Michael Boyd v. Gmac Mortgage LLC

584 F. App'x 656

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: August 22, 2014
• Docket: 12-17434
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

MEMORANDUM ***

Michael E. Boyd appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing his action alleging various claims concerning two mortgage loan agreements. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. Cervantes v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 656 F.3d 1034, 1040 (9th Cir.2011). We may affirm on any ground supported by the record, Thompson v. Paul, 547 F.3d 1055, 1058-59 (9th Cir.2008), and we affirm.

The district court properly dismissed Boyd’s quiet title claim because Boyd stopped making payments on his loans, was not released of his obligations under the loans, and Boyd’s deeds of trust authorized defendant to initiate foreclosures. See Cal. Civ.Code § 2924(a)(1); see also Gomes v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 192 Cal.App.4th 1149, 121 Cal.Rptr.3d 819, 823-24 (2011) (California law does not “provide for a judicial action to determine whether the person initiating the foreclosure process is indeed authorized”).

The district court properly dismissed Boyd’s claims related to two contracts as time-barred because the claims accrued in December 2006 and January 2007 when the contracts were formed, and Boyd did not file his original complaint until October 2011. See Cal.Civ.Proc.Code § 337 (setting forth four year limitations period).

The district court properly dismissed Boyd’s claim for violation of California’s Unfair Competition Law (“UCL”), Cal. Bus. & Prof.Code § 17200, because Boyd failed to allege sufficient facts to state a plausible UCL claim on the basis of a living trust agreement between Boyd and his spouse. See E.E.O.C. v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279, 294, 122 S.Ct. 754, 151 L.Ed.2d 755 (2002) (“It goes without saying that a contract cannot bind a nonparty.”).

Dismissal of Boyd’s due process claims was proper because nonjudicial foreclosure proceedings do not violate due process. See Apao v. Bank of N.Y., 324 F.3d 1091, 1094-95 (9th Cir.2003) (nonjudicial foreclosure was not state action and therefore did not implicate due process); Garfinkle v. Superior Court, 21 Cal.3d 268, 146 Cal.Rptr. 208, 578 P.2d 925, 934 (1978) (“[NJonjudicial foreclosure of a deed of trust constitutes private action authorized by contract and does not come within the scope of the California due process clause.”).

Because Boyd did not file a motion pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 7(b) with the lis pendens filed with his complaint, the district court did not err in taking no action on Boyd’s lis pendens, and even assuming a proper motion had been filed, there was no pending cause of action which would affect title to specific real property. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 7(b) (“A request for a court order must be made by motion.”); see also Cal.Civ.Proc.Code § 405.4 (defining “real property claim”); Cal.Civ.Proc.Code § 405.21 (a pro se litigant must seek court approval in order to record a lis pendens); Kirkeby v. Superior Court, 33 Cal.4th 642, 15 Cal.Rptr.3d 805, 93 P.3d 395, 398-99 (2004) (courts must assess whether the pleading alleges a real property claim).

Boyd’s appeal of the denial of his motions for injunctive relief is moot. See Mt. Graham Red Squirrel v. Madigan, 954 F.2d 1441, 1450 (9th Cir.1992) (when un derlying claims have been decided, the reversal of a denial of preliminary relief would have no practical consequences, and the issue is therefore moot).

The district court properly denied both Boyd’s motion for procedural relief and his attempt to remove this action to the bankruptcy court, and appropriately considered his allegations and applied the correct standard for dismissal under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6).

We do not consider arguments raised for the first time on appeal, including Boyd’s arguments concerning a First Amendment right to a court of one’s choosing. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n. 2 (9th Cir.2009) (per curiam).

AFFIRMED.

*** This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.