Michael Coates v. the State of Texas

• Court: Texas Court of Appeals, 1st District (Houston)
• Decided: June 18, 2026
• Docket: 01-24-00655-CR
• Status: Published

Opinion

Opinion issued June 18, 2026

In The

Court of Appeals For The

First District of Texas ———————————— NO. 01-24-00655-CR ——————————— MICHAEL COATES, Appellant V. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 184th District Court Harris County, Texas Trial Court Case No. 1812497

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Michael Coates appeals his conviction for murder. See TEX. PENAL CODE

§ 19.02. He asserts that the evidence was legally insufficient for the jury to reject

his self-defense theory. He also argues that the trial court erred in denying his

request for a necessity instruction in the jury charge. We affirm. Background

Coates shot and killed Marcus Mercado outside of a corner store in Houston,

Texas. Mercado died from multiple gunshot wounds to his face, scalp, torso, and

wrist. Eyewitness Dexter Fennie testified that he was parked in front of the store,

smoking a cigarette inside his truck, when he heard two men start arguing. Fennie

said that Mercado was with another person, whom investigators later identified as

Demorian Howell. Fennie testified that Mercado started an argument with Coates

and gestured that he was preparing to fight by pulling his pants up. Fennie saw

Coates take out a gun from under his jacket and began shooting.

Fennie testified that, when Coates started shooting, Howell ran away while

Mercado tried to hide behind a tree. Coates shot at Mercado again, and Mercado

fell to the ground. Coates walked up to Mercado and “hovered” over him, shooting

him again. At that point, Coates saw Fennie in his truck and walked over to him.

Fennie put his hands up, closed his eyes, and stayed still. Coates went back to

Mercado on the ground and then left. Fennie identified Coates in court as the

shooter.

The jury viewed surveillance video showing Mercado wrapped in a blanket

sitting along the road by the grocery store. In the video, Howell walks past

Mercado several times, in and out of the camera’s field of vision. Eventually,

Coates appears in the surveillance video. When he sees Coates, Howell moves off

2 the sidewalk, and Mercado stands up, tosses his blanket on the ground, and walks

toward Coates.

Coates and Mercado exchange words. Coates continues walking toward the

grocery store with his hands in his pockets. Mercado and Howell are slowly

moving toward Coates. Coates takes out a gun and opens fire.

When Coates starts shooting, Howell runs away. Mercado tries to hide

behind a tree. Coates shoots Mercado, who falls to the ground writhing. Coates

runs over to Mercado, stands over him, and points the gun at Mercado’s head. He

shoots Mercado at least twice. Mercado stops moving. Coates wanders around for

a few minutes before coming back over to Mercado. He then walks away, leaving

the field of vision.

The jury also heard testimony linking Coates to the murder weapon.

Investigators found eight spent cartridges at the scene of the crime. A firearms

expert concluded that the casings were discharged from a pistol that was recovered

from Coates’s apartment a few days after the shooting. A medical examiner

testified that Mercado died from multiple gunshot wounds. He had two gunshot

wounds to his scalp, two to his torso, one to his face, and one to his wrist. The

medical examiner testified that the gunshot wound to Mercado’s torso would have

been fatal within a few minutes, but each gunshot wound to his head, including the

one to his face and the two to his scalp, would have been instantly fatal. The

3 medical examiner also testified that Mercado’s blood alcohol level was .161 grams

per deciliter, twice the legal driving limit.

The State offered as evidence a recorded jail phone call between Coates and

his uncle, in which the uncle advises Coates on how to handle jury selection and

trial. During the call, Coates admits shooting Mercado and claims to have done so

in self-defense.

At the conclusion of evidence, the jury found Coates guilty of murder and

sentenced him to 80 years’ imprisonment and a $10,000 fine. He appealed.

Sufficiency of the Evidence

In his first issue, Coates challenges the legal and factual sufficiency of the

evidence to support the jury’s rejection of his self-defense claim. According to

Coates, no rational jury could have concluded that deadly force was not

immediately necessary for him to defend himself.

A. Standard of Review

A defendant has the burden of producing some evidence to support a claim

of self-defense. See Braughton v. State, 569 S.W.3d 592, 608 (Tex. Crim. App.

2018) (“The defendant’s burden of production requires him to adduce some

evidence that would support a rational finding in his favor on the defensive

issue.”). The State, in turn, bears the burden of persuasion to negate self-defense.

See id. at 608. The State’s burden “is not one that requires the production of

4 evidence; rather it requires only that the State prove its case beyond a reasonable

doubt.” Id. (quoting Zuliani v. State, 97 S.W.3d 589, 594 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003)).

A jury’s guilty verdict is an implicit finding rejecting a defendant’s self-defense

theory. London v. State, 325 S.W.3d 197, 202 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2008, pet.

ref’d).

We review both legal and factual sufficiency challenges to the jury’s

rejection of self-defense under the Jackson v. Virginia standard. Brooks v. State,

323 S.W.3d 893, 895 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (citing Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S.

307, 319 (1979)). Under that standard, “the relevant question is whether, after

viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational

trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a

reasonable doubt.” See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319; Rankin v. State, 617 S.W.3d 169,

182 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2020, pet. ref’d). Viewed in the light most

favorable to the verdict, the evidence is insufficient under this standard when

either: (1) the record contains no evidence, or merely a “modicum” of evidence,

probative of an element of the offense; or (2) the evidence conclusively establishes

a reasonable doubt. See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 314, 319 n.11, 320. We “may not re-

evaluate the weight and credibility of the record evidence and thereby substitute

our judgment for that of the fact finder.” Williams v. State, 235 S.W.3d 742, 750

(Tex. Crim. App. 2007). We defer to the jury “to fairly resolve conflicts in the

5 testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from basic

facts to ultimate facts.” Hooper v. State, 214 S.W.3d 9, 13 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007)

(citing Jackson, 443 U.S. at 318–19). We presume that the factfinder resolved any

conflicting inferences in favor of the verdict, and we defer to that resolution.

Jackson, 443 U.S. at 326; Clayton v. State, 235 S.W.3d 772, 778 (Tex. Crim. App.

2007).

B. Applicable Law

A person commits murder if he “intentionally or knowingly causes the death

of an individual” or “intends to cause serious bodily injury and commits an act

clearly dangerous to human life that causes the death of an individual.” See TEX.

PENAL CODE § 19.02(b)(1)–(2). The jury may infer that the defendant intended to

kill the complainant from the defendant’s use of a deadly weapon and from other

circumstantial evidence, including the defendant’s acts, words, and the extent of

the complainant’s injuries. See Brown v. State, 122 S.W.3d 794, 800 (Tex. Crim.

App. 2003) (stating jury may infer intent “from any facts in evidence which it

determines proves the existence of such intent to kill, such as the use of a deadly

weapon”); see also Ex parte Weinstein, 421 S.W.3d 656, 668 (Tex. Crim. App.

2014) (stating defendant’s “intent to commit murder may also be inferred from

circumstantial evidence, including his acts and words”); Lopez v. State, 672

S.W.3d 915, 923 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi-Edinburg 2023, pet. ref’d) (“Intent to

6 kill may also be inferred from the nature and extent of the injuries inflicted on the

victim.”).

The use of deadly force in self-defense is a defense to prosecution for

murder if the use of deadly force is “justified.” TEX. PENAL CODE §§. 9.02, 9.31–

.32. Section 9.31(a) of the Penal Code states that “a person is justified in using

force against another when and to the degree the actor reasonably believes the

force is immediately necessary to protect the actor against the other’s use or

attempted use of unlawful force.” Id. § 9.31(a). The phrase “reasonably believes”

contains “subjective and objective components.” Lozano v. State, 636 S.W.3d 25,

32 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021). “A defendant must subjectively believe that another

person used or attempted to use unlawful force . . . against the defendant and that

the defendant’s use of unlawful or deadly force in response was immediately

necessary.” Id. (quoting TEX. PENAL CODE § 1.07(a)(42)); see also TEX. PENAL

CODE § 1.07(a)(42) (defining “reasonable belief” as one held by “an ordinary and

prudent man in the same circumstances as the actor”).

Deadly force in self-defense is justified “if the actor would be justified in

using force against the other under Section 9.31” and when and to the degree the

actor reasonably believes the deadly force is immediately necessary to protect the

actor against the other’s use or attempted use of unlawful deadly force or to

7 prevent the other’s imminent commission of murder, among other crimes. Id.

§ 9.32(a).

A defendant need not testify to raise the issue of self-defense. See Bernard v.

State, No. 01-22-00877-CR, 2024 WL 3350253, at *11 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st

Dist.] July 9, 2024, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (citing

VanBrackle v. State, 179 S.W.3d 708, 712 (Tex. App.—Austin 2005, no pet.)

(“Defensive issues may be raised by the testimony of any witnesses, even those

called by the State.”)); see also Lavern v. State, 48 S.W.3d 356, 360 (Tex. App.—

Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, pet. ref’d) (“While a non-testifying defendant may be

entitled to a charge on self-defense, it is rare for the defense to be raised when the

defendant fails to testify.”). Nevertheless, there must be some evidence of the

defendant’s subjective belief that another person used or attempted to use unlawful

force against the defendant and that the defendant’s use of unlawful or deadly force

in response was immediately necessary. See Lozano, 636 S.W.3d at 32. When, as

here, a defendant does not testify, the record must contain “observable

manifestations” of the defendant’s state of mind at the time of the alleged act of

self-defense or some evidence from which the jury can infer the defendant had the

requisite mens rea. See id. at 33 (“[A] person’s belief, absent direct evidence,

generally must be inferred from the circumstances of the case.”).

8 C. Rejection of Self-Defense

Coates argues that he was justified in using deadly force to defend himself

against Mercado and Howell because (1) Mercado and Howell approached him;

(2) Mercado pulled up his pants just before Coates shot him; (3) toxicology

evidence showed Mercado was drunk at the time; (4) and during the recorded call

with his uncle, Coates admitted shooting Mercado but claimed he was afraid and

did so in self-defense.

Viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, the record reflects that

Howell and Mercado had a verbal altercation with Coates outside the corner store.

They were several feet from each other, but they were slowly moving closer

together. The surveillance video shows Coates pulling out a weapon and shooting

as Howell and Mercado retreat. There is no evidence that Howell or Mercado

pointed a gun at Coates or otherwise used force against him. Howell ran away after

the first shots. Coates shot at Mercado a second time, and Mercado fell to the

ground. Coates then stood over Mercado and shot him additional times in the head.

A rational jury could have concluded that when he drew and fired his gun,

Coates did not reasonably believe that the use of deadly force was immediately

necessary to protect himself from Mercado and Howell, who had not displayed

weapons or attacked him. See Harris v. State, 668 S.W.3d 83, 90 (Tex. App.—

Houston [1st Dist.] 2022, pet. ref’d) (explaining that even “[a]ssuming that

9 [defendant] was aware that [victim] was armed and prepared to take the drugs by

force, a rational jury could have found that” defendant did not have “a reasonable

belief that deadly force was immediately necessary at the time of the shooting, as

[victim] had not yet drawn his gun or otherwise threatened to use it at that time”).

A rational jury also reasonably could have concluded from the evidence that

Coates’s conduct was inconsistent with his claim of self-defense because he shot at

Mercado three separate times in succession, the last of which were shots in the

head as Mercado lay on the ground. See Cleveland v. State, 177 S.W.3d 374, 381

(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, pet. ref’d) (stating jury could have

reasonably concluded that defendant’s conduct in continuing to stab his wife’s

back as she lay bleeding on floor was inconsistent with his claim of self-defense);

see also Russell v. State, No. 05-17-00124-CR, 2018 WL 525559, at *6 (Tex.

App.—Dallas Jan. 24, 2018, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication)

(“Additionally, the jury could also reasonably infer that the sheer number of bullets

that were fired . . . are beyond what can be considered immediately necessary to

protect appellant from any action taken by Tell or Garcia.”).

Finally, the jury was free to evaluate the credibility of the witnesses and

testimony in listening to the recorded phone call from jail between Coates and his

uncle. The jury was free to disbelieve Coates’s statement that he was afraid and

shot Mercado in self-defense.

10 Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, we conclude

a jury rationally could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that Coates

intentionally caused Mercado’s death by shooting him and that Coates did not

reasonably believe that deadly force was immediately necessary to protect himself

against Mercado’s use or attempted use of unlawful deadly force, thus rejecting

Coates’s self-defense claim. See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 318–19; Rankin, 617 S.W.3d

at 184. We overrule Coates’s first issue.

Jury Charge Error

In his second issue, Coates argues that the trial court erred in denying his

request for a jury instruction on the defense of necessity. He argues that he

admitted to shooting Mercado during the phone call he made to his uncle, and that

the phone call proves that he reasonably believed he “had to shoot the two men

because it was immediately necessary to avoid imminent harm from them and

because the urgency of avoiding the harm clearly outweighed the law against

killing Mercado.” See TEX. PENAL CODE § 9.22.

A. Standard of Review and Applicable Law

A defendant is entitled to a jury instruction on any defensive theory raised

by evidence or testimony when such an instruction is properly requested. Krajcovic

v. State, 393 S.W.3d 282, 286 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013). Whether the evidence or

testimony is presented by the defense or the State is irrelevant, as is the strength of

11 the evidence or testimony. Booth v. State, 679 S.W.2d 498, 500 (Tex. Crim. App.

1984). Whether the record contains such evidence is a question of law, which

means we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the defendant’s

requested submission. Bufkin v. State, 207 S.W.3d 779, 782 (Tex. Crim. App.

2006).

Necessity, like self-defense, is a defense of justification. See TEX. PENAL

CODE §§ 9.02, 9.22, 9.31, 9.32. The defense of necessity provides that conduct that

otherwise would be criminal is justified if:

(1) the actor reasonably believes the conduct is immediately necessary to avoid imminent harm;

(2) the desirability and urgency of avoiding the harm clearly outweigh, according to ordinary standards of reasonableness, the harm sought to be prevented by the law proscribing the conduct; and

(3) a legislative purpose to exclude the justification claimed for the conduct does not otherwise plainly appear.

Id. § 9.22. At issue here is the third element, which is a question of law. Toliver v.

State, No. 01-23-00802-CR, — S.W.3d —, 2025 WL 3028897, at *7 (Tex. App.—

Houston [1st Dist.] Oct. 30, 2025, pet. ref’d). “[I]f there is a plain legislative

purpose to exclude the defense of necessity, then [element] (3) precludes that

defense from being included in the [trial court’s] charge [to the jury].” Id. (quoting

Chase v. State, 666 S.W.3d 832, 834 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2023, pet. ref’d)).

12 B. Analysis

Coates asserts that because he satisfied the first two elements of the

necessity defense, he was entitled to an instruction under Texas Penal Code section

9.22. The State asserts that the defense of necessity does not apply because the

Legislature’s detailed and nuanced self-defense provisions reflect its intent to

preclude necessity in violent-offense cases where deadly-force self-defense is

claimed.

Our Court and the majority of courts of appeals in Texas that have addressed

the propriety of a necessity instruction in a murder case have concluded that a

defendant may not raise a necessity defense when deadly force in self-defense is

the conduct that the defendant alleges was immediately necessary under Texas

Penal Code section 9.22(1), and the jury was also instructed as to deadly-force self-

defense pursuant to Texas Penal Code section 9.32. See Toliver, 2025 WL

3028897, at *7–8 (holding same and listing cases from courts of appeals with same

holding). “This is because the plain language of the statute governing the defense

of deadly-force self-defense . . . ‘evidences a legislative intent that precludes an

accompanying necessity instruction.’” Id. at *8 (quoting Chase, 666 S.W.3d at

835). As we explained in Toliver, section 9.32 justifies deadly force only when the

actor’s life is immediately threatened by another person’s use of unlawful deadly

force or to prevent the commission of specific violent crimes, but a necessity

13 defense involves a lower showing, requiring only that the conduct be necessary to

avoid imminent harm. Id. (noting that in absence of binding authority from Court

of Criminal Appeals, our Court agrees with majority of Texas appellate courts that

have addressed this issue).

Coates was charged with murder and requested and received an instruction

on deadly force self-defense in accordance with Texas Penal Code 9.32. We hold

that the trial court did not err in denying Coates’s request for an instruction on the

defense of necessity.

We overrule Coates’s second issue.

Conclusion

We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

Susanna Dokupil Justice

Panel consists of Justices Rivas-Molloy, Johnson, and Dokupil.

Do not publish. TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).