COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judges Callins, White and Bernhard UNPUBLISHED
Argued at Williamsburg, Virginia
MICHAEL ELIGISAH WATKINS MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY v. Record No. 0731-24-1 JUDGE DOMINIQUE A. CALLINS SEPTEMBER 30, 2025 COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF NEWPORT NEWS Matthew W. Hoffman, Judge
Charles E. Haden for appellant.
Austin E. Deramo, Assistant Attorney General (Jason S. Miyares, Attorney General; Anderson W. Peake, Assistant Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.
Following a jury trial, the trial court convicted Michael Eligisah Watkins of two counts
each of strangulation and aggravated sexual battery, and one count each of forcible sodomy,
rape, abduction, and brandishing a firearm. On appeal, Watkins challenges the sufficiency of the
evidence to sustain his convictions. Finding no error, we affirm.
* This opinion is not designated for publication. See Code § 17.1-413(A). BACKGROUND1
From July to September 2019, M.W.2 and Watkins had an intimate romantic relationship.
On the night of September 11, 2019, Watkins picked up M.W. from her work at around
10:00 p.m. and drove to his apartment. Once there, M.W. invited her friend, Venita Burke, over
for dinner. After Burke arrived, the three sat down for conversation and drinks. During that
conversation, Watkins removed a gun from his hip and placed it on the table around which
Watkins, Burke and M.W. were sitting. Watkins told Burke that he had “eyes everywhere” and
that he “own[ed] [M.W.].” Watkins also said that he wanted a threesome with M.W. and Burke.
M.W. became uncomfortable, went into the bathroom, and then started cooking dinner. Before
M.W. finished cooking, however, Watkins asked Burke to leave the apartment.
After Burke left the apartment, Watkins began yelling at M.W. and accused her of having
a sexual relationship with Burke. Although M.W. denied his accusations, Watkins choked M.W.
for “a good while” and hit M.W. multiple times. Watkins then grabbed the gun and held it to
M.W.’s head. As he held the gun to her head, Watkins told M.W. that there were “people
outside watching” who would shoot her if she tried to leave.
Watkins eventually released M.W. and stepped outside briefly. She quickly sent a
message from her phone to Burke while Watkins was outside, asking her to call the police and
1 “[W]e review the evidence in the ‘light most favorable’ to the Commonwealth, the prevailing party in the trial court.” Commonwealth v. Barney, 302 Va. 84, 96 (2023) (quoting Commonwealth v. Hudson, 265 Va. 505, 514 (2003)). “Viewing the evidence through this evidentiary prism requires us to ‘discard the evidence of the accused in conflict with that of the Commonwealth, and regard as true all the credible evidence favorable to the Commonwealth and all fair inferences to be drawn therefrom.’” Id. at 97 (quoting Commonwealth v. Perkins, 295 Va. 323, 323-24 (2018) (per curiam)). “‘This deferential principle’ applies to issues of witness credibility and the factfinder’s interpretation of all the evidence.” Reed v. Commonwealth, 85 Va. App. 196, 201 n.1 (2025) (quoting Barney, 302 Va. at 97).
“We use initials, instead of the victim’s name, to protect her privacy.” Poole v. 2
Commonwealth, 73 Va. App. 357, 360 n.1 (2021). -2- not text back. M.W. then deleted the message from her phone, fearing that Watkins would kill
her if “he read or saw that [M.W.] reached out for help.” When Watkins returned, he grabbed
M.W. by the throat again and pushed her against the wall. He eventually let go of her throat, and
the two sat down to eat dinner. When he finished, Watkins took M.W.’s keys and phone from
her and went to sleep on the living room couch. He told M.W. to wake him up once she finished
eating. Watkins previously hit M.W. if she refused to do anything he said, so she feared not
following his directions.
M.W. took her time eating and cleaning up dishes, hoping the police would arrive, but
they never came.3 Eventually, as Watkins had instructed her, M.W. woke Watkins, and then
went with him to the bedroom. Before lying down in bed, Watkins placed M.W.’s phone and
keys, and his handgun under the mattress within his reach. He then laid down on top of them.
As Watkins slept, M.W. sat on the bed, trying to think of a plan to escape, but she eventually fell
asleep.
Before sunrise the following morning, Watkins woke M.W. and told her to lay on her
stomach. M.W. understood that this request meant he wanted to have sex with her and that he
would hit her if she refused. M.W. had removed her clothing the night before because Watkins
would hit her if she slept in clothing. M.W. did not want to have sex with Watkins because,
“who would want to after everything [Watkins] did to [M.W.] the night before”? But, fearing
Watkins’s ire, M.W. laid on her stomach, and Watkins inserted his penis into M.W.’s vagina as
he spat on her, called her a “b****,” and eventually ejaculated inside of her. Watkins then told
M.W. to “clean him up” by performing fellatio and anilingus as “punishment.” He also hit M.W.
in the face when she was “doing it wrong.” After M.W. finished, Watkins vaginally penetrated
3 Burke called the police twice, but she did not know the apartment number, so the police were unable to locate it or make contact with M.W. -3- her a second time. M.W. did not want to have sex with Watkins at this point either, but she
“wanted to get it done and over with.”
Later, M.W. reminded Watkins that she was due in traffic court. After he ejaculated
again, Watkins “allow[ed]” M.W. to take a shower. While M.W. was in the shower, Watkins
read through messages on her phone. When M.W. got out of the shower, Watkins asked her
about an old message and then started “punching the life out of [her]” on the bed. Watkins hit
M.W. so hard that her ear popped and started ringing. Eventually, Watkins stopped beating
M.W., she got dressed, and he dropped her off at traffic court in her car.
After M.W. resolved her traffic ticket, Watkins picked her up and drove to his mother’s
house. Along the way, Watkins noticed the injury to M.W.’s ear. He tried to cover her ear with
her hair and told her, “I didn’t hurt you, I just hurt your feelings.” At Watkins’s mother’s house,
Watkins and his mother were inside the house as M.W. sat in the car. As soon as Watkins was
inside the house, M.W. jumped into the driver’s seat, started the car, and “jetted” off toward her
own mother’s house. Nearing the house, M.W. pulled over to call Burke through Facebook
before seeing Watkins and his mother approaching. M.W. attempted to drive away from them,
but Watkins’s mother cut her off. M.W. made a quick U-turn, pulled into her mother’s
driveway, and ran into the house. M.W.’s sisters were home and called the police.
Newport News Police Officer James Odom arrived and took pictures of M.W.’s injuries,
including a swollen ear, scratches on her neck, and bruises on her body. M.W. “just wanted this
big nightmare” to end, so she did not disclose that Watkins sexually assaulted her. Indeed, she
did not immediately disclose the sexual assault to anyone because she was “scared,” “ashamed,”
and “embarrass[ed]” and wanted the “whole ordeal . . . to disappear.” Initially, M.W. was “very
hesitant” to speak with Officer Odom and was “reluctant” to give him Watkins’s name, though
she did eventually tell Officer Odom that Watkins choked and hit her.
-4- Watkins began sending text messages to M.W.’s phone that night and later came to her
house and started banging on the back door. The following morning, Watkins’s mother started
calling M.W. and threatening her. To protect herself and because she was “terrified of [Watkins]
harassing [her],” M.W. obtained a protective order. Then, two days after the assault, Burke
“talked [M.W.] into pressing charges.” The Newport News Police Department referred M.W. to
Detective Eric Meisel of the Special Victims unit; Detective Meisel interviewed M.W. at the
hospital. M.W. told Detective Meisel that Watkins choked her, threatened her with a gun, and
sexually assaulted her.
Later that same day, forensic Sexual Assault Nurse Examiner (“SANE”) Brittany Payne
performed a physical exam on M.W. and collected evidence for a Physical Evidence Recovery
Kit (“PERK”). The exam did not show any injury to M.W.’s vaginal tissue, and DNA analysis
of samples from the PERK did not return any matches. During the exam, however, Payne
observed that M.W.’s ear was ruptured from “blunt trauma” and identified evidence of
strangulation. Police arrested Watkins two days later, charging him with two counts each of
aggravated battery and strangulation and one count each of sodomy, rape, abduction, and
brandishing a firearm.
At trial, Burke’s testimony corroborated M.W.’s statements about the evening of
September 11 and the events leading up to Watkins ordering Burke to leave. Detective Meisel
also testified that sexual assault victims often delay reporting and that reports of sexual assault
are often made at the hospital first rather than at the police station. He testified that it is “not
uncommon for there not to be vaginal injuries” in sexual assault cases. Payne went further,
testifying that “it’s not been common for [her] to find [vaginal] injuries” during her
examinations. She testified that, of the 15 sexual assault victims she had examined in her career,
-5- she had only seen 2 with vaginal injuries. She also noted that, on average, victims of sexual
assault committed by a romantic partner delayed reporting for over a month.
At the close of the Commonwealth’s case-in-chief, Watkins moved to strike her evidence
four separate times. He first moved to strike the sexual offenses since, he argued, (1) the
aggravated sexual battery charges were duplicative of the rape and sodomy charges, and (2) the
Commonwealth failed to prove four distinct sexual acts between the rape, sodomy, and
aggravated sexual battery charges. Watkins then moved to strike the Commonwealth’s evidence
as to abduction, arguing that M.W. was not held against her will. Next, he moved to strike the
sexual offenses on the basis that M.W. was not forced. Last, Watkins moved to strike the
Commonwealth’s evidence as to all charges, arguing that M.W.’s testimony was inherently
incredible. The trial court denied each of Watkins’s motions.
Watkins testified on his own behalf. Watkins asserted that Burke never came over to his
apartment and that he had never seen her outside of the courtroom. Watkins denied “drinking
with either one of them.” According to Watkins, he and M.W. had sex every day during their
relationship but claimed they had not on the night in question or the following morning. On
September 12, 2019, when he and M.W. went to his mother’s house, Watkins said he went inside
and when he came out, M.W. was gone, and he never saw her again. Watkins claimed that when
he saw M.W. last, she did not have any scratches, bruises, or injuries. Don Michael Cunnius, a
forensic DNA expert, testified to a DNA analysis he performed on M.W.’s PERK. Cunnius
stated that, generally, he could recover DNA evidence from a sample collected within two days
of an assault. But he confirmed that “moving around, showering, [and] changing [clothes]” can
lead to a loss of DNA over two days.
Watkins renewed his motions to strike, which the trial court denied. The jury convicted
Watkins of both counts each of aggravated sexual battery and strangulation, and each count of
-6- sodomy, rape, abduction, and brandishing a firearm. The trial court sentenced Watkins to 100
years and 12 months of incarceration with 80 years suspended. Watkins appeals.
ANALYSIS
We review Watkins’s challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence for plain error.4 On
plain error review, “[t]he judgment of the trial court is presumed correct and will not be
disturbed unless it is plainly wrong or without evidence to support it.” McGowan v.
Commonwealth, 72 Va. App. 513, 521 (2020) (alteration in original) (quoting Smith v.
Commonwealth, 296 Va. 450, 460 (2018)). We do not ask ourselves “whether [we] believe[] that
the evidence at the trial established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. (quoting Secret v.
Commonwealth, 296 Va. 204, 228 (2018)). Instead, “the relevant question is whether ‘any
rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable
doubt.’” Caldwell v. Commonwealth, 298 Va. 517, 526 (2020) (emphasis added) (quoting
Vasquez v. Commonwealth, 291 Va. 232, 236 (2016)).
“This familiar standard gives full play to the responsibility of the trier of fact fairly to
resolve conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from
basic facts to ultimate facts.” Raspberry v. Commonwealth, 71 Va. App. 19, 29 (2019) (quoting
Burrous v. Commonwealth, 68 Va. App. 275, 279 (2017)). And where, as here, the jury renders
a general verdict, it is “presumed to be responsive to all the issues in the case affecting the
4 Watkins’s broad assignment of error barely complies with Rule 5A:20(c)(2). Watkins asserted that the trial court erred by “denying [his] motion to strike.” At trial, the court denied four individual motions to strike, each advanced separately by Watkins. Rule 5A:20(c)(2) requires assignments of error to address the rulings in the trial court from which an appeal is taken, and if the assignments are insufficient, “the appeal will be dismissed.” Here, we find Watkins’s assignment of error minimally compliant because (1) before Watkins made his initial set of motions, he stated “we have a Motion to Strike”; and (2) the trial court’s conviction order reflects that Watkins “moved the [c]ourt to strike the evidence.” Although his assignment does little to aid the Commonwealth or the Court in identifying the ruling he specifically contests, we find sufficient corroboration in the record to characterize his multiple motions to strike as a single, omnibus one. -7- correctness of the verdict, and it is only where it affirmatively appears from the record that it is
uncertain whether the verdict responds to all such issues that it will be held to be invalid.” Fields
v. Commonwealth, 129 Va. 774, 780 (1921) (citation omitted).
Each of Watkins’s arguments is considered in turn.
I. Four Distinct Acts
Watkins first argues that the Commonwealth failed to prove four distinct acts to support
both counts of aggravated sexual battery as distinct from the rape and sodomy. He asserts that
M.W. testified only to two incidents and that the aggravated sexual battery counts are necessarily
duplicative of the rape and sodomy charges. We disagree.
“The elements of rape . . . consist of engaging in sexual intercourse with the victim,
against her will, by force, threat, or intimidation.” Sheets v. Commonwealth, 80 Va. App. 706,
714-15 (2024) (alteration in original) (quoting Commonwealth v. Minor, 267 Va. 166, 173
(2004)). Similarly, the elements of forcible sodomy may consist of “engag[ing] in . . . fellatio
[or] anilingus . . . with a complaining witness . . . against the will of the complaining witness,
[or] by force, threat or intimidation of or against the complaining witness.” Code
§ 18.2-67.1(A)(2). The accused may also be “guilty of aggravated sexual battery if he . . .
sexually abuses the complaining witness . . . against the will of the complaining witness by force,
threat or intimidation . . . [while] us[ing] or threaten[ing] to use a dangerous weapon.”5 Code
§ 18.2-67.3(A)(4)(c). Neither rape, sodomy nor aggravated sexual battery is a lesser-included
offense of the other because each “contains an element that the [other] offense does not contain.”
Bowden v. Commonwealth, 52 Va. App. 673, 676 (2008) (quoting Dalton v. Commonwealth, 259
5 As used in Code § 18.2-67.3, “sexual abuse” may mean “an act committed with the intent to sexually molest, arouse, or gratify any person, where: . . . [t]he accused intentionally touches the complaining witness’s intimate parts or . . . forces the complaining witness to touch the accused’s . . . intimate parts.” Code § 18.2-67.10(6). The term “intimate parts” refers to the “genitalia, anus, groin, breast, or buttocks of any person.” Code § 18.2-67.10(2). -8- Va. 249, 253 (2000)) (holding that forcible sodomy and aggravated sexual battery are not
lesser-included offenses of one another).
Here, the jury’s finding that Watkins engaged in four distinct sexual crimes which
support his rape, forcible sodomy, and two aggravated sexual battery convictions is not plainly
wrong or without evidentiary support. The evidence was sufficient to prove four distinct sexual
acts corresponding to each conviction. The jury heard evidence that Watkins penetrated M.W.’s
vagina with his penis against her will—i.e., a rape. He then ordered M.W. to “clean” his penis
by performing fellatio on him against her will, establishing an act of forcible sodomy. Soon
thereafter, Watkins punished M.W. for her earlier interactions with Burke by directing her to
perform anilingus on him. And, afterward, Watkins vaginally penetrated M.W. with his penis a
second time. Together with Watkins’s ongoing threats of violence against M.W. and his
maintenance of the handgun under his side of the mattress, these latter two events constitute
distinct factual predicates which support each charge of aggravated sexual battery. Hence,
Watkins’s argument that the Commonwealth failed to prove four distinct assaults fails.
II. Force, Threat, or Intimidation
Watkins next contends that the Commonwealth’s evidence for the sexual assault charges
was insufficient since M.W. did not testify that Watkins used violence to force her to perform
sexual acts. He argues that he could not have sexually assaulted M.W. because M.W. previously
engaged in consensual intercourse with Watkins. He claims that M.W.’s willingness to engage
in intercourse with Watkins was evidenced by her “disrob[ing]” so Watkins could have “better
access to her body.” Again, we disagree.
Rape, forcible sodomy, and aggravated sexual battery each require proof that the accused
used force, threat or intimidation in perpetration of the offense. Code
§§ 18.2-67.1(A)(2), -67.3(A)(4)(c); Sheets, 80 Va. App. at 714-15. Force requires “evidence of
-9- ‘some array or show of force in form sufficient to overcome resistance’” and “must be used to
overcome the victim’s will.” Sabol v. Commonwealth, 37 Va. App. 9, 16 (2001) (quoting Jones
v. Commonwealth, 219 Va. 983, 986 (1979)). Meanwhile, threat requires “expression of an
intention to do bodily harm.” Id. at 17 (quoting Morse v. Commonwealth, 17 Va. App. 627, 634
(1994)). Intimidation differs from threat as intimidation “may occur without threats” and refers
to “putting a victim in fear of bodily harm by exercising such domination and control of her as to
overcome her mind and overbear her will.” Sutton v. Commonwealth, 228 Va. 654, 663 (1985).
Here, the jury’s finding that Watkins used force, threat, or intimidation while committing
rape, forcible sodomy, and aggravated sexual battery is not plainly wrong or without evidentiary
support. Watkins used actual and threatened violence as a tool to condition M.W. into
complying with his sexual demands. For example, M.W. removed her clothing before getting
into bed with Watkins because he would hit her if she slept in clothing. Similarly, when Watkins
told her to lay on her stomach, M.W. knew that he wanted to have sex with her and that he would
hit her if she refused. Aside from her fears of his violence if she did not comply, M.W. did not
want to have sex with Watkins after he choked her multiple times and held a gun to her head the
night before. During his assault of M.W., she was aware that Watkins kept his handgun under
the mattress within his reach, and he hit M.W. in the face when she was “doing it wrong.”
Based on these facts, a reasonable juror could have found that Watkins hitting M.W.
when she was “doing it wrong” constituted a “show of force” to “overcome [M.W.’s] will.”
Sabol, 37 Va. App. at 16. A reasonable juror likewise could have found that Watkins intimidated
M.W. by creating an environment where M.W. felt her compliance with Watkins’s sexual
demands was mandatory and her noncompliance would be met with violence—i.e., by “putting
[M.W.] in fear of bodily harm . . . to overcome her mind and overbear her will.” Sutton, 228 Va.
at 663. M.W. was choked and threatened at gunpoint less than 12 hours prior to being sexually
- 10 - assaulted for walking out of the room when Watkins expressed a desire for a threesome with
M.W. and Burke. From this fact, a reasonable juror could have found that M.W. submitted to
Watkins’s sexual advances that morning out of fear, and “[s]ubmission through fear to sexual
intercourse is not consent.” Id.
III. Abduction
Next, Watkins contends that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his abduction
conviction since M.W. “elected to remain with [Watkins] . . . and voluntarily chose to climb into
bed and sleep naked with him in the same bed overnight.” He also argues that even if M.W. was
detained by Watkins, her detention was ancillary and incidental to the sexual assault. We
disagree with both of Watkins’s arguments.
“Any person who, by force, intimidation or deception, and without legal justification or
excuse . . . detains . . . another person with the intent to deprive such other person of his personal
liberty . . . shall be deemed guilty of ‘abduction.’” Code § 18.2-47(A). “Put simply, the actus
reus of the crime is a taking, transporting, or detention of another, while the mens rea of the
crime is a specific intent to deprive another of her liberty.” Brown v. Commonwealth, 74
Va. App. 721, 730-31 (2022). Detaining a victim entails “having that victim ‘remain in a certain
location, or even in a certain position’ through the use of force, intimidation, or deception.”
Commonwealth v. Herring, 288 Va. 59, 74 (2014) (quoting Burton v. Commonwealth, 281 Va.
622, 628 (2011)). In this context, detention may be achieved by “having that victim remain
within a house.” Id. at 75. For purposes of abduction, “[i]ntimidation is defined as ‘[u]nlawful
coercion; extortion; duress; putting in fear.’” Brown, 74 Va. App. at 731 (second alteration in
original) (quoting Bivins v. Commonwealth, 19 Va. App. 750, 752 (1995)). “[A] victim suffers
fear of bodily harm in the abduction context if the defendant imposes ‘psychological pressure on
- 11 - [the victim] who, under the circumstances, is vulnerable and susceptible to such pressure.’” Id.
at 732 (second alteration in original) (quoting Sutton, 228 Va. at 663).
Although this Court reviews de novo the question of whether an abduction is “merely
incidental to another crime,” we “defer to the trial court’s findings of historical fact.” Hoyt v.
Commonwealth, 44 Va. App. 489, 496 n.4 (2004). “[T]he General Assembly did not intend to
make the kind of restraint which is an intrinsic element of crimes such as rape . . . a criminal act,
punishable as a separate offense.” Lawlor v. Commonwealth, 285 Va. 187, 224 (2013) (quoting
Brown v. Commonwealth, 230 Va. 310, 314 (1985)). “The only issue when abduction is charged
alongside an offense for which detention is an intrinsic element is whether any detention
exceeded the minimum necessary to complete the required elements of the other offense.” Id. at
225. Relevant to the issue, we consider “the duration of the detention” and whether the detention
(1) “occurred during the commission of a separate offense;” (2) “is inherent in the separate
offense;” or (3) “created a significant danger to the victim independent of that posed by the
separate offense.” Hoyt, 44 Va. App. at 494 (quoting Gov’t of V.I. v. Berry, 604 F.2d 221, 227
(3d Cir. 1979)).
Here, the jury’s finding that M.W.’s detention by Watkins was not voluntary is not
plainly wrong or without evidentiary support. Contrary to Watkins’s contentions, M.W. did not
elect to remain with Watkins and did not voluntarily choose to sleep naked in bed with him. The
jury heard testimony that while drinking with M.W. and Burke, Watkins placed a gun on the
table and told Burke that he “own[ed] [M.W.]” and that he had “eyes everywhere.” When M.W.
left the room in response to Watkins’s suggestion of a threesome with Burke, Watkins told Burke
to leave and proceeded to choke and hit M.W. He held a gun to M.W.’s head as he told her that
he had “people outside watching” who would shoot her if she tried to leave. Watkins later took
- 12 - M.W.’s keys and phone from her, placing them under his side of the mattress along with his
handgun.
M.W. did not attempt to escape, even when Watkins was sleeping, having previously
endured Watkins’s violence for disobeying his orders. During her brief reprieve when Watkins
was outside and she had access to her phone, M.W. texted Burke asking her to call the police,
reflecting the involuntary nature of M.W.’s detention with Watkins. When the police did not
arrive, M.W. testified that she laid awake on the bed, trying to conjure up an escape plan. The
next day, Watkins would not allow M.W. to drive her own car to traffic court, instead dropping
her off. Ultimately, M.W. only escaped Watkins’s detention by driving away from Watkins as
he went inside his mother’s house; even then, Watkins and his mother chased after M.W.,
stopping only when M.W. took refuge in her family’s home.
Based on the foregoing, the jury had evidence before it that Watkins required M.W. to
remain in his home and in his presence by intimidation. Herring, 288 Va. at 74-75. M.W. was
“put[] in fear” by Watkins’s displays and threats of violence, wielding of a gun, and control of
M.W.’s movements and property. Brown, 74 Va. App. at 731 (quoting Bivins, 19 Va. App. at
752). She suffered bodily harm because of Watkins’s actions, succumbing to what a reasonable
juror could conclude was psychological pressure he imposed, and enduring his sexual and
physical violence. Id. at 732. Simply put, M.W. did not remain with Watkins voluntarily.
Further, her detention was not merely incidental to Watkins raping, forcibly sodomizing,
and sexually battering M.W. Although M.W.’s detention overlapped with the detention inherent
in the sexual assault, M.W.’s detention started well before the sexual assault and ended well
after. Watkins took steps to deprive M.W. of the ability to communicate with others, used
violence to exert his dominance over M.W. in front of others, and prevented her from using her
own car to undermine her chances for physical escape. This ongoing detention, which lasted
- 13 - overnight and through the following day, created a significant danger to M.W. as she was denied
the opportunity to seek care for her compounding injuries. And this detention was not necessary
for Watkins to carry out his sexual assault of M.W. in the middle of the night; those events made
up only a fraction of the time M.W. was detained by Watkins. Watkins’s detention of M.W.,
therefore, “exceeded the minimum necessary to complete the required elements of” rape, forcible
sodomy, and aggravated sexual assault. Lawlor, 285 Va. at 225.
IV. Inherent Incredibility
Watkins punctuates his challenge by arguing that the evidence was insufficient to sustain
any of his convictions since M.W.’s testimony was inherently incredible. He asserts that M.W.’s
testimony was rife with inconsistencies and that M.W. was unable to recall key facts in the case.
He argues that M.W.’s allegations were uncorroborated by other evidence. Watkins further
argues that M.W.’s testimony was inherently incredible because (1) he denied sexually assaulting
or harming M.W.; (2) DNA evidence was not discovered; (3) no injuries to M.W.’s vagina or
anus were discovered; and (4) M.W. delayed reporting the sexual assaults. We disagree.
“As to the matter of witness credibility . . . the scope of our review is . . . narrow[].”
Grimaldo v. Commonwealth, 82 Va. App. 304, 320 (2024). “To be ‘incredible,’ testimony ‘must
be either so manifestly false that reasonable men ought not to believe it, or it must be shown to
be false by objects or things as to the existence and meaning of which reasonable men should not
differ.’” Lambert v. Commonwealth, 70 Va. App. 740, 759 (2019) (quoting Juniper v.
Commonwealth, 271 Va. 362, 415 (2006)). “Moreover, we cannot say that a witness’s testimony
is ‘inherently incredible [unless it is] so contrary to the human experience as to render it
unworthy of belief.’” Grimaldo, 82 Va. App. at 321 (alteration in original) (quoting Johnson v.
Commonwealth, 58 Va. App. 303, 315 (2011)). “In the absence of such extraordinary
contradiction, we defer to the factfinder’s conclusions on issues of witness credibility.” Id.
- 14 - “These same principles apply in cases involving rape, sodomy, and other sexual offenses,
which may be sustained solely upon the testimony of the victim, even in the absence of
corroborating evidence.” Ragsdale v. Commonwealth, 38 Va. App. 421, 429 (2002) (quoting
Ashby v. Commonwealth, 33 Va. App. 540, 548-49 (2000)). Indeed, “the testimony of a single
witness, if found credible by the trial court and not found inherently incredible by this Court, is
sufficient to support a conviction.” McCary v. Commonwealth, 36 Va. App. 27, 41 (2001). The
fact that a “witness may have delayed in reporting knowledge of a case or given inconsistent
statements . . . does not necessarily render the testimony unworthy of belief.” Juniper, 271 Va.
at 415. These circumstances are “appropriately weighed as part of the entire issue of witness
credibility, which is left to the jury to determine.” Id. And, “[i]n its role of judging witness
credibility, the fact finder is entitled to disbelieve the self-serving testimony of the accused and
to conclude that the accused is lying to conceal his guilt.” Washington v. Commonwealth, 75
Va. App. 606, 616 (2022) (alteration in original) (quoting Flanagan v. Commonwealth, 58
Va. App. 681, 702 (2011)).
Here, M.W.’s testimony is not inherently incredible. First, the fact that Watkins’s own
testimony contradicted M.W.’s does not make her testimony inherently incredible. The jury was
entitled to disbelieve his self-serving testimony. Id. Second, experts testified that the lack of
DNA evidence or physical injuries is consistent with human experience. Grimaldo, 82 Va. App.
at 321. Detective Meisel testified that it is “not uncommon for there not to be vaginal injuries”
in sexual assault cases, and Payne testified that “it’s not been common for [her] to find [vaginal]
injuries” during her examinations. Watkins’s own expert testified that normal activities such as
“moving around, showering, [and] changing [clothes]” can lead to a loss of DNA over the course
of two days. Third, M.W.’s negligible two-day delay in reporting is consistent with the common
behavior of sexual assault victims, especially those assaulted by romantic partners. We have
- 15 - previously held that a seven-year delay in reporting may not render a victim’s testimony
inherently incredible. See Love v. Commonwealth, 18 Va. App. 84, 90 (1994). Any concerns
caused by a delay in reporting are properly left to the jury. Id.
Moreover, and contrary to Watkins’s assertions, M.W.’s testimony was well corroborated
by the evidence and testimony presented at trial. Burke’s testimony corroborated all of M.W.’s
statements about the events in the apartment leading up to the incident, such as Watkins’s
possessive rant and placing a gun on the table. Burke also confirmed that M.W. messaged her
asking that she “call the police” and “don’t text back.” A jury would consequently have a
sufficient basis for believing the credibility of M.W.’s testimony as to the precipitating events.
As for the actual assaults, Burke and Detective Meisel both observed injuries on M.W. consistent
with the assaults as she described them. The jury also considered photographic evidence of these
same injuries.
In sum, M.W.’s testimony was not inherently incredible since her testimony was not “so
contrary to the human experience as to render it unworthy of belief.” Grimaldo, 82 Va. App. at
321 (quoting Johnson, 58 Va. App. at 315).
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Affirmed.
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