Michael D. Foster v. Yamaurys Pulido Jimenez

• Court: District Court of Appeal of Florida
• Decided: May 27, 2026
• Docket: 3D2024-2059
• Status: Published

Opinion

Third District Court of Appeal State of Florida

Opinion filed May 27, 2026. Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

________________

No. 3D24-2059 Lower Tribunal No. 16-25288-CA-01 ________________

Michael D. Foster, et al., Appellants,

vs.

Yamaurys Pulido Jimenez, Appellee.

An Appeal from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Charles Kenneth Johnson, Judge.

Wallen & Kelley, and Todd L. Wallen; Drury Law Firm, and Christopher M. Drury, for appellants.

Wicker Smith O’Hara McCoy & Ford, P.A., and Jessica L. Gross, and Nina N. Batista, for appellee.

Before FERNANDEZ, MILLER, and BOKOR, JJ.

PER CURIAM. Affirmed. See Miami-Dade Cnty. v. Guyton, 388 So. 3d 50, 51–52 (Fla.

3d DCA 2023) (“While we apply de novo review to these rulings, in reviewing

the trial court's denial of the . . . motion for directed verdict (and motion for

judgment in accordance with its earlier motion for directed verdict), [a]n

appellate court must evaluate the evidence in the light most favorable to the

non-moving party, drawing every reasonable inference flowing from the

evidence in the nonmoving party's favor, and [i]f there is conflicting evidence

or if different reasonable inferences may be drawn from the evidence, then

the issue is factual and should be submitted to the jury for resolution.”)

(quotation omitted); Graham Cos. v. Amado, 305 So. 3d 572, 577 (Fla. 3d

DCA 2020) (“In negligence cases, motions for directed verdict should be

treated with special caution because it is the function of the jury to weigh and

evaluate the evidence.”); Edwards v. Orkin Exterminating Co., 718 So. 2d

881, 883 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998) (“The power to direct a verdict should be

cautiously exercised, and a motion for a directed verdict should never be

granted unless the evidence is such that under no view which the jury might

lawfully take of the evidence favorable to the adverse party could a verdict

for the latter party be sustained.”) (quotation omitted); Wald v. Grainger, 64

So. 3d 1201, 1205 (Fla. 2011) (“[A] jury is free to weigh the opinion testimony

of expert witnesses, and either accept, reject or give that testimony such

2 weight as it deserves considering the witnesses’ qualifications, the reasons

given by the witness for the opinion expressed, and all the other evidence in

the case, including lay testimony.”); Smith v. Brown, 525 So. 2d 868, 870

(Fla. 1988) (“Clearly, it is a jury function to evaluate the credibility of any

given witness.”); see also Weatherly v. Louis, 31 So. 3d 803, 805 (Fla. 3d

DCA 2009) (noting that to find an abuse of discretion in the denial of a motion

for new trial, “the evidence must be clear and obvious, and not conflicting”)

(quotation omitted); Southwin, Inc. v. Verde, 806 So. 2d 586, 588 (Fla. 3d

DCA 2002) (“If reasonable people could differ concerning the propriety of the

judge's decision, no abuse of discretion is demonstrated. Determinations

regarding the weight of the evidence or the credibility of witnesses are

peculiarly within the province of the finder of fact and will not be disturbed on

appeal.”) (quotations omitted).