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<P><SPAN STYLE="font-size: 14pt"><STRONG>Opinion issued September 28, 2006</STRONG></SPAN></P>
<P ALIGN="CENTER"><SPAN STYLE="font-family: Times New Roman" STYLE="font-size: 13pt"><STRONG></STRONG></SPAN><SPAN STYLE="font-family: Times New Roman" STYLE="font-size: 13pt"><STRONG>In The</STRONG></SPAN><SPAN STYLE="font-family: Times New Roman" STYLE="font-size: 14pt"><STRONG></STRONG></SPAN></P>
<P ALIGN="CENTER"><SPAN STYLE="font-family: EngrvrsOldEng Bd BT" STYLE="font-size: 18pt"><STRONG>Court of Appeals</STRONG></SPAN><SPAN STYLE="font-family: EngrvrsOldEng Bd BT" STYLE="font-size: 14pt"><STRONG></STRONG></SPAN></P>
<P ALIGN="CENTER"><SPAN STYLE="font-family: Times New Roman" STYLE="font-size: 13pt"><STRONG>For The</STRONG></SPAN><SPAN STYLE="font-family: Times New Roman" STYLE="font-size: 14pt"><STRONG></STRONG></SPAN></P>
<P ALIGN="CENTER"><SPAN STYLE="font-family: EngrvrsOldEng Bd BT" STYLE="font-size: 18pt"><STRONG>First District of Texas</STRONG></SPAN><SPAN STYLE="font-family: EngrvrsOldEng Bd BT" STYLE="font-size: 14pt"></SPAN></P>
<P ALIGN="CENTER"><SPAN STYLE="font-family: EngrvrsOldEng Bd BT" STYLE="font-size: 14pt"><STRONG><HR ALIGN="CENTER" WIDTH="15%">
</STRONG></SPAN></P>
<P ALIGN="CENTER"><SPAN STYLE="font-family: Times New Roman" STYLE="font-size: 14pt"><STRONG></STRONG></SPAN><SPAN STYLE="font-family: Times New Roman" STYLE="font-size: 14pt"><STRONG>NO. <A NAME="5">01-06-00341-CV</A></STRONG></SPAN></P>
<P ALIGN="CENTER"><SPAN STYLE="font-family: Times New Roman" STYLE="font-size: 14pt"><STRONG> __________</STRONG></SPAN></P>
<P ALIGN="CENTER"><SPAN STYLE="font-family: Times New Roman" STYLE="font-size: 14pt"><STRONG>MICHAEL F. REILAND, SR., Appellant</STRONG></SPAN><SPAN STYLE="font-family: Times New Roman" STYLE="font-size: 13pt"><STRONG></STRONG></SPAN></P>
<P ALIGN="CENTER"><SPAN STYLE="font-family: Times New Roman" STYLE="font-size: 14pt"><STRONG></STRONG></SPAN><SPAN STYLE="font-family: Times New Roman" STYLE="font-size: 14pt"><STRONG>V.</STRONG></SPAN></P>
<P ALIGN="CENTER"><SPAN STYLE="font-family: Times New Roman" STYLE="font-size: 14pt"><STRONG><A NAME="7"></A>PATRICK THOMAS PROPERTIES, INC., Appellee</STRONG></SPAN></P>
<P ALIGN="CENTER"><SPAN STYLE="font-family: Times New Roman" STYLE="font-size: 14pt"><STRONG><HR>
<P ALIGN="CENTER"><SPAN STYLE="font-family: Times New Roman" STYLE="font-size: 14pt"><STRONG>On Appeal from the<A NAME="8"></A> 133rd District Court</STRONG></SPAN></P>
<P ALIGN="CENTER"><SPAN STYLE="font-family: Times New Roman" STYLE="font-size: 14pt"><STRONG><A NAME="10"></A>Harris County, Texas</STRONG></SPAN></P>
<P ALIGN="CENTER"><SPAN STYLE="font-family: Times New Roman" STYLE="font-size: 14pt"><STRONG>Trial Court Cause No. 2004-71829</STRONG></SPAN></P>
<P ALIGN="CENTER"><SPAN STYLE="font-family: Times New Roman" STYLE="font-size: 14pt"><STRONG><HR>
<P ALIGN="CENTER"><SPAN STYLE="font-family: Times New Roman"><STRONG></STRONG></SPAN><SPAN STYLE="font-family: Times New Roman" STYLE="font-size: 14pt"><STRONG>O P I N I O N</STRONG></SPAN><SPAN STYLE="font-family: Times New Roman"></SPAN></P>
<P><SPAN STYLE="font-family: Times New Roman" STYLE="font-size: 14pt"> This is an accelerated appeal of an interlocutory order pursuant to section
51.014(d) of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem.
Code Ann. 51.014(d) (Vernon 2003) (allowing for interlocutory appeal when
parties agree that order involves controlling question of law with substantial ground
for difference of opinion). Appellant, Michael F. Reiland, Sr., appeals the trial
court's order denying his motion for summary judgment and granting partial summary
judgment in favor of appellee, Patrick Thomas Properties, Inc. ("PTP"). The trial
court found that the Right of First Refusal at issue is a valid and enforceable
conveyance of real property. In two points of error, Reiland contends that the trial
court erred in granting partial summary judgment in favor of PTP because the alleged
Right of First Refusal is void as a matter of Texas law due to the fact that (1) the legal
description of the property conveyed in the document is legally inadequate and (2)
the document contains an artificial price cap that operates as an unreasonable restraint
on alienation.</SPAN></P>
<P><SPAN STYLE="font-family: Times New Roman" STYLE="font-size: 14pt"> We reverse and render. </SPAN></P>
<P><SPAN STYLE="font-family: Times New Roman" STYLE="font-size: 14pt"><STRONG><CENTER>Background</STRONG></CENTER>
</SPAN></P>
<P><SPAN STYLE="font-family: Times New Roman" STYLE="font-size: 14pt"> On February 18, 1977, Leonard Bythel Weis and Marjorie K. Weis granted to
Beverly Faulkner a Right of First Refusal to acquire a 3.0152 acre tract of real
property. The Right of First Refusal described the land as "3.0152 acres adjoining
on the east side that certain 1.984 acre tract conveyed by Leonard Bythel Weis and
wife, Marjorie K. Weis to Beverly Faulkner, Trustee on or about February 18, 1977,"
and it further identified the tract "as being 3.0152 acres in the William Walters
Survey, Abstract 851, Harris County, Texas."<A HREF="#N_1_"><SUP> (1)</SUP></A></SPAN><SPAN STYLE="font-family: Times New Roman"> </SPAN><SPAN STYLE="font-family: Times New Roman" STYLE="font-size: 14pt">The price is derived by the terms
established in the Right of First Refusal: </SPAN></P>
<P><SPAN STYLE="font-family: Times New Roman" STYLE="font-size: 14pt"> Faulkner, Trustee, her successors or assigns shall have and
does have the right of first refusal on the herein described
real property on identical terms as those stated in an
acceptable offer to Leonard Bythel Weis and wife,
Marjorie K. Weis, but at ten cents (.10) per square foot less
than such offer not to exceed a price of fifty cents (.50) per
square foot . . . .</SPAN></P>
<P><SPAN STYLE="font-family: Times New Roman" STYLE="font-size: 14pt">The Right of First Refusal was declared valid for "so long as Leonard Bythel Weis,
or wife, Marjorie K. Weis are alive plus twenty-one (21) years." Both Leonard and
Marjorie Weis have died.<A HREF="#N_2_"><SUP> (2)</SUP></A></SPAN><SPAN STYLE="font-family: Times New Roman"> </SPAN></P>
<P><SPAN STYLE="font-family: Times New Roman"> On November 15, 1999, Robert W. Mauk, Trustee of the Leonard B. Weis
Trust, conveyed the tract to Reiland for $164,000. Five years later, Faulkner assigned
the Right of First Refusal to PTP. Faulkner was unaware of the sale to Reiland and
only became aware of the transaction when a real estate broker later informed her that
Reiland was in the process of selling the property to someone else. Faulkner then
informed PTP, and, upon further investigation, PTP discovered that the property was
conveyed to Reiland in 1999. PTP sued Reiland and sought judgment to enforce its
Right of First Refusal and claimed to be "ready, willing, and able to comply" with its
terms to purchase the land, at the maximum price under the Right of First Refusal of
$66,211.20. The market price of the property at the time of the suit was assessed at
$203,229.18.</SPAN></P>
<P><SPAN STYLE="font-family: Times New Roman"> PTP filed a motion for partial summary judgment to enforce its right to acquire
the tract under the Right of First Refusal. Attached to the motion was an affidavit
from John Montgomery, PTP's director of operations, wherein he testified that PTP
would have exercised its right of first refusal had it been notified of the earlier sale
to Reiland, and it was "ready, willing and able to purchase the 3.0 Acre Tract
pursuant to the terms stated in the Right of First Refusal." Also attached to the
motion was a document reflecting the survey of the property describing the metes and
bounds. The exhibit reflects, however, that the survey was conducted in 1999, more
than 22 years <EM>after</EM> the Right of First Refusal was created. </SPAN></P>
<P><SPAN STYLE="font-family: Times New Roman"> Reiland filed a cross-motion for summary judgment, which asserted that the
Right of First Refusal was void because (1) the description contained therein is
legally inadequate and (2) it contains an artificial price cap that operates as an
unreasonable restraint on alienation. In response, PTP submitted an affidavit from
Greg Schmidt, a registered professional surveyor. In his affidavit, Schmidt testified
that </SPAN></P>
<P><SPAN STYLE="font-family: Times New Roman"> I was able to locate the property, in part, because the Right of First
Refusal refers to a deed which involved the same parties. I have
reviewed the Harris County Real Property Records and there is only one
other tract of real property which was owned by Leonard Bythel Weis
and Marjorie K. Weis which was conveyed to Beverly Faulkner,
Trustee. A copy of this deed is attached as Exhibit C. Therefore, the
property which is described in the Right of First Refusal is adjacent to
the property which was conveyed in the deed.</SPAN></P>
<P><SPAN STYLE="font-family: Times New Roman"> I have also reviewed another deed in which Robert W. Mauk, Trustee,
conveyed the same property to Michael Reiland, Sr. A copy of this deed
is attached as Exhibit D. This deed describes the real property by the
use of a metes and bounds description. The real property which is
described in the deed from Mauk to Reiland is the same property which
is described in the Right of First Refusal which is attached as Exhibit B. </SPAN></P>
<P><SPAN STYLE="font-family: Times New Roman"> The trial court granted partial summary judgment in favor of PTP and denied
Reiland's motion, holding that the legal description in the Right of First Refusal was
adequate as a matter of law and that the Right of First Refusal was not an invalid
restraint on alienation; therefore the Right of First Refusal was a valid and
enforceable conveyance of real property.<STRONG>Summary Judgment</STRONG></SPAN></P>
<P><SPAN STYLE="font-family: Times New Roman"><EM> </EM>In two points of error, Reiland contends that the trial court erred in granting
partial summary judgment in favor of PTP, because the alleged Right of First Refusal
is void as a matter of law due to the fact that (1) the legal description of the property
conveyed in the document is legally inadequate and (2) the document contains an
artificial price cap that operates as an unreasonable restraint on alienation. </SPAN></P>
<P><SPAN STYLE="font-family: Times New Roman"><STRONG>Standard of Review</STRONG></SPAN></P>
<P><SPAN STYLE="font-family: Times New Roman">Both parties moved for traditional summary judgment under Texas Rule of
Civil Procedure 166a(c). <EM>See</EM> TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(c). We review a trial court's
granting of a summary judgment de novo. <EM>FM Props. Operating Co. v. City of
Austin</EM>, 22 S.W.3d 868, 872 (Tex. 2000). Summary judgment is proper when a
movant establishes that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that he is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(c);<EM> Randall's Food
Mkts., Inc. v. Johnson</EM>, 891 S.W.2d 640, 644 (Tex. 1995). In reviewing the granting
of a motion for summary judgment, we consider as true all the evidence that favors
the non-movant. <EM>Watts v. Hermann Hosp.</EM>, 962 S.W.2d 102, 104 (Tex.
App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 1997, no pet.). We indulge every reasonable inference in
favor of the non-movant and resolve all reasonable doubts in its favor. <EM>Cont'l Casing
Corp. v. Samedan Oil Corp.</EM>, 751 S.W.2d 499, 501 (Tex. 1988); <EM>Watts</EM>, 962 S.W.2d
at 104. </SPAN><SPAN STYLE="font-family: Times New Roman">When both parties move for summary judgment, each must carry its own
burden of proof, both as movant and in response to the other party's motion, as non-movant. <EM>CU Lloyd's v. Feldman</EM>, 977 S.W.2d 568, 569 (Tex. 1998).</SPAN><SPAN STYLE="font-family: Times New Roman"></SPAN></P>
<P><SPAN STYLE="font-family: Times New Roman"><EM></EM>When both parties move for summary judgment and the trial court grants one
motion and denies the other, the unsuccessful party may appeal both the prevailing
party's motion, and the denial of its own. <EM>See Holmes v. Morales</EM>, 924 S.W.2d 920,
922 (Tex. 1996). We must then review both sides' summary judgment evidence,
determine all questions presented, and render the judgment that the trial court should
have rendered. <EM>FM Props. Operating Co.</EM>, 22 S.W.3d at 872. <STRONG><EM> </EM></STRONG></SPAN><SPAN STYLE="font-family: Times New Roman" STYLE="COLOR: #0000ff"><STRONG><EM><SPAN STYLE="text-decoration: underline"></SPAN><SPAN STYLE="text-decoration: underline"></SPAN><SPAN STYLE="text-decoration: underline"></SPAN><SPAN STYLE="text-decoration: underline"></SPAN><SPAN STYLE="text-decoration: underline"></SPAN><SPAN STYLE="text-decoration: underline"></SPAN><SPAN STYLE="text-decoration: underline"></SPAN><SPAN STYLE="text-decoration: underline"></SPAN><SPAN STYLE="text-decoration: underline"></SPAN><SPAN STYLE="text-decoration: underline"></SPAN><SPAN STYLE="text-decoration: underline"></SPAN><SPAN STYLE="text-decoration: underline"></SPAN><SPAN STYLE="text-decoration: underline"></SPAN><SPAN STYLE="text-decoration: underline"><A HREF="http://web2.westlaw.com/find/default.wl?DB=713&SerialNum=1995125189&FindType=Y&ReferencePositionType=S&ReferencePosition=473&AP=&fn=_top&rs=WLW6.06&vr=2.0&sv=Split"></SPAN></EM></STRONG></SPAN><SPAN STYLE="font-family: Times New Roman"><STRONG><EM></EM></STRONG></SPAN><SPAN STYLE="font-family: Times New Roman" STYLE="COLOR: #0000ff"><STRONG><EM><SPAN STYLE="text-decoration: underline"></A><SPAN STYLE="text-decoration: underline"></SPAN><SPAN STYLE="text-decoration: underline"></SPAN><SPAN STYLE="text-decoration: underline"></SPAN><SPAN STYLE="text-decoration: underline"></SPAN><SPAN STYLE="text-decoration: underline"></SPAN><SPAN STYLE="text-decoration: underline"></SPAN><SPAN STYLE="text-decoration: underline"></SPAN><SPAN STYLE="text-decoration: underline"></SPAN><SPAN STYLE="text-decoration: underline"></SPAN><SPAN STYLE="text-decoration: underline"></SPAN><SPAN STYLE="text-decoration: underline"></SPAN><SPAN STYLE="text-decoration: underline"></SPAN><SPAN STYLE="text-decoration: underline"></SPAN><SPAN STYLE="text-decoration: underline"></SPAN><SPAN STYLE="text-decoration: underline"></SPAN><SPAN STYLE="text-decoration: underline"></SPAN><SPAN STYLE="text-decoration: underline"></SPAN><SPAN STYLE="text-decoration: underline"></SPAN><SPAN STYLE="text-decoration: underline"></SPAN><SPAN STYLE="text-decoration: underline"></SPAN><SPAN STYLE="text-decoration: underline"></SPAN><SPAN STYLE="text-decoration: underline"></SPAN><SPAN STYLE="text-decoration: underline"></SPAN><SPAN STYLE="text-decoration: underline"></SPAN><SPAN STYLE="text-decoration: underline"></SPAN><SPAN STYLE="text-decoration: underline"></SPAN><SPAN STYLE="text-decoration: underline"></SPAN><SPAN STYLE="text-decoration: underline"></SPAN><SPAN STYLE="text-decoration: underline"></SPAN><SPAN STYLE="text-decoration: underline"></SPAN><SPAN STYLE="text-decoration: underline"></SPAN><SPAN STYLE="text-decoration: underline"></SPAN><SPAN STYLE="text-decoration: underline"></SPAN><SPAN STYLE="text-decoration: underline"></SPAN><SPAN STYLE="text-decoration: underline"></SPAN><SPAN STYLE="text-decoration: underline"></SPAN><SPAN STYLE="text-decoration: underline"></SPAN><SPAN STYLE="text-decoration: underline"></SPAN><SPAN STYLE="text-decoration: underline"></SPAN><SPAN STYLE="text-decoration: underline"></SPAN><SPAN STYLE="text-decoration: underline"></SPAN><SPAN STYLE="text-decoration: underline"></SPAN><SPAN STYLE="text-decoration: underline"></SPAN><SPAN STYLE="text-decoration: underline"></SPAN><SPAN STYLE="text-decoration: underline"></SPAN><SPAN STYLE="text-decoration: underline"></SPAN><SPAN STYLE="text-decoration: underline"></SPAN><SPAN STYLE="text-decoration: underline"></SPAN><SPAN STYLE="text-decoration: underline"></SPAN><SPAN STYLE="text-decoration: underline"></SPAN><SPAN STYLE="text-decoration: underline"></SPAN><SPAN STYLE="text-decoration: underline"></SPAN><SPAN STYLE="text-decoration: underline"></SPAN><SPAN STYLE="text-decoration: underline"></SPAN><SPAN STYLE="text-decoration: underline"></SPAN><SPAN STYLE="text-decoration: underline"></SPAN><SPAN STYLE="text-decoration: underline"></SPAN><SPAN STYLE="text-decoration: underline"></SPAN><SPAN STYLE="text-decoration: underline"></SPAN><SPAN STYLE="text-decoration: underline"></SPAN></EM></STRONG></SPAN><SPAN STYLE="font-family: Times New Roman"><STRONG><EM><SPAN STYLE="text-decoration: underline"><A HREF=" "></SPAN></EM></STRONG></SPAN><SPAN STYLE="font-family: Times New Roman" STYLE="COLOR: #0000ff"><STRONG><EM><SPAN STYLE="text-decoration: underline"></SPAN></EM></STRONG></SPAN><SPAN STYLE="font-family: Times New Roman"><STRONG><EM></EM></STRONG></SPAN><SPAN STYLE="font-family: Times New Roman" STYLE="COLOR: #0000ff"><STRONG><EM><SPAN STYLE="text-decoration: underline"></A><A></SPAN></EM></STRONG></SPAN><SPAN STYLE="font-family: Times New Roman"><STRONG><EM><SPAN STYLE="text-decoration: underline"></SPAN></EM></STRONG></SPAN><SPAN STYLE="font-family: Times New Roman" STYLE="COLOR: #0000ff"><STRONG><EM><SPAN STYLE="text-decoration: underline"></SPAN></EM></STRONG></SPAN><SPAN STYLE="font-family: Times New Roman"><STRONG><EM></EM></STRONG></SPAN><SPAN STYLE="font-family: Times New Roman" STYLE="COLOR: #0000ff"><STRONG><EM><SPAN STYLE="text-decoration: underline"></A><A></SPAN></EM></STRONG></SPAN><SPAN STYLE="font-family: Times New Roman"><STRONG><EM><SPAN STYLE="text-decoration: underline"></SPAN></EM></STRONG></SPAN><SPAN STYLE="font-family: Times New Roman" STYLE="COLOR: #0000ff"><STRONG><EM><SPAN STYLE="text-decoration: underline"></A><A></SPAN></EM></STRONG></SPAN><SPAN STYLE="font-family: Times New Roman"><STRONG><EM><SPAN STYLE="text-decoration: underline"></SPAN></EM></STRONG></SPAN><SPAN STYLE="font-family: Times New Roman" STYLE="COLOR: #0000ff"><STRONG><EM><SPAN STYLE="text-decoration: underline"></A><A></SPAN></EM></STRONG></SPAN><SPAN STYLE="font-family: Times New Roman"><STRONG><EM><SPAN STYLE="text-decoration: underline"></SPAN></EM></STRONG></SPAN><SPAN STYLE="font-family: Times New Roman" STYLE="COLOR: #0000ff"><STRONG><EM><SPAN STYLE="text-decoration: underline"></A></SPAN></EM></STRONG></SPAN><SPAN STYLE="font-family: Times New Roman"><STRONG><SPAN STYLE="text-decoration: underline">Inadequate Land Description</SPAN></STRONG></SPAN><SPAN STYLE="font-family: Times New Roman"><SPAN STYLE="text-decoration: underline"> </SPAN></SPAN></P>
<P><SPAN STYLE="font-family: Times New Roman"><SPAN STYLE="text-decoration: underline"> In point of error one, Reiland contends that the alleged Right of First Refusal
from the Weises to Faulkner is void as a matter of law due to the fact that the legal
description of the property conveyed in the document is legally inadequate. </SPAN></SPAN></P>
<P><SPAN STYLE="font-family: Times New Roman"><SPAN STYLE="text-decoration: underline"> On February 18, 1977, more than 20 years before Reiland's purchase, the
Weises created a Right of First Refusal in which they granted</SPAN></SPAN></P>
<P><SPAN STYLE="font-family: Times New Roman"><SPAN STYLE="text-decoration: underline"> to Beverly Faulkner, Trustee, her successors or assigns the right of first
refusal to purchase the property identified as being 3.0152 acres
adjoining on the east side that certain 1.984 acre tract conveyed by
Leonard Bythel Weis and wife, Marjorie K. Weis to Beverly Faulkner,
Trustee on or about February 18, 1977. </SPAN></SPAN></P>
<P><SPAN STYLE="font-family: Times New Roman"><SPAN STYLE="text-decoration: underline"> The tract is further identified as being 3.0152 acres in the William
Walters Survey, Abstract 851, Harris County, Texas.</SPAN></SPAN></P>
<P><SPAN STYLE="font-family: Times New Roman"><SPAN STYLE="text-decoration: underline">There was no metes and bounds description of the 3.0152-acre tract attached to the
Right of First Refusal.</SPAN></SPAN></P>
<P><SPAN STYLE="font-family: Times New Roman"><SPAN STYLE="text-decoration: underline"> In his motion for summary judgment, Reiland argued that the Right of First
Refusal was deficient as a matter of law because "(1) there is nothing in the
description that would allow an individual to identify the three-acre tract with
reasonable certainty, and (2) the document wholly fails to define the size, shape or
boundaries of the land to which it relates." We agree.</SPAN></SPAN></P>
<P><SPAN STYLE="font-family: Times New Roman"><SPAN STYLE="text-decoration: underline"> Much like in <EM>Matney v. Odom</EM>, 210 S.W.2d 980 (Tex. 1948), the primary
question in this case is whether the description of the 3.0152 acres set out in the Right
of First Refusal meets the requirements of the statute of frauds. If the requirement
was not met, PTP was not entitled to enforce specific performance of the Right of
First Refusal.</SPAN></SPAN></P>
<P><SPAN STYLE="font-family: Times New Roman"><SPAN STYLE="text-decoration: underline"> The well-settled rule to test the sufficiency of a description in a deed is that
"the writing must furnish within itself or by reference to some other existing writing,
the means or data by which the land to be conveyed may be identified with reasonable
certainty." <EM>Morrow v. Shotwell</EM>, 477 S.W.2d 538, 539 (Tex. 1972). In <EM>Morrow</EM>, the
court examined a property description in a contract of sale. A description that
identified property by tract, survey, and county was held to be an insufficient
description because it did not refer to any other existing writing and because there
were no means or data to tell a surveyor on what course and for what distances he will
run. <EM>Id</EM>. at 539-40 (citing<EM> Greer v. Greer</EM>, 191 S.W.2d 848 (Tex. 1935) (holding
insufficient a description that included acreage, survey, county, patent, volume, and
abstract numbers) and <EM>Pfeiffer v. Lindsay</EM>, 1 S.W. 264, 266 (Tex. 1886) (holding
insufficient a description that included acreage, survey, county, and abstract
number)); <EM>see also Harlan v. Vetter</EM>, 732 S.W.2d 390, 394 (Tex. App.--Eastland
1987, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (holding that, if property description is to be supplied by
writing to which reference is made in deed, reference must be adequate to identify
writing). If the descriptions "are insufficient to identify the lands to be conveyed,
they necessarily must also be insufficient to identify land out of which an unidentified
part is to be conveyed." <EM>Morrow</EM>, 477 S.W.2d at 540. Describing land in this way
violates the statute of frauds. <EM>Id</EM>. In essence, the extrinsic evidence referred to must
operate to clarify the conveyance.</SPAN></SPAN></P>
<P><SPAN STYLE="font-family: Times New Roman"><SPAN STYLE="text-decoration: underline"> The statute of conveyances and the statute of frauds require that conveyances
and contracts of sale of real property be in writing and signed by the conveyor or
party to be charged. Tex. Prop. Code Ann. 5.021 (Vernon 1984); Tex. Bus. &
Com. Code Ann. 26.01(b)(4) (Vernon 2002). In order for a conveyance or contract
of sale to meet the requirements of the statute of frauds, the property description must
furnish within itself or by reference to another <EM>existing</EM> writing the means or data to
identify the particular land with reasonable certainty. <EM>Pick v. Bartel</EM>, 659 S.W.2d 636,
637 (Tex. 1983); <EM>Morrow</EM>, 477 S.W.2d at 539. The purpose of a description in a
written conveyance is not to identify the land, but to afford a means of identification.
<EM>Jones v. Kelley</EM>, 614 S.W.2d 95, 99-100 (Tex. 1981). The legal description in the
conveyance must not only furnish enough information to locate the general area as
in identifying it by tract survey and county, it need contain information regarding the
size, shape, and boundaries. <EM>See Morrow</EM>, 477 S.W.2d at 539; <EM>Matney</EM>, 210 S.W.2d
at 982. If enough appears in the description so that a person familiar with the area
can locate the premises with reasonable certainty, it is sufficient to satisfy the statute
of frauds. <EM>Gates v. Asher</EM>, 280 S.W.2d 247, 248-49 (Tex. 1955). Even when "the
record leaves little doubt that the parties knew and understood what property was
intended to be conveyed, . . . the knowledge and intent of the parties will not give
validity to the contract and neither will a plat made from extrinsic evidence."
<EM>Morrow</EM>, 477 S.W.2d at 540.<A HREF="#N_3_"><SUP> (3)</SUP></A></SPAN></SPAN><SPAN STYLE="font-family: Times New Roman" STYLE="font-size: 13pt" STYLE="COLOR: #0000ff"><SPAN STYLE="text-decoration: underline"></SPAN></SPAN><SPAN STYLE="font-family: Times New Roman" STYLE="font-size: 13pt"><SPAN STYLE="text-decoration: underline"></SPAN></SPAN></P>
<P><SPAN STYLE="font-family: Times New Roman" STYLE="font-size: 13pt"><SPAN STYLE="text-decoration: underline"> If a conveyance of an interest in real property does not sufficiently describe the
land to be conveyed, it is void under the statute of frauds. <EM>Pick</EM>, 659 S.W.2d at 637.
Such a contract, deed, or conveyance will not support an action for specific
performance or a suit for damages for a breach of contract. <EM>Wilson v. Fisher</EM>, 188
S.W.2d 150, 152 (Tex. 1945).</SPAN></SPAN></P>
<P><SPAN STYLE="font-family: Times New Roman" STYLE="font-size: 13pt"><SPAN STYLE="text-decoration: underline"> Here, as in <EM>Matney</EM>, there is nothing "indicating the shape of the block or the
courses and lengths of its border lines or those of the [3.0152] acres." 210 S.W.2d
at 982. To locate the 3.0152 acres with definiteness, it is necessary to first fix the
location of the piece of land of which it is a part, and then locate the 3.0152 acres by
boundaries, or metes and bounds of some character "adjoining on the east side that
certain 1.984 tract." <EM>See id</EM>. Also as in <EM>Matney</EM>, we hold that, "under the established
law of this state, the descriptive language used in this lease is vitally lacking in
definiteness." <EM>Id</EM>. </SPAN></SPAN></P>
<P><SPAN STYLE="font-family: Times New Roman" STYLE="font-size: 13pt"><SPAN STYLE="text-decoration: underline"> PTP attached a copy of the metes and bounds created when the property was
surveyed in 1999. This evidence, however, is "inadmissible to aid the description in
the written contract, because there is no reference to such [survey] in the contract
which must be looked to in determining whether the statute of frauds is satisfied."
<EM>Id</EM>. at 983.</SPAN></SPAN></P>
<P><SPAN STYLE="font-family: Times New Roman" STYLE="font-size: 13pt"><SPAN STYLE="text-decoration: underline"> Further, in <EM>Morrow</EM>, after a search of the abstract records and on directions
given by an attorney, a surveyor was able to locate the property on the ground and to
make a plat showing its location and boundaries that was introduced into evidence. <EM>
Morrow</EM>, 477 S.W.2d at 540. Similarly here, a surveyor did locate "the real property"
by, "in part," reviewing the Harris County Real Property Records. The rule for the
admissibility of extrinsic evidence to aid in descriptions for the conveyance of land,
however, is that a "resort to extrinsic evidence . . . is not for the purpose of supplying
the location or description of land, but only for the purpose of identifying it with
reasonable certainty from the data <EM>in the memorandum</EM>." <EM>Id</EM>. at 541 (emphasis added).
There were no documents attached to or referenced by the Right of First Refusal that
indicate the shape and boundaries of the 3.0152-acre tract. </SPAN></SPAN></P>
<P><SPAN STYLE="font-family: Times New Roman" STYLE="font-size: 13pt"><SPAN STYLE="text-decoration: underline"> We hold that the Right of First Refusal contains an inadequate land description
and thus violates the statute of frauds. Accordingly, we sustain point of error one.</SPAN></SPAN></P>
<P><SPAN STYLE="font-family: Times New Roman" STYLE="font-size: 13pt" STYLE="COLOR: #0000ff"><SPAN STYLE="text-decoration: underline"></SPAN></SPAN><SPAN STYLE="font-family: Times New Roman" STYLE="font-size: 13pt"><SPAN STYLE="text-decoration: underline">Price Cap</STRONG></SPAN></SPAN></P>
<P><SPAN STYLE="font-family: Times New Roman" STYLE="font-size: 13pt"><SPAN STYLE="text-decoration: underline"> In point of error two, Reiland contends that the alleged Right of First Refusal
from the Weises to Faulkner is void as a matter of law due to the fact that the
document contains an artificial price cap that operates as an unreasonable restraint on
alienation.</SPAN></SPAN></P>
<P><SPAN STYLE="font-family: Times New Roman" STYLE="font-size: 13pt"><SPAN STYLE="text-decoration: underline"> Having held that the Right of First Refusal violates the Statute of Frauds, we
need not address point of error two.</SPAN></SPAN><SPAN STYLE="font-family: Times New Roman" STYLE="font-size: 13pt" STYLE="COLOR: #0000ff"><SPAN STYLE="text-decoration: underline"></SPAN></SPAN></P>
<P><SPAN STYLE="font-family: Times New Roman" STYLE="font-size: 13pt" STYLE="COLOR: #0000ff"><STRONG><SPAN STYLE="text-decoration: underline"></SPAN></STRONG></SPAN><SPAN STYLE="font-family: Times New Roman" STYLE="font-size: 13pt"><STRONG><SPAN STYLE="text-decoration: underline"> <CENTER><STRONG>Conclusion</STRONG></CENTER>
</SPAN></SPAN></P>
<P><SPAN STYLE="font-family: Times New Roman" STYLE="font-size: 13pt"><SPAN STYLE="text-decoration: underline"> We reverse the trial court's judgment and render judgment in favor of Reiland
quieting title and removing the cloud on Reiland's property.</SPAN></SPAN></P>
<P><SPAN STYLE="font-family: Times New Roman" STYLE="font-size: 13pt"><SPAN STYLE="text-decoration: underline"> </SPAN></SPAN></P>
<P><SPAN STYLE="font-family: Times New Roman" STYLE="font-size: 13pt"><SPAN STYLE="text-decoration: underline"> George C. Hanks, Jr.</SPAN></SPAN></P>
<P><SPAN STYLE="font-family: Times New Roman" STYLE="font-size: 13pt"><SPAN STYLE="text-decoration: underline"> Justice</SPAN></SPAN></P>
<P><SPAN STYLE="font-family: Times New Roman" STYLE="font-size: 13pt"><SPAN STYLE="text-decoration: underline">Panel consists of Justices Taft, Keyes, and Hanks.
<P><A NAME="N_1_">1. </A> </SPAN><SPAN STYLE="font-family: Times New Roman" STYLE="font-size: 13pt">The correct name of the survey in the Harris County Real Property records is the
"William Waters" survey.
<P><A NAME="N_2_">2. </A> </SPAN><SPAN STYLE="font-family: Times New Roman" STYLE="font-size: 13pt">Although the record does not reflect when either Leonard or Marjorie Weis died,
Reiland does not dispute the validity of the Right of First Refusal based on this fact.
<P><A NAME="N_3_">3. </A></SPAN></SPAN><SPAN STYLE="font-family: Times New Roman" STYLE="font-size: 13pt"><SPAN STYLE="text-decoration: underline"> PTP argues that the Texas Supreme Court's recent decision in <EM>J. Hiram Moore, Ltd.
v. Greer</EM>, 172 S.W.3d 609 (Tex. 2005) supports the position that extrinsic evidence
can be admitted in this case. We disagree. The <EM>Moore</EM> case, which addressed the
propriety of granting summary judgment when an ambiguity exists in a royalty deed,
stood for the long-standing principle that, once a contract is found to be ambiguous,
a jury can hear extrinsic evidence and determine the parties' intent. <EM>Id</EM>. at 614. The
<EM>Moore</EM> case did not discuss the statute of frauds or the <EM>Morrow</EM> opinion, which is still
good law. </SPAN></SPAN></P>
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