Michael Chandler, Eddie Jones, and Chad Maddison, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated v. Iowa Department of Corrections

• Court: Supreme Court of Iowa
• Decided: February 21, 2025
• Docket: 24-0189
• Status: Published

Opinion

In the Iowa Supreme Court

No. 24–0189

Submitted December 18, 2024—Filed February 21, 2025

Michael Chandler, Eddie Jones, and Chad Maddison, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated,

Appellants,

vs.

Iowa Department of Corrections,

Appellee.

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Coleman McAllister,

judge.

The plaintiffs appeal the district court’s granting of summary judgment on

their claims under Iowa Code § 80F.1 against the Iowa Department of

Corrections. Affirmed.

McDermott, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which all justices

joined.

Jim Duff (argued) and Thomas J. Duff of Duff Law Firm, P.L.C., West Des

Moines, for appellants.

Brenna Bird, Attorney General; Breanne A. Stoltze (argued), Assistant

Solicitor General; and Christopher J. Deist and Christine A. Louis, Assistant

Attorneys General, for appellee.

Charles Gribble and Christopher Stewart of Gribble Boles Stewart &

Witosky for amicus curiae Iowa Professional Firefighters Association. 2

McDermott, Justice.

Iowa Code chapter 80F contains a “bill of rights” for peace officers that

provides a range of procedural protections and remedies for officers, particularly

surrounding investigations into complaints of alleged misconduct. The plaintiffs

in this case—peace officers working for the Iowa Department of

Corrections—allege they were each disciplined after an administrative

investigation by their employer. After the Department imposed its discipline, the

officers requested copies of witness statements and investigation reports

involving their cases, but they allege that the Department refused to turn over

the documents as chapter 80F requires. The officers filed a lawsuit against the

Department seeking money damages and injunctive relief. The Department

moved to dismiss the lawsuit, arguing that chapter 80F grants the officers no

right to bring a cause of action against it. The district court granted the

Department’s motion and dismissed the case. In this appeal, we must decide

whether officers have a right to sue their employing agency under chapter 80F.

In 2007, the legislature enacted the “Peace Officer, Public Safety, and

Emergency Personnel Bill of Rights.” 2007 Iowa Acts ch. 160 (codified at Iowa

Code ch. 80F (2009)). Among other rights granted to peace officers, the statute

provides that if an administrative investigation results in disciplinary action

against an officer, “copies of any witness statements and the complete

investigative agency’s report shall be timely provided to the officer . . . upon

request at the completion of the investigation.” Iowa Code § 80F.1(9) (2023). The

officers allege the Department violated this provision by failing to turn over

witness statements and investigative reports related to their disciplinary cases

despite their requests. 3

Iowa Code § 80F.1(13) describes an officer’s right to sue for damages under

chapter 80F:

An officer shall have the right to bring a cause of action against any person, group of persons, organization, or corporation for damages arising from the filing of a false complaint against the officer or any other violation of this chapter including but not limited to actual damages, court costs, and reasonable attorney fees.

This subsection was amended, along with quite a few other subsections in

chapter 80F, in 2021. See 2021 Iowa Acts ch. 183, §§ 17–20. Where § 80F.1(13)

had previously stated “the right to pursue civil remedies under the law,” the

amended statute states “the right to bring a cause of action,” and where it had

previously stated “against a citizen arising from the filing of a false complaint

against the officer,” the amended statute states “against any person, group of

persons, organization, or corporation for damages arising from the filing of a false

complaint or any other violation of this chapter including but not limited to actual

damages, court costs, and reasonable attorney fees.” Id. § 18.

The officers argue that the 2021 amendments responded to an Iowa court

of appeals opinion in 2011, which held that the pre-amendment iteration of

chapter 80F did not create a private right of action for officers against their

employing agency for violations of chapter 80F. See Dautovic v. Bradshaw,

No. 09–1763, 2011 WL 1005432, at *1 (Iowa Ct. App. Mar. 21, 2011). In

response, the State argues that the 2021 amendments had nothing to do with

the court of appeals opinion, which came down a full decade earlier, but instead

sprung from the legislature’s desire to provide protections against frivolous

reports of police misconduct after the nationwide protests that followed the

murder of George Floyd by Minneapolis police.

But we need not speculate about legislative motivations to decide the

question of statutory interpretation before us. “In questions of statutory 4

interpretation, ‘[w]e do not inquire what the legislature meant; we ask only what

the statute means.’ ” Com. Bank v. McGowen, 956 N.W.2d 128, 133 (Iowa 2021)

(alteration in original) (quoting Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Theory of Legal

Interpretation, 12 Harv. L. Rev. 417, 419 (1899)). We derive a statute’s meaning

and purpose from the text, not from assumptions about the legal drafter’s

inspirations. As Justice Scalia neatly put the point, “The law is what the law

says . . . .” Bank One Chi., N.A. v. Midwest Bank & Tr. Co., 516 U.S. 264, 279

(1996) (Scalia, J., concurring).

Both parties offer some persuasive textual arguments about what the

statute means. The officers begin by arguing that the word “person” in

§ 80F.1(13) requires us to apply the expansive definition found in Iowa Code

§ 4.1(20). Section 4.1 begins with an introductory clause that guides its

application and is followed by various definitions and interpretive rules,

including a definition of “person”:

In the construction of the statutes, the following rules shall be observed, unless such construction would be inconsistent with the manifest intent of the general assembly, or repugnant to the context of the statute:

....

20. Person. Unless otherwise provided by law, “person” means individual, corporation, limited liability company, government or governmental subdivision or agency, business trust, estate, trust, partnership or association, or any other legal entity.

Iowa Code § 4.1(20). The officers argue that under § 4.1(20)’s definition, the

Department, as a “government or governmental subdivision or agency,” is a

“person” and thus an officer may bring a cause of action against it under

§ 80F.1(13). The officers further argue that because the language in § 80F.1(13)

authorizes a cause of action not only for false complaints but for “any other

violation of this chapter,” and because the other provisions of the chapter focus 5

on duties that the employing agency owes its officers, the “any other violation”

language must mean that the agency falls within the definition of “person.”

But as the State argues, the officers’ attempt to define “person” using

§ 4.1(20) creates considerable dissonance when we read § 80F.1 in context.

“Context is a primary determinant of meaning.” Antonin Scalia & Bryan A.

Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 167 (2012) [hereinafter

Scalia & Garner, Reading Law] (discussing the whole-text canon). When we

construe statutory text, we “consider the overall structure and context of the

statute, not just specific words or phrases in a vacuum.” State v. Lopez,

907 N.W.2d 112, 120 (Iowa 2018).

For starters, the definition of “person” in § 4.1(20) includes “corporation.”

But § 80F.1(13) separately lists “corporation,” making its recitation a pointless

redundancy if § 4.1(20)’s definition applies. Similarly, § 4.1 itself tells us that

when we read statutes, unless otherwise specified, “the singular includes the

plural.” Iowa Code § 4.1(17); see Scalia & Garner, Reading Law 129 (discussing

the gender/number canon). Yet § 80F.1(13) lists not merely “person” but “groups

of persons.” Restating “groups of persons” would be another needless addition if

§ 4.1(20)’s definition of “person” applies. And if “person” automatically

incorporates everything in § 4.1(20), such as a corporation, government agency,

estate, trust, partnership, and so on, the nature of what’s described with “groups

of persons” gets rather odd. It would be strange, for instance, to refer to “groups”

of government agencies or “groups” of estates. See Scalia & Garner, Reading Law

140 (discussing the grammar canon).

When interpreting legal texts, “[w]e presume statutes or rules do not

contain superfluous words.” Iowa Ins. Inst. v. Core Grp. of Iowa Ass’n for Just.,

867 N.W.2d 58, 75 (Iowa 2015) (alteration in original) (quoting State v. McKinley, 6

860 N.W.2d 874, 882 (Iowa 2015)); see Scalia & Garner, Reading Law 174

(discussing the surplusage canon). Applying the definition of “person” from

§ 4.1(20), as the officers say we must, requires us to assume that the legislature

was adding superfluous words in its list of parties who could be sued.

And then, to compound the confusion, we must assume that in adding

redundant language, the legislature was deceptively selective in the

redundancies it chose. The list that follows “person” in § 80F.1(13) notably does

not repeat “governmental subdivision or agency” from § 4.1(20). Nor does it

include a more specific term used repeatedly in § 80F.1 itself—“the employing

agency”—that would make the point equally obvious. When the legislature

amended § 80F.1 in 2021 by adding the “cause of action” language, it also added

several new subsections. See 2021 Iowa Acts ch. 183, §§ 19–20 (codified at Iowa

Code § 80F.1(20)–(23) (Iowa 2022)). Three of those subsections impose additional

obligations on an officer’s employer. See Iowa Code § 80F.1(20)–(22). In each

instance, the statute refers to the employer as “the employing agency.” Id. A

statute’s meaning “is expressed by omission as well as by inclusion, and the

express mention of one thing implies the exclusion of others not so mentioned.”

Roberts v. Roberts, 6 N.W.3d 730, 738 (Iowa 2024) (quoting State v. Hall,

969 N.W.2d 299, 309 (Iowa 2022)); see Scalia & Garner, Reading Law 107

(discussing the negative-implication canon). The list of potential defendants

includes only “person, group of persons, organization, or corporation” and does

not include the “employing agency.” See Iowa Code § 80F.1(13). The implication

is that the employing agency cannot be sued.

Further, when interpreting the meaning of statutory language, we consider

the language’s relationship not only to other provisions of the same statute but

also to other provisions of related statutes. Vaudt v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 7

4 N.W.3d 45, 50 (Iowa 2024). The legislature in other Code chapters has

specifically included “agency” in a list when authorizing a cause of action against

an agency. See, e.g., Iowa Code § 235A.20 (authorizing a private cause of action

under the Iowa Tort Claims Act and Municipal Tort Claims Act against “any

person, agency or other recipient” that improperly disseminates or receives child

abuse information (emphasis added)); id. § 692.6 (imposing liability under the

Iowa Tort Claims Act and Municipal Tort Claims Act for “any person, agency, or

governmental body” that improperly disseminates or receives child abuse

information (emphasis added)); cf. id. § 232.75(2) (imposing criminal liability on

any “person, official, agency, or institution” that knowingly and willfully fails to

report suspected child abuse (emphasis added)). These other Code provisions,

too, suggest that employing agencies are not subject to suit under § 80F.1(13).

All in all, we believe that the weight of the contextual clues points toward

applying an ordinary definition of “person”—referring to an individual

human—as opposed to the expansive definition found in § 4.1(20). It is worth

recalling that even the introductory clause to § 4.1 counsels that we do not

presume one of its definitions applies if such an application would be “repugnant

to the context of the statute.” See also id. § 4.1(38) (“Words and phrases shall be

construed according to the context and the approved usage of the

language . . . .”). Our best reading of the statute, in its full context, provides that

an officer may only bring a cause of action against a listed party—a “person,

group of persons, organization, or corporation”—and not a state agency.

To the extent any question on the subject remains, the Department argues

that the absence of language in § 80F.1 exempting it from the requirements of

Iowa’s Administrative Procedure Act cements the point. Under chapter 17A, the

pathway for a party to litigate an administrative dispute against an agency 8

requires compliance with the Administrative Procedure Act. The Act states that

its provisions “shall be the exclusive means by which a person or party who is

aggrieved or adversely affected by agency action may seek judicial review of such

agency action.” Id. § 17A.19. A party may avoid the act’s exclusive coverage of a

claim only when another statute “expressly provide[s] otherwise . . . by referring

to [Chapter 17A] by name.” Id. (emphasis added).

A lawsuit that challenges an agency’s performance of a statutory duty

constitutes an “agency action” under chapter 17A. Id. § 17A.2(2); Tindal v.

Norman, 427 N.W.2d 871, 872 (Iowa 1998). The officers allege that the

Department violated its statutory duty under § 80F.1(9) to provide them with

copies of witness statements and investigation reports in their disciplinary

matters. The officers thus present a challenge to an agency action generally

covered under chapter 17A. To overcome chapter 17A’s exclusivity and permit a

direct cause of action, the Department contends that § 80F.1 must “expressly

provide otherwise” by referring to chapter 17A “by name.” Id. § 17A.19.

The officers concede that chapter 80F includes no reference to chapter 17A

whatsoever, let alone any express provision displacing the procedures in

§ 17A.19. But they argue that no other statute provides the clear exemption the

Department says is required, yet we have authorized private causes of action

against agencies in many cases. The Department, in response, cites two statutes

that it argues operate outside chapter 17A that do properly refer to chapter 17A

by name. See id. § 216.16(1) (“This provision also applies to persons claiming to

be aggrieved by an unfair or discriminatory practice committed by the state or

an agency or political subdivision of the state, notwithstanding the terms of the

Iowa administrative procedure Act, chapter 17A.”); id. § 70A.28(5), (6) (providing

that “an action in district court” is an alternative to a hearing “conducted in 9

accordance with the rules of the public employment relations board and the Iowa

administrative procedure Act, chapter 17A”). The officers argue that although

both statutes mention chapter 17A, neither of them provides the exemption

language that § 17A.19 suggests.

The officers further argue that our holding in Walsh v. Wahlert shows that

§ 17A.19’s exclusive-remedy language is unnecessary when another statute

expressly creates a cause of action. 913 N.W.2d 517, 525 (Iowa 2018). In Walsh,

an employee (an administrative law judge) at a state agency alleged that the

agency’s director was attempting to unlawfully convert his merit-based position

to non-merit-based. Id. at 518–19. The employee disclosed the director’s plans

to other government officials. Id. Shortly after, the agency laid off the employee,

stating that the move was necessary because of a budget shortfall. Id. at 519.

Believing that his firing was pretextual, the employee in Walsh sued,

bringing a cause of action for (among others) retaliation against both the agency

director and the State of Iowa under § 70A.28 (colloquially known as Iowa’s

“whistleblower-protection statute”). Id. The district court granted summary

judgment against the employee, holding that chapters 8A (which provides

administrative remedies to merit employees) and 17A (the Administrative

Procedure Act) provided the exclusive means to challenge the director’s action.

Id. at 521. On appeal, we reversed the summary judgment ruling. Id. at 525.

Although we acknowledged that chapter 17A provided the exclusive remedies for

common law claims, we concluded that because “the legislature has expressly

created independent statutory causes of action in the alternative to chapter

17A-type review, judicial review of agency action under the administrative

procedures act is not the exclusive means of obtaining judicial review.” Id. 10

But our holding in Walsh doesn’t take us as far as the officers suggest.

The remedies language in § 70A.28 (the whistleblower-protection statute at issue

in Walsh) and the remedies in the language in § 80F.1 are not worded alike. We

explained in Walsh that § 70A.28 “is an unusual case in which we have a statute

that expressly creates an independent cause of action in the alternative to

administrative remedies under Iowa Code chapter 17A.” Id. (emphasis added).

Section 70A.28 refers to chapter 17A as offering an alternate remedy. See Iowa

Code § 70A.28(6) (“Subsection 2 may also be enforced by an employee through

an administrative action . . . . The hearing shall otherwise be conducted in

accordance with the rules of the employment appeal board and the Iowa

administrative procedure Act, chapter 17A.”).

Yet § 80F.1 contains no similar language that even mentions chapter 17A,

let alone “expressly creat[ing] an independent cause of action in the alternative

to administrative remedies under Iowa Code chapter 17A.” Walsh, 913 N.W.2d

at 525. Section 80F.1 is not the “unusual case” that we confronted in Walsh in

which the whistleblower statute granted an option to pursue a private right of

action or to proceed directly under chapter 17A. By never mentioning chapter

17A, § 80F.1 leaves us little indication that it is setting up an alternate path to

chapter 17A’s requirements. The failure in § 80F.1 even to acknowledge chapter

17A’s otherwise-exclusive remedies counsels against reading § 80F.1(13) as

providing a right of action against an agency outside § 17A’s requirements.

We thus conclude that the officers’ claims against their employing agency

based on § 80F.1(9) do not find a direct path to the courthouse through the

private cause of action in § 80F.1(13), and we affirm the district court’s granting

of summary judgment in the Department’s favor.

Affirmed.