Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of Florida v. Miami-Dade County

• Court: District Court of Appeal of Florida
• Decided: July 15, 2026
• Docket: 3D2025-0562
• Status: Published

Opinion

Third District Court of Appeal State of Florida

Opinion filed July 15, 2026. Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

________________

No. 3D25-0562 Lower Tribunal No. 24-7581-CA-01 ________________

Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of Florida, Appellant,

vs.

Miami-Dade County, Appellee.

An Appeal from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Mavel Ruiz, Judge.

Kula & Associates, P.A., and Elliot B. Kula and Elaine D. Walter; Christopher Ajizian, P.A., and Christopher Ajizian; Todd R. Friedman, P.A., and Todd R. Friedman, for appellant.

Geraldine Bonzon-Keenan, Miami-Dade County Attorney, Christopher J. Wahl and Luis M. Reyes and Christian Sanchez Leon, Assistant County Attorneys, for appellee.

Before FERNANDEZ, LOGUE, and LINDSEY, JJ.

LINDSEY, J. Appellant, The Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of Florida (the “Tribe”),

appeals an order dismissing a declaratory judgment action brought against

Miami-Dade County (“the County”). For the reasons set forth below, we

reverse.

I. BACKGROUND

By way of background, in 1989, the federal government conveyed a

115-acre parcel of land in unincorporated Miami-Dade County (the

“Property”) to the County subject to a deed restriction and reverter that

restricted the Property’s use to correctional purposes. The County never

operated the Property for correctional purposes.

In 1998, the Miami-Dade Department of Corrections (“MDCR”) leased

the Property to the State of Florida Department of Children and Families

(“DCF”). DCF constructed and operated a youth treatment facility on the

Property. In 2019, the Miami-Dade County Homeless Trust, an agency and

instrumentality of Miami-Dade County, began planning a project to benefit

special needs people experiencing homelessness (the “Project”).1 The

Homeless Trust recommended the Property as the Projects’ site.

1 Although DCF eventually ceased its operations and returned the Property to the County, if the Homeless Trust were to repurpose the facility for the Project, the County would need the federal government to release the deed restriction.

2 In October 2022, the County Commission therefore adopted a

resolution (the “2022 Resolution”). The 2022 Resolution authorized the

County Mayor to execute a real estate transaction with the federal

government where the federal government would release the deed

restriction and waive its reversionary rights in exchange for the County’s

payment of a sum representing the appraised value of the Property when it

was conveyed to the County. The 2022 Resolution also approved over $11

million in funding, both for the transaction and for anticipated facility

improvements in furtherance of the Project.

Thereafter, the Homeless Trust sought guidance from the County’s

Assistant Director of Planning for the County’s Department of Regulatory and

Economic Resources regarding the County’s Comprehensive Development

Master Plan (“CDMP”) 2 and any applicable zoning process. The County’s

Assistant Director issued a letter in December 2022 (the “Planning Letter”)

2 The CDMP is “[a] local comprehensive land use plan,” which “is a statutorily mandated legislative plan to control and direct the use and development of property within [the County.]” Machado v. Musgrove, 519 So. 2d 629, 632– 33 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987) (citing § 163.3167(1), Fla. Stat. (1985)). The plan accomplishes this goal, in relevant part, by setting forth a “future land use plan element,” which contains a “future land use map and goals, policies, and measurable objectives to guide future land use decisions.” Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs of Brevard Cnty. v. Snyder, 627 So. 2d 469, 473 (Fla. 1993). Once a plan is adopted, “all development orders approved by local governments must be consistent with the adopted local plan.” Id.

3 opining that the Project’s proposed land use “is an institutional use and can

be considered for approval . . . if compatible” and would therefore be

“consistent with the CDMP.” The Planning letter also referred to the

governmental facilities approval process. 3

The Planning Letter advised that the Property was already subject to a

prior governmental facility approval for institutional use—the correctional

facility. Therefore, the Planning letter advised that the Project’s proposed

institutional use would be consistent with, and within the scope of, the prior

approval. The Planning letter also advised that “[w]hen plans are completed

for the renovation of the building, those plans should be submitted . . . for a

review of a ‘administrative approval for a non-substantial change’ to the

existing Government Facility approval.” But the Planning letter concluded

with the following caveat: “This letter is provided in response to your request

for interpreting the provisions of the CDMP and does not constitute a

departmental recommendation on any pending or future requests for

development approval.” (emphasis added).

In 2023, the County Commission adopted another resolution (the

“2023 Resolution”), which approved $2 million in bond funding for facility

improvements in furtherance of the Project and amended the 2022

3 The governmental facilities approval process is set forth in section 33- 303(b) of The Code of Miami-Dade County, Florida (“County Code”).

4 Resolution to authorize some of those authorized expenditures to be pulled

from bond funds.

As the Planning Letter explained, construction and operation of the

Project would need to be approved through the governmental facilities

approval process set forth in section 33-303(b) of the County Code. This

process provides an alternative to the County’s zoning approval process

when the County seeks to construct or operate a governmental facility. The

procedure generally requires the County Commission to, among other

things, provide appropriate notice to the public, hold a public hearing, and

then issue a decision. See County Code § 33-303(b)(2).

Additionally, once a governmental facility has been approved under the

public hearing process, subsequent changes to the facility may be approved

administratively, so long as the changes are “non-substantial.” See County

Code § 33-303(b)(6). This administrative approval must be made by the

Director of the Department of Regulatory and Economic Resources after

considering the factors in subsection (b)(6). See id.

In April 2024, while the Project had not yet received a formal

development order, the Tribe filed a one count complaint against the County

for declaratory relief. The Tribe alleged that the County violated Florida law

when it passed certain resolutions permitting the construction of the Project

outside of the County’s Urban Development Boundary (the “UBD”) adjacent

5 to Tribe-owned property. Particularly, the Tribe alleged that the 2022 and

2023 Resolutions violated the County Code and CDMP because they

authorized funding for the construction and operation of the Project without

properly changing the Property’s permitted use.

The County moved to dismiss arguing the Tribe’s claims fell into three

categories, all requiring dismissal: (1) the County used an administrative

approval process, the statutes under which the Tribe sought relief were

facially unapplicable to the administrative process, and the Tribe failed to

allege a special injury to attain standing; (2) a consistency challenge under

section 163.3215 is only allowed for development orders, the complaint

contained no allegations that the County’s actions constituted a development

order, and, even if it did, any challenge to the consistency of a development

order was time-barred; and (3) no due process violation occurred because

the County held a public hearing.

The Tribe responded arguing, as a threshold matter, the trial court was

bound to the four corners rule in determining the motion to dismiss. As such,

the Tribe contended it sought declaratory judgment action on the basis that

the County’s Resolutions were tantamount to a development order. 4

4 Section 163.3164(15), Florida Statutes (2024) defines “development order” as “any order granting, denying, or granting with conditions an application for a development permit.” And section 163.3164(16), Florida Statutes (2024) defines “development permit” as “any building permit, zoning permit,

6 As to the complaint itself, the Tribe argued it contained well-pled

allegations for declaratory relief on the County’s improper use of its

comprehensive plan and code to circumvent the County’s obligations under

Florida law. The Tribe also argued it had standing given its status as an

adjacent landowner and the County’s failure to give it notice required under

section 33-303. 5

After a hearing, on February 28, 2025, the trial court “dismisse[d] the

action, without prejudice, for Plaintiff to re-file once consistency review has

ripened.” Twelve days later, on March 12, 2025, the Tribe moved under

Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.140 to extend the time to file its first

amended complaint. The County opposed the extension request, noting the

“consistency review” had not “ripened” so that an amendment could not be

articulated. The trial court denied the Tribe’s request relying on its ruling that

an action could be “re-file[d] once consistency review has ripened.” On

March 28, 2025, the trial court directed the clerk to close the case, clarifying

that its “order of dismissal did not authorize or require an amended pleading

subdivision approval, rezoning, certification, special exception, variance, or any other official action of local government having the effect of permitting the development of land.” 5 The Tribe withdrew its allegations related to general bond procedures and voluntarily dismissed those declaratory judgment claims.

7 to be filed at this time, [the Tribe’s] Motion must be denied.” On March 31,

2025, this timely appeal followed.

II. ANALYSIS

Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.190 provides the right to amend the

Tribe sought: “A party may amend a pleading once as a matter of course at

any time before a responsive pleading is served[.]” See also Sarfaty v. M.S.,

232 So. 3d 1074, 1082 n.12 (Fla. 3d DCA 2017) (discussing the “absolute

right to amend the complaint before a responsive pleading is served”).

Further, the County’s motion to dismiss was not a responsive pleading and

the Tribe had not yet exercised its absolute right to amend it once. See Boca

Burger, Inc. v. Forum, 912 So. 2d 561, 567 (Fla. 2005) (citing Fla. R. Civ. P.

1.100(a)) (“[T]he filing of a motion to dismiss does not terminate a plaintiff’s

absolute right to amend the complaint ‘once as a matter of course.’”); Galvez

v. CIT Bank, 407 So. 3d 522, 524 (Fla. 3d DCA 2025), reh’g denied (Mar.

27, 2025) (quotation omitted) (“[A] motion to dismiss is not a ‘responsive

pleading’ because it is not a ‘pleading’ under the rules.”).

Therefore, we find the trial court did not have discretion to deny the

Tribe’s request to file its first amended complaint. See Grove Isle Ass’n, Inc.

v. Grove Isle Associates, LLLP, 137 So. 3d 1081, 1095 (Fla. 3d DCA 2014)

(quotation omitted) (“[A] trial court does not have discretion to deny leave to

amend on the basis that the complaint is not amendable until (1) the

8 defendant has filed an answer or (2) the plaintiff has already exercised the

right to amend once.”); Bronstein v. Progressive Am. Ins. Co., 338 So. 3d

966, 968 n.2 (Fla. 3d DCA 2022) (citation omitted) (explaining the “right of

plaintiff under rule 1.190(a) to amend complaint once before service of

responsive pleading is automatic and absolute, and trial court has no

discretion to deny such amendment”); see also Solonenko v. Vogue

Properties, LLC, 192 So. 3d 87 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016) (emphasis in original)

(“While appellee argues amendment of the complaint would be futile,

appellant has the right to amend her complaint, even if it appears likely that

the amended complaint would be meritless.”); Williams v. Gaffin Indus.

Services, Inc., 88 So. 3d 1027, 1030 (Fla. 2d DCA 2012) (“[R]ule 1.190(a)

and Boca Burger, Inc. clearly provide that the trial court could not deny

[Appellant’s] request to amend the complaint based on [Appellee’s]

argument that an amendment would have been futile.”). Accordingly, we are

constrained to reverse and remand for proceedings consistent herewith. 6

Reversed and remanded.

6 We express no opinion on the merits of the Tribe’s declaratory relief action or on any of the other issues raised in this appeal.