Mezitt v. Department of Public Utilities

241 N.E.2d 829, 354 Mass. 692
CourtMassachusetts Supreme Judicial Court
DecidedNovember 7, 1968
StatusPublished
Cited by4 cases

This text of 241 N.E.2d 829 (Mezitt v. Department of Public Utilities) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Mezitt v. Department of Public Utilities, 241 N.E.2d 829, 354 Mass. 692 (Mass. 1968).

Opinion

Whittemore, J.

The petitioners, Weston Nurseries, Inc. and three individuals, being the owners of the land in Hopkinton on which the nursery business is conducted, appeal under G. L. c. 25, § 5, as amended, from a decision of the Department granting an exemption pursuant to G. L. c. 40A, § 10, from the Hopkinton zoning by-law for a parcel of land adjacent to the nursery land, owned by the Tennessee Gas Transmission Company (Tennessee Gas).

The Department’s decision, dated December 8, 1965, determined that the construction by Tennessee Gas of a plant for liquefying natural gas and storing it in below ground level reservoirs was “reasonably necessary for the convenience and welfare of the public” and granted the exemption subject to certain restrictions and conditions. The intention is to use the stored gas to supplement normal pipeline supply particularly during periods of peak winter demand.

Tennessee Gas is a natural gas pipeline company as defined by G. L. c. 164 and a public service corporation supplying natural gas in bulk to a number of Massachusetts gas companies. Eighteen of those gas companies have been permitted to intervene and have urged affirmance of the Department’s decision.

The Federal Power Commission, on July 26, 1965, determined that public convenience and necessity required the proposed “construction and operation of [the] facilities” and ordered that a certificate therefor issue. According to the findings and order (an exhibit before the Department) the proposal was for “a liquified natural gas (LNG) plant, a cryogenic in-ground (LNG) storage facility and regasification . . . facilities . . . [by means of which] natural gas . . . during off-peak periods [will be] liquified at a rate of 12,500 Mcf per day, and stored at a temperature of -260° Farenheit in two in-ground frozen bedrock containers.”

The petition of Tennessee Gas to the Department recited the Commission order and its proposal “to erect a plant to liquefy, store and re-deliver natural gas, including a compressor building, a processing complex and underground [694]*694reservoirs.” In describing the proposed plant it recited, inter aha, “Qt]he reservoirs (seven in number) and accessory-facilities, all are located approximately 250 ft. or more, from any existing property line.” The decision of the Department recites: “Initially, two cylindrical reservoirs wih be constructed which will be identical and which will be one hundred thirty five feet in diameter and one hundred eighty feet in depth. Provision has been made for the installation of five additional reservoirs on the same site as load conditions require.”

The Department’s order exempted the site of ninety-eight acres, more or less, from the operation of the zoning by-law “in accordance with the testimony given at the hearing,” subject to restrictions as tó blasting and sound control during construction and to ten permanent rules, including Rule I: “This order shall apply to additional reservoirs.”

1. Except as stated in section 2 of this opinion we discern no error in the decision or the proceedings. The decision shows that the Department weighed the effect of the new plant on the neighborhood and on the town. Several town officials asked questions and stated their reservations as to the desirability and effect of the plant but there was no formal opposition except by the petitioners. The Commissioner of Natural Resources appeared, asked a few questions, and did not oppose. The decision noted that the chairman of the board of selectmen appeared for his board in favor of the petition.

The findings and the decision showed sufficient concern for the impact on the local area. The plant, as the decision recites, is to be located on the northeast corner of the town approximately 3,000 feet from the Ashland-HopMnton boundary. The site is surrounded on three sides by the nursery land; the nearest dwelling is 2,300 feet from the proposed location of the storage tanks; and the nearest building used for human occupancy, the Weston Nurseries office and storage building, is approximately 1,800^'feet away. The Permanent Rules restrict the emission of con[695]*695taminants, fix sound levels and ground temperature, and prescribe fire and leakage protection and landscaping. The evidence showed careful regard for safety in the planning and design of the project.

With any rezoning that increases the business use of what had been a residential area, some adverse effect on the value of adjacent or nearby land is a possible and, in many cases, a likely concomitant. This is a consideration for the rezoning authority. In this case the Department is given the rezoning power because the public "convenience or welfare” (G. L. c. 40A, § 10) to be considered is that of the entire area of the Commonwealth served by the regulated utilities using the gas to be stored. New York Cent. R.R. v. Department of Pub. Util. 347 Mass. 586, 592. The need and the advantages of the plant were shown in the uncontro-verted evidence, and the Department was fully justified in finding that "the proposed situation of the parcel . . . and the type of structures to be erected thereon are reasonably necessary for the convenience and welfare of the public.” Nothing in the testimony of the petitioners required an express finding as to the effect on hypothetical future residential use of their land in the event the nursery business should be discontinued.1

There is no basis in the evidence for concluding that other property values in the town would be affected. The statement in the decision that the "question of alleged damages to property values is not properly before us, the Department having no jurisdiction in this respect,” does not show that the Department did not weigh such evidence as there was of an [696]*696adverse effect on other property. Indeed, its full discussion of the asserted effect of “frost, air pollution, soil erosion on nursery crops, fire, noise [and] contamination of water” shows the contrary. It is of course true that the Department may not make any award for concomitant damages to property, but, as the decision shows it was aware, adverse effects that may be reflected in lessened values are relevant.

It was not inappropriate for the Department to note, as bearing on the adverse effect of a further zoning exemption, the circumstance that the site had already been exempted by its decision in 1963 for a compressor station, combination warehouse, garage, shop and office in one building, a radio tower and loading dock.

There was no error in prescribing in Rule B that “[t]he ambient air at the property line shall not contain more than . . . [prescribed] quantities of contaminants.”* 2 The testimony was that there would be no more air pollution than would be expected from automobile engines. Before compressing and freezing the gas, all components that might cause malfunction are removed. “This would include carbon dioxide, water, hydrogen sulphide and other heavier hydrocarbons.” These are combined with the fuel gas burned in the compressors. According to testimony the products of the combustion would be carbon dioxide and water. We assume, however, that the Department knew that such combustion tends to put other products in the atmosphere. There was no testimony as to dangerous pollutant levels. The petitioners referred to the observed effect of heavy pollution on plant life and it was appropriate for the Department to condition its order on the permitted pollution levels which its expertise indicated were suitable.

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Bluebook (online)
241 N.E.2d 829, 354 Mass. 692, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/mezitt-v-department-of-public-utilities-mass-1968.