Michael C. Sternberg, et al. v. Cindy Hendrickson, et al.

• Court: District Court, N.D. California
• Decided: April 8, 2026
• Docket: 3:24-cv-04271
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 7 MICHAEL C. STERNBERG, et al., Case No. 24-cv-04271-AMO

8 Plaintiffs, ORDER RE MOTION TO DISMISS, FIRST MOTION FOR PARTIAL 9 v. SUMMARY JUDGMENT, MOTIONS FOR MISCONDUCT REFERRALS, 10 CINDY HENDRICKSON, et al., AND MOTION FOR DISCLOSURE OF POTENTIAL CONFLICTS Defendants. 11 Re: Dkt. Nos. 96, 98, 99, 101, 102

12 13 Before the Court are a motion to dismiss by Defendants Santa Clara County Bar 14 Association (“SCCBA”), and its CEO, Sherry Diamond, Dkt. No. 96, self-represented Plaintiff 15 Michael C. Sternberg’s partial motion for summary judgment against Defendants Diamond and 16 the SCCBA, Dkt. No. 98, his two motions to refer certain individuals for investigation into 17 misconduct and other abuses, Dkt. Nos. 99, 101, and a motion requesting that this Court disclose 18 potential conflicts of interest, Dkt. No. 102. The Court addresses each motion in turn. 19 I. MOTION TO DISMISS 20 A. Background1 21 Sternberg alleges that “[o]n April 7, 2021, he “spoke with Sherry Diamond, CEO of the 22 Santa Clara County Bar Association, on the phone.” Dkt. No. 20 (“Am. Compl.”) ¶ 141. 23 Diamond told Sternberg “she would email [him] the policy on how Local General Rule 3B 24 complaints are processed,” and she did. Id. ¶¶ 142-43. She did not, however, “disclose to 25 [Sternberg] that the Local General Rule 3B complaint process was a sham.” Id. ¶ 144. On June 3, 26 1 This background is based on the allegations in Sternberg’s amended complaint, which are taken 27 as true and liberally construed in his favor at the motion to dismiss stage. See Watison v. Carter, 1 2021, Sternberg “emailed Sherry Diamond to confirm she was still CEO of the Santa Clara Bar 2 and the address to which [he] could send [his] 3B complaint. She confirmed the same day.” Id. ¶ 3 146. On June 7, 2021, Sternberg mailed a letter, dated June 5, 2021, “to Presiding Judge Theodore 4 Zayner, Santa Clara County Superior Court. In the letter, [Sternberg] reported the abduction of 5 [his] children, other constitutional rights violations, and Aeschleman’s[2] fraudulent filings with 6 the court. [He] also complained of bias under Local General Rule 3B.” Id. ¶ 147. The same day, 7 he mailed a copy of that letter to Diamond. Id. ¶¶ 148, 149. On June 11, 2021, Sternberg “sent 8 [Presiding Judge] Zayner a complaint about Aeschleman’s fraudulent ex parte filings with the 9 court. Attached to the letter was evidence that Aeschleman had served [Sternberg] a different 10 version of a motion than what was filed with the court.” Id. ¶ 150. The same day, he emailed the 11 letter to Diamond. Id. ¶ 151. On October 27, 2023, Diamond “admitted to the State Bar of 12 California that she had shredded, and did not read, the 6/2021 complaints [Sternberg] sent to her 13 and [Presiding Judge] Zayner pursuant to Local General Rule 3B.” Id. ¶ 227. 14 Based on these events, Sternberg asserts a claim “[p]ursuant to 42 USC 1983; 28 USC 15 2201; U.S. Const. amend. I & XIV; Conspiracy” against Diamond and the SCCBA. Am. Compl. 16 at 27-28. According to Sternberg:

17 Since 2021, Sherry Diamond and the SCCBA, acting under color of California law, have deprived [him] of [his] constitutional rights to 18 the care, custody, and control of [his] children without due process. They have denied [him] and [his] children the right to freely 19 associate to petition the government of redress of grievances through corrupt and secretive practices intentionally designed to deprive 20 [him] of those rights. Diamond and the SCCBA embedded itself with the Santa Clara County Superior Court to run a fake bias 21 complaint process. The court wrote rules about the process and specifically delegated powers to Diamond and the SCCBA. In 2021, 22 [Sternberg] requested the SCCBA policies from Diamond regarding the procedure outlined in the local court rules. [Sternberg] submitted 23 [his] complaints to her, but rather than review the complaints in accordance with her own policies, she shredded them. To this day, 24 she and the SCCBA refuse to report professional and judicial misconduct that they know is depriving [Sternberg] of [his] federally 25 protected rights, despite California law mandating such reporting. Diamond and the SCCBA actions were intentional furtherances in a 26 conspiracy to deprive [Sternberg] of federally protected rights. They 27 know that Santa Clara judges and law enforcement routinely violate 1 parental rights under color of law, and their actions are in support of those long standing practices to protect state actors, with whom they 2 are fully aligned, from scrutiny or consequences. Furthermore, based on information and belief, the bulk of Sherry Diamond and the 3 SSCBA’s funding comes from municipal and state treasuries. Diamond and the SCCBA’s conduct is done with the specific intent 4 to enrich local attorneys who loot and pillage the wealth of parents’ through illegal litigation tactics designed to prolong due process 5 violations. As a direct result of Diamond’s and the SCCBA’s ongoing failure to report judicial and professional misconduct, 6 [Sternberg] ha[s] had [his] children unreasonably seized for 6 years and have suffered over $200,000 in fraudulent litigation costs. 7 8 Id. 9 Sternberg seeks a declaration “that Sherry Diamond and the Santa Clara County Bar 10 Association have so fully enmeshed themselves into the Santa Clara County Superior Court that 11 they meet the definition of person under 42 USC § 1983 for all purposes[,]” “[t]hat Diamond 12 violated California Rule of Professional Conduct 8.3 and 8.4 and that such violations deprive 13 [him] of [his] 14th Amendment right to due process.” Id. at 35. 14 B. Legal Standards 15 1. Rule 12(b)(1) 16 A motion to dismiss filed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) is a challenge to the court’s subject 17 matter jurisdiction. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). “If a federal plaintiff asserts as a legal wrong an 18 allegedly erroneous decision by a state court, and seeks relief from a state court judgment based on 19 that decision, Rooker-Feldman bars subject matter jurisdiction in federal district court.” Noel v. 20 Hall, 341 F.3d 1148, 1164 (9th Cir. 2003). If, however, “a federal plaintiff asserts as a legal 21 wrong an allegedly illegal act or omission by an adverse party, Rooker-Feldman does not bar 22 jurisdiction.” Id.; see also Miroth v. County of Trinity, 136 F.4th 1141, 1156 (9th Cir. 2025) 23 2. Rule 12(b)(6) 24 A motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) tests the legal 25 sufficiency of the claims alleged in the complaint. Ileto v. Glock, 349 F.3d 1191, 1199-1200 (9th 26 Cir. 2003). To overcome a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the factual allegations in the 27 plaintiff’s complaint “ ‘must . . . suggest that the claim has at least a plausible chance of 1 Aluminum Co. Sec. Litig., 729 F.3d 1104, 1107 (9th Cir. 2013) (alterations in original)). In ruling 2 on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, courts “accept factual allegations in the complaint as true and construe 3 the pleadings in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Manzarek v. St. Paul Fire & 4 Marine Ins. Co., 519 F.3d 1025, 1031 (9th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted). 5 “[A]llegations in a complaint . . . may not simply recite the elements of a cause of action, 6 but must contain sufficient allegations of underlying facts to give fair notice and to enable the 7 opposing party to defend itself effectively.” Levitt, 765 F.3d at 1135 (quoting Starr v. Baca, 652 8 F.3d 1202, 1216 (9th Cir. 2011)). The court may dismiss a claim “where there is either a lack of a 9 cognizable legal theory or the absence of sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal claim.” 10 Hinds Invs., L.P. v. Angioli, 654 F.3d 846, 850 (9th Cir. 2011) (citing Johnson v. Riverside 11 Healthcare Sys., LP, 534 F.3d 1116, 1121 (9th Cir. 2008)). “[T]he non-conclusory ‘factual 12 content’ and reasonable inferences from that content must be plausibly suggestive of a claim 13 entitling the plaintiff to relief.” Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). 14 C. Discussion 15 Defendants Diamond and the SCCBA move to dismiss Sternberg’s complaint on five 16 grounds. Dkt. No. 96 (“Mot.”). They contend dismissal is appropriate under Rule 12(b)(1) 17 because Sternberg’s action is barred pursuant to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Mot. at 7. In the 18 alternative, Defendants argue that dismissal is warranted under Rule 12(b)(6) because they are not 19 persons to whom liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the First Amendment, or the Fourteenth 20 Amendment attaches, Sternberg’s allegations are insufficient to meet the heightened pleading 21 standards that apply to conspiracy and fraud claims, Sternberg’s claims are barred by the two-year 22 statute of limitations applicable to Section 1983 claims, and Sternberg has not stated a basis for 23 injunctive or declaratory relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2201. Id. at 7-8. Sternberg opposes the motion. 24 Dkt. No. 97 (“Opp.”).3 25 3 In his opposition, Sternberg requests that the Court refer Defendants’ Attorney, Aman Joea, to 26 the Standing Committee on Professional Conduct pursuant to Civil Local Rule 11-6(h) and (l), and asks that “[t]he referral order . . . be publicly filed on the docket.” Id. at 2. Sternberg asserts that 27 the motion to dismiss “makes frivolous arguments, FRCP 11 violations, and violations of the 1 As a preliminary matter, the Court declines to grant Defendants’ motion to dismiss on the 2 basis that Sternberg’s complaint is barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine or the statute of 3 limitations. As Sternberg notes in his opposition, to which Defendants have elected not to file a 4 reply, neither Diamond nor the SCCBA address the recent Ninth Circuit decision, Miroth v. 5 County of Trinity, 136 F.4th 1141 (9th Cir. 2025), which, according to Sternberg, permits him to 6 “directly challenge state court decisions in this court without running afoul or [sic] Rooker- 7 Feldman[.]” Opp. at 6. Nor do Defendants offer anything other than a generic argument as to 8 why the doctrine applies here, which does not explain why the specific relief Sternberg seeks 9 against Defendants would be barred under Rooker-Feldman:

10 Here, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars all of Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants. His allegations consist of attacks on state court 11 rulings and judgments styled as civil rights complaints against a large mix of defendants that would require this Court to review 12 many state court rulings, orders, and judgments. In order for this Court to award Plaintiff the relief he seeks, it would have to review 13 the orders made in the state court proceedings in the Underlying State Action. A finding by this Court in Plaintiff’s favor on any of 14 the numerous issues raised in this case would thus undercut the rulings of California Superior Court judges. Consequently, this 15 Court should not conduct de facto appellate review of those orders, and should grant the motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter 16 jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. 17 Mot. at 11. 18 Additionally, Sternberg contends in his opposition that “Defendants concede that [he] 19 timely sued them in the District of Nevada within the limitations period.” Id. at 8. Again, without 20 the benefit of a reply, the Court declines to dismiss Sternberg’s claims as time-barred, particularly 21 where, as here, Defendants seek dismissal on statute of limitations grounds due to the filing of this 22 action, without reference to the predecessor action filed in Nevada. Mot. at 12. Defendants 23 acknowledge that “Sternberg originally filed this case in the District of Nevada, Case Nos. 2:23- 24 cv-01466 and 2:23-cv-02022” and that the district court in that case “dismissed the claims against 25 Defendants for lack of personal jurisdiction on July 23, 2024[,]” but ignore its impact on the 26

27 arguments raised in the motion to dismiss, the Court DENIES Sternberg’s request for a referral to 1 statute of limitations issue raised here, arguing only that:

2 The claims in this case against Defendants are obviously time-barred under the two-year statute of limitations applicable to actions under 3 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 (“Section 1983.”) [sic] See W. Shield Investigations & Security Consultants v. Superior Court, 82 4 Cal.App.4th 935, 953 (2000). W. Shield notes that the statute of limitations for claims under Section 1983 is the same as the statute 5 of limitations for personal injury actions under state law, which in California is 2 years under California Code of Civil Procedure 6 section 335.1. The FAC is based on conduct that took place in 2021, see ECF No. 20, p. 15, which was much longer than 2 years prior to 7 filing this complaint in 2024. Therefore, the claims are barred by the applicable statute of limitations 8 9 Mot. at 7, 12. 10 Accordingly, the Court declines to dismiss Sternberg’s claims on these two grounds and 11 turns to the remaining grounds Defendants raise in their motion. 12 1. Constitutional Claims 13 To prevail on his Section 1983 claim, Sternberg must allege that Diamond and SCCBA 14 were acting under color of state law, and similarly, for his claims under the First and Fourteenth 15 Amendments, he must allege that Diamond and the SCCBA were state actors. See West v. Atkins, 16 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988) (citations omitted); Manhattan Cmty. Access Corp. v. Halleck, 587 U.S. 17 802, 808 (2019). “In cases under [Section] 1983, ‘under color’ of law has consistently been 18 treated as the same thing as the ‘state action’ required under the Fourteenth Amendment.” United 19 States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 794 n.7 (1966). 20 Sternberg alleges “that Sherry Diamond and the Santa Clara County Bar Association have 21 so fully enmeshed themselves into the Santa Clara County Superior Court that they meet the 22 definition of person under 42 USC § 1983 for all purposes[,]” that “Sherry Diamond and the 23 SCCBA, acting under color of California law, have deprived [him] of [his] constitutional rights[,]” 24 that they “embedded [themselves] with the Santa Clara County Superior Court to run a fake bias 25 complaint process[,]” that their “ actions were intentional furtherances in a conspiracy to deprive 26 [him] of federally protected rights[,]” and that “[t]hey know that Santa Clara judges and law 27 enforcement routinely violate parental rights under color of law, and their actions are in support of 1 scrutiny or consequences.” Am. Compl. at 27-28, 35. Sternberg further alleges “on information 2 and belief,” that “the bulk of Sherry Diamond and the SSCBA’s funding comes from municipal 3 and state treasuries[,]” and that their “conduct is done with the specific intent to enrich local 4 attorneys who loot and pillage the wealth of parents’ through illegal litigation tactics designed to 5 prolong due process violations.” Id. at 38. 6 Sternberg further contends that the SCCBA acted “under delegated judicial authority.” 7 Opp. at 9. He points to General Court and Administrative Rule 3(B), which provides, in part:

8 The Santa Clara County Superior Court and the Santa Clara County Bar Association have established a procedure to assist in 9 maintaining a courtroom environment free of bias or the appearance of bias. This procedure is fully set forth in the Santa Clara County 10 Bar Association’s “Fairness and Equality in the Court’s Procedure.” Any complaints concerning conduct that exhibits bias on the part of 11 attorneys, litigants, judges and courtroom personnel arising within the physical confines of the courthouse and courtroom over which a 12 presiding judge and/or a sitting judge has authority or influence may be made to the Executive Director or Officer of the Santa Clara 13 County Bar Association or one of the four liaisons who are appointed by the Santa Clara County Bar Association to handle 14 these complaints.4 15 Dkt. No. 97-1 at 2. He also points to the Official Biased Conduct in the Courtroom Complaint 16 Procedure that Diamond emailed him on April 7, 2021. Opp. at 10. That document provides, in 17 part: The overarching purpose of this informal complaint procedure is to 18 help preserve the integrity and impartiality of the judicial system. The Superior Court of Santa Clara County and the Santa Clara 19 County Bar Association approved this procedure to assist Superior Court judges in carrying out their duty to ensure that courtroom 20 proceedings will be fair and impartial for all courtroom participants. This includes treating all courtroom participants with respect no 21 matter their disability, gender, race, religion, ethnicity, sexual orientation or socioeconomic status. Judges’ orders, rulings and 22 decisions should be based on the sound exercise of judicial discretion and balancing of competing rights and interests, not 23 influenced by stereotypes or biases. The objective of this procedure is to educate rather than discipline the judge and/or the person to 24

25 4 Sternberg requests judicial notice of Local General 3(B), which, according to Sternberg, he downloaded from the Santa Clara County Superior Court official website and was in effect at the 26 time Diamond allegedly shredded his complaint. Opp. at 9. He also requests judicial notice of the Official Biased Conduct in the Courtroom Complaint Procedure that Diamond emailed him on 27 April 7, 2021. Id. at 10. The Court takes judicial notice of the existence of these documents whom the complaint may be directed in an effort to prevent future 1 conduct that is biased. This informal procedure complies with the California Rules of Court, Standard 10.20, which addresses a court’s 2 duty to prohibit bias in the courtroom, and is not intended to and does not replace or supersede the existing complaint procedures in 3 the offices of the Presiding Judge and the Chief Executive Officer of the Superior Court. 4 5 Dkt. No. 97-2 at 2. 6 Sternberg contends General Rule 3(B) “formally delegates administration of courtroom 7 bias complaints to SCCBA, requiring complaints to be routed through SCCBA officers acting as 8 court liaisons,” and that such “delegation vested SCCBA with gatekeeping authority over access 9 to court-created due-process protections.” Opp. at 10. He also contends that the Official Biased 10 Conduct in the Courtroom Complaint Procedure entrusts the SCCBA to administer “core due- 11 process functions created by the State[,]” such that when Diamond shredded his complaint, she 12 “exercised authority created by court rule to administer a state judicial function and thereby 13 nullified the very due-process mechanism the State established.” Id. 14 Without the benefit of a reply from Defendants addressing these points, the Court declines 15 to dismiss Sternberg’s constitutional claims. Accordingly, Defendants’ motion to dismiss is 16 DENIED as to Sternberg’s constitutional claims. Defendants may renew their arguments in a 17 subsequent motion to dismiss or motion for judgment on the pleadings as appropriate. 18 2. Conspiracy 19 Sternberg’s amended complaint does not specify the legal basis for his conspiracy claim. 20 See generally Am. Compl. Defendants move to dismiss the claim on the grounds that Sternberg’s 21 allegations are insufficient under the applicable elements under California law. Mot. at 15-16. 22 Sternberg defends the claim under the elements applicable to a federal claim for conspiracy to 23 violate constitutional rights. Opp. at 10-11. Again, without the benefit of a reply from Defendants 24 addressing the arguments raised in Sternberg’s opposition, the Court declines to dismiss the 25 conspiracy claim. Accordingly, Defendants’ motion to dismiss the conspiracy claim is DENIED. 26 Defendants may renew their arguments in a subsequent motion to dismiss or motion for judgment 27 on the pleadings as appropriate. 1 3. Declaratory and Injunctive Relief 2 Finally, Sternberg seeks declaratory and injunctive relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2201, which 3 provides: In a case of actual controversy within its jurisdiction . . . any court of 4 the United States, upon the filing of an appropriate pleading, may declare the rights and other legal relations of any interested party 5 seeking such declaration, whether or not further relief is or could be sought. Any such declaration shall have the force and effect of a 6 final judgment or decree and shall be reviewable as such. 7 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a). 8 Defendants move to dismiss Sternberg’s prayer for declaratory and injunctive relief 9 because “[t]he present case is not withing [sic] this court’s jurisdiction for the procedural reasons 10 described above and because Plaintiff has not stated any claim upon which relief can be granted. 11 Thus, this Court is not empowered to grant any of the various declaratory and injunctive remedies 12 requested by Plaintiff.” Mot. at 16. Because the Court DENIES the motion to dismiss as to 13 Sternberg’s substantive claims, it also DENIES the motion as to his prayer for declaratory and 14 injunctive relief. Defendants may renew their arguments in a subsequent motion to dismiss or 15 motion for judgment on the pleadings as appropriate. 16 D. Conclusion 17 For the reasons set forth above, Defendants’ motion to dismiss is DENIED. The Court 18 previously indicated it would set a “deadline for the second amended complaint once all motions 19 to dismiss, including any forthcoming motion to dismiss by defendants who Sternberg has not yet 20 served, are resolved.” Dkt. No. 89. Now that all such motions have been resolved, Sternberg may 21 file a second amended complaint within 30 days of this Order. Other than curing the deficiencies 22 discussed in the dismissal orders issued in this case thus far, the second amended complaint may 23 not plead new substantive allegations, name new defendants, or assert new claims without the 24 defendants’ consent or leave of Court. 25 II. MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT 26 In his motion for partial summary judgment, Sternberg seeks an order that “(1) Sherry 27 Diamond and the SCCBA are persons who acted under color of state law, and (2) that they 1 children, and to due process, when they shredded [his] complaints submitted pursuant to the local 2 court rules.” Id. at 7. The Court DENIES the motion as premature. See Wesco Ins. Co. v. Sentry 3 Ins. Co., No. 25-CV-07584-TSH, 2026 WL 790749, at *5 n.3 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 20, 2026); see also 4 Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 advisory committee note to 2010 amendment (“Although the rule allows a 5 motion for summary judgment to be filed at the commencement of an action, in many cases the 6 motion will be premature until the nonmovant has had time to file a responsive pleading or other 7 pretrial proceedings have been had.”). The Court will set a deadline for summary judgment 8 motions, oppositions, and replies at a later date, if appropriate. 9 III. MOTIONS FOR REFERRAL 10 Sternberg seeks a “referral for an investigation into misconduct and constitutional abuses 11 against Sherry Diamond (aka Sherry the Shredder) and the Santa Clara County Bar Association 12 (SCCBA jointly).” Dkt. No. 99. Sternberg also “seek[s] referral for an investigation into 13 misconduct and constitutional abuses against California Attorney Tristan Aeschleman[,]” asks that 14 the Court order Attorney Raymond Rollan, who represents the California State Bar, “to file a 15 sworn declaration into this case detailing when he became aware of Judge Gordon’s summary 16 judgment order, and to whom he reported that credible evidence of Tristan Aeschleman’s 17 misconduct and when[,]” requests that the Court order Attorney Sharon Nagle, who represents the 18 Judicial Defendants, “to report [Judge Roberta] Hayashi’s conduct together with the evidence 19 cited in this motion to the California Commission on Judicial Performance, to copy California 20 Supreme Court Chief Justice Patricia Guerrero on the correspondence, and to file the 21 correspondence into this case along with a sworn affidavit demonstrating that she has complied 22 with this court’s order[,]” and moves the Court “to report Judge Cindy Hendrickson to the 23 California Commission on Judicial Performance for the ethical violations documented in Exhibit 24 B[,]” who, according to Sternberg, “should be ordered to copy California Supreme Court Chief 25 Justice Patricia Guerrero on the correspondence, and to file the correspondence into this case 26 along with a sworn affidavit demonstrating that she has complied with this court’s order.” Dkt. 27 No. 101 at 2, 5, 6. Having reviewed Sternberg’s motions for referral, the Court declines to refer 1 therefore DENIED. 2 IV. MOTION FOR DISCLOSURE OF POTENTIAL CONFLICTS 3 Lastly, Sternberg seeks disclosure of the undersigned’s potential conflicts of interest. Dkt. 4 No. 102. He asserts:

5 Federal judges must abide by the Code of Conduct for United States Judges, a set of ethical principles and guidelines adopted by the 6 Judicial Conference of the United States. Judges may not hear cases in which they have either personal knowledge of the disputed facts, 7 a personal bias concerning a party to the case, earlier involvement in the case as a lawyer, or a financial interest in any party or subject 8 matter of the case.

9 On 10/31/25 at ECF 82, this court issued an order dismissing the State Bar of California (CABAR) defendants with prejudice. The 10 court cited three cases, one of which was not in this circuit, and two of which were not cited in CABAR’s motion to dismiss. The bizarre 11 order granted blanked Eleventh Amendment immunity to the defendants for “official acts” thus unilaterally voiding 42 USC § 12 1983. Several other such orders have issued for other defendants. In all of these orders, Judge Martínez-Olguín refused to address 13 attorney misconduct as required of her by the Code of Conduct for U.S. Judges. As such, I did some digging. 14 Here is what I’ve found so far: 15 • The attorney who filed CABAR’s Motion to Dismiss (ECF 61) was 16 Anik Banerjee. According to his Linked In profile, he graduated from University of California, Berkeley - School of Law in 2004. 17 Attached as Exhibit A is a true and correct copy of his profile which I downloaded from Linked In on 2/5/26. 18 • Attached as Exhibit B is a true and correct partial copy of Berkeley 19 Law’s Annual Report for Philanthropy, which I download from their website on 2/5/26. Anik Banerjee and Araceli Martínez-Olguín 20 appear as alumni who graduated in 2004.

21 • Prior to taking the federal bench, Judge Martínez-Olguín worked for several institutions that had to do with immigration. It just so 22 happens that on 2/6/25, I did a public records request with CABAR. Attached is Exhibit C is a true and correct copy of my request along 23 with a spreadsheet of grant recipients they produced. I have highlighted groups on the spreadsheet that were given money by 24 CABAR, and that according to the online source detailed below, Judge Martínez-Olguín had a financial relationship with. 25 • Attached as Exhibit D is a true and correct copy of a biography and 26 endorsement of Judge Martínez-Olguín from afj.org, which I downloaded on 2/5/26. I have highlighted the names of 27 organizations listed on the CABAR grant list in Exhibit C. 1 Based on the above, Sternberg moves “the court to disclose in a written order, the exact 2 nature, past and present, of [the undersigned’s] relationship with attorney Anik Banerjee[,]” “the 3 exact nature, past and present, of [the undersigned’s] Judge Martínez-Olguín’s relationship with 4 ALL the organizations listed on the spreadsheet in Exhibit C,” and “the exact nature, past and 5 present, of Judge Martínez-Olguín’s relationship with all other attorneys that have been involved 6 in this case.” Id. at 3. He contends “[t]his information is necessary, so that [he] may determine 7 whether [his] due process rights are being violated[,]” and asserts he has “a right to an impartial 8 judge.” Id. 9 The Court is guided by the ethical rules, including the Code of Conduct for United States 10 Judges, and applicable statutes. Under 28 U.S.C. § 455(a), “[a]ny justice, judge, or magistrate 11 judge of the United States shall disqualify [herself] in any proceeding in which [her] impartiality 12 might reasonably be questioned.” 28 U.S.C. § 455(a). Under Section 455(b), a judge shall also 13 disqualify herself where:

14 (1) Where [s]he has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party, or personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts 15 concerning the proceeding; (2) Where in private practice [s]he served as lawyer in the 16 matter in controversy, or a lawyer with whom he previously practiced law served during such association as a lawyer concerning 17 the matter, or the judge or such lawyer has been a material witness concerning it; 18 (3) Where [s]he has served in governmental employment and in such capacity participated as counsel, adviser or material witness 19 concerning the proceeding or expressed an opinion concerning the merits of the particular case in controversy; 20 (4) [Sh]e knows that [s]he, individually or as a fiduciary, or h[er] spouse or minor child residing in his household, has a financial 21 interest in the subject matter in controversy or in a party to the proceeding, or any other interest that could be substantially affected 22 by the outcome of the proceeding; (5) [Sh]e or h[er] spouse, or a person within the third degree 23 of relationship to either of them, or the spouse of such a person: (i) Is a party to the proceeding, or an officer, director, or 24 trustee of a party; (ii) Is acting as a lawyer in the proceeding; 25 (iii) Is known by the judge to have an interest that could be substantially affected by the outcome of the proceeding; 26 (iv) Is to the judge’s knowledge likely to be a material witness in the proceeding. 27 1 Having reviewed Sternberg’s motion and the exhibits thereto, the undersigned does not 2 have any relevant information to share or to disclose pursuant to Section 455. “The only public 3 disclosure contemplated by the statute is a voluntary one, in the inapposite context of a possible 4 waiver by a party. . . . Consequently, a litigant has no statutory right to demand any disclosures or 5 discovery from a judge under 28 U.S.C. § 455[.]” See Sanai v. Kozinski, No. 19-CV-08162-YGR 6 (JD), 2021 WL 2273982, at *2 (N.D. Cal. May 24, 2021) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 455(e)); see also 28 7 U.S.C. § 455(e) (“No justice, judge, or magistrate judge shall accept from the parties to the 8 proceeding a waiver of any ground for disqualification enumerated in subsection (b). Where the 9 ground for disqualification arises only under subsection (a), waiver may be accepted provided it is 10 preceded by a full disclosure on the record of the basis for disqualification.”). 11 Nor does the undersigned perceive any basis for recusal under Section 455(a) or 455(b). 12 The pertinent test under Section 455(a) and 455(b)(1) is “whether a reasonable person with 13 knowledge of all the facts would conclude that the judge’s impartiality might reasonably be 14 questioned.” National Abortion Federation v. Center for Medical Progress, 257 F. Supp. 3d 15 1084, 1089 (N.D. Cal. 2017) (quoting United States v. Holland, 519 F.3d 909, 913-14 (9th Cir. 16 2008)). “The reasonable person for this inquiry is not someone who is hypersensitive or unduly 17 suspicious, but rather is a well-informed, thoughtful observer[,]” and “a well-informed, thoughtful 18 observer would be aware that recusal is not required based on the mere existence of personal or 19 working relationships among colleagues, or even friendships.” Sanai, 2021 WL 2273982, at *3 20 (internal quotations and citation omitted). That the undersigned attended the same law school at 21 the same time as an attorney of record or previously worked for organizations that received grants 22 from a party in this litigation is not grounds for recusal. See Onwuka v. Lynch, No. 8:22-CV- 23 00287-FWS-JC, 2022 WL 16859967, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 8, 2022) (“General allegations 24 regarding the court’s former employment or professional relationships are insufficient to warrant 25 recusal.”). 26 /// 27 /// ] Accordingly, Sternberg’s motion for disclosure is DENIED. 2 IT IS SO ORDERED. 3 Dated: April 8, 2026 4 col: □

ARACELI MARTINEZ-OLGUIN 6 United States District Judge 7 8 9 10 1] a 12 13

15 16

Z 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28