Meza-Islas v. Garland

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: April 4, 2024
• Docket: 22-1917
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS APR 4 2024 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

JUAN MANUEL MEZA-ISLAS, No. 22-1917 Agency No. Petitioner, A200-246-819 v. MEMORANDUM* MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney General,

Respondent.

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted March 29, 2024** Pasadena, California

Before: RAWLINSON, LEE, and BRESS, Circuit Judges.

Juan Manuel Meza-Islas (Meza-Islas), a native and citizen of Mexico,

petitions for review of a decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA)

dismissing his appeal of the denial by an Immigration Judge (IJ) of withholding of

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). removal and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). We have

jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a), and we deny the petition.

“Where, as here, the [BIA] adopts the IJ’s decision citing Matter of

Burbano, 20 I. & N. Dec. 872 (B.I.A. 1994) and provides its own review of the

evidence and law, we review the decisions of both the BIA and the IJ.” Udo v.

Garland, 32 F.4th 1198, 1202 (9th Cir. 2022) (citations omitted). “We review the

[BIA’s] legal conclusions de novo and its factual findings for substantial

evidence.” Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). “A finding by the

IJ is not supported by substantial evidence when any reasonable adjudicator would

be compelled to conclude to the contrary based on the evidence in the record.”

Bringas-Rodriguez v. Sessions, 850 F.3d 1051, 1059 (9th Cir. 2017) (en banc)

(citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

1. Substantial evidence supports the BIA’s determination that Meza-Islas

failed to establish past persecution. Meza-Islas argues that the “psychological and

emotional trauma” inflicted upon him supported a finding of past persecution. But

the record does not compel that conclusion. “Persecution . . . is an extreme

concept that means something considerably more than discrimination or

harassment. . . .” Sharma v. Garland, 9 F.4th 1052, 1060 (9th Cir. 2021) (citations

and internal quotation marks omitted). Meza-Islas was attacked by five members

of the Martinez family with a machete, resulting in a cut to his back, which healed

2 after a few weeks without medical treatment. This event did not rise to the level of

persecution. See id. at 1061 (noting that “[w]e have repeatedly denied petitions for

review when . . . the record did not demonstrate significant physical harm”). And

although Meza-Islas received two threatening phone calls, “[t]hreats . . . constitute

past persecution . . . only when the threats are so menacing as to cause significant

actual suffering or harm.” Lim v. I.N.S., 224 F.3d 929, 936 (9th Cir. 2000)

(citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Finally, “the cumulative effect of

all the incidents” do not “form a sufficiently negative portrait” of Meza-Islas’s

experience to require “a finding of past persecution.” Sharma, 9 F.4th at 1061

(citations omitted).1

2. Meza-Islas contends that his family-based particular social group is

cognizable. However, the BIA did not entertain Meza-Islas’s “claim under a

family-based particular social group” because he failed to “clearly or meaningfully

raise a family-based social group” before the IJ. Meza-Islas does not challenge the

BIA’s ruling on this point. We therefore decline to disturb the BIA’s decision. See

Honcharov v. Barr, 924 F.3d 1293, 1297 (9th Cir. 2019) (per curiam) (holding that

the BIA “did not err when it declined to consider [the] proposed particular social

1 Meza-Islas maintains that substantial evidence supports the determination that he has a well-founded fear of future persecution on account of his family ties. However, this issue is not before us. See Garcia v. Wilkinson, 988 F.3d 1136, 1142 (9th Cir. 2021) (“In reviewing the BIA’s decisions, we consider only the grounds relied upon by that agency.”).

3 groups that were raised for the first time on appeal”). In any event, “the lack of a

nexus to a protected ground is dispositive of [petitioner’s] . . . withholding of

removal claim[].” Riera-Riera v. Lynch, 841 F.3d 1077, 1081 (9th Cir. 2016)

(citation omitted). Substantial evidence supports the IJ’s determination that Meza-

Islas’s past harm was not on account of a protected ground but was linked to a

personal vendetta between families.

3. Substantial evidence also supports the agency’s denial of CAT relief.

To establish eligibility for CAT relief, an applicant must establish the existence of

a “particularized threat of torture . . . inflicted by or at the instigation of or with

the consent and acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an

official capacity.” Lalayan v. Garland, 4 F.4th 822, 840 (9th Cir. 2021) (citation

omitted) (emphasis in the original). Although Meza-Islas contends “that the

Mexican police force is plagued with corruption at all levels,” he does not “cite any

direct evidence that the Mexican government or local Mexican officials are aware

of and have acquiesced in any . . . plan to torture [Meza-Islas].” B.R. v. Garland,

26 F.4th 827, 845 (9th Cir. 2022) (citation omitted). Thus, “the record does not

compel the conclusion that [Meza-Islas] faces any ongoing or particularized threat

of torture.” Rodriguez-Hernandez v. Garland, 89 F.4th 742, 754 (9th Cir. 2023)

(citation, original alterations, and internal quotation marks omitted) (emphasis in

the original).

4 PETITION DENIED.2

2 Meza-Islas’s motion to stay removal, Dkt. 4, is denied. The temporary stay of removal shall remain in place until the mandate issues.