Michael Crivelli v. Department of Transportation, Federal Aviation Administration

794 F.2d 666, 1986 U.S. App. LEXIS 20279
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
DecidedJune 18, 1986
DocketAppeal 85-1773
StatusPublished

This text of 794 F.2d 666 (Michael Crivelli v. Department of Transportation, Federal Aviation Administration) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Michael Crivelli v. Department of Transportation, Federal Aviation Administration, 794 F.2d 666, 1986 U.S. App. LEXIS 20279 (Fed. Cir. 1986).

Opinion

COWEN, Senior Circuit Judge.

The petitioners, Michael Crivelli and Stuart Morse, formerly employed at the air traffic control facility in Ronkonkoma, New York, appeal from a decision of the Merit Systems Protection Board (Board), affirming their removal for participation in the 1981 illegal air traffic controllers’ strike. We affirm the decision of the Board in the case of Michael Crivelli, but we vacate and remand the decision in the case of Stuart Morse.

The basic facts relating to the strike are set forth in Schapansky v. Department of Transportation, FAA, 735 F.2d 477 (Fed.Cir.), ce rt. denied, — U.S. —, 105 S.Ct. 432, 83 L.Ed.2d 358 (1984), and need not be repeated here.

I. Michael Crivelli

Michael Crivelli was on uncancelled annual leave until August 19, 1981. On August 16, he learned that his father had died suddenly and unexpectedly. The following day, he went to the facility, crossed the picket line, and spoke to the Acting Deputy Chief, who extended petitioner’s leave until the shift beginning at 7 a.m. on August 24, 1981. On August 24, he left his house intending to go to work, but rode around in his car for approximately 2 hours, and then went home. He testified he was upset and confused because his father had passed away so suddenly. He telephoned the facility about 9 a.m. the same day in an effort to get his leave extended for another day. He explained the circumstances to the Acting Deputy Chief, who informed petitioner that since he had failed to report for his 7 a.m. shift he would be fired. He did not picket in support of the strike until after he was told that he had been fired.

In his case, the presiding official found: With regard to Mr. Crivelli, he in fact, offered no coherent or reasonable explanation of his failure to appear for work. Such failure to work aided PATCO’s cause and, when considered in conjunction with his picketing, makes it more likely than not that his absence was part of the ongoing concerted withholding of services.

The full Board affirmed this decision summarily, noting that when petitioner phoned the facility on August 24, he had not asked to return to work.

We have encountered some difficulty in deciding this case, both because of the paucity of Crivelli’s testimony regarding his capacity to work and the brevity of the findings of the presiding official on that issue. Since he knew that the strike was in progress, petitioner’s failure to report for work at his 7 a.m. shift after the expiration o'f his leave, was sufficient to establish a prima facie case of strike participation. The burden then devolved on petitioner to establish by objective evidence that he was incapable of performing any duties. Triolo v. Department of Transportation, FAA, 769 F.2d 760, 762 (Fed.Cir.1985); Anderson v. Department of Transportation, FAA, 735 F.2d 537 (Fed.Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 105 S.Ct. 432, 83 L.Ed.2d 358 (1984). Although he was upset over the death of his father, petitioner failed to establish that he was unable to return to work, and at least, to perform some non-control duties, for which there was a great need at that time. In spite of the terseness of the presiding official’s decision, we regard it as essentially a finding of fact that petitioner had failed to discharge his burden of proving his incapacity to return to his station and to perform some work there. After a careful study of the record we cannot say that the Board’s decision, which sustained the determination of the presiding official, was arbitrary, capricious, or unsupported by substantial evidence. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(c) (1982); see Hayes v. Dept. of the Navy, 127 F.2d 1535, 1537 (Fed.Cir.1984).

II. Stuart Morse

The agency removed petitioner for being on strike and AWOL on August 3 and 6, 1981. He was scheduled for regular days off on August 4 and 5, and these were *668 not cancelled. He contends that he was on approved sick leave on August 3 and 6, the only days at issue in this case.

The following paragraph is a summary of the petitioner’s uncontradicted testimony at the hearing before the Merit Systems Protection Board:

Petitioner had a history of stomach ulcers, for which his doctor prescribed the drug Librex. The FAA flight surgeon informed him that when he was taking Li-brex, he was disqualified from working as an air traffic controller and that he could ask for temporary non-control duties or take sick leave while using the drug. At his facility, the management did not require controllers taking disqualifying medication to perform non-control duties. On some occasions, petitioner had voluntarily performed non-control duties, but he usually took sick leave while using Librex. Under the prevailing procedures, he would call the facility, state that he would not be at work because he was taking Librex, and estimate the time he expected to be on sick leave. There was no requirement that he call the facility daily while on sick leave, nor was he obligated to submit a doctor’s certificate to obtain approval of sick leave to justify absences of 4 days or less.

When petitioner’s ulcer flared up on August 2,1981, he began taking Librex on the advice of his doctor. He telephoned his team supervisor on that day, stated that he was on Librex, and requested a few days of sick leave. The team supervisor indicated his approval. Petitioner’s testimony regarding this telephone conversation was not contradicted by any significant evidence. The only evidence to the contrary was the testimony of Mr. Stolfi, his team supervisor, who denied receiving any request from petitioner for sick leave for either August 1, 2, or 3. The time and attendance records, however, confirmed petitioner’s testimony; they showed that he was on sick leave on August 2. The presiding official concluded that petitioner must have telephoned the facility on August 2, because the records indicated that he was granted sick leave for that day. The transcript of the testimony reflects that the memory of the team supervisor was faulty; he testified that he was not on duty on August 2, despite the fact that the time and attendance records showed that he and his crew worked from 8 a.m. to 4 p.m. on that day.

Although there was no credible evidence contrary to the testimony of petitioner, the presiding official held:

With regard to Mr. Morse, I conclude, notwithstanding the testimony of Mr. Stolfi, that appellant must have telephoned the facility since his official records indicate he was granted sick leave on Sunday. Nevertheless, I find it extremely unreasonable, and therefore do not credit, his argument that he believed his one phone call entitled him to indefinite continuous sick leave without further authorization or substantiation.

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Related

Roy L. Schapansky v. Department of Transportation, Faa
735 F.2d 477 (Federal Circuit, 1984)
Kipp Anderson v. Department of Transportation, Faa
735 F.2d 537 (Federal Circuit, 1984)
Schapansky v. Department of Transportation
469 U.S. 1018 (Supreme Court, 1984)

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794 F.2d 666, 1986 U.S. App. LEXIS 20279, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/michael-crivelli-v-department-of-transportation-federal-aviation-cafc-1986.