Meyers v. Credit Bureau Services, Inc.

CourtDistrict Court, D. Nebraska
DecidedNovember 29, 2021
Docket8:20-cv-00141
StatusUnknown

This text of Meyers v. Credit Bureau Services, Inc. (Meyers v. Credit Bureau Services, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Nebraska primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Meyers v. Credit Bureau Services, Inc., (D. Neb. 2021).

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEBRASKA

RICHARD D. MYERS, Bankruptcy trustee for the bankruptcy estate of Donna Jean Lunsford;

8:20CV141 Plaintiff,

vs. ORDER

CREDIT BUREAU SERVICES, INC., and C. J. TIGHE,

Defendants.

This matter is before the Court on Defendants’ Motion for Leave to File Amended Answer and Affirmative Defense (Filing No. 66). For the reasons explained below, the motion will be granted. BACKGROUND Plaintiff filed this suit on April 13, 2020, alleging Defendants violated the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”) and Nebraska Consumer Protection Act (“NCPA”) by sending certain debt collection letters. (Filing No. 1.) On November 10, 2020, Defendants filed their Answer and Affirmative Defenses, which contained a bona fide error affirmative defense. (Filing No. 34.) Defendants withdrew this defense on May 20, 2021. (Filing No. 51.) On August 12, 2021, Plaintiff served answers to interrogatories indicating that the material basis for his claim that Defendants violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692f(1) of the FDCPA is that “Defendants are seeking and collecting interest and other charges, which are not part of any underlying agreement between the original creditor and the consumer or allowed by law.”1 (Filing No. 72-1.) On September 3, 2021, following receipt of these interrogatory responses, Defendants filed their Motion to Amend requesting leave to amend their Answer to include a bona fide error affirmative defense. The motion is opposed. DISCUSSION Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15, the Court should “freely give leave” to amend a pleading “when justice so requires.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15. Nevertheless, a party does not have an absolute right to amend and “denial of leave to amend may be justified by undue delay, bad faith on the part of the moving party, futility of the amendment or unfair prejudice to the opposing party.” Amrine v. Brooks, 522 F.3d 823, 833 (8th Cir. 2008) (quotation and citation omitted). Additionally, where a party “seeks leave to amend after a scheduling order deadline, that party must first demonstrate good cause under Rule 16(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure before the court can consider whether the proposed amendments are proper under Rule 15(a).” BDC Farms, Inc. v. Certified Angus Beef, LLC, No. 8:08CV25, 2007 WL2344814, *3 (D. Neb. Aug. 14, 2007) (quotation omitted). “The primary measure of Rule 16’s good cause standard is the moving party’s diligence in attempting to meet the case management order’s requirements.” Bradford v. DANA Corp., 249 F.3d 807, 809 (8th Cir. 2001). “[I]f the reason for seeking the amendment is apparent before the deadline and no offsetting factors appear, the Rule 16 deadline must govern.” Financial Holding Corp. v. Garnac Grain Co., 127 F.RD. 165, 166 (W.D. Mo. 1989). Defendants seek to amend their Answer to include a bona fide error affirmative defense, to provide as follows: “As to whether Defendants sought to collect an amount that was not expressly authorized by agreement creating the debt or permitted by law, Defendants acted in good faith with reasonable grounds to believe that their actions were not in violation of law, including the FDCPA, and to the extent that it is applicable, which Defendants dispute, the actions were

1 Defendants assert that after the trial in a similar case brought against Defendants by Plaintiff’s counsel (Bassett v. Credit Bureau Services, Case No. 16-cv-449 (D. Neb. 2016)), they suspected Plaintiff would argue Defendants violated the FDCPA and NCPA by seeking to collect interest that was not allowed by Neb. Rev. Stat. § 45-104. Defendants contend Plaintiff’s counsel covertly asserted this argument in Bassett on the eve of trial. Thus, Defendants served these discovery requests to clarify the precise basis for Plaintiff’s claims. In addition, Senior United States District Court Judge Joseph Bataillon’s Memorandum and Order issued August 13, 2021 in Bassett seemed to indicate the possibility of a bona fide error defense if pled by Defendants. unintentional and/or were the result of a bona fide error.” (Filing No. 66-1.) Defendants argue amendment should be allowed because Plaintiff did not directly allege in the Complaint that the letters violated the FDCPA and NCPA by seeking to collect interest that was not allowed by law. Plaintiff maintains that the entire basis for Plaintiff’s § 1692f(1) claim was not clear until they received Plaintiff’s interrogatory responses on August 12, 2021.2 In opposition to the motion, Plaintiff claims amendment would be futile because the proposed defense is insufficiently pled. Plaintiff also maintains amendment would be futile because reliance on “advice of counsel or mistake of law does not constitute a bona fide error under the FDCPA.” (Filing No. 69.) Defendants dispute that their defense is insufficiently pled. They also contend that they are not attempting to assert an advice of counsel defense and that the bona fide error defense is not futile. Futility justifies a court’s denial of leave to amend a pleading. Geier v. Missouri Ethics Com'n, 715 F.3d 674, 678 (8th Cir. 2013). However, a motion to amend should be dismissed on the merits “only if it asserts clearly frivolous claims or defenses.” Gamma-10 Plastics, Inc. v. Am. President Lines, 32 F.3d 1244, 1255 (8th Cir. 1994) (quotation omitted). “Likelihood of success on the new claim or defenses is not a consideration for denying leave to amend unless the claim is clearly frivolous.” Becker v. Univ. of Neb., 191 F.3d 904, 908 (8th Cir. 1999). “The party opposing such amendment ha[s] the burden of establishing that leave to amend would be . . . futile.” Sokolski v. Trans Union Corp., 178 F.R.D. 393, 396 (E.D.N.Y. 1998) (citation omitted). Both parties have pointed the Court to authority to support their respective positions regarding the availability of advice of counsel or mistake of law defenses in connection with FDCPA claims. Based on this authority, the Court is unable to conclude at this time that

2 Section 1692f provides: A debt collector may not use unfair or unconscionable means to collect or attempt to collect any debt. Without limiting the general application of the foregoing, the following conduct is a violation of this section: (1) The collection of any amount (including any interest, fee, charge, or expense incidental to the principal obligation) unless such amount is expressly authorized by the agreement creating the debt or permitted by law.

15 U.S.C. § 1692f(1). Defendants’ proposed amendment is clearly frivolous. Further, the Court is not convinced the proposed affirmative defense is insufficiently pled.

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Related

Gordon M. Becker v. University of Nebraska, at Omaha
191 F.3d 904 (Eighth Circuit, 1999)
Gerald Geier v. Missouri Ethics Commission
715 F.3d 674 (Eighth Circuit, 2013)
Amrine v. Brooks
522 F.3d 823 (Eighth Circuit, 2008)
Sokolski v. Trans Union Corp.
178 F.R.D. 393 (E.D. New York, 1998)

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Meyers v. Credit Bureau Services, Inc., Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/meyers-v-credit-bureau-services-inc-ned-2021.