Michael A. Pryor v. J. B. Hunt Transport, Inc.

• Court: Mississippi Supreme Court
• Decided: May 7, 2026
• Docket: 2025-CP-00354-SCT
• Status: Published

Opinion

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF MISSISSIPPI

NO. 2025-CP-00354-SCT

MICHAEL A. PRYOR

v.

J. B. HUNT TRANSPORT, INC.

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 02/27/2025 TRIAL JUDGE: HON. KELLY LEE MIMS TRIAL COURT ATTORNEYS: ARTHUR D. SPRATLIN, JR. DONNA BROWN JACOBS MARGARET ZIMMERMAN SMITH NICOLE ALISE BROUSSARD COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED: PONTOTOC COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: MICHAEL A. PRYOR (PRO SE) ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE: DONNA BROWN JACOBS ARTHUR D. SPRATLIN, JR. MARGARET ZIMMERMAN SMITH NICOLE ALISE BROUSSARD NATURE OF THE CASE: CIVIL - TORTS-OTHER THAN PERSONAL INJURY & PROPERTY DAMAGE DISPOSITION: AFFIRMED - 05/07/2026 MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:

EN BANC.

COLEMAN, PRESIDING JUSTICE, FOR THE COURT:

¶1. In June 2023, Michael Pryor filed suit in the United States District Court for the

Northern District of Mississippi against J.B. Hunt Transport Services, Inc., for alleged

emotional distress and malicious prosecution stemming from an incident that occurred

between July and September 2019. The federal court dismissed the action for lack of

subject-matter jurisdiction. In July 2024, Pryor refiled the case in the Circuit Court of

Pontotoc County. The trial court granted summary judgment after determining that the statute of limitations had run on both claims. Pryor appeals, contending that the statute of

limitations was tolled. The statute of limitations did not toll, and we affirm.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS

¶2. On July 15, 2019, Pryor agreed to transport cargo brokered by J.B. Hunt. On July 17,

2019, Pryor transported the cargo from Ecru, Mississippi, to Smithton, Pennsylvania, where

the receiver rejected the shipment. Pryor notified J.B. Hunt of the rejection, and J.B. Hunt

instructed him to return the load to Ecru. J.B. Hunt employee Manny Galace assured Pryor

that J.B. Hunt “would pay the charges to return [the] rejected cargo to the shipper.”

¶3. Pryor arrived back in Ecru on the evening of July 18, 2019. On July 19, 2019, J.B.

Hunt employee Mike Hatfield, a corporate security officer, emailed Pryor, stating that J.B.

Hunt would not pay the return charges. Pryor attempted to negotiate the charges but was

unsuccessful.

¶4. On July 22, 2019, Hatfield emailed Pryor, stating that retaining the load would

constitute theft. Pryor responded that he was placing a “carrier lien” on the cargo. That same

day, Hatfield contacted the Pontotoc Police Department and reported that Pryor had stolen

a load of furniture.

¶5. On July 24, 2019, J.B. Hunt filed a cargo claim with Pryor’s insurer, asserting that the

furniture was damaged. Pryor placed the furniture into storage the following day.

¶6. On August 12, 2019, a Pontotoc police investigator served Pryor with a search warrant

related to the alleged theft. The following month, in September 2019, Pryor was arrested and

2 charged with felony embezzlement. The criminal charges were “retired to file” on August

9, 2021, and were expunged on August 18, 2022.

¶7. Pryor alleges that J.B. Hunt’s report of theft and his subsequent arrest caused him

humiliation, embarrassment, and economic loss, as well as severe emotional distress. Pryor

further claims the emotional distress caused a latent medical injury that manifested as daily

heart palpitations, which were not diagnosed until a doctor’s appointment on November 16,

2021. Pryor contends that his emotional-distress claims are tolled to the appointment date

under the discovery rule. However, the medical record Pryor submitted as evidence of his

diagnosis, and as noted in J.B. Hunt’s brief, states that Pryor “reports daily palpitations since

he had COVID in 08/21.” The trial court did not address a latent injury or tolling in its

decision, nor did it address either issue elsewhere in the record.

¶8. Based on the above-listed events, Pryor filed a lawsuit in the United States District

Court for the Northern District of Mississippi on June 21, 2023, which was dismissed for

lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Pryor then filed suit in the Pontotoc County Circuit Court

on July 8, 2024, asserting claims for malicious prosecution and intentional and/or negligent

infliction of emotional distress. J.B. Hunt filed a motion to dismiss or, alternatively, a motion

for summary judgment.

¶9. The trial court granted J.B. Hunt’s motion for summary judgment, and Pryor appealed.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶10. We review a court’s ruling on a Rule 56 motion for summary judgment de novo: “It

3 is well-settled that appellate review of the trial court’s grant or denial of a motion for

summary judgment requires the application of de novo review.” Adams v. Graceland Care

Ctr. of Oxford, LLC, 208 So. 3d 575, 579 (Miss. 2017) (citing Copiah Cnty. v. Oliver, 51

So. 3d 205, 207 (¶ 7) (Miss. 2011) (citing Monsanto v. Hall, 912 So. 2d 134, 136 (Miss.

2005))).

¶11. The parties bear the same burdens of producing evidence that they would bear at a

trial. Karpinsky v. Am. Nat’l Ins. Co., 109 So. 3d 84, 88-89 (¶ 11) (Miss. 2013) (citing

Daniels v. GNB, Inc., 629 So. 2d 595, 600 (Miss. 1993)). Here , J.B. Hunt bears the burden

of persuading the Court that no issue of material fact exists, and Pryor bears the burden of

producing competent evidence that demonstrates the existence of a material issue of fact.

Id.

DISCUSSION

¶12. The issues Pryor raises on appeal are based upon whether the trial court correctly

applied the statute of limitations to his emotional-distress and malicious-prosecution claims.

Rule 28(a)(3) of the Mississippi Rules of Appellate Procedure says that “[n]o issue not

distinctly identified shall be argued by counsel, except upon request of the court.” M.R.A.P.

28(a)(3).

Nature of the Emotional-Distress Claim

¶13. In his complaint, Pryor asserts a claim for “garden-variety” emotional distress. The

complaint does not specify whether the claim sounds in intentional or negligent infliction of

4 emotional distress. Both negligent and intentional infliction of emotional distress fall under

Mississippi’s three-year statute of limitations found in Mississippi Code Section 15-1-49

(Rev. 2019). See GEICO Cas. Co. v. Stapleton, 315 So. 3d 464, 467-69 (¶¶ 7-17) (Miss.

2021).

¶14. Under the three-year limitations period, Pryor’s emotional-distress claim would have

accrued on September 11, 2019, the date of his arrest, and it would have expired on

September 11, 2022. The present action, which was filed on July 8, 2024, was therefore

untimely. Pryor contends, however, that he suffered a latent injury that was not discovered

until a doctor’s appointment on November 16, 2021. He argues that the statute of limitations

should therefore be tolled under the discovery rule, which provides: “In actions for which no

other period of limitation is prescribed and which involve latent injury or disease, the cause

of action does not accrue until the plaintiff has discovered, or by reasonable diligence should

have discovered, the injury.” Miss. Code Ann. § 15-1-49(2) (Rev. 2019). In Angle v.

Koppers, Inc., 42 So. 3d 1 (Miss. 2010), the Court clarified the accrual of claims under the

discovery rule. The Angle Court held that under Section 15-1-49(2), “the cause of action

accrued upon discovery of the injury, not discovery of the injury and its cause.” Angle, 42

So. 3d at 5 (¶ 9). In his response to J.B. Hunt’s motion for summary judgment, Pryor argued,

“Plaintiff was unaware of what was causing his health problems until November 16, 2021

. . . .” On that day, Pryor saw a doctor who, he contends, tied preexisting health issues to

emotional distress. Under Angle, Pryor’s ignorance of the cause of his injuries is not relevant

5 as long as he knew of the injuries themselves, and he admits knowing of them in the above-

quoted response.

¶15. “The question of whether a statute of limitations is tolled by the discovery rule often

turns on the factual determination of ‘what the plaintiff knew and when.’” Raddin v.

Manchester Educ. Found., Inc., 175 So. 3d 1243, 1249 (¶ 13) (Miss. 2015) (internal

quotation marks omitted) (quoting Stringer v. Trapp, 30 So. 3d 339, 342 (Miss. 2010)).

Pryor’s response to the motion for summary judgment makes clear that he knew of his

injuries well before the doctor’s visit he points to as the accrual point for his claim.

Accordingly, the trial court did not err by granting J.B. Hunt’s motion for summary judgment

as to Pryor’s emotional-distress claim.

Nature of the Malicious-Prosecution Claim

¶16. To prevail on a claim for malicious prosecution, a plaintiff must establish six elements

as laid out in Strong v. Nicholson: “(1) the institution of a criminal proceeding; (2) by, or

at the instance of, the defendant; (3) termination of such proceedings in plaintiff’s favor; (4)

malice in instituting the proceeding; (5) want of probable cause for the proceeding; and (6)

the plaintiff’s suffering of injury or damage as a result of the prosecution.” Strong v.

Nicholson, 580 So. 2d 1288, 1293 (Miss. 1991). It is the third element, favorable

termination, that is being contested here. J.B. Hunt contends that Pryor cannot satisfy the

third element because the criminal case did not terminate in his favor. The record reflects

that Pryor moved to dismiss the charges, but the trial court did not grant that motion. Instead,

6 the charges were “retired to file.” The record does not explain why the case was retired to

the file, or whether the State intended to pursue it further. Pryor instead relies on a later

order of expungement as proof that the prosecution terminated in his favor.

¶17. A malicious-prosecution cause of action cannot accrue until the underlying criminal

proceeding has terminated in the plaintiff’s favor. Id. Until that termination occurs, the

claim is not complete, and the statute of limitations cannot begin to run. Id.

¶18. Mississippi law makes clear that not every procedural end to a prosecution constitutes

a favorable termination for purposes of malicious prosecution. See Stewart v. Se. Foods,

Inc., 688 So. 2d 733, 737 (Miss. 1996). A termination that is not grounded in the merits or

does not reflect the accused’s innocence will not satisfy the element. See Bearden v.

BellSouth Telecomms., Inc., 29 So. 3d 761, 766 (¶ 12-14) (Miss. 2010); Stewart, 688 So.

2d at 737. In Bearden, 29 So. 3d at 766 (¶ 12-14), the Supreme Court held that dismissal for

lack of jurisdiction did not qualify as a favorable termination because it was not a resolution

on the merits. Likewise, a dismissal based on mercy or leniency does not constitute favorable

termination because “a belief that the accused is guilty” remains. Stewart, 688 So. 2d at 737.

¶19. At the same time, Mississippi law recognizes that a prosecution need not end in an

acquittal to satisfy the favorable-termination requirement. The Mississippi Supreme Court

has held that abandonment of the prosecution is sufficient: “The requirement of termination

is satisfied by showing that the civil suit upon which the malicious prosecution claim is based

was abandoned.” Joiner Ins. Agency, Inc. v. Principal Cas. Ins. Co., 684 So. 2d 1242, 1244

7 (Miss. 1996) (citing 52 Am. Jur. 2d Malicious Prosecution § 42 (1970)). Consistent with

that principle, the Court of Appeals held that when criminal charges were remanded to the

file and no longer pursued, the termination element was met because “[a]lthough he was not

actually acquitted, he was not convicted, and the charges were no longer being pursued.”

Hyer v. Caruso, 102 So. 3d 1232, 1236 (¶ 13) (Miss. Ct. App. 2012). A case that is merely

“retired to file” is not necessarily terminated; it may be reopened and prosecuted at any time.

However, under Joiner and Hyer, if the retirement to the file was because of abandonment

in the sense that the State ceased pursuing the charges and allowed the prosecution to lapse,

then the criminal proceeding terminated at that point, and the malicious-prosecution claim

accrued at that time.

¶20. Pryor’s assertion that the order of expungement serves as favorable termination from

which the cause of action accrues is incorrect. An order of expungement does not terminate

a criminal procedure; it removes records after a prosecution has ended. An order of

expungement may be used as evidence of a favorable termination, but it cannot itself

constitute a favorable termination alone. See Scribner v. Dillard, 269 F. Supp. 2d 716, 719-

20 (N.D. Miss. 2003).

¶21. The record here is silent as to why the charges were retired to the file. Malicious-

prosecution claims are subject to the Mississippi Code Section 15-1-35 (Rev. 2019) one-year

statute of limitations. The charges were retired to the file August 10, 2021; therefore, the

one-year statute of limitations expired August 10, 2022. Pryor filed the current lawsuit on

8 July 8, 2024. Accordingly, even if Pryor’s claim for malicious prosecution accrued on the

date the charges were retired to the file, the statute of limitations had passed long before he

filed the current lawsuit.

CONCLUSION

¶22. The Circuit Court of Pontotoc County’s order granting summary judgment in favor

of J.B. Hunt is affirmed.

¶23. AFFIRMED.

RANDOLPH, C.J., ISHEE, GRIFFIS, SULLIVAN AND BRANNING, JJ., CONCUR. KING, P.J., CONCURS IN RESULT ONLY WITHOUT SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION.