Meza v. CDCR Secretary

District Court, E.D. California·Decided July 25, 2025·No. 1:25-cv-00290·Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 10 11 JOHN MEZA, Case No. 1:25-cv-00290-HBK (PC) 12 Plaintiff, ORDER TO ASSIGN A DISTRICT JUDGE

13 v. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO 14 CDCR SECRETARY, R. CLIFTON and E. DISMISS ACTION WITHOUT PREJUDICE1

SILVA, 15 14-DAY DEADLINE Defendants. 16 17 18 Plaintiff John Meza is a former state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis in 19 this civil rights action.2 (Doc. Nos. 1, 7). For the reasons set forth below, the undersigned 20 recommends that the District Court dismiss this action without prejudice for Plaintiff’s failure to 21 respond and comply with a court order, and failure to keep the Court informed of his current 22 address of record and prosecute this action. 24 Plaintiff initiated this action by filing a rights complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging 25 Eighth Amendment stemming from his unlawful extension of his incarceration. (Doc. No. 1). 26

27 1 This matter was referred to the undersigned pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Rule 302 (E.D. Cal. 2022). 28 2 Plaintiff initiated this action while still a prisoner, prior to his release. 1 Specifically, Plaintiff claims on February 28, 2025, he was informed by prison officials that his 2 scheduled parole date of March 2, 2025, had been extended to March 9, 2025, due to the 3 California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation’s failure to credit seven days for a class 4 he completed at Bakersfield College. (Id. at 3). Plaintiff asserts that this adjustment was 5 erroneously applied, resulting in his continued incarceration beyond his lawful release date. (Id.). 6 On May 6, 2025, the Court issued a screening order, pursuant 28 U.S.C. § 1915A finding 7 the Complaint, as pled, failed to state an official capacity claim against any of the named 8 Defendants, was barred by the Eleventh Amendment to the extent it sought monetary damages 9 against the States, and failed to allege sufficient facts to state either an Eighth Amendment or 10 Fourteenth Amendment claim. (See generally Doc. No. 7). In its May 6, 2025 Order, the Court 11 afforded Plaintiff three options to exercise before June 13, 2025: (1) file an amended complaint; 12 (2) file a notice that he intends to stand on his initial complaint subject to the undersigned 13 recommending the district court dismiss for reasons stated in the May 6, 2025 Screening Order; 14 or (3) file a notice to voluntarily dismiss this action, without prejudice, under Federal Rule of 15 Civil Procedure 41(a)(1) because no defendant had yet been served. (Id. at 7-8). The Court 16 expressly warned Plaintiff that if he “fails to timely respond to this Court Order or seek an 17 extension of time to comply” the undersigned “will recommend that the district court dismiss this 18 case as a sanction for Plaintiff’s failure to comply with a court order and prosecute this action.” 19 (Id. at 8, ¶ 2). As of the date of this of this Findings and Recommendation, Plaintiff has failed to 20 exercise any of the three options from the Court’s Screening Order, or request an extension of 21 time to comply, and the time to do so has expired.3 See docket. 22 On May 20, 2025, the Court granted Plaintiff’s renewed application to proceed in forma 23 pauperis. (Doc. No. 9). On June 18, 2025, the Court’s May 20, 2025 Order was returned as 24 undeliverable.4 25 //// 26

27 3 More than 45 days have passed since the date Plaintiff was deliver his response to the Screening Order to correctional officials for mailing. 28 4 The May 6, 2025 Order was not returned to the Court as undeliverable. 2 1. Rule 41 and Local Rule 110 3 A. Legal Standard 4 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b) permits the court to involuntarily dismiss an action 5 when a litigant fails to prosecute an action or fails to comply with other Rules or with a court 6 order. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b); see Applied Underwriters v. Lichtenegger, 913 F.3d 884, 889 7 (9th Cir. 2019) (citations omitted). Similarly, this Court’s Local Rules, which correspond with 8 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11, provide, “[f]ailure of counsel or of a party to comply with … 9 any order of the Court may be grounds for the imposition by the Court of any and all sanctions … 10 within the inherent power of the Court.” E.D. Cal. L.R. 110. “District courts have inherent power 11 to control their dockets” and, in exercising that power, may impose sanctions, including dismissal 12 of an action. Thompson v. Housing Auth., City of Los Angeles, 782 F.2d 829, 831 (9th Cir. 1986). 13 A court may dismiss an action based on a party’s failure to prosecute an action, obey a court 14 order, or comply with local rules. See, e.g., Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1260-61 (9th Cir. 15 1992) (dismissal for failure to comply with a court order to amend a complaint); Malone v. U.S. 16 Postal Service, 833 F.2d 128, 130-31 (9th Cir. 1987) (dismissal for failure to comply with a court 17 order); Henderson v. Duncan, 779 F.2d 1421, 1424 (9th Cir. 1986) (dismissal for failure to 18 prosecute and to comply with local rules). In determining whether to dismiss an action, the Court 19 must consider the following factors: (1) the public’s interest in expeditious resolution of 20 litigation; (2) the Court’s need to manage its docket; (3) the risk of prejudice to the defendants; 21 (4) the public policy favoring disposition of cases on their merits; and (5) the availability of less 22 drastic sanctions. Henderson, 779 F.2d at 1423; Carey v. King, 856 F.2d 1439, 1440 (9th Cir. 23 1988). 24 B. Analysis 25 After considering each of the above-stated factors, the undersigned concludes dismissal 26 without prejudice is warranted in this case. As to the first factor, the expeditious resolution of 27 litigation is deemed to be in the public interest, satisfying the first factor. Yourish v. California 28 Amplifier, 191 F.3d 983, 990-91 (9th Cir. 1999). 1 Turning to the second factor, this Court’s need to efficiently manage its docket cannot be 2 overstated. This Court has one of the heaviest caseloads in the nation, and due to the delay in 3 filling judicial vacancies, which was further exacerbated by the COVID-19 pandemic, operated 4 under a declared judicial emergency through May 2, 2021. See In re Approval of the Judicial 5 Emergency Declared in the Eastern District of California, 956 F.3d 1175 (9th Cir. 2020). This 6 Court’s time is better spent on its other matters than needlessly consumed managing a case with a 7 recalcitrant litigant. The Court cannot effectively manage its docket when a litigant ceases to 8 litigate his/her case or respond to a court order. Thus, the Court finds that the second factor 9 weighs in favor of dismissal.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Meza v. CDCR Secretary, (E.D. Cal. 2025).

Meza v. CDCR Secretary (Meza v. CDCR Secretary) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

Related

Sibron v. New York
392 U.S. 40 (Supreme Court, 1968)
Patricia Scott Anderson v. Air West, Incorporated
542 F.2d 522 (Ninth Circuit, 1976)
Gregory Carey v. John E. King
856 F.2d 1439 (Ninth Circuit, 1988)
Michael Henry Ferdik v. Joe Bonzelet, Sheriff
963 F.2d 1258 (Ninth Circuit, 1992)
J. Wilkerson v. B. Wheeler
772 F.3d 834 (Ninth Circuit, 2014)
Applied Underwriters, Inc. v. Larry Lichtenegger
913 F.3d 884 (Ninth Circuit, 2019)