Michael Aaron Jobson v. the State of Texas
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Opinion
In the Court of Appeals Second Appellate District of Texas at Fort Worth ___________________________
No. 02-23-00095-CR ___________________________
MICHAEL AARON JOBSON, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS
On Appeal from Criminal District Court No. 4 Tarrant County, Texas Trial Court No. 1774483R
Before Kerr, Birdwell, and Bassel, JJ. Memorandum Opinion by Justice Kerr MEMORANDUM OPINION
Appellant Michael Aaron Jobson appeals his sentence of 25 years’ incarceration
for failure to comply with sex-offender-registration requirements. See Tex. Code Crim.
Proc. Ann. art. 62.102. In a single point, Jobson argues that his sentence is illegal
because it is outside the lawful punishment range. We agree that the trial court
imposed an illegal sentence, and we therefore reverse Jobson’s sentence and remand
for a new punishment trial.
I. BACKGROUND
Jobson was indicted for failing to comply with the requirements of the sex-
offender-registration statute, a third-degree felony. See id. art. 62.102(b)(2). In two
enhancement paragraphs, the indictment alleged that Jobson had previously been
convicted of two felony-sex-offender-registration offenses.
Jobson pleaded not guilty to the alleged offense and not true to the two
enhancement paragraphs. The jury found Jobson guilty, found both enhancement
paragraphs true, and assessed Jobson’s punishment at 25 years’ incarceration. The trial
court sentenced him accordingly. Jobson now appeals the imposition of that sentence.
II. DISCUSSION
In a single point, Jobson argues that his sentence is illegal because it exceeds
the lawful punishment range. The State concedes the point, and we agree.
2 A. Standard of Review and Applicable Law
A sentence that is outside the authorized punishment range is an illegal
sentence. O’Reilly v. State, 501 S.W.3d 722, 728–29 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2016, no pet.)
(citing Ex parte Parrott, 396 S.W.3d 531, 534 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013)). “If a defendant’s
range of punishment is improperly enhanced, in the sense that the prior convictions
alleged do not actually support enhancement under the applicable statutory provision,
then the defendant has been sentenced in violation of the law and his sentence is
‘illegal.’” Bell v. State, 635 S.W.3d 641, 645 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021) (citing Ex parte Rich,
194 S.W.3d 508, 511–12 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006)). This is an unwaivable complaint
that may be challenged at any time. O’Reilly, 501 S.W.3d at 729 (first citing Ex parte
Pena, 71 S.W.3d 336, 339 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002); and then citing Baines v. State,
418 S.W.3d 663, 674 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2010, pet. ref’d)). Whether a sentence
exceeds the punishment range authorized by statute is a legal question that we review
de novo. See Yazdchi v. State, 428 S.W.3d 831, 837 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014); Fountain v.
State, No. 03-17-00699-CR, 2018 WL 3677871, at *1 (Tex. App.—Austin Aug. 3,
2018, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication).
B. Improper Punishment-Range Enhancement
The punishment range for Jobson’s charged offense was improperly enhanced.
See Bell, 635 S.W.3d at 645. Jobson’s sex-offender-registration offense is a third-degree
felony. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 62.102(b)(2). The trial court’s punishment
charge instructed the jury that if it found both of the indictment’s enhancement
3 paragraphs to be true, it must assess Jobson’s punishment within the range for a first-
degree felony—that is, “confinement . . . for any term of not less than 5 years or more
than 99 years or life.” See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 12.32. Thus, the charge allowed the
enhancements to be “stacked” such that the first enhancement raised the punishment
range to a second-degree felony and the second enhancement paragraph raised the
punishment range to a first-degree felony. This was improper.
The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has made clear that enhancements under
both Article 62.102(c) of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure and Section 12.42 of
the Texas Penal Code “operate only to increase the level of punishment, not to
elevate the grade of the offense of conviction.” Crawford v. State, 509 S.W.3d 359,
363 n.7 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017) (citing Ford v. State, 334 S.W.3d 230, 234–35 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2011)). Therefore, when, as here, an indictment alleges multiple
enhancements under Article 62.102(c) and Penal Code Section 12.42, “the first
enhancement does not raise the first offense itself to a higher grade of felony, [rather]
every subsequent enhancement . . . proceed[s] from the identical baseline, raising the
punishment to exactly the same ‘next highest degree of felony’ as the first
enhancement.” Id.
Because both alleged enhancements should have proceeded from the same
baseline rather than being “stacked,” Jobson’s offense should have been punished as a
second-degree felony, see id., the maximum sentence for which is 20 years’
4 incarceration, Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 12.33. Jobson’s 25-year sentence is thus illegal.
See O’Reilly, 501 S.W.3d at 728–29. Accordingly, we sustain Jobson’s sole point.
III. CONCLUSION
Having sustained Jobson’s sole point, we reverse his sentence and remand this
case to the trial court for a new punishment hearing.
/s/ Elizabeth Kerr Elizabeth Kerr Justice
Do Not Publish Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)
Delivered: February 8, 2024
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