Michael Daniels v. SSA (Interested Party / NEF), et al.

Opinion

1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 7 MICHAEL DANIELS, Case No. 24-cv-09445-HSG

8 Plaintiff, ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION AND ENTERING 9 v. JUDGMENT IN DEFENDANT’S FAVOR 10 SSA (INTERESTED PARTY / NEF), et al., Re: Dkt. Nos. 14, 15 11 Defendants.

12 13 Defendant Commissioner of the Social Security Administration denied Plaintiff Michael 14 Daniels’ application for Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”). Mr. Daniels seeks judicial review 15 of that decision. For the reasons set forth below, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s motion for 16 summary judgment. Dkt. No. 14 (“Mot.”). 17 I. BACKGROUND 18 Mr. Daniels filed a petition for SSI in September 2021, with an alleged disability onset 19 date of September 1, 2021. Dkt. No. 7, Administrative Record (“AR”) 279–85. Mr. Daniels 20 identified the following medical conditions: multiple sclerosis, schizoaffective bipolar type 21 disorder, autism spectrum disorder, depression, anxiety, auditory and visual hallucinations, 22 arthritis, de Quervain’s tenosynovitis splint, delusions, and mood dysregulation. AR 307. His 23 claim was denied in December 2021, and on reconsideration in August 2022. AR 148–53, 157– 24 63. 25 Mr. Daniels then appealed to an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”), who held a hearing in 26 November 2023. AR 41–69. The ALJ denied his benefits in January 2024, finding that Mr. 27 Daniels did not qualify as disabled using the sequential five-step process codified in regulation. 1 First, under the five-step process, the ALJ must determine whether the claimant is 2 engaging in “substantial gainful activity.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(i). Substantial gainful 3 activity is work activity that involves doing significant physical or mental activities, usually done 4 for pay or profit, regardless of whether a profit is realized. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1572(a)–(b). If a 5 claimant is engaged in substantial gainful activity, the claimant is not disabled. The ALJ found 6 that Mr. Daniels had not engaged in gainful activity since September 2021. AR 21. 7 Second, the claimant must have a medically determinable impairment that is severe or a 8 combination of impairments that are severe. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(ii), (c). The ALJ found 9 that some of Mr. Daniels’ conditions—autism spectrum disorder, major depressive disorder, 10 attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder, and alcohol use disorder—were severe impairments. AR 11 21–23.1 12 Third, the ALJ must determine whether the impairment is of a severity to meet or 13 medically equal the criteria of an impairment listed in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. 14 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iii), (d), 404.1525, 404.1526. If the impairment is sufficiently 15 severe, then the claimant is disabled. If not, the analysis proceeds to the next step. The ALJ found 16 that Mr. Daniels’ impairments were not sufficiently severe to equal the listed impairments. AR 17 23–25. 18 Fourth, the ALJ must determine the claimant’s “residual functional capacity” (“RFC”), or 19 his ability to do physical and mental work activities on a sustained basis despite his limitations. 20 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iv), (e). In making this determination, the ALJ considers all of a 21 claimant’s impairments. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(b). The ALJ then matches those capacities against 22 past relevant work within the last 15 years prior to the date of disability. 20 C.F.R. 23 §§ 404.1520(f), 404.1560(b). If the claimant cannot perform that past work, the process proceeds 24 to the last step. 25 26

27 1 The ALJ found that “foreign body ingestion, dental infection, obesity, right de Quervain 1 Here, the ALJ determined that Mr. Daniels has the RFC to perform a full range of work at 2 all exertional levels, but with the nonexertional limitations that (1) “[h]e could understand 3 remember, and carry out detailed but not complex instructions and tasks”; and (2) “[h]e could have 4 occasional interaction with the supervisors, coworkers, and the general public.” AR 25. In 5 reaching the RFC determination, the ALJ found that Mr. Daniels’ medically determinable 6 impairments could reasonably be expected to cause his symptoms, but that his “statements 7 concerning the intensity, persistence[,] and limiting effects of these symptoms are not entirely 8 consistent with the medical evidence and other evidence of record.” AR 26. Notable here, the 9 ALJ found a supporting opinion from Dr. Jacklyn L. Chandler, the psychological consultative 10 examiner who evaluated Mr. Daniels in July 2022, was not fully persuasive because of limited 11 support and inconsistencies in the evidence. AR 31. The ALJ determined that Mr. Daniels would 12 be unable to perform any of his past relevant work given his RFC, age, education, and work 13 experience. AR 33. 14 Fifth, the ALJ determines whether the claimant can perform any other work considering 15 his RFC, age, education, and work experience. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(v), (g). Only if the 16 claimant is unable to do other work is he considered disabled. Id. The ALJ found that Mr. 17 Daniels had the RFC to perform work in representative occupations such as “hand packager,” 18 “cleaner,” and “assembler,” and that he could make “a successful adjustment to other work that 19 exists in significant numbers in the national economy.” AR 34. As a result, the ALJ determined 20 that Mr. Daniels was not disabled. Id. 21 Following this determination, the Appeals Council denied Mr. Daniels’ request for review 22 in October 2024. AR 1–7. 23 II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 24 The Court has jurisdiction to review final decisions of the Commissioner. See 42 U.S.C. 25 § 405(g) (“The [district] court shall have power to enter, upon the pleadings and transcript of the 26 record, a judgment affirming, modifying, or reversing the decision of the Commissioner of Social 27 Security, with or without remanding the cause for a rehearing.”). The Court may disturb the 1 evidence or is based on legal error. Luther v. Berryhill, 891 F.3d 872, 875 (9th Cir. 2018). The 2 threshold for “substantial evidence” is not high: “It means—and means only—such relevant 3 evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Biestek v. 4 Berryhill, 587 U.S. 97, 103 (2019) (quotation omitted). “The evidence must be more than a mere 5 scintilla, but may be less than a preponderance.” Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1110–11 (9th 6 Cir. 2012) (quotation omitted). “Where the evidence is susceptible to more than one rational 7 interpretation, one of which supports the ALJ’s decision, the ALJ’s conclusion must be upheld.” 8 Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 954 (9th Cir. 2002). 9 The Court must consider the administrative record as a whole, weighing both the evidence 10 that supports and the evidence that detracts from the ALJ’s conclusion. McAllister v. Sullivan, 11 888 F.2d 599, 602 (9th Cir. 1989). The ALJ is responsible for making determinations of 12 credibility and for resolving evidentiary ambiguities, including conflicting medical testimony. 13 Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 750 (9th Cir. 1989). Additionally, the Court “may not 14 reverse an ALJ’s decision on account of an error that is harmless,” and “[t]he burden of showing 15 that an error is harmful normally falls upon the party attacking the agency’s determination.” 16 Molina, 674 F.3d at 1111 (quotation omitted). 17 III. DISCUSSION 18 Mr. Daniels argues that (1) the ALJ’s rejection of Dr. Chandler’s opinion was not 19 supported by substantial evidence; and (2) the ALJ erred by preventing the hearing attorney from 20 asking the vocational expert about a relevant RFC limitation relating to Mr. Daniels’ “inability to 21 maintain adequate standards of basic hygiene, cleanliness, and neatness.” Mot. at 2, 16. 22 A. Dr. Chandler’s Report 23 Dr. Chandler examined Mr. Daniels in July 2022 and concluded that (1) he was “capable 24 of understanding, remembering, and carrying out simple, detailed, and complex job instructions 25 without difficulty;” (2) he “may have difficulty adapting to changes in routine work settings;” (3) 26 he was “likely to have mild difficulty maintaining attention and concentration;” (4) he was 27 “capable of maintaining pace and persistence;” (5) he was “likely to have mild to moderate 1 interacting appropriately with [her];” (7) “in a less structured setting, [he] may have marked 2 difficulty relating and interacting with supervisors and coworkers;” and (8) he was “likely to have 3 marked difficulty dealing with the public.” AR 1135. The ALJ found Dr. Chandler’s opinions on 4 Mr. Daniels’ mild to moderate difficulty functioning under normal stress, difficulty adapting to 5 changes, and marked difficulty interacting with others to be not fully persuasive. AR 31.2 6 For claims filed on or after March 27, 2017, an ALJ does not “defer or give any specific 7 evidentiary weight, including controlling weight to any medical opinion[s] . . . .” 20 C.F.R. 8 § 404.1520c(a). The ALJ must assess each opinion using factors codified in the regulation. Id. 9 § 404.1520c(b)(1). The only factors the ALJ is required to consider are consistency and 10 supportability. Id. § 404.1520c(b)(2). The ALJ “must articulate how persuasive [she] finds all of 11 the medical opinions from each doctor or other source, and explain how [she] considered the 12 supportability and consistency factors in reaching these findings.” Woods v. Kijakazi, 32 F.4th 13 785, 792 (9th Cir. 2022) (internal citation and quotation omitted) (cleaned up).3 Consistency 14 assesses whether a medical opinion or finding is congruent “with the evidence from other medical 15 sources and nonmedical sources in the claim,” while supportability addresses whether the medical 16 opinions are backed up by objective findings and observations. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(c)(1)–(2). 17 Applying the deferential standard that controls here, the Court finds the ALJ did not 18 commit reversable error in her consideration of Dr. Chandler’s opinion. The ALJ determined that 19 Dr. Chandler’s opinion was “not fully persuasive.” AR 31. She first concluded that Dr. 20 Chandler’s findings that Mr. Daniels was likely to have mild to moderate difficulty functioning 21 under normal stress were “vague and not well supported” and inconsistent with “the minimal 22 mental status examination findings and good activities of daily living with only rare increased 23 symptom[] reports in the record.” Id. Next, the ALJ held that Dr. Chandler’s opinion on Mr. 24 Daniels’ difficulty adapting to changes in work settings was “not well supported,” inconsistent 25 “with the intellectual and mental status examination scores in her evaluation,” and inconsistent 26 2 Mr. Daniels does not challenge the ALJ’s findings on the rest of Dr. Chandler’s evaluation. 27 1 “with the good activities of daily living reported by the claimant.” Id. Finally, the ALJ concluded 2 that Dr. Chandler’s opinion on Mr. Daniels’ marked difficulty in interacting with others was 3 somewhat supported by “the noted issues with social reciprocity” but was “not consistent with the 4 minimal similar findings during treatment and also inconsistent with his ability to maintain family 5 and romantic relationships.” Id. Specifically, the ALJ held that the “objective medical and other 6 evidence in the longitudinal record [was] inconsistent with a marked limitation in this area.” Id. 7 As required, the ALJ explicitly addressed whether she found each part of Dr. Chandler’s opinion 8 persuasive and explained her findings for supportability and consistency. Woods, 32 F.4th at 792. 9 Mr. Daniels argues that this conclusion was not supported by substantial evidence, 10 primarily by arguing that the ALJ mischaracterized his mental status examination findings as 11 “minimal,” his activities of daily living as “good,” and his increased symptom reports as “rare.” 12 Mot. at 5. The Court disagrees. 13 There was substantial evidence that Mr. Daniels had minimal mental status examination 14 findings. The ALJ reviewed treatment records from June 3, 2022 to November 4, 2022 and found 15 that Mr. Daniels “had consistently normal mental status examination findings, with fair hygiene, 16 normal attention and concentration, normal psychomotor function, regular speech and language, 17 good eye contact, and an OK mood,” and that he repeatedly “denied psychotic thought content, 18 current suicidal or homicidal ideation, and had fair judgement and insight, with adequate fund of 19 knowledge” during that time. AR 27 (citing AR 1230–31); see also AR 28 (citing AR 1149–50, 20 1169–70, 1182–83). Those reports remained “entirely normal” despite some increased symptoms 21 in August, September, and November 2022. AR 28. The ALJ then reviewed Mr. Daniels’ mental 22 status examinations through August 2023 and concluded that they were also largely normal, while 23 recognizing that Mr. Daniels had some notable but inconsistent findings relating to mood, affect, 24 speech, fidgeting, and eye contact. AR 29 (citing AR 1301, 1417, 1425–26). 25 Mr. Daniels argues that the ALJ overlooked a long list of mental status examination 26 evidence, including evidence of Mr. Daniels’ auditory and visual hallucinations. Mot. at 6–7. 27 First, in interpreting the evidence in the record, ALJs are not required to address every piece of 1 “perform a line-by-line exegesis of the claimant’s testimony” or “draft dissertations when denying 2 benefits,” Lambert v. Saul, 980 F.3d 1266, 1277 (9th Cir. 2020). However, the ALJ must explain 3 why “significant probative evidence has been rejected.” Vincent ex rel. Vincent v. Heckler, 739 4 F.2d 1393, 1394–95 (9th Cir. 1984). Here, the ALJ carefully considered Mr. Daniels’ mental 5 status examinations between June 2022 and August 2023, acknowledging some competing 6 evidence where appropriate. In fact, the ALJ specifically addressed many of the record citations 7 that Mr. Daniels mentions in his motion. Compare Mot. at 6–7 (citing “robotic prosody,” “fidgety 8 with psychomotor restlessness,” and discussing his mood, affect, and speech), with AR 28–29 9 (discussing how “[h]is prosody was noted as robotic and he spoke in an overly formal manner” 10 and “[h]e was fidgety,” and noting “some mood, affect, and speech findings”).4 Second, to the 11 extent Plaintiff is advocating for an alternative interpretation of the evidence in the record, the 12 Court is not allowed to second-guess the ALJ’s reasonable interpretation, even if such evidence 13 could also support inferences more favorable to Mr. Daniels. Molina, 674 F.3d at 1110; see also 14 Batson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 359 F.3d 1190, 1198 (9th Cir. 2004) (“When the evidence 15 before the ALJ is subject to more than one rational interpretation, [the Court] must defer to the 16 ALJ’s conclusion.”).5 17 There was also substantial evidence that Mr. Daniels had good activities of daily living. 18 The ALJ considered Mr. Daniels’ October 2021 function report, where Mr. Daniels stated that he 19 was anti-social but played musical instruments, sang, watched YouTube, babysat his nieces and 20 nephews, went to church, prepared his own meals, shopped in stores, and spoke with his family. 21 AR 26 (citing AR 336–41). The ALJ also considered Dr. Chandler’s own report, which found that 22 4 To the extent Mr. Daniels is specifically arguing that the ALJ failed to consider evidence about 23 his auditory and visual hallucinations, the Court disagrees. For example, the ALJ noted that Mr. Daniels reported auditory hallucinations in the September and October 2022 neuropsychological 24 evaluations. AR 28. But the ALJ also noted that the reported hallucinations were inconsistent with Dr. Chandler’s own report in July 2022. Id. (citing AR 1133). The Court does not find this 25 conclusion unreasonable or unsupported, particularly where the 2022 and 2023 mental status examinations were also inconsistent with reports of hallucinations. See, e.g., AR 1231. 26

5 In addition, much of the evidence cited by Mr. Daniels comes from treatment notes that—unlike 27 the notes considered by the ALJ—were written prior to the date of the claimed disability. 1 Mr. Daniels could perform most activities of daily living with restrictions related to anxiety, and 2 that he was able to drive a car, do simple household chores, prepare something simple to eat, and 3 shop unattended. AR 24 (citing AR 1133). The ALJ acknowledged Mr. Daniels’ hearing 4 testimony that, by late 2023, his activities of daily living were reduced, including that he played 5 guitar less, had stopped performing magic, needed noise canceling headphones when grocery 6 shopping, and had stopped looking after his nieces and nephews. AR 26. But she concluded that 7 this testimony was inconsistent with the medical evidence, including further testimony that Mr. 8 Daniels had a girlfriend, AR 51, socialized with “staff and peers,” and continued to play guitar and 9 do some magic into 2023, AR 1258, 1359. Cf. Trevizo v. Berryhill, 871 F.3d 664, 682 (9th Cir. 10 2017) (“Engaging in daily activities that are incompatible with the severity of symptoms alleged 11 can support an adverse credibility determination.” (quotation omitted)). 12 Mr. Daniels claims that the ALJ failed to address repeated references to poor hygiene. 13 Mot. at 7–8. The Court disagrees. The ALJ discussed that Mr. Daniels had testified to issues 14 maintaining his own hygiene, AR 26, and referenced reports stating the same, AR 27 (citing AR 15 992).6 But the ALJ found that, while Mr. Daniels “attested to problems maintaining hygiene, . . . 16 this . . . was not indicated in his mental status examinations.” AR 27, 29 (citing AR 1230–31); see 17 also Carmickle v. Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 533 F.3d 1155, 1161 (9th Cir. 2008) (“Contradiction 18 with the medical record is a sufficient basis for rejecting the claimant’s subjective testimony.”). 19 Mr. Daniels also argues that the ALJ did not address testimony and reports that were 20 contradictory to the ALJ’s findings that he had good activities of daily living and could maintain 21 family and romantic relationships, including evidence of stress, depression, and intrusive 22 memories about the passing of his son. Mot. at 15–16. But Mr. Daniels also acknowledges that 23 the ALJ cited most of these symptoms in her decision. Mot. at 16 (citing AR 27). Again, this 24 Court may not overturn the ALJ’s substantially supported decision just because some specific 25 references weren’t cited, and the Court may not substitute its judgment for the ALJ’s where her 26 decision was reasonable. 27 1 Finally, there was substantial evidence that Mr. Daniels only had rare increased symptom 2 reports. In Dr. Chandler’s July 2022 report, she noted that Mr. Daniels’ “psychiatric symptoms 3 appear[ed] to be mostly controlled by medication.” AR 28, 1135. The ALJ noted that there were 4 “some increased symptoms” beginning around August 2022. AR 28. By September and October 5 2022, Mr. Daniels had some depressive symptoms, but active psychotic symptoms “were not part 6 of his clinical picture.” AR 28 (citing AR 1141).7 Mr. Daniels then reported improvement in 7 November 2022. AR 28 (citing AR 1146–47). Finally, the ALJ concluded that “[d]espite some 8 evidence of alcohol use, including reportedly swallowing a SIM card while intoxicated . . . , he 9 had only short lived increased symptom reports.” AR 29. 10 Mr. Daniels argues that the ALJ mischaracterized evidence of his psychiatric 11 symptomology. Mot. at 8–14. First, Mr. Daniels points to records of his suicidal ideation from an 12 emergency hospitalization in July 2020. Id. at 8–9. But these records come from before the 13 beginning of the claimed disability period, and the ALJ did not err by focusing on records from on 14 or after September 2021. Carmickle, 533 F.3d at 1165.8 Second, Mr. Daniels cites a January 2023 15 hospitalization, where Mr. Daniels went to the emergency department on the anniversary of his 16 son’s death because he was suicidal and experiencing intrusive visual images. Mot. at 9–10. 17 However, the ALJ did consider this hospitalization (and the 2020 hospitalization), observing that 18 “[o]utside of short lived treatment after the prior ALJ decision with a 5150 and a two day 19 admission in early 2023, notably around increased alcohol use, he rarely reported suicidal ideation 20 and had quite minimal mood and symptoms report.” AR 29. Finally, Mr. Daniels argues that the 21 record “is replete with references to . . . exacerbation of worsening psychiatric symptomology.” 22 Mot. at 10–14. As before, most of these citations are from records before the alleged onset date, 23 and the Court is not persuaded that the ALJ’s determination was unreasonable or unsupported in 24

25 7 This is something of an oversimplification, as the report stated that “[a]ctive psychotic symptoms do not appear to be a prominent part of his clinical picture at this time, although at times his ability 26 to concentrate and attend may be impaired and he also may entertain some ideas that people find unusual.” AR 1141. 27 1 the face of these additional records. 2 Given the above, the Court concludes that there was substantial evidence supporting the 3 ALJ’s consistency and supportability analysis. At bottom, Mr. Daniels asks this Court to reweigh 4 the evidence, without pointing to symptomology or evidence that the ALJ did not consider at all. 5 While the Court is respectful of Mr. Daniels’ experiences, the threshold for substantial evidence is 6 low. Here, this is more than a scintilla of evidence, Molina, 674 F.3d at 1110–11, and “[i]t is not 7 the court’s role to ‘second-guess’ an ALJ’s reasonable interpretation of a claimant’s testimony,” 8 Smartt v. Kijakazi, 53 F.4th 489, 500 (9th Cir. 2022). Cf. Crane v. Shalala, 76 F.3d 251, 254 (9th 9 Cir. 1996) (affirming decision where ALJ considered daily activities, notes of treating therapist, 10 and evidence suggesting plaintiff responded well to treatment for depression, even if “the findings 11 upon which this determination was based were not as extensive as they might have been”). 12 It may be the case that the ALJ could have been more specific about how the mental status 13 examinations, activities of daily living, and increased symptom reports were inconsistent with Dr. 14 Chandler’s testimony, see Mot. at 5, or about how Dr. Chandler’s findings were unsupported. But 15 the Court can look to the entire decision to determine whether the ALJ’s decision is adequately 16 supported, Kaufmann v. Kijakazi, 32 F.4th 843, 851 (9th Cir. 2022), and the ALJ clearly linked 17 specific medical evidence to her discussions of mental status examinations, activities of daily 18 living, and increased symptom reports. And “[e]ven when an agency explains its decision with 19 less than ideal clarity, [the Court] must uphold it if the agency’s path may reasonably be 20 discerned.” Molina, 674 F.3d at 1121 (quotation omitted).9 21 22 23 24

25 9 There are also limitations to what an ALJ can say when they are observing a lack of evidentiary support. Where there was partial support for some of Dr. Chandler’s findings, such as in the 26 marked difficulty interacting with others, the ALJ specifically identified what that support was. AR 31. And having reviewed Dr. Chandler’s report, the Court cannot conclude that the ALJ’s 27 supportability findings were unreasonable. AR 1132–35; cf. King v. Comm’r of SSA, 475 F. 1 B. Questioning and Limitations About Hygiene 2 Mr. Daniels argues that the ALJ prevented his attorney from asking the vocational expert, 3 Ms. Chandler, about a limitation relating to his inability to maintain basic standards of hygiene, 4 neatness, and cleanliness. Mot. at 16–17. The following exchange took place at the hearing:

5 ATTY: If this hypothetical claimant in all of the hypotheticals had no ability to maintain socially appropriate behavior and adhere to basic 6 standards of neatness and cleanliness would any of the jobs you have listed be available? 7 ALJ: That is a bit vague. I couldn’t adopt that in an RFC. Could you be more specific? 8 ATTY: They had very poor personal hygiene. ALJ: Okay. What do you mean by socially appropriate? 9 Atty: Let’s just X that out and say they can’t adhere to basic standards of neatness and cleanliness. 10 ALJ: Again, I am not sure how that adheres, that creates a functional limitation. 11 VE: It sounds more like employer expectations and that is kind of an off – 12 ALJ: Right. I don’t know how to phrase that honestly, which is why I’m – I think I could phrase the socially appropriate but for the basic 13 standards of neatness and cleanliness, I mean, you could say, I guess to the extent that customers are complaining. But again, I am not sure 14 how I could adopt that, because how is that a functional limitation? ATTY: Okay. Well, that was my question, Your Honor. 15 ALJ: All right. Well I understand that Ms. Chandler said no. But again, you said, Ms. Chandler, to be clear, that would be an employer 16 expectation. VE: Correct. 17 ALJ: Okay. All right. Anything else, Mr. Ishikawa? ATTY: No. 18 19 AR 68–69. 20 As an initial matter, the Court disagrees that the ALJ prevented the attorney from asking 21 questions about a limitation relating to hygiene. The ALJ asked the attorney to clarify his original 22 question and then ultimately asked Ms. Chandler to confirm the ALJ’s understanding that this was 23 an employer expectation rather than a functional limitation. The ALJ also gave the attorney an 24 additional chance to ask other questions, and the attorney declined. 25 However, to the extent Mr. Daniels is arguing that the ALJ should have included failure to 26 adhere to basic standards of neatness and cleanliness as a functional limitation, the Court disagrees 27 that this was a harmful legal error. “If a vocational expert’s hypothetical does not reflect all the 1 that the claimant can perform jobs in the national economy.” Hill v. Astrue, 698 F.3d 1153, 1162 2 (9th Cir. 2012) (quotation omitted). As discussed earlier, the ALJ considered Mr. Daniels’ 3 testimony that he had “some problems maintaining his own hygiene, such as not showering.” AR 4 26; see also AR 27 (citing AR 992). The ALJ found that, while Mr. Daniels “attested to problems 5 maintaining hygiene, . . . this also was not indicated in his mental status examinations,” AR 28–29 6 (citing AR 1230–31), or his September 2022 and October 2022 neuropsychological evaluations, 7 AR 28 (citing AR 1139). Mr. Daniels cites a handful of references to his testimony, Mot. at 17, 8 but the ALJ considered the testimony and rejected it in light of contradictory mental status 9 examinations. Carmickle, 533 F.3d at 1161. Mr. Daniels also cites a handful of mental status 10 examinations in early 2022 finding poor hygiene. Mot. at 17. As before, the Court will not 11 question the ALJ’s determination here, where it was supported by substantial evidence and where 12 the ALJ considered significant contrary evidence.10 13 IV. CONCLUSION 14 The Court DENIES Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment, Dkt. No. 14. The Court 15 affirms the Commissioner’s decision below. This order TERMINATES the Defendant’s brief, 16 17 10 The Commissioner suggests that hygiene cannot be considered in the RFC assessment. Dkt. 18 No. 15 at 6. The Ninth Circuit has held in a non-binding, non-precedential opinion that “[t]he ALJ was not . . . required to include in the hypothetical a limitation relating to [plaintiff’s] personal 19 hygiene because body habitus is not a factor in assessing residual functional capacity.” Hartman v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 291 F. App’x 818 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing SSR 96-8p). It’s true that 20 SSR 96-8p states that “[a]ge and body habitus are not factors in assessing RFC.” But that seems to be referencing issues like “natural body build, . . . size, and weight, insofar as they are unrelated 21 to the individual’s medically determinable impairment(s).” Id. As a result, it seems at least possible that hygiene issues related to or caused by an individual’s impairment might be 22 considered.

23 For example, in Hanke v. Commissioner, Social Security Administration, No. 3:12-CV-00598-KI, 2013 WL 840192 (D. Or. Mar. 6, 2013), there was extensive evidence that the plaintiff faced 24 significant symptom-related hygiene issues and had lost or nearly lost jobs because of those issues. Id. at *7. On that record, the district court remanded, also noting that the vocational expert had 25 confirmed that the plaintiff would not be able to work if she were “unable to maintain acceptable standards of hygiene on a routine basis.” Id. at *7. 26

Given all this, it may be an unresolved question whether poor hygiene could under some 27 circumstances create a functional limitation. But since there was inconsistent evidence about Mr. ] Dkt. No. 15. The Clerk is DIRECTED to enter judgment in favor of Defendant and close the 2 case. 3 IT IS SO ORDERED. 4 |} Dated: 2/17/2026 ° a 1065 S. GILLIAM, JR. if 6 United States District Judge 7 8 9 10 11 a 12

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