Michael Angelo Favot v. Jimarion Brown

CourtMichigan Court of Appeals
DecidedSeptember 18, 2025
Docket368733
StatusPublished

This text of Michael Angelo Favot v. Jimarion Brown (Michael Angelo Favot v. Jimarion Brown) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Michigan Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Michael Angelo Favot v. Jimarion Brown, (Mich. Ct. App. 2025).

Opinion

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

STATE OF MICHIGAN

COURT OF APPEALS

MICHAEL ANGELO FAVOT, FOR PUBLICATION September 18, 2025 Plaintiff-Appellee, 10:20 AM

v Nos. 368733; 368734 Wayne Circuit Court JIMARION BROWN, LC No. 22-001890-NI

Defendant, and

MEMBERSELECT INSURANCE COMPANY,

Defendant-Appellant.

Before: CAMERON, P.J., and MURRAY and KOROBKIN, JJ.

CAMERON, P.J.

In these consolidated interlocutory appeals regarding payment of personal protection insurance (PIP) benefits, defendant1 appeals by delayed leave granted2 the orders denying its motions for partial summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(7) (payment) and (10) (no genuine issue of material fact). We affirm, in part, reverse, in part, and remand for further proceedings.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff was injured in a motor vehicle accident. Plaintiff initiated this action, alleging that defendant, his insurer, failed to fully reimburse his first-party PIP benefits in violation of the

1 Because defendant Jimarion Brown was dismissed from the case by a stipulated order, and is not a party to these appeals, we will refer to MemberSelect Insurance Company as “defendant” throughout this opinion. 2 Favot v Brown, unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered April 15, 2024 (Docket No. 368733); Favot v Brown, unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered April 15, 2024 (Docket No. 368734).

-1- no-fault act, MCL 500.3101 et seq. Defendant eventually filed two motions for partial summary disposition regarding some of the charges submitted by plaintiff’s medical providers, arguing it had paid the maximum amounts allowed under the no-fault fee schedule, MCL 500.3157. Specifically, defendant claimed that, under MCL 500.3157(15)(f), it could apply certain limitations commonly used by Medicare to determine the amount payable to plaintiff’s medical providers, because the limitations were related to the rates in the Medicare fee schedule. The trial court denied defendant’s motions for summary disposition. These appeals followed.

II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW

We review a trial court’s decision on a motion for summary disposition de novo. El-Khalil v Oakwood Healthcare, Inc, 504 Mich 152, 159; 934 NW2d 665 (2019). “MCR 2.116(C)(7) permits summary disposition ‘because of release, payment, prior judgment, [or] immunity granted by law.’ ” Clay v Doe, 311 Mich App 359, 362; 876 NW2d 248 (2015), quoting MCR 2.116(C)(7) (alteration in Clay). “When [a court] grants a motion under MCR 2.116(C)(7), [it] should examine all documentary evidence submitted by the parties, accept all well-pleaded allegations as true, and construe all evidence and pleadings in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Clay, 311 Mich App at 362 (quotation marks and citation omitted).

“A motion under MCR 2.116(C)(10), on the other hand, tests the factual sufficiency of a claim.” El-Khalil, 504 Mich at 160 (emphasis omitted). As with motions under MCR 2.116(C)(7), trial courts considering motions under MCR 2.116(C)(10) “must consider all evidence submitted by the parties in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion.” El-Khalil, 504 Mich at 160. “A motion under MCR 2.116(C)(10) may only be granted when there is no genuine issue of material fact.” El-Khalil, 504 Mich at 160. “A genuine issue of material fact exists when the record leaves open an issue upon which reasonable minds might differ.” Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted).

We review issues of statutory interpretation de novo. Titan Ins Co v American Country Ins Co, 312 Mich App 291, 296; 876 NW2d 853 (2015). “The primary goal of statutory interpretation is to give effect to the intent of the Legislature.” Le Gassick v Univ of Mich Regents, 330 Mich App 487, 495; 948 NW2d 452 (2019) (quotation marks and citation omitted). “The most reliable evidence of legislative intent is the plain language of the statute.” Id. Clear and unambiguous statutory language must be applied as written. Measel v Auto Club Group Ins Co, 314 Mich App 320, 326; 886 NW2d 193 (2016). Moreover, we must interpret “statutory provisions in harmony with the entire statutory scheme.” Nyman v Thomson Reuters Holdings, Inc, 329 Mich App 539, 544; 942 NW2d 696 (2019).

III. ANALYSIS

Defendant argues that the trial court erred by denying its motions for summary disposition because there was no genuine issue of material fact that MCL 500.3157 authorized it to apply limitations related to the rates in Medicare’s no-fault fee schedule when determining the amount payable. Defendant also argues that it properly paid plaintiff’s claims. We agree, in part.

“The no-fault act is Michigan’s statutory framework for insurance coverage, compensation, and dispute resolution related to motor vehicle accidents.” True Care Physical Therapy, PLLC v

-2- Auto Club Group Ins Co, 347 Mich App 168, 177; 14 NW3d 456 (2023). In 2019, the Legislature amended the no-fault act in an attempt to control the cost of automobile insurance. Andary v USAA Cas Ins Co, 512 Mich 207, 214; 1 NW3d 186 (2023). As part of these reforms, the Legislature amended MCL 500.3157 to include fee schedules, that cap the amount payable to providers who render treatment for accidental bodily injury to an injured person under the no-fault act. The portions of MCL 500.3157 at issue here state:

(2) Subject to subsections (3) to (14), a physician, hospital, clinic, or other person that renders treatment or rehabilitative occupational training to an injured person for an accidental bodily injury covered by personal protection insurance is not eligible for payment or reimbursement under this chapter for more than the following:

(a) For treatment or training rendered after July 1, 2021 and before July 2, 2022, 200% of the amount payable to the person for the treatment or training under Medicare.

(b) For treatment or training rendered after July 1, 2022 and before July 2, 2023, 195% of the amount payable to the person for the treatment or training under Medicare.

(c) For treatment or training rendered after July 1, 2023, 190% of the amount payable to the person for the treatment or training under Medicare.

* * *

(7) If Medicare does not provide an amount payable for a treatment or rehabilitative occupational training under subsection (2), (3), (5), or (6), the physician, hospital, clinic, or other person that renders the treatment or training is not eligible for payment or reimbursement under this chapter of more than the following, as applicable:

(a) For a person to which subsection (2) applies, the applicable following percentage of the amount payable for the treatment or training under the person’s charge description master in effect on January 1, 2019 or, if the person did not have a charge description master on that date, the applicable following percentage of the average amount the person charged for the treatment on January 1, 2019:

(i) For treatment or training rendered after July 1, 2021 and before July 2, 2022, 55%.

(ii) For treatment or training rendered after July 1, 2022 and before July 2, 2023, 54%.

(iii) For treatment or training rendered after July 1, 2023, 52.5%.

-3- (15) As used in this section:

(f) “Medicare” means fee for service payments under part A, B, or D of the federal Medicare program established under subchapter XVIII of the social security act, 42 USC 1395 to 1395lll, without regard to the limitations unrelated to the rates in the fee schedule such as limitation or supplemental payments related to utilization, readmissions, recaptures, bad debt adjustments, or sequestration.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Clay v. Doe
876 N.W.2d 248 (Michigan Court of Appeals, 2015)
Measel v. Auto Club Group Insurance Company
886 N.W.2d 193 (Michigan Court of Appeals, 2016)
Titan Insurance v. American Country Insurance
876 N.W.2d 853 (Michigan Court of Appeals, 2015)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
Michael Angelo Favot v. Jimarion Brown, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/michael-angelo-favot-v-jimarion-brown-michctapp-2025.