Glass, J.
The dispositive issue in this appeal is whether the 1955 enactment of General Statutes (Sup. 1955) § SOOOd,1 the first legislation in Connecticut authorizing courts to decree a “legal separation” of married persons, retroactively applies to previously entered equitable decrees of separate maintenance and support, thereby transforming such decrees into decrees of legal separation. Because § 3006d provided a remedy that altered substantive marital rights and obligations, we conclude that the legislature intended it to be prospective in application. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court that the equitable decree of separate maintenance and support entered in 1953 in favor of the defendant, Doris G. Thorne, in [172]*172her action against the now deceased Lawrence S. Thorne (decedent), was not transformed into a decree of legal separation by virtue of the subsequent enactment of § 3006d.2
The material facts are not in dispute. The defendant and the decedent were married in Connecticut on January 2, 1939. Some years later, the couple experienced marital difficulties. On or about September 15, 1952, the defendant left the decedent to live elsewhere, taking with her the two minor children of the marriage, the plaintiffs, Sally T. Miaño and Dana T. Tartoff. Shortly thereafter, on September 24,1952, the defendant commenced an equitable action against the decedent in the Superior Court alleging that he had been habitually cruel to her and had neglected to support her and the plaintiffs. She sought relief in the form of: “(1) A decree requiring [the decedent] to support her and [the plaintiffs], and providing at least Twelve Hundred Dollars ($1,200.00) per month for that purpose; and a temporary allowance for the same amount; (2) A lump sum judgment in the amount of Fifty Thousand Dollars ($50,000.00); [and] (3) Such other relief as to equity may appertain.”
From the transcript of the subsequent trial, it is evident that the defendant and the decedent had reached an agreement regarding the financial orders to be issued by the court. The court rendered judgment in [173]*173accordance with the agreement on May 7,1953, ordering, among other things, that the decedent make monthly payments to the defendant for the support of her and the plaintiffs. Because of the parties’ agreement, the issue of the decedent’s alleged cruelty was never factually resolved, even though the court’s memorandum of decision found all of the issues in favor of this defendant.3
After the entry of the decree of separate maintenance and support, the defendant and the decedent continued to live separately up to and including the date of October 6, 1988, when the decedent died as a resident of West Palm Beach, Florida. It was later discovered that he had left a will naming the plaintiffs as the primary beneficiaries and residuary legatees of his estate. On January 25,1989, after the will had been submitted to probate in a Florida court, the defendant filed an application in that court seeking to exercise the election afforded to a “surviving spouse” under Florida law to claim a 30 percent share of the gross estate of a deceased spouse.4 See Fla. Stat. Ann. §§ 732.201, 732.207 (West 1976). The plaintiffs promptly challenged the defendant’s status as the surviving “spouse” of the decedent by filing this action in the Connecticut Superior Court for a declaratory judgment pursuant to General Statutes § 52-29.5
6The defendant counterclaimed, [174]*174alleging that she was in fact the spouse of the decedent from the date of her marriage until the date of his death.
Thereafter, the parties filed cross motions for summary judgment on the issue of whether the defendant remained married to the decedent until the date of his death. The plaintiffs argued that § 3006d applied retroactively to the decree of separate maintenance and support obtained by the defendant, and thus transformed the decree into one of legal separation. In addition, the plaintiffs maintained that the subsequent passage and retroactive application of Public Acts 1973, No. 73-373, § 7 (b) (1973 act),6 farther transformed the decree into one of legal separation “hav[ingj the effect of a decree dissolving the marriage,” thereby giving the defendant and the decedent “the status of unmarried persons.” The court rejected the plaintiffs’ arguments and rendered summary judgment in favor of the defendant.7 The plaintiffs appealed to the Appellate Court, and we transferred the appeal to this court in accordance with Practice Book § 4023.
The plaintiffs have presented two issues for our review: (1) whether the enactment in 1955 and retroactive application of § 3006d transformed the decree of separate maintenance and support entered in 1953 into a decree of legal separation; and (2) if the decree was so transformed, whether the passage and retro[175]*175active application of the 1973 act further transformed the decree into one giving the defendant the status of an “unmarried person.” Because we hold that § 3006d does not apply retroactively, we need not consider the plaintiffs’ second claim.
The starting point for our analysis of the plaintiffs’ claim that § 3006d applied retroactively is General Statutes § 55-3. Section 55-3 provides: “No provision of the general statutes, not previously contained in the statutes of the state, which imposes any new obligation on any person or corporation, shall be construed to have a retrospective effect.” “The ‘obligations’ referred to in the statute are those of substantive law.” Nagle v. Wood, 178 Conn. 180, 186, 423 A.2d 875 (1979); see Gormley v. State Employees Retirement Commission, 216 Conn. 523, 529, 582 A.2d 764 (1990). Accordingly, “we have uniformly interpreted § 55-3 as a rule of presumed legislative intent that statutes affecting substantive rights shall apply prospectively only.” Darak v. Darak, 210 Conn. 462, 467, 556 A.2d 145 (1989). This presumption is rebutted only when the legislature “ ‘clearly and unequivocally’ expresses its intent that the legislation shall apply retrospectively. State v. Lizotte, 200 Conn. 734, 741, 517 A.2d 610 (1986); Schieffelin & Co. v. Department of Liquor Control, [194 Conn. 165, 174, 479 A.2d 1191 (1984)]; Enfield Federal Savings & Loan Assn. v. Bissell, [184 Conn. 569, 572, 440 A.2d 220 (1981)].” Darak v. Darak, supra, 468. Moreover, although we have presumed that procedural or remedial statutes are intended to apply retroactively absent a clear expression of legislative intent to the contrary; Citizens Against Pollution Northwest, Inc. v. Connecticut Siting Council, 217 Conn.
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Glass, J.
The dispositive issue in this appeal is whether the 1955 enactment of General Statutes (Sup. 1955) § SOOOd,1 the first legislation in Connecticut authorizing courts to decree a “legal separation” of married persons, retroactively applies to previously entered equitable decrees of separate maintenance and support, thereby transforming such decrees into decrees of legal separation. Because § 3006d provided a remedy that altered substantive marital rights and obligations, we conclude that the legislature intended it to be prospective in application. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court that the equitable decree of separate maintenance and support entered in 1953 in favor of the defendant, Doris G. Thorne, in [172]*172her action against the now deceased Lawrence S. Thorne (decedent), was not transformed into a decree of legal separation by virtue of the subsequent enactment of § 3006d.2
The material facts are not in dispute. The defendant and the decedent were married in Connecticut on January 2, 1939. Some years later, the couple experienced marital difficulties. On or about September 15, 1952, the defendant left the decedent to live elsewhere, taking with her the two minor children of the marriage, the plaintiffs, Sally T. Miaño and Dana T. Tartoff. Shortly thereafter, on September 24,1952, the defendant commenced an equitable action against the decedent in the Superior Court alleging that he had been habitually cruel to her and had neglected to support her and the plaintiffs. She sought relief in the form of: “(1) A decree requiring [the decedent] to support her and [the plaintiffs], and providing at least Twelve Hundred Dollars ($1,200.00) per month for that purpose; and a temporary allowance for the same amount; (2) A lump sum judgment in the amount of Fifty Thousand Dollars ($50,000.00); [and] (3) Such other relief as to equity may appertain.”
From the transcript of the subsequent trial, it is evident that the defendant and the decedent had reached an agreement regarding the financial orders to be issued by the court. The court rendered judgment in [173]*173accordance with the agreement on May 7,1953, ordering, among other things, that the decedent make monthly payments to the defendant for the support of her and the plaintiffs. Because of the parties’ agreement, the issue of the decedent’s alleged cruelty was never factually resolved, even though the court’s memorandum of decision found all of the issues in favor of this defendant.3
After the entry of the decree of separate maintenance and support, the defendant and the decedent continued to live separately up to and including the date of October 6, 1988, when the decedent died as a resident of West Palm Beach, Florida. It was later discovered that he had left a will naming the plaintiffs as the primary beneficiaries and residuary legatees of his estate. On January 25,1989, after the will had been submitted to probate in a Florida court, the defendant filed an application in that court seeking to exercise the election afforded to a “surviving spouse” under Florida law to claim a 30 percent share of the gross estate of a deceased spouse.4 See Fla. Stat. Ann. §§ 732.201, 732.207 (West 1976). The plaintiffs promptly challenged the defendant’s status as the surviving “spouse” of the decedent by filing this action in the Connecticut Superior Court for a declaratory judgment pursuant to General Statutes § 52-29.5
6The defendant counterclaimed, [174]*174alleging that she was in fact the spouse of the decedent from the date of her marriage until the date of his death.
Thereafter, the parties filed cross motions for summary judgment on the issue of whether the defendant remained married to the decedent until the date of his death. The plaintiffs argued that § 3006d applied retroactively to the decree of separate maintenance and support obtained by the defendant, and thus transformed the decree into one of legal separation. In addition, the plaintiffs maintained that the subsequent passage and retroactive application of Public Acts 1973, No. 73-373, § 7 (b) (1973 act),6 farther transformed the decree into one of legal separation “hav[ingj the effect of a decree dissolving the marriage,” thereby giving the defendant and the decedent “the status of unmarried persons.” The court rejected the plaintiffs’ arguments and rendered summary judgment in favor of the defendant.7 The plaintiffs appealed to the Appellate Court, and we transferred the appeal to this court in accordance with Practice Book § 4023.
The plaintiffs have presented two issues for our review: (1) whether the enactment in 1955 and retroactive application of § 3006d transformed the decree of separate maintenance and support entered in 1953 into a decree of legal separation; and (2) if the decree was so transformed, whether the passage and retro[175]*175active application of the 1973 act further transformed the decree into one giving the defendant the status of an “unmarried person.” Because we hold that § 3006d does not apply retroactively, we need not consider the plaintiffs’ second claim.
The starting point for our analysis of the plaintiffs’ claim that § 3006d applied retroactively is General Statutes § 55-3. Section 55-3 provides: “No provision of the general statutes, not previously contained in the statutes of the state, which imposes any new obligation on any person or corporation, shall be construed to have a retrospective effect.” “The ‘obligations’ referred to in the statute are those of substantive law.” Nagle v. Wood, 178 Conn. 180, 186, 423 A.2d 875 (1979); see Gormley v. State Employees Retirement Commission, 216 Conn. 523, 529, 582 A.2d 764 (1990). Accordingly, “we have uniformly interpreted § 55-3 as a rule of presumed legislative intent that statutes affecting substantive rights shall apply prospectively only.” Darak v. Darak, 210 Conn. 462, 467, 556 A.2d 145 (1989). This presumption is rebutted only when the legislature “ ‘clearly and unequivocally’ expresses its intent that the legislation shall apply retrospectively. State v. Lizotte, 200 Conn. 734, 741, 517 A.2d 610 (1986); Schieffelin & Co. v. Department of Liquor Control, [194 Conn. 165, 174, 479 A.2d 1191 (1984)]; Enfield Federal Savings & Loan Assn. v. Bissell, [184 Conn. 569, 572, 440 A.2d 220 (1981)].” Darak v. Darak, supra, 468. Moreover, although we have presumed that procedural or remedial statutes are intended to apply retroactively absent a clear expression of legislative intent to the contrary; Citizens Against Pollution Northwest, Inc. v. Connecticut Siting Council, 217 Conn. 143, 151, 584 A.2d 1183 (1991); “a statute which, in form, provides but a change in remedy but actually brings about changes in substantive rights is not subject to retroactive application.” Hunter v. Hunter, 177 Conn. 327, [176]*176332, 416 A.2d 1201 (1979). “The rule is one of obvious justice and prevents the assigning of a quality or effect to acts or conduct which they did not have or did not contemplate when they were performed.” Union Pacific R.R. Co. v. Laramie Stock Yards Co., 231 U.S. 190, 199, 34 S. Ct. 101, 58 L. Ed. 179 (1913).
While § 3006d was intended to provide a new remedy for spouses desiring to live apart,8 the marital rights and obligations of spouses subject to a decree of legal separation were markedly different from those bound by an equitable decree of separate maintenance and support. The fundamental difference concerned the corollary marital rights and obligations of cohabitation and support. To obtain a decree of separate maintenance and support, an aggrieved spouse, typically a wife, was required to demonstrate in an equitable proceeding that she was “justified” in living apart from her husband. DeRosa v. DeRosa, 129 Conn. 409, 412, 28 A.2d 846 (1942). A wife alleging her husband’s cruelty as a ground for the entry of the decree, for example, could prevail with a showing of “something less than conduct which would constitute intolerable cruelty as a ground for divorce. It [was] sufficient if the husband [had] made it intolerable in any way for his wife to live with him.” Kurzatkowski v. Kurzatkowski, 142 Conn. 680, 683, 116 A.2d 906 (1955); see Cantiello v. Cantiello, 136 Conn. 685, 689, 74 A.2d 199 (1950); Campbell v. Campbell, 110 Conn. 277, 279, 147 A. 800 (1929).
The nature of the relief afforded by the decree of separate maintenance and support, however, was limited. Rather than authorizing a wife’s continued separation [177]*177from her husband, the decree provided only temporary relief from her obligation to cohabit with him as an incident to her right to receive his support. See Martin v. Martin, 134 Conn. 354, 356, 57 A.2d 622 (1948); see also 24 Am. Jur. 2d, Divorce and Separation § 4. A husband could at any time make a good faith offer of reconciliation,9 which would place his wife under an obligation to resume cohabitation if the original justification for her refusal to do so had passed. See Kurzatkowski v. Kurzatkowski, supra, 684; accord Martin v. Martin, supra, 358. If she unjustifiably rejected the offer of reconciliation, her right to support could be forfeited; see Kurzatkowski v. Kurzatkowski, supra, 683; DeRosa v. DeRosa, supra, 411; and she could be charged with willful desertion, a ground for divorce. See General Statutes (1949 Rev.) § 7327; Campbell v. Campbell, supra; see also 24 Am. Jur. 2d, supra, § 111.
By comparison, the decree of legal separation available under § 3006d, while leaving the bulk of the statutory and common law rights and obligations of married persons intact,10 terminated the right and correspond[178]*178ing obligation of cohabitation, thereby authorizing the continued separation of the parties to the decree.11 See Viglione v. Viglione, 22 Conn. Sup. 65, 69, 160 A.2d 501 (1960); see also Pettis v. Pettis, 91 Conn. 608, 617-18, 101 A. 13 (1917) (discussing similar decree of divorce a menso et thoro); see generally 24 Am. Jur. 2d, supra, §§ 4, 111; 1 H. Clark, Law of Domestic Relations (1987) § 7.4. Although cohabitation could be resumed at any time after the entry of the decree upon the mere filing of a written “declaration of resumption”; General Statutes (Sup. 1955) § 3006d; a wife could reject her husband’s offer of reconciliation without jeopardizing her right to support or incurring a charge of willful desertion. See generally 24 Am. Jur. 2d, supra, § 111; 1 H. Clark, supra. A husband, on the other hand, could not invoke his right to his wife’s cohabitation as an incident to his obligation to support her by simply improving his behavior and making the appropriate offer of reconciliation. 24 Am. Jur. 2d, supra, § 111; 1 H. Clark, supra.
The evident basis for the distinction between the rights and obligations of married persons bound by the respective decrees was that a wife seeking a decree of legal separation, unlike a wife bringing an equitable action for separate maintenance and support, was required to demonstrate, “in accordance with the procedures governing divorces,” that she “would be entitled to a divorce.” General Statutes (Sup. 1955) § 3006d. In other words, “[t]he existence of statutory grounds for a divorce must be established in such proceedings, such grounds as would justify the court in finally terminating the marriage relationship.” Viglione v. Viglione, supra, 70. A wife alleging that her husband [179]*179had treated her cruelly was therefore required to establish that his behavior rose to the level of “intolerable cruelty,” a statutory ground for divorce; see General Statutes (1949 Rev.) § 7327; which entailed proof that “the cumulative effect of the [husband’s] cruelty upon the suffering [wife] has become such that the public and personal objects of matrimony have been destroyed beyond rehabilitation . . . .” McEvoy v. McEvoy, 99 Conn. 427, 432, 122 A. 100 (1923); see also Campbell v. Campbell, supra.
In view of the substantive disparity between the marital rights and obligations of spouses subject to the respective decrees, we presume that the legislature did not intend § 3006d retroactively to transform previously entered equitable decrees of separate maintenance and support, obtained upon a lesser degree of proof than that required for a divorce, into decrees of legal separation.12 The plaintiffs have not directed our [180]*180attention to any “clear and unequivocal” language in § 3006d, nor do we find any upon an independent examination of the statute, that rebuts this presumption.13 Accordingly, we conclude that § 3006d did not apply retroactively, and hence did not transform the equitable decree of separate maintenance and support obtained by the defendant into a decree of legal separation.
Since the decree was not so transformed, the subsequent passage of the 1973 act, limited in application by its terms to “actions for divorce, annulment, and legal separation,” could not have further transformed the decree into one giving the defendant the status of an “unmarried person” even if retroactively applied.
The judgment is affirmed.
In this opinion the other justices concurred.