Opinion issued August 4, 2016
In The
Court of Appeals For The
First District of Texas ———————————— NO. 01-15-00560-CR ——————————— MICHAEL ANTHONY DAVILA, Appellant V. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from the 351st District Court Harris County, Texas Trial Court Case No. 1359876
MEMORANDUM OPINION
The trial court found appellant, Michael Anthony Davila, guilty of the
first-degree felony offense of aggravated assault on a household member1 and
assessed his punishment at twelve years in prison. Appellant appeals on two issues:
1 TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.02(a), (b)(1) (West 2011); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 71.005 (West 2014). (1) the evidence is insufficient to prove that the injuries suffered by the complainant
constituted serious bodily injury, and (2) the evidence is insufficient to prove that
the unknown object was a deadly weapon. We affirm the trial court’s judgment.
Background
Wegin Ng testified that his eighteen-year old grandson, appellant, lived with
him and his wife, Mary Ann. Early one morning, Ng awoke to appellant stabbing
him in his abdomen and chest. Ng pushed appellant away and appellant fled.
According to Ng, he received six stab wounds during the attack, one of which he
described as being “pretty deep.” Ng also testified that his stab wounds bled
profusely and caused him significant pain. Although Ng could not see what appellant
had used to stab him with, Ng told hospital personnel that appellant had used a knife.
One of the first officers on the scene testified that Ng was bleeding “pretty
bad” when he arrived at Ng’s house. Ng’s medical records, which were admitted
into evidence at trial, indicate that emergency medical personal suspected that Ng
had pericardial fluid leaking into his body as a result of the stabbing. Upon his arrival
at the hospital, Ng was immediately sent in for exploratory surgery to check for any
leaks or other internal damage. During the surgery, the doctors performed a
laparotomy. One of the stab wounds required the doctors to move Ng’s spleen, and
in the process, Ng’s inferior splenic pole was injured, resulting in a necessary
splenectomy. Additionally, the doctors repaired Ng’s abdominal wounds with
2 internal sutures and staples. Ng was diagnosed at the hospital with four left
abdominal and chest stab wounds, two more stab wounds to his left arm, a splenic
laceration, traumatic abdominal hernia, and a urethral injury.
Photographs taken soon after the incident that showed the extent of Ng’s
injuries and the sutures and staples used to close the wounds were admitted into
evidence. Additional photographs were also admitted into evidence that showed that
Ng still had significant scarring on his chest, abdomen, and arm three years later.
Standard of Review and Applicable Law
When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, the evidence is viewed in the
light most favorable to the verdict to determine whether any rational factfinder could
have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson
v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 2789 (1979). The factfinder is the
sole judge of the weight and credibility of the evidence. Adelman v. State, 828
S.W.2d 418, 421 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992). We may not re-weigh the evidence and
substitute our judgment for that of the factfinder. King v. State, 29 S.W.3d 556, 562
(Tex. Crim. App. 2000). Additionally, we must give due deference to the factfinder’s
determinations. Lancon v. State, 253 S.W.3d 699, 705 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008).
A person commits the first-degree felony offense of aggravated assault of a
family member if he commits an assault and causes serious bodily injury, or uses or
exhibits a deadly weapon during the commission of the assault, to a person living in
3 the same household. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.02(a), (b)(1) (West 2011); TEX.
FAM. CODE ANN. § 71.005 (West 2014) (defining household as unit composed of
persons living together in same dwelling).
Analysis
In his first issue, appellant contends that the evidence is insufficient to show
serious bodily injury because Ng’s wounds were shallow and superficial and none
of his internal organs were injured. Serious bodily injury is defined as, “bodily injury
that creates a substantial risk of death or that causes death, serious permanent
disfigurement, or protracted loss or impairment of the function of any bodily
member or organ.” TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 1.07(a)(46) (West Supp. 2015).
Appellant argues that the serious medical conditions were only the result of medical
intervention; therefore, the evidence does not establish serious bodily injury. See
Stuhler v. State, 218 S.W.3d 706, 715 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). Based on the medical
records, the injuries themselves were sufficient to establish serious bodily injury. Ng
suffered from four abdominal and chest stab wounds, two stab wounds to his left
arm, a splenic laceration, traumatic abdominal hernia, and a urethral injury. Two
stab wounds required sutures and staples to close, and one required immediate
exploratory surgery. The trial court could have reasonably determined from the
evidence that the stab wounds to Ng’s chest and stomach created a substantial risk
of death if he had not received medical treatment. See Blea v. State, 483 S.W.3d 29,
4 32 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016) (holding that serious bodily injury is based on degree of
risk posed by injury without regard to positive effects of medical treatment).
Expert testimony is not required to establish serious bodily injury when the
injury and its effects are obvious. Carter v. State, 678 S.W.2d 155, 157 (Tex. App.—
Beaumont 1984, no pet.). A person who sustained the injury is qualified to express
an opinion about the seriousness of that injury. Jackson v. State, 399 S.W.3d 285,
292 (Tex. App.—Waco 2013, no pet.) (mem. op.). Ng testified that appellant stabbed
him six times in the chest, arms, and abdomen, and he described one of those stab
wounds as “pretty deep.” He further testified that his wounds were bleeding
profusely and he was in “quite a bit” of pain after appellant assaulted him. An officer
who saw Ng shortly after the attack also testified that Ng was bleeding “pretty bad.”
Appellant directs us to Hollaway v. State to support his argument that the
evidence was insufficient to show serious bodily injury because he alleges that the
stab wounds were superficial. 446 S.W.3d 847, 852 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2014,
no pet.) (holding one abdomen stab wound was insufficient to establish serious
bodily injury). This case is distinguishable from Hollaway because there is evidence
that Ng suffered from six stab wounds that caused significant pain and bleeding, and
required immediate surgery.
Appellant urges us to consider Hernandez v.
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Opinion issued August 4, 2016
In The
Court of Appeals For The
First District of Texas ———————————— NO. 01-15-00560-CR ——————————— MICHAEL ANTHONY DAVILA, Appellant V. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from the 351st District Court Harris County, Texas Trial Court Case No. 1359876
MEMORANDUM OPINION
The trial court found appellant, Michael Anthony Davila, guilty of the
first-degree felony offense of aggravated assault on a household member1 and
assessed his punishment at twelve years in prison. Appellant appeals on two issues:
1 TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.02(a), (b)(1) (West 2011); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 71.005 (West 2014). (1) the evidence is insufficient to prove that the injuries suffered by the complainant
constituted serious bodily injury, and (2) the evidence is insufficient to prove that
the unknown object was a deadly weapon. We affirm the trial court’s judgment.
Background
Wegin Ng testified that his eighteen-year old grandson, appellant, lived with
him and his wife, Mary Ann. Early one morning, Ng awoke to appellant stabbing
him in his abdomen and chest. Ng pushed appellant away and appellant fled.
According to Ng, he received six stab wounds during the attack, one of which he
described as being “pretty deep.” Ng also testified that his stab wounds bled
profusely and caused him significant pain. Although Ng could not see what appellant
had used to stab him with, Ng told hospital personnel that appellant had used a knife.
One of the first officers on the scene testified that Ng was bleeding “pretty
bad” when he arrived at Ng’s house. Ng’s medical records, which were admitted
into evidence at trial, indicate that emergency medical personal suspected that Ng
had pericardial fluid leaking into his body as a result of the stabbing. Upon his arrival
at the hospital, Ng was immediately sent in for exploratory surgery to check for any
leaks or other internal damage. During the surgery, the doctors performed a
laparotomy. One of the stab wounds required the doctors to move Ng’s spleen, and
in the process, Ng’s inferior splenic pole was injured, resulting in a necessary
splenectomy. Additionally, the doctors repaired Ng’s abdominal wounds with
2 internal sutures and staples. Ng was diagnosed at the hospital with four left
abdominal and chest stab wounds, two more stab wounds to his left arm, a splenic
laceration, traumatic abdominal hernia, and a urethral injury.
Photographs taken soon after the incident that showed the extent of Ng’s
injuries and the sutures and staples used to close the wounds were admitted into
evidence. Additional photographs were also admitted into evidence that showed that
Ng still had significant scarring on his chest, abdomen, and arm three years later.
Standard of Review and Applicable Law
When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, the evidence is viewed in the
light most favorable to the verdict to determine whether any rational factfinder could
have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson
v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 2789 (1979). The factfinder is the
sole judge of the weight and credibility of the evidence. Adelman v. State, 828
S.W.2d 418, 421 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992). We may not re-weigh the evidence and
substitute our judgment for that of the factfinder. King v. State, 29 S.W.3d 556, 562
(Tex. Crim. App. 2000). Additionally, we must give due deference to the factfinder’s
determinations. Lancon v. State, 253 S.W.3d 699, 705 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008).
A person commits the first-degree felony offense of aggravated assault of a
family member if he commits an assault and causes serious bodily injury, or uses or
exhibits a deadly weapon during the commission of the assault, to a person living in
3 the same household. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.02(a), (b)(1) (West 2011); TEX.
FAM. CODE ANN. § 71.005 (West 2014) (defining household as unit composed of
persons living together in same dwelling).
Analysis
In his first issue, appellant contends that the evidence is insufficient to show
serious bodily injury because Ng’s wounds were shallow and superficial and none
of his internal organs were injured. Serious bodily injury is defined as, “bodily injury
that creates a substantial risk of death or that causes death, serious permanent
disfigurement, or protracted loss or impairment of the function of any bodily
member or organ.” TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 1.07(a)(46) (West Supp. 2015).
Appellant argues that the serious medical conditions were only the result of medical
intervention; therefore, the evidence does not establish serious bodily injury. See
Stuhler v. State, 218 S.W.3d 706, 715 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). Based on the medical
records, the injuries themselves were sufficient to establish serious bodily injury. Ng
suffered from four abdominal and chest stab wounds, two stab wounds to his left
arm, a splenic laceration, traumatic abdominal hernia, and a urethral injury. Two
stab wounds required sutures and staples to close, and one required immediate
exploratory surgery. The trial court could have reasonably determined from the
evidence that the stab wounds to Ng’s chest and stomach created a substantial risk
of death if he had not received medical treatment. See Blea v. State, 483 S.W.3d 29,
4 32 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016) (holding that serious bodily injury is based on degree of
risk posed by injury without regard to positive effects of medical treatment).
Expert testimony is not required to establish serious bodily injury when the
injury and its effects are obvious. Carter v. State, 678 S.W.2d 155, 157 (Tex. App.—
Beaumont 1984, no pet.). A person who sustained the injury is qualified to express
an opinion about the seriousness of that injury. Jackson v. State, 399 S.W.3d 285,
292 (Tex. App.—Waco 2013, no pet.) (mem. op.). Ng testified that appellant stabbed
him six times in the chest, arms, and abdomen, and he described one of those stab
wounds as “pretty deep.” He further testified that his wounds were bleeding
profusely and he was in “quite a bit” of pain after appellant assaulted him. An officer
who saw Ng shortly after the attack also testified that Ng was bleeding “pretty bad.”
Appellant directs us to Hollaway v. State to support his argument that the
evidence was insufficient to show serious bodily injury because he alleges that the
stab wounds were superficial. 446 S.W.3d 847, 852 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2014,
no pet.) (holding one abdomen stab wound was insufficient to establish serious
bodily injury). This case is distinguishable from Hollaway because there is evidence
that Ng suffered from six stab wounds that caused significant pain and bleeding, and
required immediate surgery.
Appellant urges us to consider Hernandez v. State where the trial court held
that a small scar alone is not sufficient to establish permanent disfigurement. 946
5 S.W.2d 108, 113 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1997, no pet.). But see Hunt v. State, No. 12-
05-00329-CR, 2006 WL 2361438, at *3 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2006, no pet.) (mem.
op., not designated for publication) (holding that significant and permanent scarring
of victim’s back, face, and arm, was sufficient to prove serious bodily injury). Unlike
Hernandez, there is evidence in this case of cosmetic deformity. Photographs
showed significant scarring on Ng’s chest, abdomen, and arm three years after the
attack. This permanent scarring is sufficient to demonstrate serious bodily injury.
The evidence of Ng’s six stab wounds is sufficient to support the trial court’s implied
finding that the wounds created a substantial risk of death and caused serious bodily
injury. Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the verdict, we hold the
evidence is legally sufficient to prove the offense of aggravated assault. Jackson v.
Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 at 319, 99 S. Ct. 2781 at 2789. We overrule appellant’s first
issue.
In his second issue, appellant contends that the evidence is insufficient to
prove the use of a deadly weapon because the unknown object, in the manner of its
use or intended use, was not capable of causing death or serious bodily injury. The
Penal Code defines a deadly weapon as: (1) a firearm or anything manifestly
designed, made, or adapted for the purpose of inflicting death or serious bodily
injury; or (2) anything that in the manner of its use or intended use is capable of
causing death or serious bodily injury. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 1.07(a)(17) (West
6 Supp. 2015). Here, there is a question of what the object was, either a knife or
another sharp object. But even if the weapon used to stab Ng was an unknown sharp
object, the injuries suffered by the victim can by themselves be sufficient to infer
that a deadly weapon was used. Tucker v. State, 274 S.W.3d 688, 691–92 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2008). Appellant used a sharp object to repeatedly stab Ng’s body, which
resulted in surgery being required to repair the internal damage caused by the
weapon, and caused significant scarring.
A factfinder can reasonably determine from the totality of the evidence that
the unknown weapon was capable of causing death or serious bodily injury. The trial
court made an affirmative finding that appellant used a deadly weapon in
commission of the offense. The evidence of the injuries caused by the instrument
used by appellant is sufficient to support the trial court’s finding that appellant
knowingly or intentionally caused serious bodily injury with a deadly weapon. We
overrule appellant’s second issue.
Conclusion
We affirm the trial court’s judgment.
Russell Lloyd Justice
Panel consists of Chief Justice Radack and Justices Jennings and Lloyd.
Do not publish. TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b). 7