Mfib, LLC v. Ibca, LLC
This text of Mfib, LLC v. Ibca, LLC (Mfib, LLC v. Ibca, LLC) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JUN 5 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
MFIB, LLC, a Delaware limited liability No. 25-6589 company doing business as ICON National, D.C. No. 2:25-cv-02517-SPL Plaintiff - Appellant,
v. MEMORANDUM*
IBCA, LLC, a California limited liability company doing business as Icon Builders; ALLEN W. SANDS, an individual residing in Arizona,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Arizona Steven Paul Logan, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted May 19, 2026 Phoenix, Arizona
Before: GOULD, M. SMITH, and HURWITZ, Circuit Judges.
MFIB, LLC appeals the denial of its motion for a preliminary injunction
barring IBCA, LLC and its owner and founder, Allen Sands (collectively,
“Defendants”), from using the trademarks “ICON,” “ICON Builders,” and “THE
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ORIGINAL ICON BUILDERS” (“the ICON Marks”). We have jurisdiction under
28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1). We review the district court’s order for abuse of discretion,
Pom Wonderful LLC v. Hubbard, 775 F.3d 1118, 1123 (9th Cir. 2014), and affirm.
1. Sands began using the ICON Marks in connection with general
contracting services in 1985 and has used the mark in at least five affordable housing
businesses in “various states,” including California, Arizona, New Mexico, and
Texas. Sands had between 50 and 100 percent ownership and served as the president
with “final say” in each of these businesses.
In 2017, one of Sands’s business, Icon Commercial Contractors d/b/a ICON
Builders (“ICC”), merged with MFRG Construction to form MFIB. Sands agreed
not to compete with MFIB in affordable housing renovation projects, but the merger
agreement permitted ICC to continue to use the ICON Marks in connection with
other projects, some of which were still ongoing as of September 2025. MFIB
worked on projects in the affordable housing business using the trademarks “MFRG
ICON” and “ICON National.”
In 2022, MFRG bought out ICC’s interest in MFIB, and Sands’s non-
competition agreement was terminated. In November 2023, MFIB registered the
MFRG ICON and ICON National marks. Sands then dissolved ICC and founded
IBCA, LLC, headquartered in Arizona. By 2024, IBCA had undertaken affordable
housing projects in California and Texas using the ICON Marks. In 2025, MFIB
2 25-6589 sued for trademark infringement and moved for a preliminary injunction to bar
Defendants’ use of the ICON Marks.
2. A preliminary injunction is an “extraordinary remedy that may only be
awarded upon a clear showing that the plaintiff is entitled to such relief.” Winter v.
Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 22 (2008). The movant must show, among
other things, a likelihood of success on the merits. Id. at 20.
To succeed on an infringement claim, MFIB must have senior rights to the
disputed trademarks. See Pom Wonderful, 775 F.3d at 1124. But if the Defendants
engaged in continuous use of the ICON Marks before MFIB registered its marks,
their interest in the ICON Marks is senior. Casual Corner Assocs., Inc. v. Casual
Stores of Nev., Inc., 493 F.2d 709, 711-12 (9th Cir. 1974); 15 U.S.C. §§ 1115(a),
(b)(5).2 MFIB does not dispute that Sands’s other businesses have continuously used
the ICON mark since before registration. The critical issue is whether Defendants
may establish prior use through privity with Sands’s other businesses.
2 Although the parties agree that that § 1115(b)(5) applies and the district court analyzed the case under the statute, a prominent treatise states that § 1115(b)(5) “is restricted to a situation where the registrant is the senior user.” 2 McCarthy on Trademarks & Unfair Competition § 26:53 (5th ed. 2025). In any event, the analysis is the same under the common law. See Sengoku Works Ltd. v. RMC Int’l, Ltd., 96 F.3d 1217, 1219 (9th Cir. 1996) (“It is axiomatic in trademark law that the standard test of ownership is priority of use. To acquire ownership of a trademark it is not enough to . . . have registered it first; the party claiming ownership must have been the first to actually use the mark in the sale of goods or services.”).
3 25-6589 “Privity exists when there is substantial identity between parties, that is, when
there is sufficient commonality of interest.” In re Gottheiner, 703 F.2d 1136, 1140
(9th Cir. 1983) (cleaned up). “When a person owns most or all of the shares in a
corporation and controls the affairs of the corporation, it is presumed that in any
litigation involving that corporation the individual has sufficient commonality of
interest.” Id. The district court’s finding of privity is supported by the record. Sands
testified that he founded each company that engaged in prior use, served as president
of each with “final say,” and maintained between 50 and 100 percent ownership, and
each company traded off the ICON Builders mark to generate business.
3. Even if privity is established, MFIB faults the district court for failing
to consider the geographic scope of prior use. Rights deriving from prior use are
“frozen” after federal registration to “those areas where [the mark] then enjoyed
recognition based on its reputation, advertising, and sales.” Quiksilver, Inc. v.
Kymsta Corp., 466 F.3d 749, 762 (9th Cir. 2006). But we cannot fault the district
court for failing to enter a limited injunction given the procedural posture of this
case. MFIB’s motion for a preliminary injunction sought nationwide relief,
mentioning the possibility of more limited geographic scope only in a footnote.
Instead, the focus of MFIB’s arguments below was that Sands had abandoned any
rights to the ICON Marks. And the only evidence presented to the district court of
IBCA’s current and allegedly infringing use was limited to areas of prior use. Indeed,
4 25-6589 MFIB conceded at oral argument that it has no evidence of present use by the
Defendants in any area other than those of prior use. Under these circumstances, the
district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the broad relief MFIB requested.
4. We emphasize, however, that MFIB may be entitled, on an appropriate
showing, to either preliminary or permanent injunctive relief preventing use of the
ICON Marks by IBCA in areas other than those of prior use. We affirm the district
court’s denial of a preliminary injunction without prejudice to MFIB seeking such
relief.
AFFIRMED.
5 25-6589
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