Michael Christopher Tate v. Maria Concepcion Landa
This text of Michael Christopher Tate v. Maria Concepcion Landa (Michael Christopher Tate v. Maria Concepcion Landa) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
Opinion issued June 10, 2025
In The Court of Appeals For The First District of Texas ———————————— NO. 01-23-00656-CV ——————————— MICHAEL CHRISTOPHER TATE, Appellant V. MARIA CONCEPCION LANDA, Appellee
On Appeal from the 280th District Court Harris County, Texas Trial Court Case No. 2019-76987
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Appellant Michael Christopher Tate appeals an order denying his post-
judgment motion to modify a lifetime protective order in which the trial court
concluded it lacked power to modify the protective order under section 85.025(b-3)
of the Texas Family Code. Appearing on behalf of Appellee Maria Concepcion Landa, the State of Texas contends the post-judgment denial order is not appealable.
We agree and dismiss this appeal for want of jurisdiction.
Relevant Background
In October 2019, Landa filed an application in family court for a protective
order against Tate, alleging Tate engaged in conduct constituting family violence
and stalking under then-Chapter 7A of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. A
month later, the trial court signed a protective order (“the Protective Order”) finding
“[Landa] is a victim of STALKING by [Tate], TCCP Chapter 7A” and that the
Protective Order is necessary for the prevention of family violence. Pursuant to
Chapter 85 of the Texas Family Code, the Protective Order prohibited Tate from
engaging in numerous actions, including going to or near Landa’s residence or place
of employment and possessing a firearm. The Protective Order also provided that it
“is effective immediately and shall continue in effect for [Tate’s] lifetime.”
Over two-and-one-half years later, in July 2022, Tate filed a motion to vacate
the Protective Order. After a series of hearings and amendments to the motion, in
August 2023, the trial court held a hearing on Tate’s second amended motion to
modify the Protective Order, in which he sought modification under section 87.001
of the Texas Family Code.1 On August 22, 2023, the trial court signed an order
1 We note that, in the second amended motion, Tate sought modification and also recission of the Protective Order, but the trial court denied the motion without mentioning recission.
2 denying the second amended motion to modify (“the August 22 Order”), concluding
that, under section 85.025(b-3),2 it lacks power to modify the Protective Order. Tate
appeals the August 22 Order.
The August 22 Order Is Not Appealable
We generally have jurisdiction over appeals from final judgments and from
certain interlocutory orders made appealable by statute. See Lehman v. Har-Con
Corp., 39 S.W.3d 191, 195 (Tex. 2001); see also McFadin v. Broadway Coffeehouse,
LLC, 539 S.W.3d 278, 283 (Tex. 2018). A post-judgment order may be appealable
if an appeal is statutorily authorized or if the order has the nature of a mandatory
injunction that resolves property rights. Rushmore Loan Mgmt. Servs., LLC v.
Harris Cnty., No. 01-19-00758-CV, 2021 WL 3501704, at *3 (Tex. App.—Houston
[1st Dist.] Aug. 10, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op.). Moreover, “if a post judgment order
imposes obligations in addition to or in excess of those in the judgment, an appeal
from the post judgment order is permissible, provided the order disposes of all
pending issues and parties.” McFadin, 539 S.W.3d at 284. Non-appealable post-
judgment orders must be challenged by a petition for writ of mandamus. Sunnyland
Dev., Inc. v. Shawn Ibrahim, Inc., 597 S.W.3d 1, 3 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]
2 Per section 85.025(b-3), the statute’s provision regarding a motion for determining if there is a continuing need for the protective order “does not apply to a protective order issued under Subchapter A, Chapter 7B, Code of Criminal Procedure.” TEX. FAM. CODE § 85.025(b-3).
3 2020, no pet.). A direct appeal from a non-appealable post-judgment order must be
dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Id.
Here, the August 22 Order is a post-judgment order denying for lack of power
a motion to modify the Protective Order. It is not in the nature of a mandatory
injunction that resolves property rights, nor does it impose obligations in addition to
or in excess of those in the Protective Order. See In re DEK-M Nationwide, Ltd.,
627 S.W.3d 353, 360 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2021, orig. proceeding)
(“The challenged orders do not order relief that differs from or exceeds that afforded
by the final judgment; indeed, the orders award no relief at all.”). Thus, the question
becomes whether the August 22 Order is appealable by statute.
Family Code section 81.009(a) provides that, with certain inapplicable
exceptions, “a protective order rendered under this subtitle may be appealed.” TEX.
FAM. CODE § 81.009(a). Family Code section 87.001 provides, “On the motion of
any party, the court, after notice and hearing, may modify an existing protective
order to: (1) exclude any item included in the order; or (2) include any item that
could have been included in the order.” TEX. FAM. CODE § 87.001. Thus, the
statutory scheme allows appeals of protective orders rendered under the applicable
subtitle (which is title 4, subtitle B of the Texas Family Code), and allows for those
protective orders to be modified on any party’s motion. The August 22 Order is not
a protective order rendered under the applicable subtitle or even the modification of
4 such a protective order. It is the denial of a post-judgment motion to modify a
protective order, affording no relief. Section 81.009(a) does not authorize the appeal
of such an order, nor does any other statute based on our research.3
In an analogous situation, we considered the appealability of an order denying
what is known as an “unauthorized petition for release”4 from a civil commitment
under the Sexually Violent Predator Act. In re Commitment of Dunsmore, No. 01-
18-00183-CV, 2019 WL 2180446, at *1 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] May 21,
2019, no pet.) (mem. op.) (per curiam). There, the trial court had issued an order
denying the appellant’s post-commitment unauthorized petition for release, which
he sought to appeal. Id. We recognized that the Act allows for an appeal of the
order determining sexually-violent-predator status for purposes of civil commitment
and allows for the filing of an unauthorized petition for release following a
commitment. Id. at *1; see also TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 841.062, .122.
But because there “is no provision in the Sexually Violent Predator statute for appeal
3 For example, there is no statutory provision expressing that any ruling on a motion to modify under section 87.001 should be treated as a new final judgment, unlike in other situations under the Family Code in which modification proceedings constitute a new suit with a new final judgment. See TEX. FAM. CODE § 156.004 (regarding modification of orders affecting parent-child relationship); In re E.O., No. 13-18-00637-CV, 2021 WL 4995568, at *3 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi– Edinburg Oct. 28, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op.). 4 “Unauthorized” in this statutory context means without the Texas Civil Commitment Office’s authorization. See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 841.121, .122.
5 of an order denying an unauthorized petition for release,” we dismissed the appeal
for lack of jurisdiction. Id. at *1–2.
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