RENDERED: SEPTEMBER 24, 2021; 10:00 A.M. NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky Court of Appeals
NO. 2020-CA-0346-MR
MICHAEL ALLEN SASSEEN APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM MCCRACKEN CIRCUIT COURT v. HONORABLE DEANNA WISE HENSCHEL, JUDGE ACTION NO. 14-CI-00688
VIVIAN MARIE SASSEEN (NOW APPELLEE VINIARD)
OPINION AFFIRMING IN PART, VACATING IN PART, AND REMANDING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: DIXON, KRAMER,1 AND McNEILL, JUDGES.
McNEILL, JUDGE: Michael Allen Sasseen (“Father”) appeals from an order of
the McCracken Family Court denying his request for sanctions and attorney’s fees
and removing restrictions on contact between appellee, Vivian Marie Sasseen (now
1 Judge Joy A. Kramer concurred in the above-styled Opinion prior to her retirement effective September 1, 2021. Release of this Opinion was delayed due to administrative handling. Viniard) (“Mother”) and the parties’ minor child, A.S., without finding such
contact was in the best interest of the child. For the reasons below, we affirm in
part, vacate in part, and remand for specific findings of fact and conclusions of law
regarding modification of visitation.
The parties were divorced on November 4, 2014. On May 8, 2015,
the family court entered an “Agreed Supplemental Findings of Fact and Decree of
Dissolution” which incorporated a marital settlement agreement between the
parties. Pursuant to the agreement, Father and Mother were granted joint custody
of their three children, N.S., J.S., and A.S.,2 with Father being designated the
primary residential parent. At the time, Mother had become estranged from her
children and agreed to not exercise her visitation.
Relevant to the appeal, on August 24, 2017, Mother filed a “Motion to
Increase Visitation” to attempt to reconnect with her children. Following a
hearing, the family court entered an order granting mother’s request to begin
reunification counseling, and appointed Dr. Holly J. Mattingly, a licensed clinical
psychologist, to perform the counseling.
Shortly into the sessions, Father and the children became concerned
that Dr. Mattingly was siding with Mother in the reunification process and became
2 At the time of the divorce, the children ranged in age from 10 to 16. N.S. and J.S. are now emancipated. -2- increasingly distrustful of her motives. Then, in January 2019, J.S. discovered a
timeline of the family’s custody and visitation issues Mother had posted on the
internet, including information that suggested Mother had consulted with Dr.
Mattingly prior to the reunification counseling. Concerned Dr. Mattingly and
Mother were colluding in the reunification process, Father filed a motion to
terminate reunification and to disqualify Dr. Mattingly.
On May 16, 2019, the family court held a lengthy hearing on the
motion where Father, Mother, Dr. Mattingly, and Katherine Englert, the children’s
counselor, testified. Prior to the hearing, Father subpoenaed a copy of Dr.
Mattingly’s file as well as all text and email communications between Mother and
Dr. Mattingly. Based upon these communications, Father alleged Dr. Mattingly
and Mother had committed a fraud upon the court by colluding to remove Father
from the children’s lives. Following the hearing, the family court postponed ruling
on the motion until it could review the text and email communications.
On August 28, 2019, the court met with the children to get their
feedback on the reunification process. Prior to the meeting, Mother’s attorney
represented to the court that Dr. Mattingly no longer felt she was the best person to
provide therapy to the children considering the state of her and the children’s
relationship. Thereafter, the court entered an order holding that the issue of
whether to disqualify Dr. Mattingly as the reunification therapist was now moot.
-3- Subsequently, Father moved the court to specifically rule on all issues
contained in his “Motion to Terminate Reunification and Disqualify Therapist,”
including whether to terminate the reunification process; whether to disqualify Dr.
Mattingly as a reunification therapist based upon collusion and fraud; and whether
to award attorney’s fees based upon the same. On February 6, 2020, the family
court entered an order denying Father’s request for attorney’s fees, declining to
“find that there was a fraud perpetrated on the [c]ourt.” The court also denied the
motion to disqualify Dr. Mattingly and stated that it “continue[d] to believe that
reunification therapy is in the remaining minor child’s best interest.” Finally, the
court removed all restrictions on contact between Mother and A.S., noting it
“remained optimistic that the child and mother may begin to communicate slowly
and perhaps their relationship will develop on its own.” It is from this order that
Father now appeals. Further facts will be set forth as necessary below.
First, we address the threshold issue of whether the above-styled
appeal was taken from a final and appealable order. This Court lacks jurisdiction
to hear appeals from interlocutory orders, and we are required to consider the issue
of jurisdiction sua sponte before deciding a case on the merits. See generally
Hubbard v. Hubbard, 303 Ky. 411, 197 S.W.2d 923 (1946). In the case at bar,
although the order appealed from contemplates possible reunification therapy for
the remaining minor child in the future, it does not mandate the parties obtain an
-4- alternate reunification therapist or require that they take any further action
concerning reunification. As noted above, the order instead rules that there shall
be “no restriction on contact between [Mother] and [A.S.],” in the absence of either
party’s “present[ing] the [c]ourt with a proposed reunification therapist.”
As noted herein, the genesis of the February 6, 2020 order was
Father’s Motion to Terminate Reunification and Disqualify Therapist. This motion
followed the family court’s February 5, 2018 order granting mother’s request to
engage in the reunification process. Appellant’s Brief, at p. 3. In Anderson v.
Johnson, 350 S.W.3d 453, 456-67 (Ky. 2011), our Supreme Court held that a post-
decree motion concerning visitation or timesharing modification “is actually a
vehicle for the reopening and rehearing on some part of a final order, which asks
for adjudication on the merits presented at a required hearing.” Id. Hence, an
order “modifying a final order becomes the new final order and is subject to
appeal.” Id. at 436. See also KRS3 403.320; KRS 403.270. In this case, although
the February 6, 2020 order does not contain complete finality recitations under CR4
54.02, it appears to have resolved all issues then pending before the family court
by removing the restrictions on visitation between Mother and A.S.
notwithstanding Father’s assertion that Mother “circumvent[ed] court mandates for
3 Kentucky Revised Statutes. 4 Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure. -5- reunification with a scheme of collusion”; by denying Father’s request for
attorney’s fees; and by denying the motion to disqualify Dr. Mattingly. CR 54.01.
Having been satisfied that our jurisdiction was properly invoked, we now turn to
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RENDERED: SEPTEMBER 24, 2021; 10:00 A.M. NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky Court of Appeals
NO. 2020-CA-0346-MR
MICHAEL ALLEN SASSEEN APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM MCCRACKEN CIRCUIT COURT v. HONORABLE DEANNA WISE HENSCHEL, JUDGE ACTION NO. 14-CI-00688
VIVIAN MARIE SASSEEN (NOW APPELLEE VINIARD)
OPINION AFFIRMING IN PART, VACATING IN PART, AND REMANDING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: DIXON, KRAMER,1 AND McNEILL, JUDGES.
McNEILL, JUDGE: Michael Allen Sasseen (“Father”) appeals from an order of
the McCracken Family Court denying his request for sanctions and attorney’s fees
and removing restrictions on contact between appellee, Vivian Marie Sasseen (now
1 Judge Joy A. Kramer concurred in the above-styled Opinion prior to her retirement effective September 1, 2021. Release of this Opinion was delayed due to administrative handling. Viniard) (“Mother”) and the parties’ minor child, A.S., without finding such
contact was in the best interest of the child. For the reasons below, we affirm in
part, vacate in part, and remand for specific findings of fact and conclusions of law
regarding modification of visitation.
The parties were divorced on November 4, 2014. On May 8, 2015,
the family court entered an “Agreed Supplemental Findings of Fact and Decree of
Dissolution” which incorporated a marital settlement agreement between the
parties. Pursuant to the agreement, Father and Mother were granted joint custody
of their three children, N.S., J.S., and A.S.,2 with Father being designated the
primary residential parent. At the time, Mother had become estranged from her
children and agreed to not exercise her visitation.
Relevant to the appeal, on August 24, 2017, Mother filed a “Motion to
Increase Visitation” to attempt to reconnect with her children. Following a
hearing, the family court entered an order granting mother’s request to begin
reunification counseling, and appointed Dr. Holly J. Mattingly, a licensed clinical
psychologist, to perform the counseling.
Shortly into the sessions, Father and the children became concerned
that Dr. Mattingly was siding with Mother in the reunification process and became
2 At the time of the divorce, the children ranged in age from 10 to 16. N.S. and J.S. are now emancipated. -2- increasingly distrustful of her motives. Then, in January 2019, J.S. discovered a
timeline of the family’s custody and visitation issues Mother had posted on the
internet, including information that suggested Mother had consulted with Dr.
Mattingly prior to the reunification counseling. Concerned Dr. Mattingly and
Mother were colluding in the reunification process, Father filed a motion to
terminate reunification and to disqualify Dr. Mattingly.
On May 16, 2019, the family court held a lengthy hearing on the
motion where Father, Mother, Dr. Mattingly, and Katherine Englert, the children’s
counselor, testified. Prior to the hearing, Father subpoenaed a copy of Dr.
Mattingly’s file as well as all text and email communications between Mother and
Dr. Mattingly. Based upon these communications, Father alleged Dr. Mattingly
and Mother had committed a fraud upon the court by colluding to remove Father
from the children’s lives. Following the hearing, the family court postponed ruling
on the motion until it could review the text and email communications.
On August 28, 2019, the court met with the children to get their
feedback on the reunification process. Prior to the meeting, Mother’s attorney
represented to the court that Dr. Mattingly no longer felt she was the best person to
provide therapy to the children considering the state of her and the children’s
relationship. Thereafter, the court entered an order holding that the issue of
whether to disqualify Dr. Mattingly as the reunification therapist was now moot.
-3- Subsequently, Father moved the court to specifically rule on all issues
contained in his “Motion to Terminate Reunification and Disqualify Therapist,”
including whether to terminate the reunification process; whether to disqualify Dr.
Mattingly as a reunification therapist based upon collusion and fraud; and whether
to award attorney’s fees based upon the same. On February 6, 2020, the family
court entered an order denying Father’s request for attorney’s fees, declining to
“find that there was a fraud perpetrated on the [c]ourt.” The court also denied the
motion to disqualify Dr. Mattingly and stated that it “continue[d] to believe that
reunification therapy is in the remaining minor child’s best interest.” Finally, the
court removed all restrictions on contact between Mother and A.S., noting it
“remained optimistic that the child and mother may begin to communicate slowly
and perhaps their relationship will develop on its own.” It is from this order that
Father now appeals. Further facts will be set forth as necessary below.
First, we address the threshold issue of whether the above-styled
appeal was taken from a final and appealable order. This Court lacks jurisdiction
to hear appeals from interlocutory orders, and we are required to consider the issue
of jurisdiction sua sponte before deciding a case on the merits. See generally
Hubbard v. Hubbard, 303 Ky. 411, 197 S.W.2d 923 (1946). In the case at bar,
although the order appealed from contemplates possible reunification therapy for
the remaining minor child in the future, it does not mandate the parties obtain an
-4- alternate reunification therapist or require that they take any further action
concerning reunification. As noted above, the order instead rules that there shall
be “no restriction on contact between [Mother] and [A.S.],” in the absence of either
party’s “present[ing] the [c]ourt with a proposed reunification therapist.”
As noted herein, the genesis of the February 6, 2020 order was
Father’s Motion to Terminate Reunification and Disqualify Therapist. This motion
followed the family court’s February 5, 2018 order granting mother’s request to
engage in the reunification process. Appellant’s Brief, at p. 3. In Anderson v.
Johnson, 350 S.W.3d 453, 456-67 (Ky. 2011), our Supreme Court held that a post-
decree motion concerning visitation or timesharing modification “is actually a
vehicle for the reopening and rehearing on some part of a final order, which asks
for adjudication on the merits presented at a required hearing.” Id. Hence, an
order “modifying a final order becomes the new final order and is subject to
appeal.” Id. at 436. See also KRS3 403.320; KRS 403.270. In this case, although
the February 6, 2020 order does not contain complete finality recitations under CR4
54.02, it appears to have resolved all issues then pending before the family court
by removing the restrictions on visitation between Mother and A.S.
notwithstanding Father’s assertion that Mother “circumvent[ed] court mandates for
3 Kentucky Revised Statutes. 4 Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure. -5- reunification with a scheme of collusion”; by denying Father’s request for
attorney’s fees; and by denying the motion to disqualify Dr. Mattingly. CR 54.01.
Having been satisfied that our jurisdiction was properly invoked, we now turn to
the merits of Father’s arguments on appeal.
Father asserts the family court erred in failing to find fraud on the
part of Mother and Dr. Mattingly and in removing restrictions on contact between
Mother and A.S. Concerning fraud, the argument section of Father’s brief only
addresses the issue of sanctions and attorney’s fees. There is no discussion of the
court’s failure to disqualify Dr. Mattingly or terminate reunification therapy.
Therefore, we consider these issues waived. “An appellant’s failure to discuss
particular errors in his brief is the same as if no brief at all had been filed on
those issues.” Milby v. Mears, 580 S.W.2d 724, 727 (Ky. App. 1979); see
also Grange Mut. Ins. Co. v. Trude, 151 S.W.3d 803, 815-16 (Ky. 2004).
As to attorney’s fees, a trial court has broad discretion in awarding
attorney’s fees to either party in a dissolution proceeding. Tucker v. Hill, 763
S.W.2d 144 (Ky. App. 1988). KRS 403.220 authorizes an award of attorney’s fees
“after considering the financial resources of both parties” or to discourage
obstructive tactics and conduct. Gentry v. Gentry, 798 S.W.2d 928, 938 (Ky.
1990). Further, attorney’s fees may be awarded as a sanction “when the integrity
of the court is at stake.” Seeger v. Lanham, 542 S.W.3d 286, 295 (Ky. 2018). The
-6- decision of whether to award attorney’s fees will not be disturbed on appeal absent
an abuse of discretion. Sexton v. Sexton, 125 S.W.3d 258, 272 (Ky. 2004). “The
test for abuse of discretion is whether the trial judge’s decision was arbitrary,
unreasonable, unfair, or unsupported by sound legal principles.” Id. (citations
omitted).
The family court denied Father’s request for attorney’s fees after
considering “the income of both parties, the issues before the [c]ourt, and the
litigation and pleading practice and procedures.” It further did “not find that there
was a fraud perpetrated on the [c]ourt warranting an issuance of attorney fees.”
Father argues the family court’s failure to find fraud warranting an award of
attorney’s fees was an abuse of discretion, pointing to text messages and emails
between Mother and Dr. Mattingly as evidence of fraud and collusion.
Specifically, he takes issue with Mother dictating Dr. Mattingly’s therapy through
third parties; questions Dr. Mattingly’s motives and intentions in providing
therapy; and argues Dr. Mattingly advocated for Mother, not the children.
Having reviewed the record, we cannot say the family court abused its
discretion in denying Father’s request for attorney’s fees. The court considered the
financial situation of the parties as required by KRS 403.220 and the parties’
conduct as allowed by case law. It further found that no fraud had been committed
warranting sanctions. Father’s fraud allegations all boil down to disagreement
-7- over witness credibility and Dr. Mattingly’s methods. But “judging
the credibility of witnesses and weighing evidence are tasks within the exclusive
province of the trial court.” Moore v. Asente, 110 S.W.3d 336, 354 (Ky. 2003).
However, we agree with Father that the family court erred in
removing restrictions on contact between Mother and A.S. without concluding that
unrestricted contact was in the child’s best interest. Pursuant to KRS 403.320(3), a
family court may modify visitation “whenever modification would serve the best
interests of the child . . . .” Id. Here, the family court’s order contained no such
conclusion. Further, any conclusion concerning the best interest of the child
should be supported by findings of fact, as required by CR 52.01. See Anderson,
350 S.W.3d at 459. Therefore, we remand with directions to the family court to
enter specific written findings of fact and conclusions of law containing a best
interest analysis.
Based on the foregoing, the McCracken Family Court’s February 6,
2020 order is affirmed in part, vacated in part, and this matter is remanded for
further proceedings consistent with this Opinion.
KRAMER, JUDGE, CONCURS.
DIXON, JUDGE, CONCURS IN RESULT ONLY.
-8- BRIEF FOR APPELLANT: NO BRIEF FILED FOR APPELLEE.
Tiffany Gabehart Poindexter Paducah, Kentucky
-9-