MEMORANDUM DECISION FILED Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision shall not be Sep 23 2016, 9:44 am
regarded as precedent or cited before any CLERK Indiana Supreme Court court except for the purpose of establishing Court of Appeals and Tax Court the defense of res judicata, collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Timothy J. Burns Gregory F. Zoeller Indianapolis, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana Christina D. Pace Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Michael Cunagin, September 23, 2016 Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No. 49A02-1603-CR-508 v. Appeal from the Marion Superior Court State of Indiana, The Honorable Linda E. Brown, Appellee-Plaintiff Judge The Honorable Allan Reid, Commissioner Trial Court Cause No. 49G10-1508-CM-30797
Bailey, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1603-CR-508 | September 23, 2016 Page 1 of 7 Case Summary [1] Michael Cunagin (“Cunagin”) was convicted of Battery, as a Class A
misdemeanor.1 He now appeals his conviction. We affirm.
Issues [2] Cunagin raises two issues for review:
I. Whether the evidence is sufficient to support his conviction; and
II. Whether the State rebutted his self-defense claim.
Facts and Procedural History [3] Cunagin and Ashley Reynolds (“Reynolds”) were in a romantic relationship
and lived together in Marion County, Indiana. Sometime around August 16,
2015, Cunagin and Reynolds ended their relationship. Following the break up,
Cunagin agreed to move out. He signed an agreement removing himself from
the lease. Cunagin also agreed to move his belongings out of the residence by
August 29, 2015.
[4] On that day, Cunagin was removing his belongings when Reynolds and her
sister Ashley Kranning “Kranning” arrived. An argument ensued. As
1 Ind. Code § 35-42-2-1(b)(1) (2015).
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1603-CR-508 | September 23, 2016 Page 2 of 7 Kranning walked to the door, Cunagin slammed the door shut. Kranning
opened the door, which swung open. Cunagin then pushed Kranning up
against the door. Cunagin held Kranning against the door by placing his hand
or forearm against Kranning’s neck, causing her pain. Reynolds, who was
walking to her bedroom, turned and observed Cunagin yelling at Kranning as
he held her against the door. When Reynolds approached Cunagin, he let
Kranning go. Someone placed a call to 911 and Officer Jack Tindall (“Officer
Tindall”) of the Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Department came to the
residence. Kranning told Officer Tindall that Cunagin battered her, and
Cunagin told Officer Tindall that he pinned Kranning against the door. Officer
Tindall observed marks on Kranning’s neck.
[5] On August 30, 2015, the State charged Cunagin with Battery, as a Class B
misdemeanor.2 The trial court conducted a bench trial on February 22, 2016
and found Cunagin guilty. Cunagin now appeals.
Discussion and Decision Sufficiency of the Evidence [6] Cunagin contends there is insufficient evidence to sustain his conviction.
2 I.C. § 35-42-2-1(b)(1) (2015).
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1603-CR-508 | September 23, 2016 Page 3 of 7 [7] When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction, we
neither reweigh the evidence nor assess the credibility of witnesses. Drane v.
State, 867 N.E.2d 144, 146 (Ind. 2007). Accordingly, “[t]he evidence . . . and
all reasonable inferences drawn from it are viewed in a light most favorable to
the conviction.” Bailey v. State, 979 N.E.2d 133, 135 (Ind. 2012). We affirm the
conviction unless “‘no reasonable fact-finder could find the elements of the
crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.’” Drane, 867 N.E.2d at 146 (quoting
Jenkins v. State, 726 N.E.2d 268, 270 (Ind. 2000)).
[8] To convict Cunagin of Class B misdemeanor battery, the State was required to
prove that Cunagin knowingly or intentionally touched another person in a
rude, insolent, or angry manner. I.C. 35-42-2-1(b)(1). Here, the evidence most
favorable to the judgment establishes that Cunagin pinned Kranning against a
door. Cunagin did so by pushing his hand or forearm against Kranning’s neck,
causing pain and marks. Here, Cunagin admits he made contact with Kranning
but argues that any contact was inadvertent as he attempted to close and lock
the door.
[9] Cunagin’s argument is essentially a request to reweigh the evidence, which we
decline. The evidence is sufficient to support Cunagin’s battery conviction.
Self-defense Claim [10] Cunagin argues in the alternative that the State failed to rebut his claim of self-
defense.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1603-CR-508 | September 23, 2016 Page 4 of 7 [11] When a defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to rebut a claim of
self-defense, the standard of review is the same standard used for any claim of
insufficient evidence. Wallace v. State, 725 N.E.2d 837, 840 (Ind. 2000). Thus,
we neither reweigh the evidence nor judge the credibility of witnesses. Id.
[12] Self-defense is a legal justification for an otherwise criminal act. Id. Indiana
Code Section 35-41-3-2(c) provides that “[a] person is justified in using
reasonable force against any other person to protect the person or a third person
from what the person reasonably believes to be the imminent use of unlawful
force.” To prevail on a claim of self-defense, a defendant must have acted
without fault, been in a place where he had a right to be, and been in reasonable
fear or apprehension of bodily harm. Henson v. State, 786 N.E.2d 274, 277 (Ind.
2003). A defendant’s belief that he is being threatened with the imminent use of
unlawful force must be reasonable and in good faith. White v. State, N.E.2d
630, 635 (Ind. 1998). Moreover, a defendant’s reaction to that belief must be
reasonable based upon the surrounding circumstances. Id. A claim of self-
defense will fail if the person “‘uses more force than is reasonably necessary
under the circumstances.’” Weedman v. State, 21 N.E.3d 873, 883 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2014), trans. denied (quoting Sudberry v. State, 982 N.E.2d 475, 481 (Ind.
Ct. App. 2013)).
[13] When a defendant raises a claim of self-defense, the State has the burden of
rebutting at least one of the necessary elements. Wilson v. State, 770 N.E.2d
799, 800 (Ind. 2002). The State may meet its burden by offering evidence
directly rebutting the defense, by affirmatively showing that the defendant did
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1603-CR-508 | September 23, 2016 Page 5 of 7 not act in self-defense, or by relying upon the sufficiency of the evidence from
its case-in-chief.
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MEMORANDUM DECISION FILED Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision shall not be Sep 23 2016, 9:44 am
regarded as precedent or cited before any CLERK Indiana Supreme Court court except for the purpose of establishing Court of Appeals and Tax Court the defense of res judicata, collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Timothy J. Burns Gregory F. Zoeller Indianapolis, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana Christina D. Pace Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Michael Cunagin, September 23, 2016 Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No. 49A02-1603-CR-508 v. Appeal from the Marion Superior Court State of Indiana, The Honorable Linda E. Brown, Appellee-Plaintiff Judge The Honorable Allan Reid, Commissioner Trial Court Cause No. 49G10-1508-CM-30797
Bailey, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1603-CR-508 | September 23, 2016 Page 1 of 7 Case Summary [1] Michael Cunagin (“Cunagin”) was convicted of Battery, as a Class A
misdemeanor.1 He now appeals his conviction. We affirm.
Issues [2] Cunagin raises two issues for review:
I. Whether the evidence is sufficient to support his conviction; and
II. Whether the State rebutted his self-defense claim.
Facts and Procedural History [3] Cunagin and Ashley Reynolds (“Reynolds”) were in a romantic relationship
and lived together in Marion County, Indiana. Sometime around August 16,
2015, Cunagin and Reynolds ended their relationship. Following the break up,
Cunagin agreed to move out. He signed an agreement removing himself from
the lease. Cunagin also agreed to move his belongings out of the residence by
August 29, 2015.
[4] On that day, Cunagin was removing his belongings when Reynolds and her
sister Ashley Kranning “Kranning” arrived. An argument ensued. As
1 Ind. Code § 35-42-2-1(b)(1) (2015).
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1603-CR-508 | September 23, 2016 Page 2 of 7 Kranning walked to the door, Cunagin slammed the door shut. Kranning
opened the door, which swung open. Cunagin then pushed Kranning up
against the door. Cunagin held Kranning against the door by placing his hand
or forearm against Kranning’s neck, causing her pain. Reynolds, who was
walking to her bedroom, turned and observed Cunagin yelling at Kranning as
he held her against the door. When Reynolds approached Cunagin, he let
Kranning go. Someone placed a call to 911 and Officer Jack Tindall (“Officer
Tindall”) of the Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Department came to the
residence. Kranning told Officer Tindall that Cunagin battered her, and
Cunagin told Officer Tindall that he pinned Kranning against the door. Officer
Tindall observed marks on Kranning’s neck.
[5] On August 30, 2015, the State charged Cunagin with Battery, as a Class B
misdemeanor.2 The trial court conducted a bench trial on February 22, 2016
and found Cunagin guilty. Cunagin now appeals.
Discussion and Decision Sufficiency of the Evidence [6] Cunagin contends there is insufficient evidence to sustain his conviction.
2 I.C. § 35-42-2-1(b)(1) (2015).
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1603-CR-508 | September 23, 2016 Page 3 of 7 [7] When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction, we
neither reweigh the evidence nor assess the credibility of witnesses. Drane v.
State, 867 N.E.2d 144, 146 (Ind. 2007). Accordingly, “[t]he evidence . . . and
all reasonable inferences drawn from it are viewed in a light most favorable to
the conviction.” Bailey v. State, 979 N.E.2d 133, 135 (Ind. 2012). We affirm the
conviction unless “‘no reasonable fact-finder could find the elements of the
crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.’” Drane, 867 N.E.2d at 146 (quoting
Jenkins v. State, 726 N.E.2d 268, 270 (Ind. 2000)).
[8] To convict Cunagin of Class B misdemeanor battery, the State was required to
prove that Cunagin knowingly or intentionally touched another person in a
rude, insolent, or angry manner. I.C. 35-42-2-1(b)(1). Here, the evidence most
favorable to the judgment establishes that Cunagin pinned Kranning against a
door. Cunagin did so by pushing his hand or forearm against Kranning’s neck,
causing pain and marks. Here, Cunagin admits he made contact with Kranning
but argues that any contact was inadvertent as he attempted to close and lock
the door.
[9] Cunagin’s argument is essentially a request to reweigh the evidence, which we
decline. The evidence is sufficient to support Cunagin’s battery conviction.
Self-defense Claim [10] Cunagin argues in the alternative that the State failed to rebut his claim of self-
defense.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1603-CR-508 | September 23, 2016 Page 4 of 7 [11] When a defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to rebut a claim of
self-defense, the standard of review is the same standard used for any claim of
insufficient evidence. Wallace v. State, 725 N.E.2d 837, 840 (Ind. 2000). Thus,
we neither reweigh the evidence nor judge the credibility of witnesses. Id.
[12] Self-defense is a legal justification for an otherwise criminal act. Id. Indiana
Code Section 35-41-3-2(c) provides that “[a] person is justified in using
reasonable force against any other person to protect the person or a third person
from what the person reasonably believes to be the imminent use of unlawful
force.” To prevail on a claim of self-defense, a defendant must have acted
without fault, been in a place where he had a right to be, and been in reasonable
fear or apprehension of bodily harm. Henson v. State, 786 N.E.2d 274, 277 (Ind.
2003). A defendant’s belief that he is being threatened with the imminent use of
unlawful force must be reasonable and in good faith. White v. State, N.E.2d
630, 635 (Ind. 1998). Moreover, a defendant’s reaction to that belief must be
reasonable based upon the surrounding circumstances. Id. A claim of self-
defense will fail if the person “‘uses more force than is reasonably necessary
under the circumstances.’” Weedman v. State, 21 N.E.3d 873, 883 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2014), trans. denied (quoting Sudberry v. State, 982 N.E.2d 475, 481 (Ind.
Ct. App. 2013)).
[13] When a defendant raises a claim of self-defense, the State has the burden of
rebutting at least one of the necessary elements. Wilson v. State, 770 N.E.2d
799, 800 (Ind. 2002). The State may meet its burden by offering evidence
directly rebutting the defense, by affirmatively showing that the defendant did
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1603-CR-508 | September 23, 2016 Page 5 of 7 not act in self-defense, or by relying upon the sufficiency of the evidence from
its case-in-chief. Miller v. State, 720 N.E.2d 696, 700 (Ind. 1999). If the
defendant is convicted despite a claim of self-defense, this Court will reverse
only if no reasonable person could say that self-defense was negated by the
prosecution beyond a reasonable doubt. Wilson, 770 N.E.2d at 801-02.
[14] In asserting his self-defense claim, Cunagin testified that Kranning was running
toward him and that he believed he was being attacked. He stated that he put
his forearm up in a defensive manner to block Kranning. The State, however,
presented evidence of a different interaction between Cunagin and Kranning,
which the trier of fact was free to accept. Indeed, the evidence favorable to the
verdict establishes that Kranning verbally alerted Reynolds that she was
entering Reynolds’s residence, and Reynolds approved. Cunagin admits he
heard Kranning say she was coming inside. (Tr. 31.) Then, as Kranning
walked to the door, Cunagin slammed the door shut. Kranning opened the
door, at which point Cunagin pinned Kranning against the door by her neck.
[15] Based on the State’s case-in-chief, it was reasonable for the trier of fact to
conclude that Cunagin was not justified in believing that force was necessary to
protect himself. Moreover, the State’s case-in-chief also supports the reasonable
determination that Cunagin’s force used in reaction to Kranning’s entry—
pinning her against the door by her neck, holding her there, and yelling at her—
was unreasonable in light of the surrounding circumstances. Thus, Cunagin’s
challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence fails.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1603-CR-508 | September 23, 2016 Page 6 of 7 Conclusion [16] We find the evidence is sufficient to support the conviction and the State
properly negated Cunagin’s self-defense claim.
[17] Affirmed.
Riley, J., and Barnes, J., concur.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1603-CR-508 | September 23, 2016 Page 7 of 7