Michael Brumfield v. Commonwealth of Virginia

• Court: Court of Appeals of Virginia
• Decided: November 25, 2025
• Docket: 0079253
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA

Present: Judges Ortiz, Causey and Callins UNPUBLISHED

Argued by videoconference

MICHAEL BRUMFIELD MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY v. Record No. 0079-25-3 JUDGE DANIEL E. ORTIZ NOVEMBER 25, 2025 COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF CAMPBELL COUNTY John T. Cook, Judge

Charles E. Haden for appellant.

Timothy M. Davidson, Assistant Attorney General (Jason S. Miyares, Attorney General; Theophani K. Stamos, Deputy Attorney General; Susan Foster Barr, Senior Assistant Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.

Michael Brumfield appeals the trial court’s judgment that he remains a sexually violent

predator under Code § 37.2-910.1 On appeal, Brumfield argues that the trial court erred in relying

solely on his personality disorder diagnosis to find that he is “likely to engage in sexually violent

acts” under Code § 37.2-900. Additionally, Brumfield contends that his lack of new sexually

violent offenses since his predicate offense rebuts the experts’ opinions that he would have

difficulty controlling his predatory behavior. Finding no error, we affirm.

* This opinion is not designated for publication. See Code § 17.1-413(A). 1 The trial court entered a consent order releasing Brumfield for outpatient treatment under the terms of a conditional release plan. Brumfield does not challenge this aspect of the trial court’s judgment. BACKGROUND2

In 2002, when Brumfield was 17 years old, he pleaded guilty to misdemeanor sexual

battery of a 12-year-old boy. Then, in 2007, the trial court convicted Brumfield of forcible

sodomy after he inserted his penis into his two-year-old nephew’s mouth. The trial court

sentenced him to ten years’ incarceration with six years suspended. Brumfield explained that he

was babysitting his niece and nephew and “exploded” when his nephew would not listen to him.

He wanted to humiliate and “punish [his nephew] in a way [his nephew] would never forget.”

Brumfield knew it was “sadistic,” but justified it to himself because he had been similarly

punished by his father and other authority figures in his life. Brumfield admitted that he had “no

business being alone with children because [he could] be an asshole” and could “objectify

anyone [into being a sex object].”

As Brumfield neared the completion of his incarceration, the Commonwealth petitioned

the trial court to involuntarily commit him under the Civil Commitment of Sexually Violent

Predators Act. See Code §§ 37.2-900 to -921. The trial court found that Brumfield was a

sexually violent predator; he was released under a conditional release plan in 2011. In June

2014, Brumfield’s probation officer reported that he failed “to comply with probation

instructions and treatment objectives related to viewing pornographic material.” Brumfield

“admitt[ed] to being addicted to pornography” and lied to his probation officer about his

pornography use. After a hearing, the trial court found that Brumfield violated the conditions of

his release, revoked his conditional release, and committed him to the custody of the Department

of Behavioral Health and Developmental Services (the Department) for inpatient treatment.

2 The record in this case was partially sealed. “To the extent that this opinion discusses facts found in sealed documents in the record, we unseal only those facts.” Brown v. Va. State Bar ex rel. Sixth Dist. Comm., 302 Va. 234, 240 n.2 (2023). -2- At his annual review, Brumfield stipulated that he remained a sexually violent predator,

and in March 2017, the trial court entered a consent order releasing Brumfield for outpatient

treatment under the terms of a conditional release plan. Within three months, Brumfield violated

the conditions of his release. He engaged in “sexual acts with a massage therapist,” placed an

advertisement for “an ‘emotional companion’” in a local newspaper, removed his GPS ankle

monitor, and absconded from Virginia. Brumfield stipulated that he violated the conditions of

his release and should be recommitted to the Department for inpatient treatment. Accordingly,

the trial court entered a consent order recommitting him to the Department in January 2018.

At Brumfield’s next annual review, he stipulated that he remained a sexually violent

predator, and in March 2020, the trial court entered a consent order releasing him for outpatient

treatment under the terms of a conditional release plan. In April 2021, Brumfield’s probation

officer reported that he had tested positive for morphine. Brumfield stipulated that he violated

the conditions of his release by testing positive for the drug and lying about his drug use to his

probation officer. That summer, the trial court entered a consent order finding that Brumfield

remained suitable for conditional release.

In September 2022, Brumfield’s probation officer again reported to the trial court that

Brumfield had violated the conditions of his release. Brumfield stipulated that he “creat[ed] a

YouTube channel and engag[ed] in on-line gaming without permission,” lied about accessing the

internet to his probation officer, “possess[ed] unauthorized electronic devices,” “ha[d] sexual

contact with unreported partners,” and “possess[ed] on his electronic devices sexually explicit

images and videos of himself engaging in sexual relations with unidentified females.” Brumfield

agreed that this conduct violated the conditions of his release and that he was no longer suitable

for conditional release. Accordingly, in November 2022, the trial court entered a consent order

revoking his conditional release and recommitting him to the Department for inpatient treatment.

-3- After a review hearing in 2023, the trial court determined that Brumfield remained a sexually

violent predator and was not eligible for conditional release.

Before the recent review hearing, Drs. William T. KcKenna and Ilona Gravers, both

licensed clinical psychologists, evaluated Brumfield and concluded that he remained a sexually

violent predator. Both doctors diagnosed Brumfield with Other Specified Personality Disorder,

with antisocial traits,3 and two substance abuse disorders that are in remission. Dr. McKenna

explained that Brumfield’s personality disorder “manifested in deficits in interpersonal functioning,

impulse control and emotional self-regulation,” noting Brumfield’s life-long history of criminal

behavior and rule breaking, his evident impulsiveness and “difficulty managing sexual impulses,”

and that Brumfield “historically lacked remorse for his behavior and operated in a self-serving

manner.” Dr. McKenna was concerned about Brumfield’s “attract[ion] to be[ing] powerful over

others,” but did not believe he required another year of inpatient treatment, and this “risk” could be

managed in an outpatient setting. Dr. Gravers made similar observations, opined that Brumfield’s

“mental abnormalities contribute to his risk to commit sexual offenses,” and concluded he was at a

“moderate” risk of reoffending. Dr. Gravers also observed that Brumfield struggled with regulating

his sexual impulses and “has had distorted thinking that allowed him to offend and violate his

conditions,” both of which would need to continue to be addressed in the community.

At the review hearing, Dr. McKenna reiterated his opinion that Brumfield was a sexually

violent predator and acknowledged Brumfield’s positive behavior while committed. Nonetheless,

Dr. McKenna explained that a personality disorder is “not always active” and a person may “present

differently” when situations demand it, but the disorder is “always there.” Brumfield’s behavior

while committed was but “one piece of th[e] very complex puzzle” of whether he remained a

sexually violent predator.

3 Dr. McKenna also classified Brumfield’s disorder as exhibiting narcissistic traits. -4- After argument from counsel, the trial court found that Brumfield remained a sexually

violent predator. The court found that Drs. McKenna and Gravers “considered all th[e] data and

[gave] reasonable opinions based on that data,” specifically that Brumfield had “a personality

disorder and . . . has difficulty controlling the predatory behavior,” “which makes him likely to

engage in acts in the community.” The trial court later entered a consent order releasing Brumfield

for outpatient treatment under the terms of a conditional release plan. Brumfield appeals,

challenging the finding that he remains a sexually violent predator.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

When a respondent appeals a trial court’s judgment that he is a sexually violent predator,

this Court “view[s] the facts in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth.” Shivaee v.

Commonwealth, 270 Va. 112, 127 (2005). “We also accord the Commonwealth the benefit of all

inferences fairly deducible from the evidence.” Id. We “will not reverse the judgment of the trial

court unless it is plainly wrong or without evidence to support it.” Commonwealth v. Squire, 278

Va. 746, 749 (2009).

ANALYSIS

On appeal, Brumfield argues that the trial court improperly weighed the evidence to

conclude that he remains a sexually violent predator. First, Brumfield contends the trial court

improperly relied only on his personality disorder diagnosis to find that he is “likely to engage in

sexually violent acts.” Code § 37.2-900. Second, Brumfield asserts that his lack of criminal history

since the predicate offense in 2007 refutes any finding that he “finds it difficult to control his

predatory behavior.” We disagree.

-5- A “[s]exually violent predator” is “any person who (i) has been convicted of a sexually

violent offense4 . . . ; and (ii) because of a mental abnormality or personality disorder, finds it

difficult to control his predatory behavior, which makes him likely to engage in sexually violent

acts.” Code § 37.2-900. At a review hearing, the Commonwealth must prove “by clear and

convincing evidence that the respondent remains a sexually violent predator.” Code § 37.2-910(C).

“[T]he mere use of the phrase mental abnormality or personality disorder does not automatically

invoke a conclusion that a respondent is likely to engage in sexually violent acts.” Squire, 278 Va.

at 752. Rather, the court must find that “particular elements of the respondent's mental disorders . . .

made the respondent likely to engage in sexually violent acts.” Id.

When determining whether a respondent meets the criteria for classification as a sexually

violent predator, we reject a formulaic approach and instead look at whether the record as a whole

“supports such a determination by the trier of fact.” DeMille v. Commonwealth, 283 Va. 316, 321

(2012) (whether a respondent remains “a sexually violent predator likely to engage in sexually

violent acts is to be based on the totality of the record, including but not limited to expert

testimony”); Squire, 278 Va. at 751 (holding that the expert opinion, while persuasive, is not

dispositive to establish that respondent is likely to commit violent sexual acts). Relevant factors

include expert reports and testimony as well as the respondent’s behavioral history. See Squire, 278

Va. at 751; Commonwealth v. Miller, 273 Va. 540, 552 (2007).

A holistic review of the record supports the trial court’s finding that Brumfield remains a

sexually violent predator. First, both Dr. McKenna and Dr. Gravers diagnosed Brumfield with

“Other Specified Personality Disorder, with antisocial traits,” a diagnosis that “meets § 37.2-900’s

definition of an acquired personality disorder.” Dr. McKenna explained that individuals with this

4 It is uncontested that Brumfield’s forcible sodomy conviction constitutes a “sexually violent offense” under Code § 37.2-900. -6- diagnosis “frequently lack empathy, and tend to be callous, cynical, and contemptuous of the

feelings, rights and sufferings of others.” Brumfield’s diagnosis manifests in “deficits in

interpersonal functioning, impulse control, and emotional self-regulation.” As Dr. McKenna

explained, that Brumfield did not present obvious symptoms of this disorder and exhibited good

behavior during his most recent commitment does not mean he no longer suffers from the disorder.

Rather, Brumfield has a demonstrated history of progressing when committed for treatment and

subsequently relapsing on conditional release.

While Brumfield’s diagnosis alone is not dispositive as to whether he remains a sexually

violent predator, the experts’ reports demonstrate that Brumfield’s mental disorder makes him likely

to re-engage in sexually violent acts. Both experts noted that Brumfield’s diagnosis results in “risk-

taking” behavior and leads to “difficulty managing sexual impulses.” Dr. Gravers explained that

Brumfield has a “history of law and rules violation” and “has struggled with sexual self-control

throughout his life.” That Brumfield has not been charged with or convicted of new offenses is not

dispositive. Indeed, as Dr. McKenna wrote in her risk assessment, Brumfield’s “antisocial

cognitions” or “attitudes, beliefs, justifications, or excuses that can facilitate sexual offending” “both

historically and currently” remain a risk. The trial court relied on the experts’ “reasonable opinions

based on [the historical] data” to conclude that Brumfield’s personality disorder makes him likely to

engage in sexually violent acts. Such determination is supported by the record and entitled to

deference on appeal. Squire, 278 Va. at 749-51; Commonwealth v. Jackson, 276 Va. 184, 197

(2008) (We “will not substitute [our] judgment on the credibility of a witness for that of the circuit

court.”). Thus, the trial court did not err by finding that Brumfield’s personality disorder “makes

him likely to engage in sexually violent acts.” Code § 37.2-900.

Second, the record contains ample evidence that Brumfield “finds it difficult to control his

predatory behavior.” Id. On conditional release, Brumfield repeatedly failed to adhere to

-7- restrictions related to sexual conduct. For example, he “engaged in inappropriate sexual behavior of

sexual contact with his massage therapist[,] . . . considered paying a prostitute for sex when

stressed,” and “made videos engaging in sexual contact with multiple partners.” Additionally,

probation officers have found unauthorized electronic devices in Brumfield’s home, and monitoring

software revealed that he had taken “pornographic and sexually explicit images” with several

partners despite “telling the supervising officer he had no sexual partners.” While Brumfield

correctly notes that he has not been charged with a subsequent sexually violent offense, he has a

history of violating his conditional release by engaging in prohibited sexual conduct. Thus, the trial

court did not err finding that Brumfield “finds it difficult to control his predatory behavior.”

When considering whether a respondent remains a sexually violent predator the trial court

must consider the record as a whole. DeMille, 283 Va. at 318. Accordingly, we will not disturb the

trial court’s holding when, as is the case here, the respondent’s past behavior on conditional release,

psychological evaluations, and expert testimony demonstrate that he meets the definition of sexually

violent predator under Code § 37.2-900.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the trial court’s judgment is affirmed.

Affirmed.

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