Michael Garcia v. the State of Texas

• Court: Texas Court of Appeals, 10th District (Waco)
• Decided: June 25, 2026
• Docket: 10-25-00129-CR
• Status: Published

Opinion

Court of Appeals Tenth Appellate District of Texas

10-25-00129-CR

Michael Garcia, Appellant

v.

The State of Texas, Appellee

On appeal from the 54th District Court of McLennan County, Texas Judge Susan N. Kelly, presiding Trial Court Cause No. 2023-593-C2

JUSTICE SMITH delivered the opinion of the Court.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

A jury found Michael Garcia guilty of the felony offense of evading arrest

or detention with a vehicle and found that the vehicle was used as a deadly

weapon in commission of the offense. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §§

1.07(a)(17)(B), 38.04(b)(2)(A). Garcia pled true to two felony enhancement

paragraphs, and the jury assessed his punishment at forty-three years in

prison. In two issues on appeal, Garcia contends that the evidence is insufficient to support the jury’s deadly weapon finding and that he was

egregiously harmed by alleged jury charge error. We affirm.

Sufficiency of the Evidence – Deadly Weapon Finding

In his first issue, Garcia argues that we must strike the jury’s deadly

weapon finding because there is no evidence that another person was placed

in actual danger during the commission of the offense. We disagree.

STANDARD OF REVIEW AND RELEVANT LAW

To hold evidence legally sufficient to sustain a deadly weapon finding,

the evidence must demonstrate that: (1) the object meets the definition of a

deadly weapon; (2) the deadly weapon was used or exhibited during the

transaction on which the felony conviction was based; and (3) that other people

were put in actual danger. Brister v. State, 449 S.W.3d 490, 494 (Tex. Crim.

App. 2014). A vehicle, though not a deadly weapon per se, may be a deadly

weapon if its manner of use or intended use is capable of causing serious bodily

injury or death. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 1.07(a)(17)(B); Cates v. State,

102 S.W.3d 735, 738 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003).

We review the evidence in the light most favorable to the deadly-weapon

finding to determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found beyond

a reasonable doubt that the vehicle was used or exhibited as a deadly weapon.

Id.

Michael Garcia v. The State of Texas Page 2 ANALYSIS

Garcia maintains that the State presented only evidence of hypothetical

danger to other people during the commission of the offense.

Dash camera video shows that Garcia initially pulled over when law

enforcement attempted to initiate a traffic stop for speeding, but then quickly

drove off. While turning onto another street, Garcia ran a stop sign. His

backseat passenger fell out of the moving vehicle and rolled into the street.

Garcia traveled up to 67 miles per hour through a residential neighborhood.

He passed multiple vehicles on the roadway while evading, and a few

pedestrians were present on the sides of the road. At one point, Garcia moved

from the center lane into the left lane without using his turn signal, then

swerved back into the center lane to pass a vehicle that had pulled over. The

officer then terminated his pursuit “due to the nature of how the vehicle was

driving” because he “did not feel like it was safe.”

The officer then returned to check on the passenger who rolled out of the

vehicle. The passenger informed the officer that “Mike” was the driver and

suggested that “Mike” might have fled because he had been drinking. A few

minutes later, the officer relocated to where Garcia had veered off the road and

crashed the vehicle into a street sign and some landscaping. The vehicle had

sustained extensive frontend damage and had been abandoned on the side of

Michael Garcia v. The State of Texas Page 3 the road. A bystander told officers that they observed two males fleeing from

the crashed vehicle. At trial, the backseat passenger who had rolled out of the

vehicle confirmed that another individual was riding with him and Garcia.

Combined with the bystander’s statement, this reasonably suggests that

another individual was in Garcia’s vehicle when he wrecked it.

Courts have routinely considered excessive speeding through residential

neighborhoods, the presence of other motorists or pedestrians, disregarding

traffic controls, erratic driving involving abrupt or unsafe maneuvers, and loss

of vehicle control in evaluating the sufficiency of evidence supporting a deadly

weapon finding. See, e.g., Drichas v. State, 175 S.W.3d 795, 799 (Tex. Crim.

App. 2005); Serrano v. State, 636 S.W.3d 717, 725-27 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth

2021, pet. ref’d). In addition to the other motorists on the road, we also consider

that Garcia posed a danger of serious bodily injury or death to the passenger

in his vehicle through the manner in which he drove, culminating in Garcia

running off the roadway and crashing through a street sign with force

sufficient enough to cause extensive damage to the car. See Brown v. State,

No. 10-05-00374-CR, 2007 WL 603408, at *6 (Tex. App.—Waco Feb. 21, 2007,

pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication). Viewing the evidence in

the light most favorable to the verdict, we find that a rational trier of fact could

have found beyond a reasonable doubt that the manner in which Garcia drove

Michael Garcia v. The State of Texas Page 4 his car during the offense placed others in actual danger of death or serious

bodily injury. Accordingly, we overrule Garcia’s first issue.

Jury Charge Error

In his second issue, Garcia claims that the trial court erred by

referencing the offense level of a lesser-included offense in the guilt-innocence

jury charge. We disagree.

The jury charge included an instruction that would allow the jury to find

Garcia guilty of the lesser-included offense of evading detention. See TEX.

PENAL CODE ANN. § 38.04(b). The instruction stated, “The offense of Evading

Detention is a Class A misdemeanor.” Garcia asserts that this instruction

constitutes improper inclusion of “issues regarding punishment at the guilt-

innocence stage.” This Court has previously determined that it is not error for

a guilt-innocence charge to refer to the general punishment classification of an

offense. Penrose v. State, No. 10-02-00264-CR, 2004 WL 1903395, at *1 (Tex.

App.—Waco Aug. 25, 2004, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for

publication); see also Smith v. State, 761 S.W.2d 546, 548-49 (Tex. App.—

Corpus Christi-Edinburg 1988, no pet.). Moreover, the charge did not include

any explanation about the punishment range applicable a Class A

misdemeanor or otherwise provide punishment-related information to the jury.

See Wilson v. State, 391 S.W.3d 131, 137-38 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2012, no

Michael Garcia v. The State of Texas Page 5 pet.) (trial court committed harmless error by advising jury on full range of

punishment applicable to lesser-included offense). In accordance with our

precedent, we find no error.

Accordingly, Garcia’s second issue is overruled.

Conclusion

Having overruled all of Garcia’s issues on appeal, we affirm the trial

court’s judgment.

STEVE SMITH Justice

OPINION DELIVERED and FILED: June 25, 2026 Before Chief Justice Johnson, Justice Smith, and Justice Harris Affirmed Do not publish CRPM

Michael Garcia v. The State of Texas Page 6