NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JUN 15 2018 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
MICHAEL GAREDAKIS; et al., No. 16-16332
Plaintiffs-Appellants, D.C. No. 4:14-cv-04799-PJH v.
BRENTWOOD UNION SCHOOL MEMORANDUM* DISTRICT; et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of California Phyllis J. Hamilton, Chief District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted January 11, 2018 San Francisco, California
Before: WALLACE, RAWLINSON, and WATFORD, Circuit Judges.
Plaintiffs appeal from summary judgment on their Americans with
Disabilities Act (ADA) and Rehabilitation Act claims. One plaintiff, M.G., appeals
from summary judgment on seven state law claims.
1. The district court properly entered summary judgment in favor of
defendants on plaintiffs’ ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims based on the alleged
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. denial of a free appropriate public education because plaintiffs failed to exhaust the
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act’s procedures before filing this action.
Fry v. Napoleon Cmty. Sch., 137 S. Ct. 743, 752–53 (2017).
Plaintiffs also seek relief under these statutes based on a hostile educational
environment theory. Assuming without deciding that such a theory is cognizable in
our circuit, plaintiffs’ claims fail because they have not shown the alleged abuse
was “by reason of” or “solely by reason of” their disabilities. K.M. ex rel. Bright v.
Tustin Unified Sch. Dist., 725 F.3d 1088, 1099 (9th Cir. 2013), citing 42 U.S.C. §
12132 and 29 U.S.C. § 794. We reject plaintiffs’ argument that their placement in
Holder’s class “by reason of” their disabilities satisfies the causation requirement.
That fact tells us nothing about Holder’s motivation for allegedly abusing them,
which is the relevant question. See K.M. ex rel. Bright, 725 F.3d at 1099. By
contrast, plaintiffs’ reading would effectively remove the element of causation
from the statutes. Denying any benefit to a student in a special education classroom
would violate the statutes, regardless of why it was denied or if students without
disabilities received it.
We affirm summary judgment on plaintiffs’ federal claims.
2. The district court erred in concluding that M.G.’s state law claims do
not qualify for the childhood sexual abuse exception to the California Government
Claims Act. Cal. Gov. Code § 905(m). M.G. did not need to plead Section 340.1 in
2 the complaint; it was sufficient to allege facts showing that the exception applies.
A.M. v. Ventura Unified Sch. Dist., 3 Cal. App. 5th 1252, 1262 (2016).
Holder and her aides’ alleged conduct would have constituted a lewd or
lascivious act under section 288 of the California Penal Code. Cal. Civ. Proc. Code
§ 340.1(e). A defendant can violate section 288 without actually touching the
victim. “The required touching may be done by the child on his or her own person
provided it was caused or instigated by a perpetrator having the requisite specific
intent.” People v. Villagran, 5 Cal. App. 5th 880, 890 (2016). The “requisite
specific intent” is that “of arousing, appealing to, or gratifying the lust of the child
or the accused.” Id. at 891, citing Cal. Penal Code § 288. Here, the complaint
alleged that this was “a game” the adults played, resulting in M.G.’s sexual
arousal. M.G.’s father testified that Holder, to the best of his recollection, told him
“this thing with the toes was a game and they like to figure out which colors arouse
him the most.” That Holder and the aides were not sexually aroused by the game –
they found it to be “funny” or even “cute” – is of no matter. The statute is
disjunctive. Cal. Penal Code § 288. An intent to arouse either themselves or M.G.
is sufficient. In addition, the evidence is clear that they intended to arouse M.G. for
their humor. See Villagran, 5 Cal. App. 5th at 891 (“Because intent for purposes
of . . . section 288 can seldom be proven by direct evidence, it may be inferred
from the circumstances”).
3 Defendants argue on appeal that the exception does not apply because M.G.
presented no evidence that the alleged abuse occurred on or after January 1, 2009.
We need not consider this argument because defendants did not raise it in the
district court. United States v. Gilbert, 807 F.3d 1197, 1201 (9th Cir. 2015).1
Consideration at this late stage would unfairly prejudice M.G. because he can no
longer develop the factual record.
Even if we were to consider the argument, M.G. has introduced enough
evidence to survive summary judgment. Viewing the evidence in the light most
favorable to M.G., as we must, there is a genuine dispute of fact as to whether the
abuse continued throughout the school year. T.B. ex rel. Brenneise v. San Diego
Unified Sch. Dist., 806 F.3d 451, 466 (9th Cir. 2015). While M.G.’s father
witnessed the game only on one occasion in fall 2008, M.G. was in Holder’s class
until April 2009. His mother testified an aide told her that the conduct occurred
“[a] couple times a week.” In addition, the fact that Holder and the aides called the
activity a “game” suggests repeated occurrences. Further, because M.G. was a non-
1 We respectfully disagree with our dissenting colleague that United States v. Williams, 846 F.3d 303, 311 (9th Cir. 2016) requires consideration of this argument. Williams recognized that “Our court applies a general rule against entertaining arguments on appeal that were not presented or developed before the district court.” Id. (quotations and citations omitted). There, the government had advanced a general probable cause theory in the district court, and we held it was “able to make a more precise argument on appeal as to why the officers had probable cause.” Id. at 311-12 (emphasis added).
4 verbal three-year old, he may not have been able to report later abuse to his
parents. Finally, his continued masturbatory behavior toward women’s feet in
public also suggests prolonged abuse. Therefore, we reject defendants’ argument
that there was no evidence abuse continued on or after January 1, 2009.
We hold the district court erred by concluding that M.G.’s claims did not
qualify for the childhood sexual abuse exception to the California Government
Claims Act. We reverse this part of the district court’s decision.
AFFIRMED in part; REVERSED in part.
Defendants shall bear M.G.’s costs on appeal. All other parties shall bear
their own costs.
5 FILED JUN 15 2018 Garedakis v. Brentwood Union School Dist., Case No. 16-16332 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S.
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NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JUN 15 2018 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
MICHAEL GAREDAKIS; et al., No. 16-16332
Plaintiffs-Appellants, D.C. No. 4:14-cv-04799-PJH v.
BRENTWOOD UNION SCHOOL MEMORANDUM* DISTRICT; et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of California Phyllis J. Hamilton, Chief District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted January 11, 2018 San Francisco, California
Before: WALLACE, RAWLINSON, and WATFORD, Circuit Judges.
Plaintiffs appeal from summary judgment on their Americans with
Disabilities Act (ADA) and Rehabilitation Act claims. One plaintiff, M.G., appeals
from summary judgment on seven state law claims.
1. The district court properly entered summary judgment in favor of
defendants on plaintiffs’ ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims based on the alleged
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. denial of a free appropriate public education because plaintiffs failed to exhaust the
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act’s procedures before filing this action.
Fry v. Napoleon Cmty. Sch., 137 S. Ct. 743, 752–53 (2017).
Plaintiffs also seek relief under these statutes based on a hostile educational
environment theory. Assuming without deciding that such a theory is cognizable in
our circuit, plaintiffs’ claims fail because they have not shown the alleged abuse
was “by reason of” or “solely by reason of” their disabilities. K.M. ex rel. Bright v.
Tustin Unified Sch. Dist., 725 F.3d 1088, 1099 (9th Cir. 2013), citing 42 U.S.C. §
12132 and 29 U.S.C. § 794. We reject plaintiffs’ argument that their placement in
Holder’s class “by reason of” their disabilities satisfies the causation requirement.
That fact tells us nothing about Holder’s motivation for allegedly abusing them,
which is the relevant question. See K.M. ex rel. Bright, 725 F.3d at 1099. By
contrast, plaintiffs’ reading would effectively remove the element of causation
from the statutes. Denying any benefit to a student in a special education classroom
would violate the statutes, regardless of why it was denied or if students without
disabilities received it.
We affirm summary judgment on plaintiffs’ federal claims.
2. The district court erred in concluding that M.G.’s state law claims do
not qualify for the childhood sexual abuse exception to the California Government
Claims Act. Cal. Gov. Code § 905(m). M.G. did not need to plead Section 340.1 in
2 the complaint; it was sufficient to allege facts showing that the exception applies.
A.M. v. Ventura Unified Sch. Dist., 3 Cal. App. 5th 1252, 1262 (2016).
Holder and her aides’ alleged conduct would have constituted a lewd or
lascivious act under section 288 of the California Penal Code. Cal. Civ. Proc. Code
§ 340.1(e). A defendant can violate section 288 without actually touching the
victim. “The required touching may be done by the child on his or her own person
provided it was caused or instigated by a perpetrator having the requisite specific
intent.” People v. Villagran, 5 Cal. App. 5th 880, 890 (2016). The “requisite
specific intent” is that “of arousing, appealing to, or gratifying the lust of the child
or the accused.” Id. at 891, citing Cal. Penal Code § 288. Here, the complaint
alleged that this was “a game” the adults played, resulting in M.G.’s sexual
arousal. M.G.’s father testified that Holder, to the best of his recollection, told him
“this thing with the toes was a game and they like to figure out which colors arouse
him the most.” That Holder and the aides were not sexually aroused by the game –
they found it to be “funny” or even “cute” – is of no matter. The statute is
disjunctive. Cal. Penal Code § 288. An intent to arouse either themselves or M.G.
is sufficient. In addition, the evidence is clear that they intended to arouse M.G. for
their humor. See Villagran, 5 Cal. App. 5th at 891 (“Because intent for purposes
of . . . section 288 can seldom be proven by direct evidence, it may be inferred
from the circumstances”).
3 Defendants argue on appeal that the exception does not apply because M.G.
presented no evidence that the alleged abuse occurred on or after January 1, 2009.
We need not consider this argument because defendants did not raise it in the
district court. United States v. Gilbert, 807 F.3d 1197, 1201 (9th Cir. 2015).1
Consideration at this late stage would unfairly prejudice M.G. because he can no
longer develop the factual record.
Even if we were to consider the argument, M.G. has introduced enough
evidence to survive summary judgment. Viewing the evidence in the light most
favorable to M.G., as we must, there is a genuine dispute of fact as to whether the
abuse continued throughout the school year. T.B. ex rel. Brenneise v. San Diego
Unified Sch. Dist., 806 F.3d 451, 466 (9th Cir. 2015). While M.G.’s father
witnessed the game only on one occasion in fall 2008, M.G. was in Holder’s class
until April 2009. His mother testified an aide told her that the conduct occurred
“[a] couple times a week.” In addition, the fact that Holder and the aides called the
activity a “game” suggests repeated occurrences. Further, because M.G. was a non-
1 We respectfully disagree with our dissenting colleague that United States v. Williams, 846 F.3d 303, 311 (9th Cir. 2016) requires consideration of this argument. Williams recognized that “Our court applies a general rule against entertaining arguments on appeal that were not presented or developed before the district court.” Id. (quotations and citations omitted). There, the government had advanced a general probable cause theory in the district court, and we held it was “able to make a more precise argument on appeal as to why the officers had probable cause.” Id. at 311-12 (emphasis added).
4 verbal three-year old, he may not have been able to report later abuse to his
parents. Finally, his continued masturbatory behavior toward women’s feet in
public also suggests prolonged abuse. Therefore, we reject defendants’ argument
that there was no evidence abuse continued on or after January 1, 2009.
We hold the district court erred by concluding that M.G.’s claims did not
qualify for the childhood sexual abuse exception to the California Government
Claims Act. We reverse this part of the district court’s decision.
AFFIRMED in part; REVERSED in part.
Defendants shall bear M.G.’s costs on appeal. All other parties shall bear
their own costs.
5 FILED JUN 15 2018 Garedakis v. Brentwood Union School Dist., Case No. 16-16332 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS Rawlinson, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in part:
I agree that the district court properly entered summary judgment on the
Plaintiffs’ claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act and the Rehabilitation
Act. However, I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that summary judgment
was improper on the state law claims.
As an initial matter, I take exception to the notion that we need not consider
Defendants’ argument that the exception to California Penal Code § 288 does not
apply due to Plaintiff M.G.’s failure to present any evidence of abuse occurring on
or after January 1, 2009. The majority’s reliance on United States v. Gilbert, 807
F.3d 1197, 1201 (9th Cir. 2015), is misplaced. In Gilbert, we reiterated that “[a]s a
general rule, a federal appellate court does not consider an issue not passed upon
below.” Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). However, the issue of
the exception to California Penal Code § 288 was passed upon below. The
majority acknowledges as much. See Majority Opinion, pp. 4-5 (“We hold the
district court erred by concluding that M.G.’s claims did not qualify for the
childhood sexual abuse exception to the California Government Claims Act. . . .”).
What the majority is really saying is that the defendants did not make the argument
that M.G. failed to present evidence that the alleged abuse occurred on or after January 1, 2009. But we have repeatedly held that it is issues that are waived, not
arguments. See United States v. Williams, 846 F.3d 303, 311 (9th Cir. 2016)
(“[W]e have made it clear that it is claims that are deemed waived or forfeited, not
arguments. . . .”) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted); see also Yee v.
City of Escondido, 503 U.S. 519, 534 (1992) (“Once a federal claim is properly
presented, a party can make any argument in support of that claim; parties are not
limited to the precise arguments they made below. . . .”) (citations omitted). In
addition, on de novo review, we may affirm on any basis supported by the record.
See Perfect 10, Inc. v. Visa Int’l Serv. Ass’n, 494 F.3d 788, 794 (9th Cir. 2007).
On the merits, I disagree that M.G. raised a material issue of fact regarding
abuse occurring on or after January 1, 2009. The record reflects that M.G.’s father
observed only one incident in the fall of 2008. The fact that M.G. remained in the
class until April, 2009, is not evidence of the asserted abuse. The “suggestions”
and “maybes” from the majority are not evidence. Majority Disposition, p. 4. See
Guidroz-Brault v. Missouri Pac. R. Co., 254 F.3d 825, 829 (9th Cir. 2001)
(observing that to survive summary judgment, plaintiffs bear the burden to produce
evidence “other than speculation or guesswork”). Finally, continued effects of an
action do not equate to continued engagement in the challenged act. See, e.g.,
Garcia v. Brockway, 526 F.3d 456, 462 (9th Cir. 2008) (“A continuing violation is
occasioned by continual unlawful acts, not by continual ill effects from an original violation.”) (citations, footnote reference, and alteration omitted).
Because M.G. failed to raise a material issue of fact regarding the existence
of abuse occurring on or after January 1, 2009, I would affirm the district court’s
ruling that M.G.’s claims did not qualify for the child abuse exception to the
Government Claims Act. In sum, I would affirm the district court decision in its
entirety.