This opinion will be unpublished and may not be cited except as provided by Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2014).
STATE OF MINNESOTA IN COURT OF APPEALS A15-1774
Michael Delaney Harris, petitioner, Appellant,
vs.
State of Minnesota, Respondent.
Filed July 11, 2016 Affirmed Reyes, Judge
Ramsey County District Court File No. 62CR123704
Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Carol Comp, Special Assistant Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)
Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and
John J. Choi, Ramsey County Attorney, Kaarin Long, Assistant County Attorney, St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondent)
Considered and decided by Schellhas, Presiding Judge; Peterson, Judge; and Reyes,
Judge.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
REYES, Judge
On appeal from the denial of postconviction relief, appellant argues that he should
be allowed to withdraw his guilty plea to fifth-degree possession of a controlled substance because of testing deficiencies discovered at the St. Paul Police Department
Crime Lab (SPPDCL). We affirm.
FACTS
On May 5, 2012, appellant Michael Delaine Harris was arrested for violating an
order for protection (OFP). When appellant was arrested, an officer found a brown vial
in his pocket containing what the officer suspected was cocaine. The SPPDCL tested the
substance, and it tested positive for cocaine. On June 8, 2012, appellant pleaded guilty to
fifth-degree possession of a controlled substance, and in exchange, the state dismissed the
charge related to the OFP violation. The district court accepted appellant’s plea and
adjudicated him guilty. Appellant was sentenced on July 26, 2012.
On July 25, 2014, appellant filed a petition for postconviction relief. In his
petition, appellant outlined several problems at the SPPDCL that were revealed in a 2012
case and subsequent lab audits. The postconviction court denied appellant’s petition for
postconviction relief without an evidentiary hearing. The postconviction court
determined that appellant’s petition was timely but meritless. This appeal follows.
DECISION
“[Appellate courts] review a denial of a petition for postconviction relief, as well
as a request for an evidentiary hearing, for an abuse of discretion.” Riley v. State, 819
N.W.2d 162, 167 (Minn. 2012). “A postconviction court abuses its discretion when its
decision is based on an erroneous view of the law or is against logic and the facts in the
record.” State v. Nicks, 831 N.W.2d 493, 503 (Minn. 2013) (quotation omitted).
“[Appellate courts] review legal issues de novo,” but our review of factual issues “is
2 limited to whether there is sufficient evidence in the record to sustain the postconviction
court’s findings.” Matakis v. State, 862 N.W.2d 33, 36 (Minn. 2015) (quotation omitted).
An individual who is convicted of a crime and claims the conviction was obtained
in violation of the individual’s constitutional rights may file a petition for postconviction
relief. Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd. 1 (2012). A petition for postconviction relief must be
filed within two years of the later of “(1) the entry of judgment or conviction or sentence
if no direct appeal is filed; or (2) an appellate court’s disposition of petitioner’s direct
appeal.” Id., subd. 4(a) (2012). Here, appellant’s petition is timely because it was filed
on July 25, 2014, which is within two years of July 26, 2012, the date on which appellant
was sentenced. Id. We next turn to appellant’s substantive arguments.
Appellant argues that, in light of the deficiencies at the SPPDCL, he should be
allowed to withdraw his guilty plea based on (1) newly discovered evidence; (2) a Brady
violation; (3) a procedural due-process violation; (4) manifest injustice; and
(5) ineffective assistance of counsel. In addition, appellant argues that he is entitled to an
evidentiary hearing. Appellant’s first three arguments fail because a counseled guilty
plea “has traditionally operated, in Minnesota and in other jurisdictions, as a waiver of all
non-jurisdictional defects arising prior to the entry of the plea.” State v. Ford, 397
N.W.2d 875, 878 (Minn. 1986). We address appellant’s remaining arguments in turn.
I. Manifest injustice
Appellant argues that his guilty plea was not accurate, voluntary, or intelligent,
resulting in a manifest injustice. We are not persuaded.
3 A court must allow a defendant to withdraw a guilty plea if it is necessary to
correct a manifest injustice. Minn. R. Crim. P. 15.05, subd. 1. “Manifest injustice occurs
if a guilty plea is not accurate, voluntary, and intelligent.” Perkins v. State, 559 N.W.2d
678, 688 (Minn. 1997). “A defendant bears the burden of showing his plea was invalid.
Assessing the validity of a plea presents a question of law that [appellate courts] review
de novo.” State v. Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d 90, 94 (Minn. 2010) (citations omitted).
A. Accurate
For a guilty plea to be accurate, “[a] proper factual basis must be established.”
State v. Ecker, 524 N.W.2d 712, 716 (Minn. 1994). Appellant pleaded guilty to fifth-
degree possession of a controlled substance, and he admitted to all of the elements of the
offense. He admitted that the substance he possessed was cocaine and acknowledged in
his plea petition that he was not claiming innocence. These facts, admitted by appellant
at his plea hearing, satisfy the accuracy requirement.
B. Voluntary
Courts determine whether a plea is voluntary “by considering all relevant
circumstances” and ensuring that the defendant did not plead guilty “due to improper
pressure or coercion.” Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d at 96. Appellant argues that the test results
from the SPPDCL created improper pressure that induced him to plead guilty. The
record does not support appellant’s contention. Appellant did not ask to review the
SPPDCL records, did not challenge the test results, and did not dispute that the substance
was cocaine. Appellant’s plea petition, which he signed and acknowledged at the plea
hearing, stated that no one had threatened him or made him any promises in order to
4 obtain a guilty plea. Accordingly, appellant was not improperly pressured or coerced to
plead guilty.
C. Intelligent
For a guilty plea to be intelligent, the defendant must understand the charges
against him, the rights he is waiving, and the consequences of the plea. Id. Appellant
argues that he did not know about the deficiencies at the SPPDCL, did not understand the
scope of his right to challenge the evidence against him, and did not know that he was
waiving this right by pleading guilty. At the plea hearing, appellant confirmed that he
understood that he had been charged with and was pleading guilty to fifth-degree
possession of a controlled substance. He also stated that he had no reason to dispute the
law-enforcement tests, which indicated that the controlled substance appellant possessed
was cocaine. Additionally, the signed plea petition confirms that appellant’s attorney
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This opinion will be unpublished and may not be cited except as provided by Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2014).
STATE OF MINNESOTA IN COURT OF APPEALS A15-1774
Michael Delaney Harris, petitioner, Appellant,
vs.
State of Minnesota, Respondent.
Filed July 11, 2016 Affirmed Reyes, Judge
Ramsey County District Court File No. 62CR123704
Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Carol Comp, Special Assistant Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)
Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and
John J. Choi, Ramsey County Attorney, Kaarin Long, Assistant County Attorney, St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondent)
Considered and decided by Schellhas, Presiding Judge; Peterson, Judge; and Reyes,
Judge.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
REYES, Judge
On appeal from the denial of postconviction relief, appellant argues that he should
be allowed to withdraw his guilty plea to fifth-degree possession of a controlled substance because of testing deficiencies discovered at the St. Paul Police Department
Crime Lab (SPPDCL). We affirm.
FACTS
On May 5, 2012, appellant Michael Delaine Harris was arrested for violating an
order for protection (OFP). When appellant was arrested, an officer found a brown vial
in his pocket containing what the officer suspected was cocaine. The SPPDCL tested the
substance, and it tested positive for cocaine. On June 8, 2012, appellant pleaded guilty to
fifth-degree possession of a controlled substance, and in exchange, the state dismissed the
charge related to the OFP violation. The district court accepted appellant’s plea and
adjudicated him guilty. Appellant was sentenced on July 26, 2012.
On July 25, 2014, appellant filed a petition for postconviction relief. In his
petition, appellant outlined several problems at the SPPDCL that were revealed in a 2012
case and subsequent lab audits. The postconviction court denied appellant’s petition for
postconviction relief without an evidentiary hearing. The postconviction court
determined that appellant’s petition was timely but meritless. This appeal follows.
DECISION
“[Appellate courts] review a denial of a petition for postconviction relief, as well
as a request for an evidentiary hearing, for an abuse of discretion.” Riley v. State, 819
N.W.2d 162, 167 (Minn. 2012). “A postconviction court abuses its discretion when its
decision is based on an erroneous view of the law or is against logic and the facts in the
record.” State v. Nicks, 831 N.W.2d 493, 503 (Minn. 2013) (quotation omitted).
“[Appellate courts] review legal issues de novo,” but our review of factual issues “is
2 limited to whether there is sufficient evidence in the record to sustain the postconviction
court’s findings.” Matakis v. State, 862 N.W.2d 33, 36 (Minn. 2015) (quotation omitted).
An individual who is convicted of a crime and claims the conviction was obtained
in violation of the individual’s constitutional rights may file a petition for postconviction
relief. Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd. 1 (2012). A petition for postconviction relief must be
filed within two years of the later of “(1) the entry of judgment or conviction or sentence
if no direct appeal is filed; or (2) an appellate court’s disposition of petitioner’s direct
appeal.” Id., subd. 4(a) (2012). Here, appellant’s petition is timely because it was filed
on July 25, 2014, which is within two years of July 26, 2012, the date on which appellant
was sentenced. Id. We next turn to appellant’s substantive arguments.
Appellant argues that, in light of the deficiencies at the SPPDCL, he should be
allowed to withdraw his guilty plea based on (1) newly discovered evidence; (2) a Brady
violation; (3) a procedural due-process violation; (4) manifest injustice; and
(5) ineffective assistance of counsel. In addition, appellant argues that he is entitled to an
evidentiary hearing. Appellant’s first three arguments fail because a counseled guilty
plea “has traditionally operated, in Minnesota and in other jurisdictions, as a waiver of all
non-jurisdictional defects arising prior to the entry of the plea.” State v. Ford, 397
N.W.2d 875, 878 (Minn. 1986). We address appellant’s remaining arguments in turn.
I. Manifest injustice
Appellant argues that his guilty plea was not accurate, voluntary, or intelligent,
resulting in a manifest injustice. We are not persuaded.
3 A court must allow a defendant to withdraw a guilty plea if it is necessary to
correct a manifest injustice. Minn. R. Crim. P. 15.05, subd. 1. “Manifest injustice occurs
if a guilty plea is not accurate, voluntary, and intelligent.” Perkins v. State, 559 N.W.2d
678, 688 (Minn. 1997). “A defendant bears the burden of showing his plea was invalid.
Assessing the validity of a plea presents a question of law that [appellate courts] review
de novo.” State v. Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d 90, 94 (Minn. 2010) (citations omitted).
A. Accurate
For a guilty plea to be accurate, “[a] proper factual basis must be established.”
State v. Ecker, 524 N.W.2d 712, 716 (Minn. 1994). Appellant pleaded guilty to fifth-
degree possession of a controlled substance, and he admitted to all of the elements of the
offense. He admitted that the substance he possessed was cocaine and acknowledged in
his plea petition that he was not claiming innocence. These facts, admitted by appellant
at his plea hearing, satisfy the accuracy requirement.
B. Voluntary
Courts determine whether a plea is voluntary “by considering all relevant
circumstances” and ensuring that the defendant did not plead guilty “due to improper
pressure or coercion.” Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d at 96. Appellant argues that the test results
from the SPPDCL created improper pressure that induced him to plead guilty. The
record does not support appellant’s contention. Appellant did not ask to review the
SPPDCL records, did not challenge the test results, and did not dispute that the substance
was cocaine. Appellant’s plea petition, which he signed and acknowledged at the plea
hearing, stated that no one had threatened him or made him any promises in order to
4 obtain a guilty plea. Accordingly, appellant was not improperly pressured or coerced to
plead guilty.
C. Intelligent
For a guilty plea to be intelligent, the defendant must understand the charges
against him, the rights he is waiving, and the consequences of the plea. Id. Appellant
argues that he did not know about the deficiencies at the SPPDCL, did not understand the
scope of his right to challenge the evidence against him, and did not know that he was
waiving this right by pleading guilty. At the plea hearing, appellant confirmed that he
understood that he had been charged with and was pleading guilty to fifth-degree
possession of a controlled substance. He also stated that he had no reason to dispute the
law-enforcement tests, which indicated that the controlled substance appellant possessed
was cocaine. Additionally, the signed plea petition confirms that appellant’s attorney
informed him of the rights he was waiving and that he would not have another
opportunity to object to the state’s evidence against him. These facts indicate that
appellant understood the charges against him, the rights he was waiving, and the
consequences of his guilty plea.
Therefore, we conclude that appellant’s plea was accurate, voluntary, and
intelligent. As such, the district court did not abuse its discretion by determining that
appellant is not entitled to postconviction relief based upon a manifest injustice.
II. Ineffective assistance of counsel
Appellant argues that he received objectively unreasonable representation because
his attorney did not demand and review the SPPDCL file. We disagree.
5 Appellate courts review ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims de novo. State v.
Rhodes, 657 N.W.2d 823, 842 (Minn. 2003). To succeed on an ineffective-assistance-of-
counsel claim, appellant must show that (1) his counsel’s representation fell below an
objective standard of reasonableness and (2) but for counsel’s errors, there is a reasonable
probability that the outcome of the proceeding would have been different. Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88, 694, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064, 2068 (1984). “We need
not address both the performance and prejudice prongs if one is determinative.” Rhodes,
657 N.W.2d at 842. An attorney provides objectively reasonable assistance when he
exercises the customary skill and diligence that a reasonably competent attorney would
exercise under similar circumstances. State v. Vang, 847 N.W.2d 248, 266-67 (Minn.
2014). “Trial counsel’s performance is presumed to be reasonable.” Id. at 266.
This court recently addressed an argument similar to that of appellant’s in Roberts
v. State, 856 N.W.2d 287, 293 (Minn. App. 2014), review denied (Minn. Jan. 28, 2015).
Roberts also claimed that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because his
attorney failed to investigate and discover the deficiencies at the SPPDCL. Id. at 293.
But like Roberts, appellant does not allege that his attorney failed to discuss this option
with him, refused to request the file, “or advised him not to challenge the results.” Id.
Appellant also fails to provide evidence that it was the customary practice of defense
attorneys at the time to request SPPDCL files for cases involving controlled substances.
Because appellant does not show how his attorney’s representation fell below an
objective standard of reasonableness, his ineffective-assistance-of-counsel argument fails,
and we need not consider the prejudice prong of the Strickland test. Accordingly, we
6 conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying appellant’s petition
for postconviction relief based on his ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim.
III. Evidentiary hearing
Finally, appellant argues that the postconviction court erred by denying his request
for an evidentiary hearing. We disagree.
A postconviction court’s decision regarding whether to hold an evidentiary
hearing is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Riley, 819 N.W.2d at 167. A
postconviction petitioner is not entitled to an evidentiary hearing if “the petition and the
files and records of the proceeding conclusively show that the petitioner is entitled to no
relief.” Minn. Stat. § 590.04, subd. 1 (2012). “An evidentiary hearing is not required
unless there are material facts in dispute that must be resolved to determine the
postconviction claim on its merits.” Powers v. State, 695 N.W.2d 371, 374 (Minn. 2005).
For the reasons previously discussed, the record conclusively demonstrates that
appellant is not entitled to relief, and there are no disputed issues of material fact.
Therefore, appellant has not shown that the postconviction court abused its discretion by
denying his request for an evidentiary hearing. Id.
Affirmed.