IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
NO. 2022-CA-00149-COA
MICHAEL HOLLIDAY APPELLANT
v.
STATE OF MISSISSIPPI APPELLEE
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 01/11/2022 TRIAL JUDGE: HON. ROBERT THOMAS BAILEY COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED: KEMPER COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: JAMES A. WILLIAMS ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE: OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL BY: CASEY B. FARMER NATURE OF THE CASE: CIVIL - POST-CONVICTION RELIEF DISPOSITION: AFFIRMED - 04/11/2023 MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:
BEFORE CARLTON, P.J., WESTBROOKS AND McCARTY, JJ.
McCARTY, J., FOR THE COURT:
¶1. A man plead guilty to statutory rape and sexual battery. He was sentenced to serve
thirty years. The defendant filed a petition for post-conviction relief arguing that his trial
counsel was ineffective and that he was entitled to an evidentiary hearing. The trial court
denied the petition, finding he knowingly and voluntarily plead guilty. The defendant
appealed. Finding no error, we affirm.
BACKGROUND
¶2. Michael Holliday was indicted in Kemper County on one count of statutory rape and
one count of sexual battery. He was also charged with one count of incest and one count of
child exploitation. Holliday’s daughter was the victim in each of his charges. ¶3. His first court-appointed counsel withdrew due to his appointment as a circuit court
judge. Holliday was then appointed a second attorney. He claims this attorney worked out
a plea deal of ten years to serve but later withdrew as his counsel due to becoming an
assistant district attorney. Holliday claimed that despite his withdrawal, the attorney assured
him the ten-year deal would stand. However, Holiday later stated that because of docket
overcrowding, the plea was never submitted to the trial court. A third attorney was then
appointed. Holliday claimed the new attorney offered him fifteen years to serve, but he
ultimately turned it down and requested a trial. Afterward, Holliday filed a petition to enter
a guilty plea. During the hearing on the guilty plea, the State nolle prosequied the other two
charges.
¶4. The trial court then explained to Holliday that by pleading guilty, he would waive
certain Constitutional guarantees or rights. Holliday stated that he understood and that his
attorney went over his rights with him. The court also asked if he was satisfied with the legal
services of his attorney. He responded, “Yes.” He then affirmed his attorney went over the
essential elements of the crimes to which he plead guilty. The trial court further asked if
Holliday understood the court may impose the same punishment as if he had plead not guilty.
He replied, “Yes, I do.” Holliday also affirmed that he was not promised a lighter sentence
if he plead guilty.
¶5. The court subsequently entered an order accepting Holliday’s guilty plea and setting
his sentencing date. The order stated there was “no agreement between the Office of the
District Attorney and the Defendant on initial time to serve” and that this was a “true BLIND
2 PLEA.”
¶6. At Holliday’s sentencing hearing, the defense called the victim as a witness. Counsel
for Holliday asked the victim what would be an appropriate sentence for her father.
Overwhelmed with emotion, she responded, “I don’t know.” The trial court then told the
victim, “If you don’t have an opinion, you don’t have to give one; but as [defense counsel]
stated, you are the victim of this matter.” The defense then rested. The court sentenced
Holliday to thirty years to serve in custody for statutory rape and fifteen years to serve in
custody for sexual battery, with fifteen years suspended.
¶7. Holliday timely filed a petition for post-conviction relief first arguing his due process
rights were violated because he plead guilty with the expectancy of a much lesser sentence
than thirty years day-for-day. He also argued his due process rights were violated because
the State “successfully eliminated” his daughter from giving her opinion regarding an
appropriate sentence. He therefore claimed the matter should have been further explored.
Holliday further argued his trial counsel was ineffective because the attorney failed to timely
accept the original plea offer, failed to advise him that a “plea in the blind” would expose
him to a harsher sentence, and failed to “properly marshal favorable testimony from the
victim.”
¶8. Attached to his petition were three affidavits—one from Holliday’s other daughter and
two from him. In the daughter’s affidavit, she stated that her father said he was “offered . . .
10 years, but he didn’t sign the paperwork because the Court was tied up.” She said her
father also stated he could “face life, but if he plead guilty he would get less time.”
3 ¶9. In Holliday’s affidavits, he explained he wanted to withdraw his guilty plea because
he was “mislead.” He claimed his first attorney worked out a “10 year plea [deal] that was
suppose[d] to stand,” but his second attorney instead presented him with a fifteen-year plea
deal. He stated he turned down the subsequent plea offer and asked to go to trial. However,
he claimed his attorney told him that he was facing “about 90 years” and that he would
receive a lesser sentence if he plead guilty. So, he said he agreed and plead guilty.
¶10. Furthermore, regarding whether he knew the sentencing range, he stated, “[T]he Judge
explain[ed] to me about it but I didn’t believe I would receive the maximum sentence.”
¶11. The trial court denied Holliday’s PCR petition. In a detailed and thoughtful opinion,
the court stated, “A knowing and voluntary guilty plea waives certain constitutional rights,
among them, the privilege against self-incrimination, the right to confront and cross-examine
the State’s witnesses, the right to a jury trial, and the right to have the State prove each
element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt.” In analyzing whether Holliday’s plea
was knowing and voluntary, the court stated, “[Holliday] repeatedly affirmed to the Court
that he understood he was being charged under Mississippi Code Annotated §§ 97-3-65(1)(a)
and 97-3-95, what the elements of those crimes were, what the State would have to prove,
and what the possible punishments for the crimes were.” The trial court found that
Holliday’s guilty plea was knowing and voluntary; therefore, his claims were without merit.
¶12. Further, the trial court found Holliday did not receive an unfair sentence, as he claims
the State prevented the victim from giving an opinion regarding an appropriate sentence. The
trial court stated, “The purpose of a victim statement is not to provide rights to the convicted
4 criminal.” Relying on Mississippi Code Annotated sections 99-19-151 to 99-19-161(Rev.
2015), the court found “the victim was not required to submit a victim impact statement or
cooperate in the preparation of a victim impact statement.”
¶13. Aggrieved, Holliday appeals.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶14. “When reviewing a trial court’s denial or dismissal of a PCR petition, we will only
disturb the trial court’s factual findings if they are clearly erroneous; however, we review the
trial court’s legal conclusions under a de novo standard of review.” Cuevas v. State, 304 So.
3d 1163, 1167 (¶19) (Miss. Ct. App. 2020).
DISCUSSION
¶15. Holliday’s two arguments on appeal both revolve around the trial court’s disposition
of his PCR petition without an evidentiary hearing.
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
NO. 2022-CA-00149-COA
MICHAEL HOLLIDAY APPELLANT
v.
STATE OF MISSISSIPPI APPELLEE
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 01/11/2022 TRIAL JUDGE: HON. ROBERT THOMAS BAILEY COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED: KEMPER COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: JAMES A. WILLIAMS ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE: OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL BY: CASEY B. FARMER NATURE OF THE CASE: CIVIL - POST-CONVICTION RELIEF DISPOSITION: AFFIRMED - 04/11/2023 MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:
BEFORE CARLTON, P.J., WESTBROOKS AND McCARTY, JJ.
McCARTY, J., FOR THE COURT:
¶1. A man plead guilty to statutory rape and sexual battery. He was sentenced to serve
thirty years. The defendant filed a petition for post-conviction relief arguing that his trial
counsel was ineffective and that he was entitled to an evidentiary hearing. The trial court
denied the petition, finding he knowingly and voluntarily plead guilty. The defendant
appealed. Finding no error, we affirm.
BACKGROUND
¶2. Michael Holliday was indicted in Kemper County on one count of statutory rape and
one count of sexual battery. He was also charged with one count of incest and one count of
child exploitation. Holliday’s daughter was the victim in each of his charges. ¶3. His first court-appointed counsel withdrew due to his appointment as a circuit court
judge. Holliday was then appointed a second attorney. He claims this attorney worked out
a plea deal of ten years to serve but later withdrew as his counsel due to becoming an
assistant district attorney. Holliday claimed that despite his withdrawal, the attorney assured
him the ten-year deal would stand. However, Holiday later stated that because of docket
overcrowding, the plea was never submitted to the trial court. A third attorney was then
appointed. Holliday claimed the new attorney offered him fifteen years to serve, but he
ultimately turned it down and requested a trial. Afterward, Holliday filed a petition to enter
a guilty plea. During the hearing on the guilty plea, the State nolle prosequied the other two
charges.
¶4. The trial court then explained to Holliday that by pleading guilty, he would waive
certain Constitutional guarantees or rights. Holliday stated that he understood and that his
attorney went over his rights with him. The court also asked if he was satisfied with the legal
services of his attorney. He responded, “Yes.” He then affirmed his attorney went over the
essential elements of the crimes to which he plead guilty. The trial court further asked if
Holliday understood the court may impose the same punishment as if he had plead not guilty.
He replied, “Yes, I do.” Holliday also affirmed that he was not promised a lighter sentence
if he plead guilty.
¶5. The court subsequently entered an order accepting Holliday’s guilty plea and setting
his sentencing date. The order stated there was “no agreement between the Office of the
District Attorney and the Defendant on initial time to serve” and that this was a “true BLIND
2 PLEA.”
¶6. At Holliday’s sentencing hearing, the defense called the victim as a witness. Counsel
for Holliday asked the victim what would be an appropriate sentence for her father.
Overwhelmed with emotion, she responded, “I don’t know.” The trial court then told the
victim, “If you don’t have an opinion, you don’t have to give one; but as [defense counsel]
stated, you are the victim of this matter.” The defense then rested. The court sentenced
Holliday to thirty years to serve in custody for statutory rape and fifteen years to serve in
custody for sexual battery, with fifteen years suspended.
¶7. Holliday timely filed a petition for post-conviction relief first arguing his due process
rights were violated because he plead guilty with the expectancy of a much lesser sentence
than thirty years day-for-day. He also argued his due process rights were violated because
the State “successfully eliminated” his daughter from giving her opinion regarding an
appropriate sentence. He therefore claimed the matter should have been further explored.
Holliday further argued his trial counsel was ineffective because the attorney failed to timely
accept the original plea offer, failed to advise him that a “plea in the blind” would expose
him to a harsher sentence, and failed to “properly marshal favorable testimony from the
victim.”
¶8. Attached to his petition were three affidavits—one from Holliday’s other daughter and
two from him. In the daughter’s affidavit, she stated that her father said he was “offered . . .
10 years, but he didn’t sign the paperwork because the Court was tied up.” She said her
father also stated he could “face life, but if he plead guilty he would get less time.”
3 ¶9. In Holliday’s affidavits, he explained he wanted to withdraw his guilty plea because
he was “mislead.” He claimed his first attorney worked out a “10 year plea [deal] that was
suppose[d] to stand,” but his second attorney instead presented him with a fifteen-year plea
deal. He stated he turned down the subsequent plea offer and asked to go to trial. However,
he claimed his attorney told him that he was facing “about 90 years” and that he would
receive a lesser sentence if he plead guilty. So, he said he agreed and plead guilty.
¶10. Furthermore, regarding whether he knew the sentencing range, he stated, “[T]he Judge
explain[ed] to me about it but I didn’t believe I would receive the maximum sentence.”
¶11. The trial court denied Holliday’s PCR petition. In a detailed and thoughtful opinion,
the court stated, “A knowing and voluntary guilty plea waives certain constitutional rights,
among them, the privilege against self-incrimination, the right to confront and cross-examine
the State’s witnesses, the right to a jury trial, and the right to have the State prove each
element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt.” In analyzing whether Holliday’s plea
was knowing and voluntary, the court stated, “[Holliday] repeatedly affirmed to the Court
that he understood he was being charged under Mississippi Code Annotated §§ 97-3-65(1)(a)
and 97-3-95, what the elements of those crimes were, what the State would have to prove,
and what the possible punishments for the crimes were.” The trial court found that
Holliday’s guilty plea was knowing and voluntary; therefore, his claims were without merit.
¶12. Further, the trial court found Holliday did not receive an unfair sentence, as he claims
the State prevented the victim from giving an opinion regarding an appropriate sentence. The
trial court stated, “The purpose of a victim statement is not to provide rights to the convicted
4 criminal.” Relying on Mississippi Code Annotated sections 99-19-151 to 99-19-161(Rev.
2015), the court found “the victim was not required to submit a victim impact statement or
cooperate in the preparation of a victim impact statement.”
¶13. Aggrieved, Holliday appeals.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶14. “When reviewing a trial court’s denial or dismissal of a PCR petition, we will only
disturb the trial court’s factual findings if they are clearly erroneous; however, we review the
trial court’s legal conclusions under a de novo standard of review.” Cuevas v. State, 304 So.
3d 1163, 1167 (¶19) (Miss. Ct. App. 2020).
DISCUSSION
¶15. Holliday’s two arguments on appeal both revolve around the trial court’s disposition
of his PCR petition without an evidentiary hearing. He further argues his trial counsel was
ineffective because the attorney failed to timely accept a plea offer, failed to advise him that
an open plea would probably result in a harsher sentence, and failed to adequately question
the victim at his sentencing hearing.
¶16. This Court has ruled on a nearly identical issue in a case where a man plead guilty to
drug trafficking. Cuevas, 304 So. 3d at 1166 (¶12). At his plea hearing, the trial court asked
Cuevas whether his attorney discussed the facts, circumstances, and elements of the crime
of trafficking and whether his plea was freely and voluntarily given. Id. He affirmed each
of the court’s questions. Id. He was subsequently sentenced to serve eight years in custody.
Id. Cuevas then filed a PCR petition, arguing the trial court erred in denying his PCR
5 petition without an evidentiary hearing. Id. at 1167 (¶18). He further argued his trial counsel
was ineffective because he failed to provide evidence to substantiate the mitigating factors
and failed to show the pre-sentencing report to his client. Id. The trial court denied his
petition, finding it was clear on the face of his petition that he was not entitled to PCR. Id.
He appealed. Id.
¶17. This court began by stating that “not all PCR petitions require a full adversarial
hearing.” Id. at (¶21). We then explained, “[A] PCR petition may be dismissed without the
benefit of a hearing if it plainly appears from the face of the motion, any annexed exhibits
and the prior proceedings in the case that the movant is not entitled to any relief.” Id.
Looking to the face of Cuevas’ petition, this court found that our ability to analyze his claim
was limited because he plead guilty. Id. at (¶22). Therefore, his “PCR claim [was] waived
unless we [found] his guilty plea was involuntary.” Id. Our Court stated that “pleas are
traditionally voluntary as long as a judge advises a defendant of his rights, the nature of the
charge against him, and the consequences of his plea. Id. at (¶23).
¶18. Ultimately, we found Cuevas’ plea was voluntary because the trial court “adequately
afforded [him] an opportunity to raise any concerns that could have affected his freedom.”
Id. at 1168 (¶26). Also, he “affirmed to the [trial] court that he was fully aware of the
consequences of his decisions.” Id. Therefore, this Court held that Cuevas’ ineffective-
assistance-of-counsel claim was without merit and that his petition needed no further inquiry.
Id. at (¶28).
¶19. Like Cuevas, “it plainly appears from the face of the motion, any annexed exhibits and
6 the prior proceedings . . . that [Holliday] is not entitled to any relief.” Id. at 1167 (¶21). Not
only is this evident from the transcript of his guilty plea, but this is also evident from his own
affidavit where he admits the trial judge made him aware of the sentencing range, but he
simply did not believe the judge. The trial court thoroughly explained to him the facts and
circumstances surrounding each of his charges, the elements of those charges, and the
consequences of his guilty plea. Critically, the trial court explained that by pleading guilty,
he would waive certain constitutional rights and that the trial court could impose the
maximum sentence for each charge. He repeatedly affirmed to the trial court he was aware
of those consequences.
¶20. Aligned with our ruling in Cuevas, Holliday’s guilty plea was knowing and voluntary
because he was “afforded . . . an opportunity to raise any concerns,” and he affirmed he was
“fully aware of the consequences” of his decision. Id. at (¶26).
¶21. Furthermore, Holliday does not challenge the voluntariness of his guilty plea. Rather,
his argument centers on an expectation that he would receive a lesser sentence. But this
expectation was clearly addressed by the trial court during his plea hearing. And by
Holliday’s own sworn testimony, although the trial court explained the consequences of his
guilty plea, he simply “didn’t believe” he would receive a thirty-year sentence.
¶22. Therefore, because Holliday voluntarily and knowingly plead guilty, his ineffective-
assistance-of-counsel claim is without merit. Furthermore, he is not entitled to an evidentiary
hearing. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in denying Holliday’s petition.
¶23. AFFIRMED.
7 BARNES, C.J., CARLTON AND WILSON, P.JJ., GREENLEE, WESTBROOKS, McDONALD, LAWRENCE AND EMFINGER, JJ., CONCUR. SMITH, J., NOT PARTICIPATING.