[299]*299LOUIS B. BUTLER, JR., J.
¶ 1. The defendants, Bayer AG, et al. (collectively "Bayer"), seek review of a published court of appeals' decision1 reversing a circuit court order that dismissed all claims brought under Wisconsin's Antitrust Act, Chapter 133 of the Wisconsin Statutes, by Barbara Meyers, Lynn Stucker, Loyal Berg, and Eugene Browning (collectively "Meyers"), representing a putative class of Wisconsin residents who purchased the antibiotic ciprofloxacin hydrochloride from Bayer under the brand name Cipro. Meyers' complaint2 alleges that Wisconsin consumers paid inflated prices for Cipro as a result of an unlawful agreement between Bayer and three manufacturers of generic drugs, Barr Laboratories, Inc. ("Barr"), Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc. ("HMR") and The Rugby Group ("Rugby"), which precluded Barr, HMR and Rugby from selling or marketing generic ciprofloxacin hydrochloride to compete with Cipro.
¶ 2. The circuit court, Honorable Michael D. Guolee, dismissed Meyers' claims against Bayer, concluding that Wisconsin's Antitrust Act, Wis. Stat. § 133.03 (2005-06),3 applied only to intrastate commerce. Meyers appealed, and the court of appeals held the case in abeyance pending our decision in Olstad v. Microsoft Corp., 2005 WI 121, 284 Wis. 2d 224, 700 N.W.2d 139. Subsequently, we concluded in Olstad that Wisconsin's Antitrust Act applies to cases involving interstate conduct if
[300]*300(1) the actionable conduct, such as the formation of a combination or conspiracy, occurred within this state, even if its effects are felt primarily outside of Wisconsin; or (2) the conduct complained of "substantially affects" the people of Wisconsin and has impacts in this state, even if the illegal activity resulting in those impacts occurred predominantly or exclusively outside this state.
Olstad, 284 Wis. 2d 224, ¶ 1. Applying Olstad, the court of appeals reversed the circuit court on grounds that the Wisconsin Antitrust Act reaches interstate commerce, and Meyers' complaint alleged facts of illegal conduct that, if true, "substantially affected" the people of Wisconsin and had impacts in this state. Meyers v. Bayer AG, 2006 WI App 102, ¶¶ 1, 10-11, 293 Wis. 2d 770, 718 N.W.2d 251.
¶ 3. We follow our precedent set forth in Olstad for determining when Chapter 133 reaches interstate commerce: A plaintiff filing an action under Wisconsin's Antitrust Act must allege price fixing as a result of the formation of a combination or conspiracy that" 'substantially affects' the people of Wisconsin and has impacts in this state" when the challenged conduct occurs predominately or exclusively outside this state. Olstad, 284 Wis. 2d 224, ¶ 85. We conclude that additional limitations Bayer and amici Milwaukee Metropolitan Chamber of Commerce and Wisconsin Manufacturers and Commerce seek to read into the "substantially affects" standard are unsupported by our precedents and are contrary to the policy choices of the legislature.
¶ 4. Meyers' 35-page, 106-paragraph complaint alleges a broad price-fixing scheme affecting "at a minimum, thousands ... in Wisconsin" who purchased the best-selling antibiotic Cipro "at any time since [301]*301January 6, 1995." We conclude Meyers' complaint alleges illegal conduct that, if true, substantially affected the people of Wisconsin and had impacts in this state.4 We therefore affirm the court of appeals' decision reversing the circuit court's order dismissing Meyers' claims, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
I-H
¶ 5. This review of a decision of the court of appeals arises on a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. For purposes of this review, we accept as true the facts alleged in Meyers' complaint. Tietsworth v. Harley-Davidson, Inc., 2004 WI 32, ¶ 5, 270 Wis. 2d 146, 677 N.W.2d 233. The facts as set forth below are taken from Meyers' complaint except where otherwise noted.
¶ 6. Bayer filed U.S. Patent No. 4,670,444 (" '444 patent") on May 29, 1984, a compound patent for the [302]*302drug ciprofloxacin hydrochloride. In October 1987, a subsidiary of Bayer obtained approval from the Food and Drug Administration ("FDA") to market ciprofloxa-cin hydrochloride. The drug was marketed under the name Cipro, a broad spectrum antibiotic approved to treat sinusitis, lower respiratory infections, and fifteen other ailments. Cipro quickly became one of the most prescribed drugs of its kind.5 Meyers' complaint states that within one year of its introduction, Cipro was adopted in the formulary of every hospital in the United States.
¶ 7. In October 1991 Barr filed an Abbreviated New Drug Application ("application") with the FDA, pursuant to certain provisions of 21 U.S.C. § 355, a/k/a the Hatch-Waxman Act, requesting approval to market and sell generic ciprofloxacin hydrochloride ("generic Cipro"). Pursuant to the Hatch-Waxman Act, Barr notified Bayer of its application, and asserted that Bayer's '444 patent was invalid and unenforceable. In response, Bayer filed a patent infringement lawsuit against Barr on January 16, 1992, challenging Barr's application to market and sell generic Cipro. As a result of the infringement lawsuit, FDA approval of Barr's application was automatically postponed by operation of statute, 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii) (1991), pending resolution of the patent infringement lawsuit.
¶ 8. On January 6, 1995, with the patent case as yet unresolved, the FDA gave tentative approval to Barr's application for generic Cipro. Meyers' complaint states that, following the FDA's action, a Barr official [303]*303reportedly stated that Barr would bring to market its generic Cipro "immediately" if Barr prevailed in the patent infringement suit.
¶ 9. On March 29, 1996, Barr entered into an agreement with Rugby, a rival generic drug manufacturer, in which Barr agreed to share equally with Rugby any rights and profits from the eventual marketing and distribution of generic Cipro in exchange for Rugby's assistance in funding the patent litigation with Bayer.
¶ 10. Bayer moved for summary judgment in the patent suit with Barr and Rugby in January 1996. On June 5, 1996, the court presiding over the patent litigation denied Bayer's motion for summary judgment, and denied a motion for reconsideration on September 5, 1996.
¶ 11. On January 8, 1997, Bayer, Barr, HMR, and Rugby entered into four agreements (collectively, the "Agreement") which allocated the entire United States market for Cipro for at least six years, and required Bayer to make large monetary payments to Barr and HMR.6 According to the complaint, Bayer made an initial payment to Barr and HMR of $49.1 million. The complaint asserts that the Agreement granted Bayer an unlawful monopoly in the market for Cipro and generic Cipro. As a part of the Agreement, Bayer and Barr agreed to resolve the patent litigation by entering into a consent judgment that acknowledged the validity and enforceability of the '444 patent. Bayer states it is undisputed that the discussions relating to the Agreement occurred in New York and Germany.
[304]*304¶ 12. The Agreement further provided that Bayer could either (a) license and supply Bayer-manufactured Cipro to Barr and HMR for resale under a generic label; or (b) pay quarterly amounts to Barr from 1998 through at least 2003.7 The former of these options established the price Barr and HMR would pay to Bayer for Cipro, and required Barr and HMR to share its profits with Bayer. The Agreement also required Barr to amend its application to the FDA, ending its challenge to the validity of the '444 patent. The Agreement required that the parties not disclose the terms of the Agreement. The consent judgment ending the patent litigation in federal court contained no information about the terms of the Agreement and made no mention of any payments from Bayer to Barr.
¶ 13. Meyers' complaint asserts that, as a result of the Agreement, Bayer maintained its monopoly of the United States market for Cipro and generic equivalents of Cipro. Published reports cited in the complaint show that from January 1997 to December 1998, Bayer increased the price of Cipro by 16.7%, one of the largest increases for any prescription drug in the United States. Bayer's internal sales documents show that its revenues and profits increased substantially after the execution of the Agreement, according to the complaint. From 1998 to 1999, Bayer's United States revenues from Cipro went up from $834,620,400 to $1,042,473,100, an increase of 25%, while its net profits jumped from $756,265,800 to $921,631,900, an increase of 22%.
[305]*305¶ 14. The complaint asserts that were it not for the conduct of the defendants, generic manufacturers, including Barr, would have begun marketing and selling generic Cipro in the United States no later than January 1995. The complaint asserts that, "[a]s a result of the illegal conduct of Defendants, Plaintiffs and members of the Class were compelled to pay, and did pay, supracompetitive prices for Cipro which were substantially higher than the prices that Plaintiffs and members of the Class would have paid absent the unlawful agreements and conspiracy alleged herein."
¶ 15. In November 2000, Meyers,8 both individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, filed suit against Bayer, Barr, Rugby, Watson and HMR in Milwaukee County Circuit Court. The complaint states that the named plaintiffs and members of the putative class are Wisconsin residents who purchased Cipro indirectly from Bayer at any time since January 6, 1995. The complaint alleges violations of the Wisconsin Unfair Competition statute, Wis. Stat. § 100.20(1), and the Wisconsin Antitrust Act, Wis. Stat. § 133.03(1).
¶ 16. The case was removed to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin and subsequently transferred to a New York federal district court. On October 1, 2001, the case was remanded back to the state court where it was originally filed. See In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 166 F. Supp. 2d 740, 742-43 (E.D.N.Y. 2001).
¶ 17. On remand of the matter back to the Milwaukee Circuit Court, Bayer moved to dismiss Meyers' complaint. In an order dated September 19, 2003, the Milwaukee County Circuit Court, Honorable Michael D. [306]*306Guolee, granted Bayer's motion, concluding that the complaint failed to state a claim on which relief could be granted. The circuit court's decision relied on Conley Publishing Group, Ltd. v. Journal Communications, Inc., 2003 WI 119, ¶ 16, 265 Wis. 2d 128, 665 N.W.2d 879, which stated that "the scope of Chapter 133 is limited to intrastate transactions."
¶ 18. Meyers appealed from the order of dismissal. The court of appeals stayed the appeal pending the outcome of the Olstad case, which was on certification to this court to resolve an apparent conflict between a line of cases including Conley Publishing, which held that Chapter 133 did not reach interstate commerce, and a divergent line of cases, including State v. Allied Chemical and Dye Corp., 9 Wis. 2d 290, 295, 101 N.W.2d 133 (1960), which suggested that Chapter 133 provided a remedy in at least some cases involving interstate conduct. In a 5-0 decision, with Chief Justice Abrahamson and Justice Bradley not participating, we wrote that Chapter 133 "applies to interstate commerce, at least in some circumstances." Olstad, 284 Wis. 2d 224, ¶ 74. We explained that Wisconsin's Antitrust Act provides a remedy whenever: (1) the actionable conduct occurs within the state; or (2) the actionable conduct "substantially affects" the people of Wisconsin and has impacts in the state, even if the conduct resulting in these impacts occurred outside of Wisconsin. Id., ¶ 85.
¶ 19. In view of Olstad, the court of appeals reversed the circuit court, concluding that the circuit court's interpretation of the scope of the Wisconsin Antitrust Act was erroneous. Meyers, 293 Wis. 2d 770, 9. The court of appeals noted that while Olstad did not define substantially affects, this court stated in Allied Chemical, 9 Wis. 2d at 295, that [t]he public interest [307]*307and welfare of the people of Wisconsin are substantially affected if prices of a product are fixed or supplies thereof are restricted as the result of an illegal combination or conspiracy." The court of appeals examined Meyers' complaint and concluded that it set forth the necessary facts and allegations to withstand a motion to dismiss. Meyers, 293 Wis. 2d 770, ¶ 13.
¶ 20. Bayer filed a petition seeking review of the court of appeals' decision, stating that the issue presented for review was whether the allegations of the complaint satisfied the "substantially affects" test articulated in Olstad. We granted Bayer's petition to address this particular issue, and we affirm.
¶ 21. The matter of whether a complaint states a claim upon which relief can be granted is a question of law subject to our independent review. Beloit Liquidating Trust v. Grade, 2004 WI 39, ¶ 17, 270 Wis. 2d 356, 677 N.W.2d 298 (citation omitted). "A motion to dismiss a complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted tests the legal sufficiency of the complaint." Id. For the limited purposes of assessing the complaint's legal sufficiency, we accept as true all facts as set forth in the complaint, and reasonable inferences that may be drawn from such facts. Id. "[A] complaint in a civil action should not be dismissed as legally insufficient unless it is clear that there are no circumstances under which the plaintiff can recover." Lewis v. Sullivan, 188 Wis. 2d 157, 164, 524 N.W.2d 630 (1994).
¶ 22. Whether the complaint is legally sufficient in this case depends upon application of the Wisconsin Antitrust Act, Chapter 133, and the cases construing it, [308]*308to the facts as pled. Interpretation and application of statutes and case law to a set of facts are matters of law that we decide de novo. Welin v. American Family Mut. Ins. Co., 2006 WI 81, ¶ 16, 292 Wis. 2d 73, 717 N.W.2d 690.
¶ 23. Statutory interpretation begins with the language of the statute. We apply the language of the statute as written, giving the words their commonly accepted meanings. Statutory context is relevant to the plain meaning of a statute. Previous cases construing a statute also become a part of our understanding of a statute's plain meaning. See Olstad, 284 Wis. 2d 224, ¶ 21 (quoting Zimmerman v. Wisconsin Elec. Power Co., 38 Wis. 2d 626, 633-34, 157 N.W.2d 648 (1968) (" 'It has often been said that once a construction has been given to a statute, the construction becomes a part of the statute.'")).
HH HH H-i
¶ 24. Two years ago, we concluded in Olstad, 284 Wis. 2d 224, ¶ 1, that the Wisconsin Antitrust Act, Wis. Stat. § 133.03,
may reach interstate commerce if (1) actionable conduct, such as the formation of a combination or conspiracy, occurred within this state, even if its effects are felt primarily outside Wisconsin; or (2) the conduct complained of "substantially affects" the people of Wisconsin and has impacts in this state, even if the illegal activity resulting in those impacts occurred predominantly or exclusively outside this state.
A civil plaintiff filing an action under the act must allege either that actionable conduct occurred within the state, or that the conduct complained of "substan[309]*309tially affects" the people of Wisconsin and has impacts in this state. Id,., ¶ 85. Because the issue in Olstad arose on a certified question, we did not apply the "substantially affects" test to the facts of the case, a class action against the software manufacturer Microsoft alleging monopolistic practices. See id. We explicitly declined to elaborate on the meaning of "substantially affects," except to state the following: "Operating with lesser standards would jeopardize the action, undermine the validity of our antitrust statute, and create the spectacle of Lilliputian harassment in Wisconsin courts." Id.
¶ 25. Bayer contends that the cases upon which Olstad relied establish that the "substantially affects" test requires that plaintiffs allege specific and particularized effects on Wisconsin consumers, not merely generalized allegations of nationwide effects. It further asserts that plaintiffs must allege that the impacts on this state are more than that indirect purchasers in Wisconsin may have paid higher prices because of the challenged conduct. Meyers contends that requiring allegations of specific and particularized effects would amount to a heightened pleading standard for claims brought under the Wisconsin Antitrust Act, and be contrary to the purposes of the statute. To consider these arguments, we examine the language of the Wisconsin Antitrust Act and those cases interpreting it.
A
¶ 26. Wisconsin Stat. § 133.03 provides as follows, in relevant part:
(1) Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce is illegal. Every person who makes any contract [310]*310or engages in any combination or conspiracy in restraint of trade or commerce is guilty of a Class H felony, except that, notwithstanding the maximum fíne specified in s. 939.50(3)(h), the person may be fined not more than $100,000 if a corporation, or, if any other person, may be fined not more than $50,000.
(2) Every person who monopolizes, or attempts to monopolize, or combines or conspires with any other person or persons to monopolize any part of trade or commerce is guilty of a Class H felony, except that, notwithstanding the maximum fine specified in s. 939.50(3)(h), the person may be fined not more than $100,000 if a corporation, or, if any other person, may be fined not more than $50,000.
Chapter 133 contains a statement of legislative’ intent, which provides as follows:
The intent of this chapter is to safeguard the public against the creation or perpetuation of monopolies and to foster and encourage competition by prohibiting unfair and discriminatory business practices which destroy or hamper competition. It is the intent of the legislature that this chapter be interpreted in a manner which gives the most liberal construction to achieve the aim of competition. It is the intent of the legislature to make competition the fundamental economic policy of this state and, to that end, state regulatory agencies shall regard the public interest as requiring the preservation and promotion of the maximum level of competition in any regulated industry consistent with the other public interest goals established by the legislature.
Wis. Stat. § 133.01. Wisconsin Stat. § 133.18 provides treble damages to "any person injured, directly or indirectly." As we noted in Olstad, 284 Wis. 2d 224, ¶ 61, language providing recovery to those harmed indirectly was adopted in response to the United States [311]*311Supreme Court's decision in Illinois Brick Co. v. State of Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977), which limited recovery-under the federal antitrust statute to direct purchasers.
¶ 27. We thoroughly examined the language of the Wisconsin Antitrust Act, its legislative history and historical context in Olstad to determine whether the Wisconsin Antitrust Act applies to conduct that reaches interstate commerce. There, we noted that the Wisconsin Antitrust Act was adopted in 1893, three years after passage of the Sherman Antitrust Act. Olstad, 284 Wis. 2d 224, ¶ 41. At that time, there was little doubt that state antitrust law was limited in scope to conduct impacting intrastate commerce; the Supreme Court saw only a narrow role for state government in commercial regulation. Id., ¶ 30. Courts then treated state and federal governments as " 'separate and distinct sovereignties, acting separately and independently of each other, within their respective spheres.'" Id., ¶ 33 (quoting The Collector v. Day, 78 U.S. 113, 124 (1870)).
¶ 28. Our early cases interpreting the reach of the Wisconsin Antitrust Act were consistent with this narrow view of state regulatory authority, holding that the statute applied only to intrastate commerce. See, e.g., State v. Lewis & Leidersdorf Co., 201 Wis. 543, 549, 230 N.W 692 (1930); Pulp Wood v. Green Bay Paper & Fiber Co., 157 Wis. 604, 625, 147 N.W. 1058 (1914). While the Supreme Court later adopted a much less rigid view of the role of state government in regulation, some of this court's decisions continued to adhere to the view that the Wisconsin Antitrust Act was limited in scope to intrastate commerce. See, e.g., Conley Publishing, 265 Wis. 2d 128; Grams v. Boss, 97 Wis. 2d 332, 346, 294 N.W.2d 473 (1980). However, as we discussed in Olstad, 284 Wis. 2d 224, ¶¶ 24-27, other cases held that the Wisconsin Antitrust Act reached interstate commerce [312]*312in some circumstances. See State v. Milwaukee Braves, 31 Wis. 2d 699, 144 N.W.2d 1 (1966); Allied Chemical, 9 Wis. 2d 290. Based on the apparent conflict between these lines of cases, we concluded in Olstad, 284 Wis. 2d 224, ¶ 28, that Chapter 133 had been interpreted inconsistently, and, as a result, the statute was ambiguous.9 We therefore examined the legislative history of the Wisconsin Antitrust Act, and in particular a 1980 overhaul of the statute. See id., ¶¶ 55-73.
¶ 29. The 1980 revision, Olstad explained, included language that permitted indirect purchasers harmed by antitrust violations to recover under the Wisconsin Antitrust Act. Id., ¶ 61-63 (discussing language now contained in Wis. Stat. § 133.18 providing that "any person injured, directly or indirectly, by reason of anything prohibited by this chapter may sue"). A letter from Attorney General Bronson La Follette to the bill's Assembly author, Representative Marjorie Miller, indicated that this change
would reverse the effect of the U.S. Supreme Court's ruling in the Illinois Brick case on Wisconsin law. The Court, in that case, ruled that only direct purchasers may recover damages for illegally-priced goods. Thus, indirect purchasers — such as state and local governments which purchase most of their supplies through wholesalers, retailers or other middlemen — are left out [313]*313in the cold when it comes to recovering for the illegally inflated prices they and their constituents must pay.
Id., ¶ 62 (quoting Letter to Representative Marjorie Miller from Attorney General Bronson La Follette dated October 3, 1979, located in Legislative Council files, Madison, Wisconsin). We note that Meyers and the putative class were indirect purchasers of Cipro, and that without this change they would not have had a cause of action under the Wisconsin Antitrust Act.
¶ 30. Moreover, we noted in Olstad that the 1980 revision created a new section, Wis. Stat. § 133.01, that included a broad statement of legislative intent. Id., ¶ 68. This section provided, in part: "It is the intent of the legislature that this chapter be interpreted in a manner which gives the most liberal construction to achieve the aim of competition." Id.
¶ 31. We concluded in Olstad that these changes (along with other legislative history material) Te[ft] little doubt of the legislature's intent to apply the Wisconsin antitrust statute to interstate commerce." Id., ¶ 55. We then held that when the challenged conduct does not occur within the state of Wisconsin and impacts interstate commerce, the Wisconsin Antitrust Act applies if the conduct "substantially affects" the people of Wisconsin and has "impacts"10 in this state. Id., ¶ 85. The "substantially affects" standard [314]*314comes from the following language in the Allied Chemical decision: "The public interest and welfare of the people of Wisconsin are substantially affected if prices of a product are fixed or supplies thereof are restricted as the result of an illegal combination or conspiracy." Allied Chemical, 9 Wis. 2d at 295.
¶ 32. Bayer contends that the cases upon which Olstad relied establish two limiting principles that should govern the application of the "substantially affects" test. First, Bayer argues plaintiffs must allege specific and particularized effects on Wisconsin consumers, not merely generalized allegations of nationwide effects, citing Emergency One, Inc. v. Waterous Co., 23 F. Supp. 2d 959 (E.D. Wis. 1998), and State v. Milwaukee Braves, Inc., 31 Wis. 2d 699, 144 N.W.2d 1 (1966). Second, Bayer argues plaintiffs must put forth allegations more specific than merely that some Wisconsin downstream consumers may have generally paid higher prices because of the challenged conduct, citing Emergency One. We examine the cases on which we relied in Olstad — Allied Chemical, Milwaukee Braves and Emergency One — to determine whether they support Bayer's argument.
B
¶ 33. The Allied Chemical case arose out of an action alleging monopolistic practices in violation of the Wisconsin Antitrust Act brought by the attorney general against manufacturers and sellers of the chemical calcium chloride. At the time of the state suit, the [315]*315Federal Trade Commission (FTC) was already investigating allegations of price-fixing against the calcium chloride companies, and the trial court dismissed the complaint on grounds that the federal regulatory agency had taken exclusive jurisdiction over the matter. Allied Chemical, 9 Wis. 2d at 293.
¶ 34. This court reversed the trial court's dismissal, concluding that federal antitrust law did not preempt state efforts to enact and enforce effective legislation against monopolistic practices. Id. at 295. The court further concluded that there was no conflict between the federal and state statutes, that the Wisconsin statutes made no attempt to regulate or burden interstate commerce, and that the FTC was not established to enforce the federal antimonopoly statutes but to regulate certain trade practices instead. Moreover, the court cited letters in the record from FTC officials and the Department of Justice that indicated that the attitude of the federal government was to cooperate with the state in its efforts to enforce state statutes dealing with conspiracies and monopolies. Id. at 295-96. Importantly, the Allied Chemical court held that the Wisconsin antitrust statute was enacted to protect state consumers from the effects of monopolistic practices. Id.
¶ 35. In Milwaukee Braves, the State brought an action under the Wisconsin Antitrust Act in response to the departure from Wisconsin of the Milwaukee Braves professional baseball club. Although the Milwaukee Braves court declined to enforce Chapter 133, in part because of major league baseball's well-settled exemption from antitrust regulation, all seven members of the court asserted that the Wisconsin Antitrust Act could be applied to interstate commerce. Olstad, 284 Wis. 2d 224, ¶ 27 (discussing Milwaukee Braves, 31 Wis. 2d at [316]*316725). The Milwaukee Braves court noted that the exercise of the defendants' monopoly power caused "substantial injury to business activity within Wisconsin" such that the court would "assume, at this point, that a violation of Wisconsin law has occurred if our law can be applied." Milwaukee Braves, 31 Wis. 2d at 719. Nevertheless, the court recognized that while "[t]he state may, ordinarily, protect the interests of its people by enforcing its antitrust act against persons doing business in interstate commerce," the state policy must yield when a conflict exists between state and federal policy. Id. at 721.
¶ 36. In Emergency One, a Wisconsin federal district court considered the issue of whether the Wisconsin Antitrust Act reaches interstate commerce several years before our decision in Olstad. Emergency One, a Florida-based manufacturer of fire trucks, sued a Wisconsin truck manufacturer and two manufacturers of fire pump hoses, alleging the three companies conspired to choke competition in the United States market for fire pumps, in violation of Wisconsin's Antitrust Act. The Emergency One court carefully examined our precedents and the legislative history of Wis. Stat. § 133.03 and concluded that the Wisconsin Antitrust Act reaches interstate commerce to some degree. Emergency One, 23 F. Supp. 2d at 966.
¶ 37. To determine when the statute would apply in cases involving interstate commerce, the Emergency One court relied on an "adverse effects" standard that is, in essence, the test we adopted in Olstad. Emergency One, 23 F. Supp. 2d at 969-970. The Emergency One court explained that the "adverse effects" test "extend[s] the jurisdictional scope of Wisconsin antitrust law to unlawful activity which has significantly and adversely affected trade and economic competition within this [317]*317state." Id. at 969. In examining and ultimately rejecting other approaches to determine when the antitrust act applies in cases involving interstate commerce,11 the Emergency One court concluded that "an adverse effects standard is the only standard that remains faithful to the purpose of Chapter 133 — to protect and encourage competition in this state, by penalizing interstate activities that adversely affect it." Id. at 970.
¶ 38. Applying this effects-based standard, the Emergency One court concluded that the complaint "d[id] not allege significant and adverse effects on economic competition in Wisconsin." Id. at 971.
Based on the amended complaint. .. the connection between plaintiffs injury and Wisconsin commerce is [318]*318tenuous at best. E-One identifies three Wisconsin dealerships of a number allegedly maintained by plaintiff over the years. The specific dates of operation suggest that only one dealership in Wisconsin was maintained by E-One at any given time, however. Plaintiff does not estimate the amount of sales at such dealerships in a certain time frame or suggest what proportion of those sales were affected by defendants' conduct. Plaintiff does not indicate how many fire trucks are sold in Wisconsin per year, how many by plaintiff, or how many by plaintiffs competitors. Indeed, plaintiff does not identify a single fire truck contract in Wisconsin from which E-One was precluded from bidding based on the unavailability of Waterous pumps. Without this type of information, the amended complaint does not suggest that injury to E-One also constituted significant injury to trade and commerce related to fire truck sales in Wisconsin.
Id. The court concluded: "[T]he only significant and adverse effect alleged by plaintiff is to plaintiff itself." Id.
¶ 39. Relying on the above cases, Bayer makes essentially three arguments. First, Bayer asserts that all of these cases stand for the proposition that plaintiffs bringing suit under the Wisconsin Antitrust Act must specifically allege the challenged conduct had Wisconsin impacts. Second, citing language from Milwaukee Braves noting that the departure of the Braves from the state "terminated very substantial business activity in Wisconsin," Bayer suggests that the plaintiffs must also allege that these Wisconsin impacts were disproportionate to nationwide impacts. Third, Bayer asserts that the analysis of the Emergency One court demonstrates that "bare allegations" that indirect purchasers in Wisconsin paid higher prices as a result of [319]*319the challenged conduct is not sufficient to meet the "substantially affects" standard. We consider each of these arguments in turn.
¶ 40. Bayer is correct that a plaintiff must allege that the conduct complained of has impacts in Wisconsin, and not merely nationwide impacts. Olstad, 284 Wis. 2d 224, ¶ 85. The cases demonstrate that the focus of the "substantially affects" standard is properly on Wisconsin, and the sufficiency of the plaintiffs claim depends on whether the complaint alleges that the conduct "substantially affects" the people of Wisconsin. However, when determining on a motion to dismiss whether a complaint under the Wisconsin Antitrust Act alleges that the challenged conduct "substantially affected" the people of Wisconsin, courts apply, as on any motion to dismiss, Wisconsin's notice pleading statute, Wis. Stat. § 802.02(l)(a).
¶ 41. "For well over 100 years, this court has consistently held that pleadings shall be liberally construed with a view to substantial justice between the parties." J.L. Phillips & Assoc. v. E&H Plastic Corp., 217 Wis. 2d 348, 365, 577 N.W.2d 13 (1998) (citation omitted). "[A] complaint in a civil action should not be dismissed as legally insufficient unless it is clear that there are no circumstances under which the plaintiff can recover." Lewis, 188 Wis. 2d at 164.
¶ 42. There is no exception to this rule for actions under the Wisconsin Antitrust Act. In Grams, 97 Wis. 2d 332, an insurance agency brought suit against another insurance company and a hospital service corporation, alleging antitrust violations. Writing for the majority, Justice Abrahamson concluded that while the plaintiffs' complaint was "barebone . . . conclusory in part, and may have failed to state sufficient facts" under [320]*320prior pleading rules, it was sufficient to state a claim under the notice pleading statute. Id. at 352.
¶ 43. In light of our liberal pleadings standard, a complaint under the Wisconsin Antitrust Act, where the circumstances involve interstate commerce and the challenged conduct occurred outside of Wisconsin, is sufficient if it alleges price fixing as a result of the formation of a combination or conspiracy that substantially affected the people of Wisconsin and had impacts in this state. As Meyers asserts, requiring greater specificity than the notice pleading statute demands would create a heightened pleading standard for Chapter 133 actions that would bar otherwise legitimate suits, thus undermining the Act's purposes of fostering competition and prohibiting unfair and discriminatory business practices. See Wis. Stat. § 133.01.
¶ 44. We decline to follow Bayer's suggestion that the impacts of the challenged conduct on Wisconsin must be distinguishable from or disproportionate to its impacts on other states. Under Olstad, the complaint must simply allege that the challenged conduct " 'substantially affects' the people of Wisconsin and has impacts in this state," not that these impacts be disproportionately felt in Wisconsin. Olstad, 284 Wis. 2d 224, ¶ 85.
¶ 45. Bayer apparently takes the fact that the Emergency One and Milwaukee Braves courts focused (properly) on the impacts felt in Wisconsin to mean that plaintiffs filing an action under Chapter 133 must assert allegations of disproportionate impacts on Wisconsin. As the Department of Justice asserts in its amicus brief, this approach would subject a defendant that targets the effects of its illegal conduct on Wisconsin to treble damages under Chapter 133, while another [321]*321defendant that causes equal or greater harm in Wisconsin would be immune from suit simply because the latter defendant's harms were evenly spread across the country. Neither the statute nor our case law requires that plaintiffs allege that the challenged conduct caused disproportionate injury to Wisconsin consumers. Plaintiffs need only allege that the conduct substantially affected the people of Wisconsin and had impacts in this state. Olstad, 284 Wis. 2d 224, ¶ 85.
¶ 46. Turning to Bayer's contention that the "substantially affects" standard requires more than "bare allegations" that indirect purchasers in Wisconsin paid higher prices as a result of the challenged conduct, we disagree. This argument is based on a misreading of Emergency One and, moreover, is plainly contrary to Wis. Stat. §§ 133.03 and 133.18.
¶ 47. Bayer contends that the Emergency One court held that the plaintiffs allegations of supracom-petitive prices were not sufficient to state a claim under the Wisconsin Antitrust Act. This misstates the holding of Emergency, One. The Emergency One court dismissed the plaintiffs claim because it concluded that the plaintiffs complaint "made no.. . allegations" of "any significant adverse effects on trade and economic competition within Wisconsin." Emergency One, 23 F. Supp. 2d at 970. The Emergency One court carefully examined the complaint to ascertain whether it alleged "significant adverse effects" to support a claim under state antitrust law. Id. at 970-71. Based on this examination, the court concluded that the plaintiff failed to state a claim under the Wisconsin Antitrust Act. Id. It did not dismiss the complaint based on a per se rule that "bare allegations" that indirect purchasers in Wisconsin paid higher prices is insufficient to state a claim under the act.
[322]*322¶ 48. The Wisconsin Antitrust Act specifically provides a remedy for indirect purchasers who suffer harm as a result of conduct that violates Chapter 133. See Wis. Stat. § 133.18 ("[A] person injured, directly or indirectly, by reason of anything prohibited by this chapter may sue ... and shall recover ... damages.") (emphasis added). In Olstad, we noted that the 1980 revision of Chapter 133 provided a remedy under the statute to indirect purchasers in response to Illinois Brick, 431 U.S. 720, which foreclosed recovery to indirect purchasers under the federal statute. An allegation that thousands of Wisconsin consumers paid supracompetitive prices as a result of monopolistic conduct by an interstate seller therefore states a basis for recovery under the statute.
¶ 49. The test we crafted in Olstad for determining when, in circumstances involving interstate commerce where the challenged conduct occurred outside of Wisconsin, a complaint states a claim under the Wisconsin Antitrust Act was derived in part from this court's decision in Allied Chemical, 9 Wis. 2d 290. Like the present case, Allied Chemical involved allegations of a conspiracy to fix prices to the detriment of Wisconsin consumers. This court held in Allied Chemical that price-fixing is a monopolistic practice that, by its very nature, substantially affects the public.
The public interest and welfare of the people of Wisconsin are substantially affected if prices of a product are fixed or supplies thereof are restricted as the result of an illegal combination or conspiracy. The people of Wisconsin are entitled to the advantages that flow from free competition in the purchase of calcium chloride and other products, and if the state is able to prove the allegations made in its complaint it is apparent that the acts of the defendants deny to them those advantages.
Id. at 295.
[323]*323¶ 50. Amici Wisconsin Manufacturers and Commerce (WMC) and Milwaukee Metropolitan Area Chamber of Commerce (MMAC) point us to Szukalski v. Crompton Corp., 2006 WI App 195, 296 Wis. 2d 728, 726 N.W.2d 304. There, the court of appeals affirmed a circuit court dismissal of an antitrust lawsuit brought by a group of tire buyers alleging several companies engaged in the manufacture and sale of chemicals used to process rubber conspired to fix prices. In determining the scope of the "substantially affects" test, the Szukalski court held that plaintiffs must allege "(1) specific effects on Wisconsin commerce, not merely effects that are nationwide, and (2) that these effects on Wisconsin are more than a general nationwide effect on the price," citing Emergency One, 23 F. Supp 2d at 971, and a recent decision of the Tennessee Supreme Court, Freeman Industries, LLC v. Eastman Chemical Co., 172 S.W.3d 512 (Tenn. 2005). Szukalski, 726 N.W.2d 304, ¶ 20. While noting that Szukalski is not before us, we address it to resolve any inconsistencies between it and our decision today.
¶ 51. Szukalski correctly states that a complaint must allege effects on Wisconsin, and not merely nationwide effects.12 However, its conclusion that the "substantially affects" standard requires allegations "that these effects on Wisconsin are more than a general nationwide effect on the price" misstates the Olstad [324]*324standard, and is inconsistent with our opinion today. See supra, ¶¶ 45-46. As noted, plaintiffs need not allege that the challenged conduct disproportionately affected Wisconsin, only that the challenged conduct substantially affected the people of Wisconsin and had impacts in this state. Olstad, 284 Wis. 2d 224, ¶ 85.
¶ 52. Finally, Bayer and amici WMC and MMAC contend that certain limitations on actions under the Wisconsin Antitrust Act are necessary for judicial economy and preserving a favorable business climate in Wisconsin. They assert that if the court does not adopt their proposed limitations to the "substantially affects" test, Wisconsin courts will be flooded with complex antitrust litigation. They maintain that without these limitations the specter of antitrust litigation would create a hostile atmosphere for businesses in Wisconsin.
¶ 53. To adopt on policy grounds the limitations Bayer and amici propose would be to substitute our own judgment for that of the legislature. By establishing a broad antitrust act that provides remedies to consumers not available under federal antitrust law, the legislature has made clear policy choices in the area of antitrust regulation. The "substantially affects" test adopted in Olstad is consistent with the legislature's policy choices; requiring more of plaintiffs would close off consumer suits, particularly those by indirect purchasers, contrary to the 1980 revision of the statute. Moreover, it would bar otherwise legitimate actions, thereby undermining the statute's purpose "to foster and encourage competition by prohibiting unfair and discriminatory practices which destroy or hamper competition." See Wis. Stat. § 133.01. We decline to substitute our judgment for that of the legislature. See Flynn v. Dep't of Admin., 216 Wis. 2d 521, 539, 576 N.W.2d 245 [325]*325(1998) ("This court has long held that it is the province of the legislature, not the courts, to determine public policy.")-13
C
¶ 54. We turn now to Meyers' complaint to determine if it alleges that the conduct of Bayer and the generic manufacturers substantially affected the people of Wisconsin and had impacts in this state.
¶ 55. Meyers' complaint alleges, in the course of 35 pages and 106 paragraphs, a broad price-fixing scheme affecting "at a minimum, thousands ... in Wisconsin." The complaint states that the named plaintiffs and the putative class are Wisconsin residents who purchased the antibiotic Cipro "at any time since January 6,1995," the date that Meyers alleges the market for Cipro and generic equivalents would have opened to competition. The complaint states that Cipro was the best-selling antibiotic in the world throughout most of the 1990s. It avers that Bayer posted $1 billion in sales of Cipro in the United States in 1999 alone. It states that as a result of the Agreement among Bayer and the generic manufacturers, Bayer maintained its monopoly in the United States market for Cipro; that from January 1997 to December 1998, Bayer increased its price for Cipro by 16.7%; and that from 1998 to 1999, Bayer's United States revenues for Cipro increased 25%, while its net profits increased 22%.
¶ 56. While Meyers' complaint alleges harm to "thousands of Wisconsin residents," the Emergency One complaint, by contrast, alleged a conspiracy adversely [326]*326affecting "only . . . plaintiff itself." Emergency One, 23 F. Supp. 2d at 971. The plaintiff in Emergency One was a fire truck manufacturer that apparently maintained only one dealership in Wisconsin. Id. at 960-61. The plaintiffs complaint did not state the number of sales it made in Wisconsin per year, although it certainly would have had this information.14 Id. at 971. The plaintiff did not indicate a time frame in which the people of Wisconsin suffered injury as a result of alleged monopolistic practices. Id. And the company itself was a Delaware corporation, with a principal place of business in Florida, and thus, any injury suffered by the company resulting in lay-offs or lost profits would have likely had a negligible effect on Wisconsin workers and investors. Id. at 970-71.
¶ 57. Here, Meyers alleges "thousands of Wisconsin residents" suffered economic harm as a result of Bayer's alleged monopolistic practices, starting January 6, 1995. An allegation that a group of pharmaceutical companies conspired to maintain monopoly prices on a best-selling prescription drug purchased by thousands of Wisconsin residents over several years meets the "substantially affects" test set forth in Olstad, 284 Wis. 2d 224, ¶ 85. We conclude that Meyers has sufficiently alleged that the challenged conduct of Bayer and the generic manufacturers substantially affected the people of Wisconsin and had impacts in this state. We therefore affirm the court of appeals' reversal of the circuit court's order dismissing the complaint.
[327]*327IV
¶ 58. In summary, we reaffirm the following standard set forth in Olstad for determining when Chapter 133 reaches interstate commerce: A plaintiff filing an action under Wisconsin's Antitrust Act must allege price fixing as a result of the formation of a combination or conspiracy that "substantially affects the people of Wisconsin and has impacts in this state" when the challenged conduct occurs predominately or exclusively outside this state. Olstad, 284 Wis. 2d 224, ¶ 85. We conclude that additional limitations Bayer and amici MMAC and WMC seek to read into the "substantially affects" standard are unsupported by our precedents and are contrary to the policy choices of the legislature.
¶ 59. Meyers' 35-page, 106-paragraph complaint alleges a broad price-fixing scheme affecting "at a minimum, thousands ... in Wisconsin" who purchased the best-selling antibiotic Cipro "at any time since January 6, 1995." We conclude Meyers' complaint alleges illegal conduct that, if true, substantially affected the people of Wisconsin and had impacts in this state.15 We therefore affirm the court of appeals' decision reversing the circuit court's order dismissing Meyers' claims, and remand the matter to the circuit court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
[328]*328By the Court. — The decision of the court of appeals is affirmed, and the cause is remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
¶ 60. (dissenting). Four years ago in Conley Publishing Group Ltd. v. Journal Communications, Inc., 2003 WI 119, 265 Wis. 2d 128, 665 N.W.2d 879, this court was confronted with the question whether we should adopt Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209 (1993), as the law of Wisconsin governing predatory pricing under Wis. Stat. § 133.03. As we answered this question, we noted that "Wisconsin courts have [long] followed federal court interpretations of Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act and have construed Wisconsin antitrust statutes in conformity with these federal court interpretations." Conley, 265 Wis. 2d 128, ¶ 17.