IN THE SUPREME COURT OF MISSISSIPPI
NO. 2025-KA-00022-SCT
MICHAEL ANTHONY MOODY a/k/a MICHAEL MOODY
v.
STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 12/19/2024 TRIAL JUDGE: HON. ROBERT B. HELFRICH TRIAL COURT ATTORNEYS: KIMBERLY WOODALL MORRISON BRYAN P. BUCKLEY JOHN ANTHONY PIAZZA COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED: PERRY COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: OFFICE OF STATE PUBLIC DEFENDER BY: AMBER LAUREN STEWART ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE: OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL BY: DANIELLE LOVE BURKS DISTRICT ATTORNEY: LIN CARTER NATURE OF THE CASE: CRIMINAL - FELONY DISPOSITION: AFFIRMED - 11/06/2025 MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:
BEFORE KING, P.J., MAXWELL AND CHAMBERLIN, JJ.
MAXWELL, JUSTICE, FOR THE COURT:
¶1. A jury convicted Michael Moody for possessing methamphetamine. The drug seizure
stemmed from Moody’s late-night phone call to police, claiming he was being chased.
Arriving officers found him pounding on someone’s front door. Moody appeared erratic.
And a sheriff’s deputy suspected he was high on drugs. Moody gave permission to search
what he later described as “his” vehicle. Inside, a deputy found a sunglasses case containing a glass pipe and methamphetamine. On appeal, Moody argues insufficient evidence supports
the jury’s finding he constructively possessed the methamphetamine.
¶2. But officers found the methamphetamine inside Moody’s car. And while in the
backseat of the patrol car on his way to jail, Moody remarked that he “should have gotten rid
of that shit” before calling the cops. From this, a rational juror could certainly find Moody
knowingly possessed the methamphetamine. Thus, the evidence was sufficient, and we
affirm.
Facts
¶3. On October 24, 2021, around 10:41 p.m., Perry County Sheriff’s Deputy Darryl Dye
responded to a call from outside a residence in Beaumont, Mississippi. The
caller—Moody—had first called while on Highway 98 and had placed a second call when
he reached the residence. Fearing someone was chasing him, Moody beat on the door to
wake the homeowner. Law enforcement found no evidence Moody was being chased.
¶4. When Deputy Dye arrived on the scene, a Beaumont police officer had already
escorted Moody away from the door. Moody kept repeating to himself that he was “trying
to do the right thing.” And Deputy Dye noticed Moody was acting erratically, possibly on
drugs. When Moody did not respond to initial questions, Deputy Dye asked if Moody was
under the influence of alcohol or controlled substances. Moody said he had been drinking.
He also gave Deputy Dye permission to search his car.
¶5. Inside the vehicle, Deputy Dye saw a black sunglasses case on the driver-side
2 dashboard. He opened the case and found a glass pipe with brown residue and a plastic bag
containing a crystal substance. A field test revealed the substance was methamphetamine.
After the test, Deputy Dye read Moody his Miranda1 rights and placed Moody in custody.
¶6. As the deputy led Moody to his patrol vehicle, Moody asked the homeowner if he
could leave “his” vehicle there. And en route to the Perry County jail, Moody commented
without prompt, “I should have gotten rid of that shit before I called y’all.”
¶7. Crime lab testing later confirmed the substance was 0.497 grams of
methamphetamine. A grand jury indicted Moody for possession of more than one-tenth gram
but less than two grams of methamphetamine, a Schedule II controlled substance.
¶8. After a short trial, the jury returned a guilty verdict for possession of
methamphetamine. The court sentenced Moody to three years in the Mississippi Department
of Corrections’ custody. Moody timely appealed.
Discussion
¶9. Moody raises two issues on appeal—the evidence was insufficient to support his
possession-of-methamphetamine conviction, and the verdict was against the weight of the
evidence. From the State’s evidence, a reasonable juror could conclude Moody had
dominion and control of “his” vehicle. And he also had dominion and control of the
methamphetamine—that he verbally kicked himself for not moving—found inside his car.
So sufficient evidence supported his conviction, and the verdict was not against the weight
1 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966).
3 of the evidence.
I. Sufficiency of the Evidence
¶10. “When testing the sufficiency of evidence, this Court views the evidence in the light
most favorable to the State.” Williams v. State, 305 So. 3d 1122, 1129 (Miss. 2020) (citing
Martin v. State, 214 So. 3d 217, 222 (Miss. 2017)). “We determine if any rational juror
could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. (citing
Martin, 214 So. 3d at 222). “The State receives the benefit of all favorable inferences
reasonably drawn from the evidence.” Id. (citing Hughes v. State, 983 So. 2d 270, 276
(Miss. 2008)).
¶11. Moody argues insufficient evidence supports the jury’s finding he possessed the
methamphetamine. He correctly notes the State had to prove constructive possession because
the deputy did not find the methamphetamine on his person.2 And he argues the State did not
sufficiently tie him to the vehicle. Alternatively, he suggests even if he did possess the
vehicle, the sunglasses case concealed the identity of the methamphetamine.3 But viewing
the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, the evidence supports the jury’s
2 A conviction for possession of a controlled substance may be based on either actual or constructive possession. Sills v. State, 359 So. 3d 603, 610 (Miss. 2023) (quoting Terry v. State, 324 So. 3d 753, 755 (Miss. 2021)). 3 Moody briefly argues that the lack of body-camera footage means this Court should reverse his conviction. But a lack of physical evidence “does not negate a conviction where there is testimonial evidence.” Body v. State, 318 So. 3d 1104, 1110 (Miss. 2021) (internal quotation mark omitted) (quoting Lenoir v. State, 224 So. 3d 85, 94 (Miss. 2017)). So this argument lacks merit.
4 conclusion that Moody constructively possessed the drugs.
¶12. Exerting control over the location where a controlled substance is found supports a
constructive-possession finding when the defendant knew or should have known the
substance was present. Dixon v. State, 953 So. 2d 1108, 1114 (Miss. 2007) (citing Blissett
v. State, 754 So. 2d 1242, 1244 (Miss. 2000)). Likewise, “[c]onstructive possession may be
shown by establishing the drug involved was subject to [the defendant’s] dominion or
control.” Terry, 324 So. 3d at 755-56 (second alteration in original) (quoting Haynes v.
State, 250 So. 3d 1241, 1244-45 (Miss. 2018)).
¶13. Viewed in the light most favorable to the State, sufficient evidence showed Moody
exercised dominion and control over the car. First, a rational juror could have found Moody
recently drove the vehicle because he first called police from the highway. Second, Moody
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF MISSISSIPPI
NO. 2025-KA-00022-SCT
MICHAEL ANTHONY MOODY a/k/a MICHAEL MOODY
v.
STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 12/19/2024 TRIAL JUDGE: HON. ROBERT B. HELFRICH TRIAL COURT ATTORNEYS: KIMBERLY WOODALL MORRISON BRYAN P. BUCKLEY JOHN ANTHONY PIAZZA COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED: PERRY COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: OFFICE OF STATE PUBLIC DEFENDER BY: AMBER LAUREN STEWART ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE: OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL BY: DANIELLE LOVE BURKS DISTRICT ATTORNEY: LIN CARTER NATURE OF THE CASE: CRIMINAL - FELONY DISPOSITION: AFFIRMED - 11/06/2025 MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:
BEFORE KING, P.J., MAXWELL AND CHAMBERLIN, JJ.
MAXWELL, JUSTICE, FOR THE COURT:
¶1. A jury convicted Michael Moody for possessing methamphetamine. The drug seizure
stemmed from Moody’s late-night phone call to police, claiming he was being chased.
Arriving officers found him pounding on someone’s front door. Moody appeared erratic.
And a sheriff’s deputy suspected he was high on drugs. Moody gave permission to search
what he later described as “his” vehicle. Inside, a deputy found a sunglasses case containing a glass pipe and methamphetamine. On appeal, Moody argues insufficient evidence supports
the jury’s finding he constructively possessed the methamphetamine.
¶2. But officers found the methamphetamine inside Moody’s car. And while in the
backseat of the patrol car on his way to jail, Moody remarked that he “should have gotten rid
of that shit” before calling the cops. From this, a rational juror could certainly find Moody
knowingly possessed the methamphetamine. Thus, the evidence was sufficient, and we
affirm.
Facts
¶3. On October 24, 2021, around 10:41 p.m., Perry County Sheriff’s Deputy Darryl Dye
responded to a call from outside a residence in Beaumont, Mississippi. The
caller—Moody—had first called while on Highway 98 and had placed a second call when
he reached the residence. Fearing someone was chasing him, Moody beat on the door to
wake the homeowner. Law enforcement found no evidence Moody was being chased.
¶4. When Deputy Dye arrived on the scene, a Beaumont police officer had already
escorted Moody away from the door. Moody kept repeating to himself that he was “trying
to do the right thing.” And Deputy Dye noticed Moody was acting erratically, possibly on
drugs. When Moody did not respond to initial questions, Deputy Dye asked if Moody was
under the influence of alcohol or controlled substances. Moody said he had been drinking.
He also gave Deputy Dye permission to search his car.
¶5. Inside the vehicle, Deputy Dye saw a black sunglasses case on the driver-side
2 dashboard. He opened the case and found a glass pipe with brown residue and a plastic bag
containing a crystal substance. A field test revealed the substance was methamphetamine.
After the test, Deputy Dye read Moody his Miranda1 rights and placed Moody in custody.
¶6. As the deputy led Moody to his patrol vehicle, Moody asked the homeowner if he
could leave “his” vehicle there. And en route to the Perry County jail, Moody commented
without prompt, “I should have gotten rid of that shit before I called y’all.”
¶7. Crime lab testing later confirmed the substance was 0.497 grams of
methamphetamine. A grand jury indicted Moody for possession of more than one-tenth gram
but less than two grams of methamphetamine, a Schedule II controlled substance.
¶8. After a short trial, the jury returned a guilty verdict for possession of
methamphetamine. The court sentenced Moody to three years in the Mississippi Department
of Corrections’ custody. Moody timely appealed.
Discussion
¶9. Moody raises two issues on appeal—the evidence was insufficient to support his
possession-of-methamphetamine conviction, and the verdict was against the weight of the
evidence. From the State’s evidence, a reasonable juror could conclude Moody had
dominion and control of “his” vehicle. And he also had dominion and control of the
methamphetamine—that he verbally kicked himself for not moving—found inside his car.
So sufficient evidence supported his conviction, and the verdict was not against the weight
1 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966).
3 of the evidence.
I. Sufficiency of the Evidence
¶10. “When testing the sufficiency of evidence, this Court views the evidence in the light
most favorable to the State.” Williams v. State, 305 So. 3d 1122, 1129 (Miss. 2020) (citing
Martin v. State, 214 So. 3d 217, 222 (Miss. 2017)). “We determine if any rational juror
could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. (citing
Martin, 214 So. 3d at 222). “The State receives the benefit of all favorable inferences
reasonably drawn from the evidence.” Id. (citing Hughes v. State, 983 So. 2d 270, 276
(Miss. 2008)).
¶11. Moody argues insufficient evidence supports the jury’s finding he possessed the
methamphetamine. He correctly notes the State had to prove constructive possession because
the deputy did not find the methamphetamine on his person.2 And he argues the State did not
sufficiently tie him to the vehicle. Alternatively, he suggests even if he did possess the
vehicle, the sunglasses case concealed the identity of the methamphetamine.3 But viewing
the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, the evidence supports the jury’s
2 A conviction for possession of a controlled substance may be based on either actual or constructive possession. Sills v. State, 359 So. 3d 603, 610 (Miss. 2023) (quoting Terry v. State, 324 So. 3d 753, 755 (Miss. 2021)). 3 Moody briefly argues that the lack of body-camera footage means this Court should reverse his conviction. But a lack of physical evidence “does not negate a conviction where there is testimonial evidence.” Body v. State, 318 So. 3d 1104, 1110 (Miss. 2021) (internal quotation mark omitted) (quoting Lenoir v. State, 224 So. 3d 85, 94 (Miss. 2017)). So this argument lacks merit.
4 conclusion that Moody constructively possessed the drugs.
¶12. Exerting control over the location where a controlled substance is found supports a
constructive-possession finding when the defendant knew or should have known the
substance was present. Dixon v. State, 953 So. 2d 1108, 1114 (Miss. 2007) (citing Blissett
v. State, 754 So. 2d 1242, 1244 (Miss. 2000)). Likewise, “[c]onstructive possession may be
shown by establishing the drug involved was subject to [the defendant’s] dominion or
control.” Terry, 324 So. 3d at 755-56 (second alteration in original) (quoting Haynes v.
State, 250 So. 3d 1241, 1244-45 (Miss. 2018)).
¶13. Viewed in the light most favorable to the State, sufficient evidence showed Moody
exercised dominion and control over the car. First, a rational juror could have found Moody
recently drove the vehicle because he first called police from the highway. Second, Moody
consented to Deputy Dye’s search of the car. And third, when the deputy arrested him,
Moody asked the homeowner if he could leave “his” car there. So the State proved Moody
had control over what he described as “his” car.
¶14. The State also presented sufficient evidence Moody knew or should have known about
the methamphetamine. Moody himself commented he “should have gotten rid of that shit
before [he] called [law enforcement].” And a reasonable juror could find Moody was
referring to the methamphetamine in his car—methamphetamine that he controlled and
should have ditched before officers arrived. This evidence supports the jury’s finding he
possessed the methamphetamine.
5 ¶15. Still, Moody likens his case to Ferrell v. State, arguing even if he controlled the
vehicle, the sunglasses case obscured the methamphetamine from his view. Ferrell v. State,
649 So. 2d 831 (Miss. 1995). According to Moody, he could not have constructively
possessed something hidden from view. But Moody’s reliance on Ferrell is misplaced.
¶16. In Ferrell, officers stopped the defendant for speeding and arrested him for driving
with a suspended license. 649 So. 2d at 832. When Ferrell asked an officer to retrieve his
car keys, the officer noticed a matchbox on the passenger seat. Id. The officer searched the
matchbox to find only matches. Id. But he noticed a yellow pill under the matchbox. Id.
Continuing his search, the officer found a second matchbox containing crack cocaine. Id.
at 832-33. On appeal from Ferrell’s possession conviction, this Court held that no
incriminating circumstances—other than mere proximity—supported a finding of
constructive possession.4 Id. at 835. Ferrell “was merely seated in the car next to what by
all accounts appeared to be an ordinary matchbox.” Id.
¶17. But unlike Ferrell, here, Moody was not merely in proximity to drugs. Moody
appeared erratic and high on narcotics. And when arrested, Moody griped about not getting
rid of his drugs before officers arrived. So Ferrell has no application, particularly in light
of Moody’s comment evidencing his knowledge of the drugs.
¶18. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, a reasonable juror could
have found Moody constructively possessed the methamphetamine. Thus, sufficient
4 This Court also held the officer’s search constitutionally invalid. Id. at 833-34.
6 evidence supports his conviction.
II. Weight of the Evidence
¶19. Next, Moody repackages his sufficiency challenge as an attack on the weight of the
evidence supporting the jury’s guilty verdict.
¶20. “When reviewing challenges to the weight of the evidence, this Court views the
evidence ‘in the light most favorable to the verdict[.]’” Williams v. State, 285 So. 3d 156,
160 (Miss. 2019) (alteration in original) (quoting Little v. State, 233 So. 3d 288, 292 (Miss.
2017)). “This Court will only disturb a verdict ‘. . . when it is so contrary to the
overwhelming weight of the evidence that to allow it to stand would sanction an
unconscionable injustice.’” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Little, 233 So. 3d at 292).
¶21. But for the same reasons the evidence supported his conviction, when viewed in the
light most favorable to the verdict, Moody’s conviction does not sanction an unconscionable
injustice.
Conclusion
¶22. Moody exercised dominion and control over “his” vehicle knowing there was
methamphetamine in it. And the jury’s verdict did not result in an unconscionable injustice,
so the verdict was not against the weight of the evidence. We affirm Moody’s conviction and
sentence.
¶23. AFFIRMED.
RANDOLPH, C.J., KING AND COLEMAN, P.JJ., CHAMBERLIN, ISHEE, GRIFFIS, SULLIVAN AND BRANNING, JJ., CONCUR.