Michael Harris v. 851 West Front Enterprise LLC

Opinion

1 O 2

8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10

11 Case No.: 2:25-cv-01296-MEMF MICHAEL HARRIS,

12 Plaintiff, ORDER DECLINING TO EXERCISE 13 SUPPLEMENTAL JURISDICTION OVER v. PLAINTIFF’S STATE LAW CLAIMS 14

15 851 WEST FRONT ENTERPRISE LLC; and 16 DOES 1 to 10, 17 Defendants. 18 19

20 Before the Court is the Response to the Court’s Order to Show Cause Regarding 21 Supplemental Jurisdiction filed by Plaintiff. ECF No. 12. For the reasons stated herein, the Court 22 DECLINES to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff Michael Harris’s state law claims 23 and DISMISSES the claims. 24

28 1 I. Background 2 A. Factual Background1 3 Plaintiff Michael Harris (“Harris”) is a California resident who suffers from hemiplegia and 4 hemiparesis and requires a wheelchair at all times when traveling in public. Compl. ¶ 1. Defendants 5 851 West Front Enterprise LLC and Does 1 through 10 (“Defendants”) are the owner of an auto 6 body shop (the “Business”) located at or about 851 West Front Street, Covina, California. Id. ¶ 2. 7 In or about October 2024, Harris went to the Business. Id. ¶ 10. He personally encountered 8 barriers in doing so. Id. ¶ 12. The Business does not have a parking space designated for persons 9 with disabilities, nor does it have signage indicating such a space with the International Symbol of 10 Accessibility, signage warning others not to park in the designated space, proper paint on the ground 11 for such a space, or proper van accessibility for such a space. Id. ¶ 13. These issues deny Harris the 12 full and equal access to the Business and deter him from visiting the business. Id. ¶ 14. 13 B. Procedural History 14 On February 14, 2025, Harris filed a complaint against Defendants, asserting: (1) a claim for 15 injunctive relief arising out of an alleged violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 16 42 U.S.C. § 12101, et seq.; (2) a claim for damages pursuant to California’s Unruh Civil Rights Act 17 (“Unruh Act”), Cal. Civ. Code §§ 51–53, et seq.; (3) a claim for damages pursuant to the California 18 Disabled Persons Act, Cal. Civ. Code §§ 54, et seq.; (4) a claim for damages and injunctive relief 19 based on California Health and Safety Code § 19955, et seq.; (5) a claim for damages for negligence. 20 See generally Compl. On March 17, 2025, the Court ordered Harris to show cause as to why the 21 Court should exercise supplemental jurisdiction over his state law claims. ECF No. 11 (“OSC”). 22 Harris filed a response on April 1, 2025. Response, ECF No. 12 (“Resp.”). 23 II. Applicable Law 24 A. Supplemental Jurisdiction 25 42 U.S.C. § 1367 “reflects the understanding that, when deciding whether to exercise 26 supplemental jurisdiction, ‘a federal court should consider and weigh in each case, and at every 27 28 1 The factual allegations included in this section are taken from the Complaint. ECF No. 1 (“Compl.”). The 1 stage of the litigation, the values of judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity.’” City of 2 Chicago v. Int’l Coll. of Surgeons, 522 U.S. 156, 173 (1997) (emphasis added) (quoting Carnegie- 3 Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 (1988)). A district court has supplemental jurisdiction 4 over “all other claims that are so related to claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that 5 they form part of the same case or controversy under Article III of the United States Constitution.” 6 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). However, district courts have the discretion to decline to exercise supplemental 7 jurisdiction if: 8 (1) The claim raises a novel or complex issue of State law; (2) The claim substantially predominates over the claim over which the district 9 court has original jurisdiction; (3) The district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original 10 jurisdiction; or (4) In exceptional circumstances, there are other compelling reasons for 11 declining jurisdiction. 12 Id. § 1367(c). A district court declining supplemental jurisdiction pursuant to the section 13 1367(c)(4)’s “exceptional circumstances” provision must satisfy a two-part inquiry: (1) the “district 14 court must articulate why the circumstances of the case are exceptional within the meaning of § 15 1367(c)(4)”; and (2) “in determining whether there are compelling reasons for declining jurisdiction 16 . . . the court should consider what best serves the principles of economy, convenience, fairness, and 17 comity which underlie the pendent jurisdiction doctrine.” Vo v. Choi, 49 F.4th 1167, 1171 (9th Cir. 18 2022) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Arroyo v. Rosas, 19 F.4th 1202, 1210 (9th Cir. 19 2021) (describing the inquiry)). 20 B. The ADA and Unruh Act 21 The ADA prohibits discrimination “on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment 22 of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public 23 accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public 24 accommodation.” 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a). Only injunctive relief is available under the ADA. See 25 Wander v. Kaus, 304 F.3d 856, 858 (9th Cir. 2002). 26 The Unruh Act entitles all people within California, regardless of their disability “to the full 27 and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities, privileges, or services in all business 28 1 establishments of every kind whatsoever.” Cal. Civ. Code § 51(b). Under the Unruh Act, a violation 2 of the ADA constitutes a violation of § 51 of the Unruh Act. See id. § 51(f). And although the Unruh 3 Act also permits injunctive relief, unlike the ADA, it also allows for recovery of monetary damages. 4 It entitles plaintiffs to actual damages for each offense “up to a maximum of three times the amount 5 of actual damage but in no case less than four thousand dollars.” Id. § 52(a). “The litigant need not 6 prove she suffered actual damages to recover the independent statutory damages of $4,000.” Molski 7 v. M.J. Cable, Inc., 481 F.3d 724, 731 (9th Cir. 2007). 8 Under the Unruh Act, all persons in California, “no matter what their . . . disability . . . are 9 entitled to the full and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities, privileges, or services in all 10 business establishments of every kind whatsoever.” Cal. Civ. Code § 51(b). The Unruh Act and the 11 ADA go hand-in-hand—a violation of the ADA is automatically a violation of the Unruh Act. Vo, 49 12 F.4th at 1169 (citing Arroyo, 19 F.4th at 1204). However, unlike the ADA, the Unruh Act allows for 13 recovery of monetary damages for every offense “up to a maximum of three times the amount of 14 actual damage but in no case less than four thousand dollars ($4,000).” Cal. Civ. Code § 52(a). 15 Further, California law sets forth a heightened pleading standard for lawsuits brought under 16 the Unruh Act. See Cal. Civ. Proc. Code §§ 425.55(a)(2) & (3). The stricter pleading standard 17 requires certain plaintiffs bringing construction-access claims like the one in the instant case to file a 18 verified complaint alleging specific facts concerning the plaintiff’s claim, including the specific 19 barriers encountered or how the plaintiff was deterred and each date on which the plaintiff 20 encountered each barrier or was deterred. See id. § 425.50(a). A “high-frequency litigant fee” of 21 $1,000 is also imposed on certain plaintiffs and law firms bringing these claims. See Cal. Gov’t 22 Code § 70616.5. A “high-frequency litigant” is “a plaintiff who has filed 10 or more complaints 23 alleging a construction-related accessibility violation within the 12-month period immediately 24 preceding the filing of the current complaint alleging a construction-related accessibility violation” 25 and “an attorney who has represented as attorney of record 10 or more high-frequency litigant 26 plaintiffs in actions that were resolved within the 12-month period immediately preceding the filing 27 of the current complaint alleging a construction-related accessibility violation.” Cal. Civ. Proc. Code 28 §§ 425.55(b)(1) & (2). High frequency litigants are also required to state: (1) whether the complaint 1 is filed by, or on behalf of, a high-frequency litigant; (2) in the case of a high-frequency litigant who 2 is a plaintiff, the number of complaints alleging construction-related accessibility claim filed by the 3 high-frequency litigant during the 12 months prior to filing the instant complaint; (3) the reason the 4 individual was in the geographic area of the defendant’s business; and (4) the reason why the 5 individual desired to access the defendant’s business.” See id. § 425.50(a)(4)(A). 6 III. Discussion 7 In the Order to Show Cause, the Court ordered Harris to show cause in writing why the Court 8 should exercise supplemental jurisdiction over his Unruh Act claim, California Disabled Persons Act 9 claim, California Health and Safety Code claim, and negligence claim. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c). 10 Further, the Court ordered Harris to identify the amount of statutory damages he seeks to recover 11 and provide all facts necessary for the Court to determine if Harris and Harris’s counsel satisfy the 12 definition of a “high-frequency litigants” as provided by California Code of Civil Procedure §§ 13 425.55(b)(1) & (2). The Court finds Harris’s state law claims unsuitable for supplemental 14 jurisdiction within the meaning of section 1367(c)(4). 15 A. The Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law 16 claims. 17 In the OSC, the Court ordered Harris to “identify the amount of statutory damages” sought 18 under the Unruh Act and include declarations “providing all facts necessary” for the Court to 19 determine whether Harris and Harris’s counsel satisfy the definition of a “high-frequency litigant” as 20 provided by California Code of Civil Procedure §§ 425.55(b)(1) & (2). OSC at 2. 21 i. Harris qualifies as a high frequency litigant. 22 In the response to the Court’s OSC, Harris admits that he has filed more than ten complaints 23 alleging a construction-related accessibility violation within the 12-month period immediately 24 preceding the instant complaint. ECF No. 12-2. Correspondingly, Harris’s counsel conceded that 25 their law firm “likely” qualifies as a high-frequency litigant but failed to provide any facts from 26 which the Court could determine whether Harris’s counsel satisfies the definition of a high- 27 frequency litigant under Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 425.55(b)(2); see ECF No. 12-1. 28 1 Therefore, in state court, Harris would not only be obligated to pay the $1,000 high- 2 frequency litigant fee but would also be required to meet the heightened pleading standard and allege 3 specific facts relating to his claim. Although Harris alleges that he “is deterred from visiting the 4 Business,” he has not set forth the allegations required by the heightened pleading standard— 5 namely, he fails to disclose in his complaint that the complaint was filed by or on behalf of a high- 6 frequency litigant, state the number of construction-related accessibility complaints he filed within 7 the 12 months prior to filing the instant complaint, or explain why he was in the geographic area of 8 the Business. See Compl. 9 The California legislature has determined that requiring Harris and other high frequency 10 litigants to meet this heightened pleading standard would serve California’s interest in preventing 11 continued abuse of the Unruh Act by high-frequency litigants. Arroyo, 19 F.4th at 1206–07. It is 12 therefore appropriate in view of the Gibbs values of judicial economy, convenience, fairness to 13 litigants, and comity to decline supplemental jurisdiction so that Harris may comply with the 14 requirements and California’s interest in curtailing abuse can be vindicated. See United Mine 15 Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726–27 (1966). 16 ii. Harris’s state law claims predominate over the federal ADA claim. 17 Harris asserts five claims: one federal law claim and four state law claims. See generally 18 Compl. Of these four claims, Harris seeks damages and injunctive relief in connection with his state 19 law claims and, as prescribed by statute, only seeks an injunction in connection with his ADA claim. 20 See id. 21 A district court may dismiss state law claims without prejudice if a state law claim 22 “substantially predominates” over a federal claim “in terms of proof, of the scope of the issues raised 23 or of the comprehensiveness of the remedy sought.” Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 726–27. Indeed, the Unruh 24 Act entitles plaintiffs to a minimum award of $4,000 for each violation of the Act. Cal. Civ. Code § 25 52(a). 26 The Court finds that Harris’s state law claims predominate over the federal law ADA claim. 27 Harris seeks “all appropriate damages, including but not limited to statutory damages, general 28 damages and treble damages in amounts, according to proof,” and as such, any potential monetary 1 damages awarded predominate over the injunctive relief sought on the ADA claim. Compl. at 2 Prayer. 3 iii. Given the comity concerns expressed by the Ninth Circuit, exceptional 4 circumstances exist to justify declining exercise of supplemental jurisdiction. 5 In the Ninth Circuit, to qualify as “exceptional circumstances” under section 1367(c)(4), the 6 circumstances at hand “should be ‘quite unusual’ and should not rest ‘solely’ on routinely occurring 7 conditions such as ‘docket congestion.’” Arroyo, 19 F.4th at 1211 (quoting Ex. Software N. Am., Inc. 8 v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for Cent. Dist. of Cal., 24 F.3d 1545, 1558, 1560 n.15 (9th Cir. 1994)). The Ninth 9 Circuit has held that in the context of joint ADA-Unruh Act claims, the specific legislative apparatus 10 surrounding the Unruh Act and the ADA meets the “exceptional circumstances” threshold. Vo, 49 11 F.4th at 1170 (citing Arroyo, 19 F.4th at 1213). Specifically, the California Legislature created the 12 Unruh Act to give plaintiffs seeking an injunction under the ADA the additional option of pursuing 13 monetary damages. Arroyo, 19 F.4th at 1211–12. The Unruh Act “relies dispositively on the ADA’s 14 substantive rules [and] expands the remedies available in a private action” to include monetary 15 damages. Id. at 1211. The California legislature became concerned that “high-frequency litigants 16 may be using the statute to obtain monetary relief for themselves without accompanying adjustments 17 to locations to assure accessibility to others.” Id. But rather than adjust the language of the statute, 18 the California Legislature opted to impose filing restrictions on potential litigants, making it “very 19 unattractive” for litigants seeking monetary relief to file joint ADA-Unruh Act claims in state court.” 20 Id. at 1211–12. However, as these restrictions do not apply in federal court, they have been rendered 21 “largely toothless,” causing a “wholesale shifting of Unruh Act/ADA cases into the U.S. District 22 Court for the Central District of California.” Id. As the Ninth Circuit concluded, because this evasion 23 of the Legislature’s limitations would both be unfair to defendants and constitute “an affront to the 24 comity between federal and state courts,” it rises to the level of “exceptional circumstances” under 25 section 1367(c)(4). Vo, 49 F.4th at 1171. The plaintiff asserts that “there is nothing unique in the 26 state court procedures that are not replicated in some fashion in the federal system,” Response at 10, 27 28 1 but the Ninth Circuit considered both systems and determined otherwise. See Vo, 49 F.4th at 1170- 2 1171. 3 Here, the circumstances in this case meet the “exceptional” threshold. As previously 4 discussed, Harris and/or his counsel qualify as high-frequency litigants. Further, given the “unique 5 configuration of laws in this area” that have given rise to concerns regarding fairness and the comity 6 between federal and state courts, exercising supplemental jurisdiction over Harris’s Unruh Act claim 7 results in the same evasion of the California state legislature’s filing restrictions. Id. 8 Moreover, as discussed above, Harris’s four state law claims predominate over the single 9 federal law claim. Thus, extending supplemental jurisdiction over the Unruh Act would run afoul of 10 principles of federal-state comity. 11 iv. As this case is in its nascent stages, there are compelling reasons for declining 12 supplemental jurisdiction. 13 Given that the first prong is satisfied, this Court must proceed to the second prong and 14 consider “what best serves the principles of economy, convenience, fairness, and comity which 15 underlie the pendent jurisdiction doctrine.” Id. at 1171 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting 16 Arroyo, 19 F.4th at 1210). 17 This case is still in its early stages—the initial complaint was filed on February 14, 2025, and 18 the Defendants have not yet appeared. Accordingly, Vo does not dictate that the Court retain 19 jurisdiction. Compare id. at 1172 (concluding that because “[t]he district court here declined 20 supplemental jurisdiction over Vo’s Unruh Act claim well before it ruled on the merits of the ADA 21 claim,” there is “no reason to hold that the district court abused its discretion in determining there 22 were compelling reasons to decline jurisdiction over the Unruh Act claim”), with Arroyo, 19 F.4th at 23 1215–16 (“If the district court had declined supplemental jurisdiction over Arroyo’s Unruh Act 24 claim at the outset of the litigation, it might then still have been possible to further California’s 25 interest in cabining Unruh Act damages claims through the imposition of heightened pleading 26 requirements and a substantial up-front filing fee.”). 27 28 1 Accordingly, the Court DECLINES to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Harris’s state 2 || law claims. The Court therefore DISMISSES the Unruh Act claim, California Disabled Persons Act 3 || claim, the California Health and Safety Code, and the negligence claim WITHOUT PREJUDICE. 4 5 IT IS SO ORDERED. Af 7 Dated: June 5, 2025 ee MAAME EWUSI-MENSAH FRIMPONG 9 United States District Judge 10 1] 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28