Michael Hardy, John Anderson, Kenneth Mosley & Donta Jackson v. AAA Cooper Transportation

• Court: Court of Appeals of Texas
• Decided: June 19, 2003
• Docket: 01-02-00872-CV
• Status: Published

Opinion

Opinion issued June 19, 2003

In The

Court of Appeals

For The

First District of Texas

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NO. 01-02-00872-CV

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MICHAEL HARDY, JOHN ANDERSON, KENNETH MOSLEY AND DONTA JACKSON, Appellants

V.

AAA COOPER TRANSPORTATION, INC., Appellee

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On Appeal from the 151st District Court

Harris County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 2001-23690

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MEMORANDUM OPINION

          Appellants, Michael Hardy, John Anderson, Kenneth Mosley and Donta Jackson, contest the trial court’s grant of summary judgment to AAA Cooper Transportation, (“Cooper”), in their suit alleging retaliatory termination for filing workers’ compensation claims. Essentially, appellants argue on appeal that Cooper did not meet its summary judgment burden of negating at least one element of appellants’ cause of action and that genuine issues of material fact precluded summary judgment in Cooper’s favor. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Background

          Cooper has a leave of absence policy that, in addition to the 12 weeks’ unpaid leave provided in accordance with the Family Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”), also provides an additional 60 days of extended unpaid leave to employees who have been injured in the workplace or are suffering from a serious medical condition. Cooper’s leave policy requires employees on this extended unpaid leave to return to work after the expiration of the 60 days. Appellants are former Cooper employees who filed workers’ compensation claims and took unpaid leave as a result of injuries they suffered on the job. After the expiration of the 12-week FMLA leave and the expiration of the extended 60 days of unpaid leave provided by Cooper, each of the appellants was terminated for not returning to work. Appellants subsequently filed this wrongful termination suit, alleging that their terminations were made in retaliation for their workers’ compensation claims and that their terminations thus violated Texas Labor Code section 451.002.

          Cooper filed a general denial and raised affirmative defenses to appellants’

wrongful termination claim. At the close of the discovery period, Cooper filed a motion for summary judgment. Cooper’s motion for summary judgment presented the affidavit of Jean Jones, Cooper’s personnel manager. Jones stated that the reason underlying each of the terminations at issue was the employee’s failure to return to work after the expiration of the extended 60 days unpaid leave. Appellants filed a response to Cooper’s motion for summary judgment. The trial court granted Cooper’s motion for summary judgment.

Standard of Review

          Summary judgment is proper for a defendant only if the defendant establishes that no genuine issue of material fact exists as to one or more essential elements of the plaintiff’s claim and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(c); Randall’s Food Mkts., Inc. v. Johnson, 891 S.W.2d 640, 644 (Tex. 1995). If the defendant meets this burden, summary judgment for the defendant is proper unless the plaintiff can produce controverting evidence that raises a fact issue on one of the elements the defendant negated. See City of Houston v. Clear Creek Basin Auth., 589 S.W.2d 671, 678 (Tex. 1979); Terry v. S. Floral Co., 927 S.W.2d 254, 256 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1996, no writ). We review the granting of a traditional summary judgment motion under a de novo standard. See Natividad v. Alexsis, Inc., 875 S.W.2d 695, 699 (Tex. 1994). In reviewing the granting of a summary judgment, we must accept as true any evidence in favor of the nonmovant, indulging every reasonable inference and resolving all doubts in its favor. Randall’s Food Mkts., Inc., 891 S.W.2d at 644.

Analysis

          The Workers’ Compensation Act prohibits employers from discharging an employee merely because the employee files a workers’ compensation claim. Tex. Lab. Code Ann.§ 451.001(1) (Vernon Supp. 2003). In enacting this law, the legislature sought to protect employees who are entitled to benefits under the workers’ compensation scheme and to prevent employers from firing them for taking steps to collect benefits. Carnation Co. v. Borner, 610 S.W.2d 450, 453 (Tex. 1980).           An employee claiming discharge in violation of section 451.001 bears the initial burden of at least demonstrating a causal link between the workers’ compensation claim and the alleged wrongful termination. Terry, 927 S.W.2d at 257. The employee need not prove that the workers’ compensation claim was the sole cause of the termination, but he must show that the workers’ compensation claim was at least a determining factor in the dismissal. Id. This causal connection is an element of the employee’s prima facie case, and may be established by direct or circumstantial evidence. Id. Circumstantial evidence includes, but is not limited to: (1) knowledge of the compensation claim by those making the decision on termination, (2) expression of a negative attitude toward the employee’s injured condition, (3) failure to adhere to established company policies, (4) discriminatory treatment in comparison to similarly situated employees, and (5) evidence that the stated reason for discharge was false. Continental Coffee Prods. v. Cazarez, 937 S.W.2d 444, 451 (Tex. 1996). Once the employee has established the causal link between his termination and his filing a workers’ compensation claim, it is the burden of the employer to rebut the alleged improper termination by showing that there was a legitimate reason behind it. Terry, 927 S.W.2d at 257. Thereafter, in order to survive summary judgment, the burden shifts back to the employee to produce controverting evidence of a retaliatory motive. See Tex. Division-Tranter, Inc. v. Carrozza, 876 S.W.2d 312, 313-14 (Tex. 1994).

          On appeal, appellants argue that the trial court erred when it granted summary judgment because (1) appellants pled sufficient facts to establish a causal link between their workers’ compensation claims and their terminations, (2) Cooper did not meet its burden of proof of negating the causal link between the workers’ compensation claims and the terminations, and (3) each of the appellants raised a genuine issue of material fact regarding their allegations that they were discharged in retaliation for filing workers’ compensation claims.

          At the outset, we note that the trial court’s order does not specify the grounds on which it granted summary judgment. Accordingly, we will affirm the summary judgment if any of the theories advanced in the motion is meritorious. See State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. S.S., 858 S.W.2d 374, 380 (Tex. 1993).

          In their petition, appellants alleged that they were former employees of Cooper who had been injured at their workplace, had filed workers’ compensation claims in good faith, and had subsequently been terminated. Appellants alleged that they were harassed and terminated as a result of filing their workers’ compensation claims. Cooper filed a general denial in response to appellants’ petition. In addition to its general denial, Cooper further asserted additional and affirmative defenses.

          At the close of discovery, Cooper moved for summary judgment on appellants’ claims. In support of its summary judgment motion, Cooper provided: (1) the affidavit of Jean Jones, the personnel manager at Cooper, and exhibits attached to Jones’s affidavit, and (2) transcripts from the depositions of each of the appellants.

          The summary judgment evidence submitted by Cooper showed that its FMLA leave policy provided 12 weeks of unpaid leave per year to qualifying employees and that, in addition to this FMLA leave, Cooper provided an extended 60 days of unpaid leave to employees who were unable to return to work at the end of their FMLA leave due to a serious medical condition or an on-the-job injury. The policy stated that employees who did not return to work at the end of this extended leave would be terminated. Jones’s affidavit states that Cooper consistently enforced both its FMLA and extended leave policies and that she was unable to find a single instance of any employee being kept on after exhausting both FMLA and extended leave. Finally, Jones stated that appellants’ terminations were unrelated to their workers’ compensation claims.

          Cooper also presented the deposition testimony of appellants themselves. This evidence showed that, although appellants stated that they believed their terminations were a direct result of their workers’ compensation claims and that, although some of the appellants had heard statements by managers indicating that workers’ compensation benefits might be denied, none of the appellants were able to point to other Cooper employees who had filed workers’ compensation claims, had exhausted their extended 60 days leave, and had not been terminated. Most importantly, in his deposition, one of the appellants admitted that, due to his numerous absences, he would have been terminated whether or not he had filed a workers’ compensation claim. Accordingly, Cooper’s evidence showed that appellants were terminated because they had exhausted both their 12-week FMLA leave and their extended 60-day leave—not because they filed workers’ compensation claims.

           In response, appellants provided affidavits from themselves. However, these affidavits did not controvert the evidence presented by Cooper’s motion for summary judgment.

          Reviewing the summary judgment evidence presented to the trial court, we hold that the trial court did not err when it granted summary judgment in Cooper’s favor. Although appellants alleged that they were wrongfully terminated as a result of filing workers’ compensation claims, the summary judgment evidence presented by Cooper was sufficient to negate the necessary element of causation in appellants’ claims. The summary judgment evidence presented by Cooper showed that appellants were terminated pursuant to a uniformly enforced absence policy unrelated to their workers’ compensation claim—Cooper’s uncontroverted evidence showed that appellants were terminated for exhausting their leave and not returning to work rather than for filing workers’ compensation claims. A uniform enforcement of a reasonable absence-control provision does not constitute a retaliatory discharge. Continental Coffee Prods., 937 S.W.2d at 451. “An employer who terminates an employee for violating such a rule cannot be liable for retaliatory discharge as long as the rule is uniformly enforced.” Id. Appellants’ response to Cooper’s summary judgment motion did not present any evidence to shoulder their burden of establishing that the terminations were retaliatory. See Carrozza, 876 S.W.2d at 313-14. Accordingly, we hold that the trial court correctly granted summary judgment in favor of Cooper.

Conclusion

          We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

                                                             George C. Hanks, Jr.

                                                             Justice

Panel consists of Chief Justice Radack and Justices Nuchia and Hanks.