Michael Doyle v. The YMCA of New Hampshire

2023 DNH 108

• Court: District Court, D. New Hampshire
• Decided: August 23, 2023
• Docket: 21-cv-112-SE
• Status: Published

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

Michael Doyle

v. Case No. 21-cv-112-SE Opinion No. 2023 DNH 108 The YMCA of New Hampshire

O R D E R

Pro se plaintiff Michael Doyle alleges that defendant

Granite Young Men’s Christian Association1 (“Granite YMCA”)

violated his rights under the Americans with Disabilities Act

(“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12181, et seq. by failing to provide

accessible parking and adequate seating by its pool. Faced with

Granite YMCA’s summary judgment motion, which includes competent

evidence showing that it did not violate Doyle’s rights under

the ADA (doc. no. 44), Doyle responded by filing his own motion

for summary judgment (doc. no. 47) and objecting to Granite

YMCA’s motion (doc no. 48). Neither Doyle’s motion nor his

objection refers to any relevant evidence or offers much more

than conclusory statements. Because Granite YMCA’s

uncontroverted evidence shows that it did not violate Doyle’s

ADA rights, it is entitled to summary judgment and Doyle is not.

1 The complaint names “YMCA of New Hampshire” as the defendant. The defendant states that the proper defendant is Granite YMCA, and it presumes that Doyle intended to name that entity as a defendant. Standard of Review

The court treats cross-motions for summary judgment

separately, drawing inferences in the nonmoving party’s favor.

AJC Intern., Inc. v. Triple-S Propiedad, 790 F.3d 1, 3 (1st Cir.

2015). Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that

there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the

movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ.

P. 56(a). A material fact is one that “carries with it the

potential to affect the outcome of the suit.” French v. Merrill,

15 F.4th 116, 123 (1st Cir. 2021) (quotation omitted). A

material fact is in genuine dispute if “a reasonable jury could

resolve the point in the favor of the non-moving party.” Id. In

considering a motion for summary judgment, the court may review

materials cited in the motion and other materials in the record.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(3).

Background

Doyle has chronic heart disease, obesity, hypertension, and

degenerative joint disease in both of his knees. His medical

issues make it difficult to walk and to get in and out of low

chairs.

In the summer of 2020, Doyle was a member of the Granite

YMCA’s Portsmouth, New Hampshire location (“Seacoast YMCA”). The

2 Seacoast YMCA has 117 parking spots in its parking lot,

including 10 handicapped spots near its main entrance. The main

entrance is the YMCA’s only public entrance and is handicapped

accessible. All members are required to check in at the front

desk near the entrance before using the facilities, including

the outdoor pool.

The Seacoast YMCA outdoor pool is enclosed by a fence. The

fence has a gate that faces the parking lot and is usually kept

locked. There is a grassy hill leading down from the gate to the

lot. There are no designated parking spots at the base of the

grassy hill. That area is reserved for emergency vehicle use.

Members are supposed to access the pool by an indoor route after

checking in at the front desk and not through the gate at the

top of the grassy hill.

From July through August 2020, Doyle visited the Seacoast

YMCA several times. Each time he visited, he brought his own

chair to sit by the pool. Doyle told YMCA staff that the YMCA

chairs around the pool were too low for him. They ignored his

complaints, but allowed him to bring his own chair on each

occasion.

Doyle’s visits to the Seacoast YMCA had a familiar pattern.

He would park his car in a handicapped spot near the main

entrance and check in at the front desk. He would then return to

3 his car, drive it to the area near the pool, park at the bottom

of the grassy hill, walk up the hill, and enter the pool through

the fence gate. Because the gate was often locked with a

padlock, a YMCA staff member would usually need to unlock it so

Doyle could enter. Doyle repeatedly requested that they keep the

gate unlocked whenever there were members or staff in the pool

area. The YMCA ignored his requests.

Seacoast YMCA employees frequently asked Doyle not to park

in the area in which he parked at the bottom of the hill because

it was reserved for emergency vehicle use. They also asked him

not to walk up the hill or enter the pool through the gate.

According to Doyle, he “ignored these orders as they made no

sense.” Doc. no. 19, ¶ 6.

Doyle brings a disability discrimination claim against

Granite YMCA based on the Seacoast YMCA’s alleged violations of

the ADA.2 Those violations include prohibiting him from parking

in the area closest to the outdoor pool and failing to provide

seating of adequate height in the pool area.3

2 Doyle also brought a defamation claim based on Seacoast YMCA’s employees’ statements to police that Doyle was threatening them. The court granted Granite YMCA’s motion to dismiss that claim.

3 In his summary judgment filings, Doyle mentions that the pool at the Seacoast YMCA did not have a ramp to allow handicapped individuals to enter or exit the water. Neither

4 Discussion

Doyle brought a claim under Title III of the ADA, which

prohibits discrimination in public accommodations and services

operated by private entities. “To prove a violation of Title III

of the ADA, a plaintiff must show that []he is disabled within

the meaning of the ADA, that the defendant is a private entity

that owns or operates a place of public accommodation, and that

the plaintiff was denied accommodation because of [his]

disability.” Access Now, Inc. v. Blue Apron, LLC, No. 17-CV-116-

JL, 2017 WL 5186354, at *9 (D.N.H. Nov. 8, 2017) (quotation

omitted). Relevant to Doyle’s claim, a plaintiff is denied an

accommodation because of his disability when a defendant fails:

to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless the entity can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations[.]

42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii).

Granite YMCA moves for summary judgment on Doyle’s ADA

claim. It does not dispute for the purpose of summary judgment

Doyle’s complaint nor his amended complaint alleged an ADA violation based on any need for a ramp. Therefore, the absence of a ramp is not a part of Doyle’s ADA claim in this case.

5 that Doyle is disabled within the meaning of the ADA and that it

owns and operates a place of public accommodation. It contends,

however, that the record evidence establishes that it neither

failed to make reasonable modifications that were necessary to

accommodate Doyle’s disability nor violated parking

accessibility requirements. Doyle disagrees, stating that

Granite YMCA’s motion is filled with “many false and inaccurate

assertions” and “misrepresents the facts of the case.” Doc. no.

48 at 2. Doyle also moves for summary judgment, arguing that the

facts plainly show that Granite YMCA violated his rights under

the ADA.

I. Doyle’s Motion for Summary Judgment

Doyle’s motion contains six numbered paragraphs that

largely repeat certain allegations in his amended complaint. As

Granite YMCA notes in its objection, the motion does not

“incorporate a short and concise statement of material facts,

supported by appropriate record citations,” as required under

Local Rule 56.1. Indeed, Doyle’s motion refers to no record

evidence whatsoever and does not demonstrate the absence of a

genuine issue of material fact as to his ADA claim. In short,

Doyle has not shown that he is entitled to summary judgment, and

the court denies his motion.

6 II. Granite YMCA’s Motion for Summary Judgment

Granite YMCA argues that the uncontroverted record evidence

demonstrates that it did not violate Doyle’s ADA rights with

regard to its parking spaces or the seating area around the

pool.4 The court addresses each alleged ADA violation separately.

A. Parking

The record evidence shows that the Seacoast YMCA provided

10 handicapped parking spots by the front entrance where members

were required to check in. After checking in, members could and

did then access the pool through an indoor route. Thus, the YMCA

afforded parking accommodations to handicapped individuals,

including to those who used the outdoor pool. Doyle does not

4In its objection to Doyle’s motion for summary judgment, Granite YMCA argues that Doyle does not have standing to assert his ADA claim because he is no longer a Seacoast YMCA member and cannot show a risk of future harm. See doc. no. 50-1 at 3-4; Norkunas v. HPT Cambridge, LLC, 969 F. Supp. 2d 184, 191 (D. Mass. 2013) (noting that in a Title III case, a “risk of future harm exists where a plaintiff who has suffered an injury has a firm intention to return or where the plaintiff is being deterred from patronizing the business by the defendant’s misconduct”). Granite YMCA states in its objection that Doyle’s lack of standing is another reason to grant its motion for summary judgment. Doc. no. 50-1 at 4 n.2. Because the court grants the motion on other grounds, the court does not address whether Doyle has standing to assert his ADA claim.

7 explain why those accommodations were inadequate for his alleged

disability.

Doyle may have preferred to park by the pool, walk up the

hill, and enter through a gate, but “[f]acilities need make only

reasonable accommodations that are ‘necessary.’ They are not

required to make the preferred accommodation of plaintiffs’

choice.” A.L. by & through D.L. v. Walt Disney Parks & Resorts

US, Inc., 469 F. Supp. 3d 1280, 1304 (M.D. Fla. 2020), aff’d sub

nom. A. L. by & through D.L. v. Walt Disney Parks & Resorts

U.S., Inc., 50 F.4th 1097 (11th Cir. 2022) (citations and

quotations omitted). Therefore, the handicapped parking spots

are sufficient to satisfy ADA parking requirements here.

Further, the undisputed evidence is that Doyle parked his

car in an area without designated parking spots, which was

reserved for emergency vehicle use and through which Seacoast

YMCA employees had seen emergency vehicles travel on prior

occasions. Thus, the evidence in the record shows that Doyle’s

requested modification would have impacted the safety of other

YMCA members. The ADA does not require such a modification. See,

e.g., Dudley v. Hannaford Bros. Co., 333 F.3d 299, 308 (1st Cir.

2003).

Although Doyle’s objection asserts in conclusory fashion

that Granite YMCA misrepresents the facts, he does not point to

8 any record evidence that creates a dispute of material fact as

to the parking area. Indeed, as mentioned above, Doyle cites to

no material evidence in either his summary judgment motion or

his objection to Granite YMCA’s summary judgment motion. He

quarrels with overhead photos submitted with Granite YMCA’s

motion because, he argues, their depiction of certain shrubs

near the established handicapped parking is misleading. But the

position of those shrubs is not relevant to his claims.

Earlier in the litigation, Doyle filed a motion for

sanctions, claiming that Granite YMCA’s answer contained false

and misleading statements. See doc. no. 16. In support of that

motion, Doyle filed a sworn affidavit (doc. no. 19) and pictures

of the area where he parked (doc. no. 20). Referring to the

pictures, Doyle’s affidavit asserted that Granite YMCA’s claim

that the area in which Doyle parked was reserved for emergency

vehicles was “not credible” because over 50 feet of grass

separated where he parked and the street, and because the area

was not marked “fire lane.” Doc. no. 19, ¶ 7.

To the extent that Doyle intended to rely on that evidence

in support of his argument on summary judgment, that effort

would be in vain. Neither his opinion regarding the credibility

of the statement, nor his assessment of the practicality of

using the area for emergency vehicles, nor the absence of

9 signage is sufficient to overcome a sworn statement that the

area was in fact reserved for emergency vehicles and used by

them. See, e.g., Goenaga v. Mar. of Dimes Birth Defects Found.,

51 F.3d 14, 18 (2d Cir. 1995) (“The party opposing summary

judgment may not rely simply on conclusory statements or on

contentions that the affidavits supporting the motion are not

credible, or upon the mere allegations or denials of the adverse

party’s pleading.” (quotations and citations omitted)). Doyle’s

affidavit and pictures do not create a dispute of material fact

as to whether the YMCA violated the ADA with regard to the

parking area. Even if they did, Doyle has presented no record

evidence to show that the existing handicapped parking was an

insufficient accommodation or that his desired parking was

necessary and reasonable.

For those reasons, Granite YMCA is entitled to summary

judgment on the part of Doyle’s ADA claim that is based on

parking access.

B. Seating Around the Pool

Granite YMCA makes two arguments in support of summary

judgment as to Doyle’s ADA claim regarding seating around the

pool. The first is that there is no evidence in the record to

show that it violated any ADA seating requirement. During

10 discovery, Granite YMCA propounded an interrogatory asking Doyle

to state all facts as to whether and how the pool seating is not

compliant with the ADA. Doyle stated: “Compliant seating needs

to be 24 inches above the deck not 12 inches.” Doc. no. 44-3 at

7. Likewise, Doyle references the 24-inch requirement in his

summary judgment motion, and states that he was “forced to

provide his own lawn chair to have any seating at the pool

whatsoever.” Doc. no. 47, ¶¶ 2, 4. Granite YMCA asserts that it

has not located any guidance or authority requiring movable

seating 24 inches above the deck.

Granite YMCA’s second argument is that there is no evidence

in the record to show that it refused a request for a reasonable

and necessary seating modification. Again relying on Doyle’s

interrogatory responses and its own affidavit, it argues that

the evidence in the record shows that Doyle brought his own lawn

chair to the pool because he felt the available seating was

inadequate, and that Granite YMCA never prevented him from doing

so.

Doyle does not address these arguments in his objection to

Granite YMCA’s summary judgment motion. He has provided no

evidence or argument establishing a legal requirement for

seating 24 inches above the deck. He does not allege that

bringing his own chair somehow harmed him or was insufficient.

11 Indeed, his objection does not address his claim regarding the

pool seating at all. Granite YMCA is entitled to summary

judgment on Doyle’s claim that it violated the ADA with respect

to the pool seating.

Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, Doyle’s motion for summary

judgment (doc. no. 47) is denied. The defendant’s motion for

summary judgment (doc. no. 44) is granted. The clerk of court

shall enter judgment accordingly and close the case.

SO ORDERED.

______________________________ Samantha D. Elliott United States District Judge

August 23, 2023

cc: Michael Doyle, pro se. Counsel of record.