IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
AT NASHVILLE FILED FEBRUARY 2000 SESSION March 31, 2000
Cecil Crowson, Jr. Appellate Court Clerk MICHAEL ALLEN HAMLIN, ) ) NO. M1999-00936-CCA-R3-PC Appellant, ) ) MARSHALL COUNTY VS. ) ) HON. L. CRAIG JOHNSON, STATE OF TENNESSEE, ) JUDGE ) Appellee. ) (Post-Conviction)
FOR THE APPELLANT: FOR THE APPELLEE:
HERSHELL D. KOGER PAUL G. SUMMERS 131 N. 1st Street Attorney General and Reporter P.O. Box 1148 Pulaski, TN 38478 MARVIN E. CLEMENTS JR. Assistant Attorney General Cordell Hull Building, 2nd Floor 425 Fifth Avenue North Nashville, TN 37243-0493
WILLIAM MICHAEL McCOWN District Attorney General
WEAKLEY E. BARNARD Assistant District Attorney General Marshall County Courthouse Lewisburg, TN 37091
OPINION FILED:
AFFIRMED
JOE G. RILEY, JUDGE OPINION
The petitioner, Michael Allen Hamlin, appeals the Marshall County Circuit
Court's denial of his petition for post-conviction relief arising from his 1998
convictions for eight counts of aggravated burglary, Class C felonies. The sole
issue is whether petitioner was deprived of effective assistance of counsel at the
time of entry of his guilty plea, due to an alleged conflict of interest arising from
counsel’s joint representation of petitioner and his co-defendant. Based upon our
review of the record, we conclude no conflict of interest existed. Thus, the judgment
of the trial court is AFFIRMED.
I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. Guilty Plea Proceeding
Trial counsel represented both petitioner and Lisa Hamlin, petitioner’s wife,
who was a co-defendant on some of the charges against petitioner. Trial counsel
was successful in negotiating an independent plea agreement for each defendant.
Under the agreement, petitioner pled guilt to eight counts of aggravated burglary,
Class C felonies, and received consecutive three-year sentences for each offense,
for an effective sentence of twenty-four years. Numerous other charges were
dismissed pursuant to the plea agreement. Although the wife’s sentence does not
appear in this record, petitioner alleges she received an eight-year sentence with
some form of alternative sentencing.
B. Post-Conviction Proceedings
Petitioner timely filed a petition for post-conviction relief, claiming he was
denied effective assistance of counsel in entering his guilty plea due to the conflict
of interest that arose from counsel's joint representation of himself and his co-
defendant. At the post-conviction hearing, petitioner testified that he did not
understand trial counsel's explanation of "conflict of interest" and claimed he was
2 prejudiced by counsel's joint representation. He told the court he was concerned
about his wife and was pressured into pleading guilty so that she might receive a
less severe sentence.
Trial counsel testified that the respective agreements were not contingent
upon each other. He stated that he was able to adequately represent both of his
clients. He told the court that he informed the two that if it became necessary to "pit
one against the other," he would withdraw from representation of one or both
defendants. He claimed the defendants assured him they understood and insisted
he continue representing both of them.
The trial court issued comprehensive written findings of fact and held there
was no conflict of interest in trial counsel's representation of petitioner and his wife.
In its order the court stated:
[T]rial counsel adequately represented both clients to the best of his ability and in their best interest, and it appears he kept both clients informed at all stages of the case...[Trial counsel] took great care to explain and prevent a conflict and was ever watchful for such a conflict.
This appeal followed.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
This Court reviews a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel under the
standards of Baxter v. Rose, 523 S.W.2d 930 (Tenn. 1975), and Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). The petitioner
has the burden to prove that (1) the attorney’s performance was deficient, and (2)
the deficient performance resulted in prejudice to the defendant so as to deprive
him of a fair trial. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S.Ct. at 2064; Goad v. State, 938
S.W.2d 363, 369 (Tenn. 1996); Overton v. State, 874 S.W.2d 6, 11 (Tenn. 1994);
Butler v. State, 789 S.W.2d 898, 899 (Tenn. 1990).
3 In Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 106 S.Ct. 366, 88 L.Ed.2d 203 (1985), the
Supreme Court applied the two-part Strickland standard to ineffective assistance of
counsel claims arising out of a guilty plea. The Court in Hill modified the prejudice
requirement by requiring a defendant to show that there is a reasonable probability
that, but for counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have
insisted on going to trial. 474 U.S. at 59, 106 S.Ct. at 370; Hicks v. State, 983
S.W.2d 240, 246 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1998).
III. CONFLICT OF INTEREST
Petitioner claims that the conflict of interest which resulted from trial
counsel’s dual representation of co-defendants rendered counsel’s representation
ineffective and, but for this ineffective representation, he would not have pled guilty.
In support of these allegations, petitioner relies upon Netters v. State, 957 S.W.2d
844 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1997). Petitioner argues that trial counsel had an “actual
conflict of interest;” therefore, he is entitled to a presumption of prejudice.
Petitioner’s reliance on Netters is misplaced. We conclude there was no
“actual conflict of interest” resulting from trial counsel’s dual representation. The
mere fact counsel might have a potential conflict of interest in representing multiple
clients does not authorize a presumption of ineffective assistance of counsel.
Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 100 S.Ct. 1708, 64 L.Ed.2d 333 (1980); State v.
Parrott, 919 S.W.2d 60 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995). In order for prejudice to result, an
attorney must actively represent conflicting interests. Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 349-50,
100 S.Ct. at 1718-19. “The proper focus is solely upon whether counsel’s conflict
affected counsel’s actions and the defendant’s decision.” Netters, 957 S.W.2d at
848.
4 In Netters the trial court was faced with two defendants who were both
represented by the public defender’s office. In finding defendant’s guilty plea was
not voluntarily and knowingly entered due to the conflict of interest, this Court
focused on the contingent nature of the co-defendants’ plea agreements and took
notice of defendant’s desire to go to trial versus the co-defendant’s desire to enter
a guilty plea. The Court found counsel applied inappropriate pressure to defendant
in order to protect the interest of the co-defendant. It was further undisputed that
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IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
AT NASHVILLE FILED FEBRUARY 2000 SESSION March 31, 2000
Cecil Crowson, Jr. Appellate Court Clerk MICHAEL ALLEN HAMLIN, ) ) NO. M1999-00936-CCA-R3-PC Appellant, ) ) MARSHALL COUNTY VS. ) ) HON. L. CRAIG JOHNSON, STATE OF TENNESSEE, ) JUDGE ) Appellee. ) (Post-Conviction)
FOR THE APPELLANT: FOR THE APPELLEE:
HERSHELL D. KOGER PAUL G. SUMMERS 131 N. 1st Street Attorney General and Reporter P.O. Box 1148 Pulaski, TN 38478 MARVIN E. CLEMENTS JR. Assistant Attorney General Cordell Hull Building, 2nd Floor 425 Fifth Avenue North Nashville, TN 37243-0493
WILLIAM MICHAEL McCOWN District Attorney General
WEAKLEY E. BARNARD Assistant District Attorney General Marshall County Courthouse Lewisburg, TN 37091
OPINION FILED:
AFFIRMED
JOE G. RILEY, JUDGE OPINION
The petitioner, Michael Allen Hamlin, appeals the Marshall County Circuit
Court's denial of his petition for post-conviction relief arising from his 1998
convictions for eight counts of aggravated burglary, Class C felonies. The sole
issue is whether petitioner was deprived of effective assistance of counsel at the
time of entry of his guilty plea, due to an alleged conflict of interest arising from
counsel’s joint representation of petitioner and his co-defendant. Based upon our
review of the record, we conclude no conflict of interest existed. Thus, the judgment
of the trial court is AFFIRMED.
I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. Guilty Plea Proceeding
Trial counsel represented both petitioner and Lisa Hamlin, petitioner’s wife,
who was a co-defendant on some of the charges against petitioner. Trial counsel
was successful in negotiating an independent plea agreement for each defendant.
Under the agreement, petitioner pled guilt to eight counts of aggravated burglary,
Class C felonies, and received consecutive three-year sentences for each offense,
for an effective sentence of twenty-four years. Numerous other charges were
dismissed pursuant to the plea agreement. Although the wife’s sentence does not
appear in this record, petitioner alleges she received an eight-year sentence with
some form of alternative sentencing.
B. Post-Conviction Proceedings
Petitioner timely filed a petition for post-conviction relief, claiming he was
denied effective assistance of counsel in entering his guilty plea due to the conflict
of interest that arose from counsel's joint representation of himself and his co-
defendant. At the post-conviction hearing, petitioner testified that he did not
understand trial counsel's explanation of "conflict of interest" and claimed he was
2 prejudiced by counsel's joint representation. He told the court he was concerned
about his wife and was pressured into pleading guilty so that she might receive a
less severe sentence.
Trial counsel testified that the respective agreements were not contingent
upon each other. He stated that he was able to adequately represent both of his
clients. He told the court that he informed the two that if it became necessary to "pit
one against the other," he would withdraw from representation of one or both
defendants. He claimed the defendants assured him they understood and insisted
he continue representing both of them.
The trial court issued comprehensive written findings of fact and held there
was no conflict of interest in trial counsel's representation of petitioner and his wife.
In its order the court stated:
[T]rial counsel adequately represented both clients to the best of his ability and in their best interest, and it appears he kept both clients informed at all stages of the case...[Trial counsel] took great care to explain and prevent a conflict and was ever watchful for such a conflict.
This appeal followed.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
This Court reviews a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel under the
standards of Baxter v. Rose, 523 S.W.2d 930 (Tenn. 1975), and Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). The petitioner
has the burden to prove that (1) the attorney’s performance was deficient, and (2)
the deficient performance resulted in prejudice to the defendant so as to deprive
him of a fair trial. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S.Ct. at 2064; Goad v. State, 938
S.W.2d 363, 369 (Tenn. 1996); Overton v. State, 874 S.W.2d 6, 11 (Tenn. 1994);
Butler v. State, 789 S.W.2d 898, 899 (Tenn. 1990).
3 In Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 106 S.Ct. 366, 88 L.Ed.2d 203 (1985), the
Supreme Court applied the two-part Strickland standard to ineffective assistance of
counsel claims arising out of a guilty plea. The Court in Hill modified the prejudice
requirement by requiring a defendant to show that there is a reasonable probability
that, but for counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have
insisted on going to trial. 474 U.S. at 59, 106 S.Ct. at 370; Hicks v. State, 983
S.W.2d 240, 246 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1998).
III. CONFLICT OF INTEREST
Petitioner claims that the conflict of interest which resulted from trial
counsel’s dual representation of co-defendants rendered counsel’s representation
ineffective and, but for this ineffective representation, he would not have pled guilty.
In support of these allegations, petitioner relies upon Netters v. State, 957 S.W.2d
844 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1997). Petitioner argues that trial counsel had an “actual
conflict of interest;” therefore, he is entitled to a presumption of prejudice.
Petitioner’s reliance on Netters is misplaced. We conclude there was no
“actual conflict of interest” resulting from trial counsel’s dual representation. The
mere fact counsel might have a potential conflict of interest in representing multiple
clients does not authorize a presumption of ineffective assistance of counsel.
Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 100 S.Ct. 1708, 64 L.Ed.2d 333 (1980); State v.
Parrott, 919 S.W.2d 60 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995). In order for prejudice to result, an
attorney must actively represent conflicting interests. Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 349-50,
100 S.Ct. at 1718-19. “The proper focus is solely upon whether counsel’s conflict
affected counsel’s actions and the defendant’s decision.” Netters, 957 S.W.2d at
848.
4 In Netters the trial court was faced with two defendants who were both
represented by the public defender’s office. In finding defendant’s guilty plea was
not voluntarily and knowingly entered due to the conflict of interest, this Court
focused on the contingent nature of the co-defendants’ plea agreements and took
notice of defendant’s desire to go to trial versus the co-defendant’s desire to enter
a guilty plea. The Court found counsel applied inappropriate pressure to defendant
in order to protect the interest of the co-defendant. It was further undisputed that
defendant entered his guilty plea after having been advised by counsel with a
conflict of interest. Netters, 957 S.W.2d at 848.
The circumstances surrounding trial counsel’s representation and the
petitioner’s guilty plea in the instant case are quite different. In its denial of post-
conviction relief, the trial court found that not only was petitioner adequately
informed of the potential for conflict, but he insisted that dual representation
continue.
At the arraignment, the judge informed the two defendants that they had the
right to choose any counsel they wished to represent them, but that they should be
aware that dual representation could pose a potential conflict of interest. Both
defendants then stated that they understood the potential for conflict and wished to
proceed with trial counsel's representation.
Neither defendant expressed a desire to proceed to trial. Therefore, trial
counsel effectively negotiated with the District Attorney’s office to arrange
independent plea agreements for each defendant. The pleas were not contingent
on the acceptance of both defendants. Any decision to plead guilty in the hopes
that his wife would receive a reduced sentence was made at the sole discretion of
the defendant and without any pressure or agreement by trial counsel, the District
Attorney or the trial court. Furthermore, petitioner testified at the post-conviction
hearing that he knew he was going to prison and wanted trial counsel to handle both
5 cases. In its findings of fact the trial court concluded “it is apparent from the proof
in the record that Mr. Hamlin was well informed of his rights as a defendant, and
that he desired [trial counsel] to handle his case the way it was handled.” The
evidence clearly supports this finding.
IV. CONCLUSION
We find that nothing trial counsel did or failed to do with respect to either
defendant affected petitioner’s decision to plead guilty. Petitioner failed to
demonstrate there were inconsistent interests at stake and did not show trial
counsel made a choice between possible alternative courses of action that proved
harmful to him. Thomas v. Foltz, 818 F.2d 476, 481 (6th Cir.) cert. denied 484 U.S.
870, 108 S.Ct. 198, 98 L.Ed.2d 149 (1987). We find there was no “actual conflict”
in counsel’s representation of petitioner and the co-defendant. Therefore, petitioner
is not entitled to any presumption of prejudice with respect to ineffective assistance
of counsel. Nor has petitioner established that he was prejudiced by counsel’s joint
representation.
Finding no other allegation to support petitioner’s contention that his guilty
plea was the result of ineffective assistance of counsel, we AFFIRM the judgment
of the trial court.
__________________________ JOE G. RILEY, JUDGE
CONCUR:
________________________________ THOMAS T. WOODALL, JUDGE
________________________________ JAMES CURWOOD WITT, JR., JUDGE