Michael James Ross v. Sheriff Kevin Rambosk, Collier County Sheriff, Officer Delia C. Luna, Collier County Police Officer #323, and Chief Ciro M. Dominguez, Chief of Naples Police

District Court, M.D. Florida·Decided July 30, 2026·No. 2:26-cv-02168·Unknown

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA FORT MYERS DIVISION

MICHAEL JAMES ROSS,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No.: 2:26-cv-2168-SPC-KRH

SHERIFF KEVIN RAMBOSK, Collier County Sherriff, OFFICER DELIA C. LUNA, Collier County Police Officer #323, and CHIEF CIRO M. DOMINGUEZ, Chief of Naples Police,

Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER Before the Court is Defendant Sheriff Kevin Rambosk’s Motion to Dismiss. (Doc. 4). Plaintiff Michael James Ross failed to respond. See M.D. Fla. R. 3.01(d) (“If a party fails to timely respond, the motion is subject to treatment as unopposed.”). After review, the Court grants the motion. Background This is a civil rights action.1 Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Officer Delia C. Luna “and the Naples Police Department” unlawfully arrested him on

1 The Court “accept[s] the allegations in the complaint as true and constru[es] them in the light most favorable to” Plaintiff. Belanger v. Salvation Army, 556 F.3d 1153, 1155 (11th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted). January 14, 2024. (Doc. 1 at 7). Plaintiff further alleges Defendants wrongly claimed he unlawfully possessed an air rifle as a convicted felon as a basis for

the arrest. According to Plaintiff, he has never been convicted of a felony. Because of Defendants’ wrongful arrest, Plaintiff allegedly was detained for multiple days. Plaintiff sues Defendants under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of his

First, Second, Fourth, and Eighth Amendment rights. Defendant Rambosk moves to dismiss the claims against him under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).2 Legal Standard

To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a complaint must allege “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Bare “labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action,” are

not enough. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). A district court should dismiss a claim when a party does not plead facts that make the claim facially plausible. See id. at 570. A claim is facially plausible when a

2 Defendant Rambosk’s motion also seeks dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2) for lack of personal jurisdiction. The Court denied a similar Rule 12(b)(2) motion brought by Defendants Luna and Dominguez as moot upon this case being transferred from the Western District of Texas to the Middle District of Florida. (See Doc. 23). The Court denies the Rule 12(b)(2) portion of Defendant Rambosk’s motion as moot for the same reason. court can draw a reasonable inference, based on the facts pled, that the opposing party is liable for the alleged misconduct. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

Analysis Defendant Rambosk argues that Plaintiff’s claims against him can only be treated as official-capacity claims, given that there are no allegations that he was involved in the arrest. See, e.g., Adcock v. Baca, 157 F. App’x 118, 119

(11th Cir. 2005) (holding when “the defendant in a § 1983 civil rights action is the county sheriff, the suit is effectively an action against the governmental entity he represents”) (citing Cook ex rel. Est. of Tessier v. Sheriff of Monroe Cnty., Fla., 402 F.3d 1092, 1115 (11th Cir. 2005)). It follows then, the claims

against Defendant Rambosk are in effect claims against Collier County. So, the argument goes, Plaintiff’s claims against Collier County fail under the Supreme Court’s decision in Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Services of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978), and its progeny. The Court agrees.

Under Monell, a municipality such as Collier County “cannot be held liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on a theory of respondeat superior . . . Instead, such entities may be held liable only for the execution of a governmental policy or custom.” Adcock, 157 F. App’x at 119. “[T]he bar to establish municipal

liability [under Monell] is very high.” Simmons v. Bradshaw, 879 F.3d 1157, 1169 (11th Cir. 2018) (citation omitted). “A plaintiff can establish municipal liability under Monell in three ways: (1) identifying an official policy3; (2) identifying an unofficial custom or widespread practice that is so permanent

and well settled as to constitute a custom and usage with the force of law; or (3) identifying a municipal official with final policymaking authority whose decision violated the plaintiff's constitutional rights.” Chabad Chayil, Inc. v. Sch. Bd. of Miami-Dade Cnty., Fla., 48 F.4th 1222, 1229 (11th Cir.

2022) (citation omitted). This high bar is not met. Plaintiff’s complaint does not comply with Monell. He fails to allege facts establishing liability under any of the three bases identified above. All Plaintiff offers is a conclusory statement Defendant Rambosk “should be held

accountable” for his arrest, as well as an irrelevant accusation that “Rambosk has already been tried in court for human trafficking.” (Doc. 1 at 8). Therefore, his claims against Defendant Rambosk are dismissed without prejudice. The Court will allow Plaintiff one final opportunity to amend his complaint and fix

these errors. See Mandala v. Tire Stickers, LLC, 829 F. App’x 896, 903 (11th Cir. 2020) (“A district court need not allow an amendment where there has been repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed.” (cleaned up)). Failure to remedy the deficiencies will result in

dismissal of the case with prejudice.

3 An official municipal policy is a “statute, ordinance, regulation or decision officially adopted and promulgated by [a local governing] body’s officers.” Monell, 436 U.S. at 690. Accordingly, it is ORDERED: 1. Defendant Sheriff Kevin Rambosk’s motion to dismiss (Doc. 4) is GRANTED. 2. Plaintiff Michael James Ross’ claims against Defendant Rambosk

are DISMISSED without prejudice. 3. Plaintiff may file an amended complaint on or before August 20, 2026. Failure to comply with this order may result in dismissal without further notice.

DONE and ORDERED in Fort Myers, Florida on July 30, 2026.

, tite WObLatrat he 7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Copies: All Parties of Record

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Michael James Ross v. Sheriff Kevin Rambosk, Collier County Sheriff, Officer Delia C. Luna, Collier County Police Officer #323, and Chief Ciro M. Dominguez, Chief of Naples Police, (M.D. Fla. 2026).

Michael James Ross v. Sheriff Kevin Rambosk, Collier County Sheriff, Officer Delia C. Luna, Collier County Police Officer #323, and Chief Ciro M. Dominguez, Chief of Naples Police (Michael James Ross v. Sheriff Kevin Rambosk, Collier County Sheriff, Officer Delia C. Luna, Collier County Police Officer #323, and Chief Ciro M. Dominguez, Chief of Naples Police) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

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