TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN
NO. 03-24-00379-CR
Michael Christopher Prall, Appellant
v.
The State of Texas, Appellee
FROM THE 368TH DISTRICT COURT OF WILLIAMSON COUNTY NO. 15-2658-K368, THE HONORABLE SARAH SOELDNER BRUCHMILLER, JUDGE PRESIDING
MEMORANDUM OPINION
The State indicted appellant Michael Christopher Prall with one count of failure to
render aid in an accident involving personal injury or death (count one), see Tex. Transp. Code
§ 550.021(a), and two counts of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon (counts two and three),
see Tex. Penal Code § 22.02(a)(2). Prall pleaded guilty to counts one and two pursuant to plea
bargains. In exchange for his guilty pleas, the State dismissed count three; recommended a
six-year sentence for count two; and recommended that for count one, Prall be sentenced to ten
years’ confinement probated for seven years with the sentence to run consecutively to that
imposed for count two. The trial court followed the plea bargains’ terms in sentencing Prall.
Following the completion of his sentence for count two, the State moved to revoke his
community supervision for an alleged violation of its terms and conditions. The trial court
granted the motion, found the allegation to be true, and sentenced him to ten years’ confinement. In a single issue, Prall contends that the trial court erred by cumulating his sentences in violation
of Texas Penal Code section 3.03. See id. § 3.03(a) (providing that, subject to certain
enumerated exceptions, sentences for offenses arising out of same criminal episode must run
concurrently). We affirm the trial court’s judgment revoking community supervision.
DISCUSSION
Prall contends that the trial court erred “when it sentenced [him] to a consecutive
term of ten (10) years . . . for a violation of his probation after he had already served a sentence
of six (6) years . . . from the same criminal episode.” Specifically, he argues that because the
offenses to which he pleaded guilty do not fall within the statutory exceptions to section 3.03, the
trial court’s cumulation order was unlawful. See id. § 3.03(b)–(e). He also argues that the
written judgment revoking community supervision should be modified to remove its reference to
the court’s cumulation order because the trial judge did not orally pronounce the cumulation
order during the revocation hearing. See Ex parte Madding, 70 S.W.3d 131, 136–37 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2002) (where trial court orally pronounced that sentences were to be served concurrently,
but written judgment reflected that they ran consecutively, ordering that written judgment be
corrected to conform to pronouncement). The State responds that Prall waived his right to
challenge the cumulation order.
We agree that Prall has waived his right to appeal this issue. The well-established
rule—to which Prall fails to argue an exception—is that “an appellant will not be permitted to
raise on appeal from the revocation of his community supervision any claim that he could have
brought on an appeal from the original imposition of that community supervision.” Wiley
v. State, 410 S.W.3d 313, 319 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013); see Manuel v. State, 994 S.W.2d 658, 661
2 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999) (recognizing that Court of Criminal Appeals had “long held that a
defendant placed on ‘regular’ community supervision may raise issues relating to the
conviction . . . only in appeals taken when community supervision is originally imposed” and not
“in appeals filed after ‘regular’ community supervision is revoked”).
Before signing the plea bargain for count one, Prall was admonished by the trial
court that
[i]f the punishment assessed does not exceed the punishment recommended by the District Attorney and agreed to by Defendant and his attorney, Defendant must request and receive[] the trial court’s permission before he or she may pursue an appeal on any matter in his or her case, except for those matters raised by written motions filed prior to trial.
The plea bargain in turn included among its terms the following language, which
was likewise recited on the face of the judgment of conviction for count one:
10 years TDC probated for 7 years formal probation; No fine; court costs; conditions of probation to include substance abuse evaluation and no contact with the [victim’s] family;
The defendant agrees that the sentence in Count One of this cause shall run consecutively to the sentence in Count Two of this cause (i.e., the sentence in Count One of this cause shall not begin to operate until the sentence in Count Two of this cause has ceased to operate or when the defendant is released on parole on Count Two of this cause, whichever is earlier).
The plea bargain further provided that Prall “waives (for guilt and punishment
stages) . . . [a]ny and all rights to appeal, the right [to] file a motion new trial and any right to
appeal arising from a motion for new trial.” The trial court thus certified that the case was a
plea-bargain case for which Prall had no right of appeal and that he had waived his right of
appeal. See Tex. R. App. P. 25.2(a)(2).
3 The Court of Criminal Appeals has recognized a defendant’s right to affirmatively
waive the right to concurrent sentencing under subsection 3.03(a). See Ex parte Carter,
521 S.W.3d 344, 347 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017) (plurality op.) (Ҥ 3.03 confers a Marin
waiver-only right—a right that must be implemented unless affirmatively waived.”).
Accordingly, Prall’s decisions voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently to accept the plea bargain
and waive any right to appeal from the trial court’s cumulation order at the time that he was
placed on community supervision “must work as a forfeiture of the claim, and he may not . . .
attempt to resuscitate it in a later appeal from the revocation of his community supervision.”
Wiley, 410 S.W.3d at 321.
In a case on collateral review, the Court of Criminal Appeals explained:
In this case the applicant pleaded guilty, and was convicted and sentenced, in accordance with a plea[-]bargaining agreement in which he specifically accepted the imposition of consecutive sentences in a single criminal action. There is no allegation that his decision was not counseled, intelligent, and voluntary. We hold that his decisions not to request a severance, and to accept the imposition of consecutive sentences imposed in a single criminal action for two offenses arising out of the same criminal episode, were valid waivers of his right to concurrent sentences.
Ex parte McJunkins, 954 S.W.2d 39, 41 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997); see Ex Parte Knight,
401 S.W.3d 60, 64 n.2 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (stating in dicta that applicant “could not have
challenged the cumulation order on direct appeal because she waived her appellate rights
pursuant to the plea agreement”).
Despite Prall’s waiver, we briefly address the trial court’s silence during the
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TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN
NO. 03-24-00379-CR
Michael Christopher Prall, Appellant
v.
The State of Texas, Appellee
FROM THE 368TH DISTRICT COURT OF WILLIAMSON COUNTY NO. 15-2658-K368, THE HONORABLE SARAH SOELDNER BRUCHMILLER, JUDGE PRESIDING
MEMORANDUM OPINION
The State indicted appellant Michael Christopher Prall with one count of failure to
render aid in an accident involving personal injury or death (count one), see Tex. Transp. Code
§ 550.021(a), and two counts of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon (counts two and three),
see Tex. Penal Code § 22.02(a)(2). Prall pleaded guilty to counts one and two pursuant to plea
bargains. In exchange for his guilty pleas, the State dismissed count three; recommended a
six-year sentence for count two; and recommended that for count one, Prall be sentenced to ten
years’ confinement probated for seven years with the sentence to run consecutively to that
imposed for count two. The trial court followed the plea bargains’ terms in sentencing Prall.
Following the completion of his sentence for count two, the State moved to revoke his
community supervision for an alleged violation of its terms and conditions. The trial court
granted the motion, found the allegation to be true, and sentenced him to ten years’ confinement. In a single issue, Prall contends that the trial court erred by cumulating his sentences in violation
of Texas Penal Code section 3.03. See id. § 3.03(a) (providing that, subject to certain
enumerated exceptions, sentences for offenses arising out of same criminal episode must run
concurrently). We affirm the trial court’s judgment revoking community supervision.
DISCUSSION
Prall contends that the trial court erred “when it sentenced [him] to a consecutive
term of ten (10) years . . . for a violation of his probation after he had already served a sentence
of six (6) years . . . from the same criminal episode.” Specifically, he argues that because the
offenses to which he pleaded guilty do not fall within the statutory exceptions to section 3.03, the
trial court’s cumulation order was unlawful. See id. § 3.03(b)–(e). He also argues that the
written judgment revoking community supervision should be modified to remove its reference to
the court’s cumulation order because the trial judge did not orally pronounce the cumulation
order during the revocation hearing. See Ex parte Madding, 70 S.W.3d 131, 136–37 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2002) (where trial court orally pronounced that sentences were to be served concurrently,
but written judgment reflected that they ran consecutively, ordering that written judgment be
corrected to conform to pronouncement). The State responds that Prall waived his right to
challenge the cumulation order.
We agree that Prall has waived his right to appeal this issue. The well-established
rule—to which Prall fails to argue an exception—is that “an appellant will not be permitted to
raise on appeal from the revocation of his community supervision any claim that he could have
brought on an appeal from the original imposition of that community supervision.” Wiley
v. State, 410 S.W.3d 313, 319 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013); see Manuel v. State, 994 S.W.2d 658, 661
2 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999) (recognizing that Court of Criminal Appeals had “long held that a
defendant placed on ‘regular’ community supervision may raise issues relating to the
conviction . . . only in appeals taken when community supervision is originally imposed” and not
“in appeals filed after ‘regular’ community supervision is revoked”).
Before signing the plea bargain for count one, Prall was admonished by the trial
court that
[i]f the punishment assessed does not exceed the punishment recommended by the District Attorney and agreed to by Defendant and his attorney, Defendant must request and receive[] the trial court’s permission before he or she may pursue an appeal on any matter in his or her case, except for those matters raised by written motions filed prior to trial.
The plea bargain in turn included among its terms the following language, which
was likewise recited on the face of the judgment of conviction for count one:
10 years TDC probated for 7 years formal probation; No fine; court costs; conditions of probation to include substance abuse evaluation and no contact with the [victim’s] family;
The defendant agrees that the sentence in Count One of this cause shall run consecutively to the sentence in Count Two of this cause (i.e., the sentence in Count One of this cause shall not begin to operate until the sentence in Count Two of this cause has ceased to operate or when the defendant is released on parole on Count Two of this cause, whichever is earlier).
The plea bargain further provided that Prall “waives (for guilt and punishment
stages) . . . [a]ny and all rights to appeal, the right [to] file a motion new trial and any right to
appeal arising from a motion for new trial.” The trial court thus certified that the case was a
plea-bargain case for which Prall had no right of appeal and that he had waived his right of
appeal. See Tex. R. App. P. 25.2(a)(2).
3 The Court of Criminal Appeals has recognized a defendant’s right to affirmatively
waive the right to concurrent sentencing under subsection 3.03(a). See Ex parte Carter,
521 S.W.3d 344, 347 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017) (plurality op.) (Ҥ 3.03 confers a Marin
waiver-only right—a right that must be implemented unless affirmatively waived.”).
Accordingly, Prall’s decisions voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently to accept the plea bargain
and waive any right to appeal from the trial court’s cumulation order at the time that he was
placed on community supervision “must work as a forfeiture of the claim, and he may not . . .
attempt to resuscitate it in a later appeal from the revocation of his community supervision.”
Wiley, 410 S.W.3d at 321.
In a case on collateral review, the Court of Criminal Appeals explained:
In this case the applicant pleaded guilty, and was convicted and sentenced, in accordance with a plea[-]bargaining agreement in which he specifically accepted the imposition of consecutive sentences in a single criminal action. There is no allegation that his decision was not counseled, intelligent, and voluntary. We hold that his decisions not to request a severance, and to accept the imposition of consecutive sentences imposed in a single criminal action for two offenses arising out of the same criminal episode, were valid waivers of his right to concurrent sentences.
Ex parte McJunkins, 954 S.W.2d 39, 41 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997); see Ex Parte Knight,
401 S.W.3d 60, 64 n.2 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (stating in dicta that applicant “could not have
challenged the cumulation order on direct appeal because she waived her appellate rights
pursuant to the plea agreement”).
Despite Prall’s waiver, we briefly address the trial court’s silence during the
revocation hearing on its earlier cumulation order. Prall’s punishment was in fact assessed
during the plea proceeding at which he was sentenced to ten years’ confinement, his
sentence was suspended, and he was placed on community supervision. See Pettigrew v. State, 4 48 S.W.3d 769, 773 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001) (“[T]he Legislature intended both suspended and
imposed sentences to be treated as ‘convictions’ for the purpose of stacking in order to give the
trial court the maximum flexibility possible in stacking sentences.”). It is worth quoting
our sister court, which addressed the substantively identical predecessor to the current
community-supervision statute:
Because this is a “regular probation” case, the appellant’s punishment was assessed and the sentence was pronounced on March 18, 2002. Only the imposition of the sentence of confinement was suspended while Kimball was under community supervision. A community supervision revocation hearing is neither a criminal nor a civil trial, but rather an administrative hearing. The trial court is not authorized by law to assess a new sentence. Therefore, Kimball received a sentence of ten years of confinement, and no subsequent act of the trial court effectively altered that sentence. Its authority to sentence Kimball to more than ten years of confinement ended with the oral pronouncement of sentence on March 18, 2002.
Kimball v. State, 119 S.W.3d 463, 464–65 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2003, no pet.) (internal
citations omitted). Thus, the trial court did not revisit the cumulation of Prall’s sentences at the
revocation hearing because it had already ordered them stacked following the plea proceeding
and could not alter his sentences.
For these reasons, we overrule Prall’s sole issue.
CONCLUSION
Having overruled Prall’s only issue on appeal, we affirm the trial court’s
judgment revoking community supervision.
5 __________________________________________ Maggie Ellis, Justice
Before Justices Theofanis, Crump, and Ellis
Affirmed
Filed: August 20, 2025
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