appoint the state public defender’s designee pursuant to section 13B.4 to represent an indigent person at any stage 8 of the criminal, postconviction, contempt, commitment under chapter 229A, termination under chapter 600A, detention under section 811.1A, competency under chapter 812, parole revocation if applicable under section 908.2A, or juvenile proceedings or on appeal of any criminal, postconviction, contempt, commitment under chapter 229A, termination under chapter 600A, detention under section 811.1A, competency under chapter 812, parole revocation under chapter 908, or juvenile action in which the indigent person is entitled to legal assistance at public expense. However, in juvenile cases, the court may directly appoint an existing nonprofit corporation established for and engaged in the provision of legal services for juveniles. An appointment shall not be made unless the person is determined to be indigent under section 815.9.
Iowa Code § 815.10(1)(a) (2016) (emphasis added).
In State v. Alspach, we read rule 2.28(1) (then rule 26(1)) and Iowa
Code section 815.10(1) together and concluded that they provided a right
to court-appointed counsel when a defendant is challenging restitution
“imposed as part of the original sentencing order, or supplemental orders,
under Iowa Code section 910.3,” but not when a defendant is later bringing
an action under section 910.7. 554 N.W.2d 882, 883–84 (Iowa 1996). 1 We noted in Alspach that the defendant would have had a statutory right to
counsel had the restitution been finalized at sentencing and that he
“should not be denied counsel simply because the amount of pecuniary damages was unavailable on the day of sentencing.” Id. at 884.
Nevertheless, we limited our holding “to challenges to restitution imposed
as part of the original sentencing order, or supplemental orders.” Id. In
doing so, we maintained the defendant would “ordinarily have no right to
appointed counsel” if he initiated a later action to modify the restitution
1We subsequently clarified in State v. Blank that a petition under Iowa Code section 910.7 filed within thirty days of a court’s restitution order would be “considered an extension of the criminal proceedings.” 570 N.W.2d 924, 926 (Iowa 1997). Hence, a right to counsel would attach. See State v. Dudley, 766 N.W.2d 606, 619 n.5 (Iowa 2009). 9
order because a later action would “not [be] part of the criminal
proceedings.” Id.
In State v. Dudley, 766 N.W.2d 606 (Iowa 2009), we recognized that
Iowa Code section 815.10 is not self-contained. It provides a right to
counsel “at any stage of the criminal . . . proceedings . . . in which the
indigent defendant is entitled to legal assistance at public expense.” Id. at
617 (quoting Iowa Code § 815.10(1) (2005)). Therefore, Dudley looked to
other sources to determine when the defendant is “entitled to legal
assistance at public expense.” Id. at 617–18. In Dudley, we pointed out
that the Iowa Constitution guarantees the right to counsel “in all criminal
prosecutions,” and that section 801.4(13) defines a “prosecution” as
ending at “final judgment on behalf of the state.” Id. at 617–18. Hence,
in Dudley, we concluded “the legislature intended to extend the right to
counsel enjoyed by a defendant charged with a criminal offense through
the conclusion of the criminal proceeding by judgment.” Id. at 618.
However, we did not discuss rule 2.28(1) (or 26(1)) in Dudley, beyond
noting that Alspach had relied on it. Id. at 619. Thus, we held that an
acquitted defendant had a statutory right to counsel in a postacquittal
proceeding for a judgment against him for the costs of his legal assistance
as part of his defense since the judgment “was entered in the criminal
proceeding, not in a separate action by the State.” Id. “[B]y definition,”
the defendant’s “criminal case did not end . . . until the cost judgment had
been entered against [him] and in favor of the State.” Id. at 620.
We must now decide in what category a motion to correct illegal
sentence belongs. The text of Iowa Code section 815.10 does not answer
the question; instead, it simply redirects us to whether this is a stage of
the proceeding “in which the indigent person is entitled to legal assistance
at public expense.” Iowa Code § 815.10(1)(a) (2016). Rule 2.28(1), 10
meanwhile, is ambiguous. It states that the defendant has a right to
counsel “at every stage of the proceedings . . . through appeal.” Iowa R.
Crim. P. 2.28(1). Does this mean that the right to counsel drops out once
the defendant has been through his or her direct appeal? Or does it mean
that as long as one is talking about a stage of the original criminal case,
including any appeal within that original criminal case, the right to
counsel remains?
In Alspach and Dudley we appear to have opted for the second of
these two possible readings. That is, in Alspach we declined to find a right
to counsel when the defendant files “a later action” under Iowa Code
section 910.7, which is “civil in nature and not part of the criminal
proceedings.” 554 N.W.2d at 884. Yet in Dudley we found that there is a
right to counsel when the state is seeking to collect costs of defense from
an acquitted defendant because “[t]he State is not required to initiate a
separate suit.” 766 N.W.2d at 618. “This process takes place entirely in
the context of the criminal case.” Id.
A motion to correct illegal sentence is a stage of the original criminal
case. It “takes place entirely in the context of [that case].” Id. Such a
motion is not filed as a separate action. Indeed, rule 2.24(1) authorizes it
as one of the “[p]ermissible motions after trial.” It is true that such a
motion may be filed at any time. See Iowa R. Crim. P. 2.24(5)(a). Still, it
is not filed as a separate action but within the original criminal case. It is
merely a “motion,” not an “application,” see Iowa Code § 822.3 (application
for postconviction relief), or even a “petition,” see id. § 910.7 (petition to
modify plan of restitution or restitution plan of payment). Thus, we believe
that under rule 2.28(1), Alspach, and Dudley, a right to counsel is
triggered. 11
Furthermore, we believe this interpretation is supported by the
principle that “we strive to avoid constitutional problems when we
interpret our rules.” State v. Jones, 817 N.W.2d 11, 17 (Iowa 2012).
Needless to say, serious constitutional problems would be raised if the
state could move to correct an indigent defendant’s sentence and have that
defendant sent to prison without the defendant having a right to counsel.
Likewise, serious constitutional problems would be raised if an indigent
defendant who sought a correction of his or her sentence in light of a case
like State v. Lyle, 854 N.W.2d 378 (Iowa 2014) (holding all mandatory
minimum sentences of imprisonment for juvenile offenders violate article
I, section 17 of the Iowa Constitution), did not have a right to counsel at
the resentencing.
We are aware that the motion to correct an illegal sentence has the
potential to be abused. There are tools to address such abuse. To begin
with, a motion challenging a defendant’s underlying conviction is not a
motion to correct an illegal sentence. State v. Bruegger, 773 N.W.2d 862,
871 (Iowa 2009). Additionally, “a defective sentencing procedure does not
constitute an illegal sentence . . . .” Tindell v. State, 629 N.W.2d 357, 360
(Iowa 2001) (emphasis omitted). In those events, rule 2.28(1) does not
require appointment of counsel because the motion is not a rule 2.28(1)
motion.
Furthermore, a motion to correct an illegal sentence may be
frivolous, for example, if it claims that a routine sentence was cruel and
unusual or that two convictions should have merged when it is abundantly
clear they do not. In that event, counsel should be appointed, but may
ask to withdraw employing a procedure similar to that authorized by rule
6.1005 for frivolous appeals. See Iowa R. App. P. 6.1005. 12
Because we have concluded that rule 2.28(1) affords a right to
counsel on a motion to correct an illegal sentence, we need not address
Jefferson’s arguments that such a right is mandated by the Sixth and
Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution or article I,
sections 9 and 10 of the Iowa Constitution. See, e.g., State v. Iowa Dist.
Ct., 843 N.W.2d 76, 85 (Iowa 2014) (“The doctrine of constitutional
avoidance suggests the proper course in the construction of a statute may
be to steer clear of ‘constitutional shoals’ when possible.”).
B. The Constitutionality of Jefferson’s Sentence. Jefferson asks
us to find that his lifetime special sentence under Iowa Code section
903B.1 violates the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clauses of the State
and Federal Constitutions, arguing the sentence is grossly
disproportionate to his offense. Under Iowa Code section 903B.1, “[a]
person convicted of a class ‘C’ felony or greater offense under chapter 709,”
including the offense Jefferson pled guilty to, is subject “to a special
sentence committing the person into the custody of the director of the Iowa
department of corrections for the rest of the person’s life, with eligibility
for parole as provided in chapter 906.” Iowa Code § 903B.1 (2007). This
special sentence commences “upon completion of the sentence imposed
under any applicable criminal sentencing provisions for the underlying
criminal offense and the person shall begin the sentence under
supervision as if on parole.” Id. At that point, the person serving the
special sentence is placed on the corrections continuum outlined in
chapter 901B and subject to the same procedures as other parole and
work release violations in ordinary sentencing. Id. Any revocation of
release due to parole violations “shall not be for a period greater than two
years upon any first revocation, and five years upon any second or
subsequent revocation.” Id. Finally, pursuant to Iowa Code section 13
906.15, a person convicted of a crime against a child under section 709.4,
who is serving a special sentence pursuant to section 903B.1, is eligible
for early release from parole once “the person’s term of parole equals the
period of imprisonment specified in the person’s sentence, less all time
served in confinement.” Id. § 906.15. Jefferson claims his “lack of prior
criminal history, young age, and relatively lower culpability[,] comparing
the offense of statutory rape versus the other possible felonies that would
give rise to a 903B.1 lifetime special sentence[,]” create an inference that
his sentence is grossly disproportionate to his underlying crime.
As described above, Jefferson is raising a claim that his sentence is
illegal. Accordingly, he was entitled to the appointment of counsel in the
district court. We sustain the writ and remand for the district court to
appoint counsel and consider the merits of Jefferson’s claims.
IV. Conclusion.
For the aforementioned reasons, we sustain the petition for writ of
certiorari and remand for further proceedings.
DECISION OF COURT OF APPEALS VACATED; WRIT
SUSTAINED.
All justices concur except McDonald, J., who takes no part.