Meyer v. United States

157 Ct. Cl. 141, 1962 U.S. Ct. Cl. LEXIS 97, 1962 WL 9322
CourtUnited States Court of Claims
DecidedApril 4, 1962
DocketNo. 157-56
StatusPublished

This text of 157 Ct. Cl. 141 (Meyer v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Court of Claims primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Meyer v. United States, 157 Ct. Cl. 141, 1962 U.S. Ct. Cl. LEXIS 97, 1962 WL 9322 (cc 1962).

Opinions

Jones, Chief Judge,

delivered the following opinion and announced the judgment of the court:

Plaintiff, an officer in the United States Navy, seeks increased allowances for the years June 1, 1944, to December 31, 1955, on the ground that his mother during that period was dependent on him for her chief support.1

[143]*143The term “dependent” is defined in section 4 of the Act of June 16’, 1942, 56 Stat. 359, 361. It provides that the word “dependent” shall include the father or mother of the person concerned “provided he or she is in fact dependent on such person for his or her chief support.”

For a part of the period claimed the Career Compensation Act of October 12,1949, 63 Stat. 802,804, is applicable. This latter act was modified by the Act of September 8, 1950, 64 Stat. 794. These provisions will be discussed later.

The facts are fully set out in the findings. They are in brief as follows:

Plaintiff’s father and mother were born in Germany. However, they came to this country and were married in Baltimore, Maryland, in 1898. They bought two small farms in Kansas which were taken in the father’s name. Plaintiff was the tenth child in a family of twelve. The property has at all times been under heavy mortgage and is “rundown.” The father is a heavy drinker and has not worked for many years. The mother is unable to speak or read the English language. Nine of the children never progressed beyond grade school. Plaintiff worked his way through college and obtained an engineering degree. He is the only child who has been able to contribute financially to the support of his parents. The father’s bank account for the years 1944 to 1955 shows that the balances maintained were very small and at no time exceeded $895.14. The ac[144]*144count was frequently overdrawn, and the father at all times owed the bank on notes due. Several of the boys were drafted into the Army in the early part of World War II and never returned to the farm. Plaintiff was called to active duty as an officer on March 27, 1942. Only three brothers remained on the farm. One of them became dissatisfied and left in 1946 because he was not paid any wages. Of the two brothers who remained on the farm, one was mentally deficient and the other was an invalid as the result of polio and also as the result of an accident in connection with the operation of a harvester.

Plaintiff’s contributions to his parents began in May 1943. He made application for increased allowances as an officer with dependents and was paid increases for the period from June 1, 1944, to February 28, 1950. Some time during the years 1949 and 1950 the General Accounting Office reviewed the accounts of unmarried officers, including the plaintiff’s accounts. As a result the General Accounting Office decided that plaintiff was not entitled to claim that he had been and was the chief support of his mother. The main basis for this ruling was that the mother was entitled to one-half the income from the farm that stood in her husband’s name, notwithstanding that there were two handicapped children on the farm. The defendant recouped by consecutive deductions the amount of increased allowances that had been paid plaintiff. If the mother had been considered as being allotted one-fourth the income from the farm she would have been dependent on the plaintiff for her chief support during some of the years involved in the instant case.

There are three principal periods. For the period beginning October 1,1949, through July 31,1950, the Career Compensation Act of 1949, supra, was in operation. It required as a condition that the claimed dependent must have resided in the same household. Clearly plaintiff is not entitled to recover any increased allowances for this period.

For the period August 1, 1950, to December 31, 1955, the requirement that the residence be in the same house was repealed but an amendment was added which made the decision of the head of the Department final and not subject to any review except for fraud or gross negligence. There is [145]*145some confusion in the record as to whether a direct decision was ever made by the Secretary of the Navy. At the same time the record does not disclose that the plaintiff ever filed the necessary additional papers. Whichever horn of the dilemma is taken we have no jurisdiction in the state of the record to make a determination as to this particular period. While for some of those years there is an indication that plaintiff may have been the chief support of his mother, that is a matter, with the exceptions noted, for the exclusive determination of the Secretary of the Navy. Counsel for the defendant indicated that proper application had never been made. It was disputed. At any rate, we have no choice but to dismiss the claim for this period, and it will be dismissed without prejudice.

This leaves for consideration the period of plaintiff’s claim covering the years June 1, 1944, to September 30, 1949. In considering this period we must exclude the year 1949 because in that year, which was evidently a good farm year, it seems apparent that the plaintiff was not the chief support of his mother.

For the years June 1, 1944, to December 31, 1948, we believe it is clearly shown that the plaintiff was the chief support of his mother. The question of whether a mother is dependent upon an officer for her chief support is a factual one and depends altogether on the facts of the individual case. Numerous cases have been cited by both parties, but the law is clear and the statute is clear, and each case must be decided upon the merits presented.2 Any regulations promulgated under the statute should or should not be applied depending on the circumstances and facts of the individual case and should not be a matter of arbitrary application.

Defendant earnestly insists that one-half the total proceeds of the farm should be allotted to the mother, and that this would preclude plaintiff from recovery. However, there is no exact yardstick that can be used for measurement of cases [146]*146of this kind. Certainly an allotment of the full one-half would not be justified.

We further conclude, upon a reading of the entire record, that the mother actually received much less than even one-quarter, whatever the family farm income might have been. The two small farms stood in the father’s name, and he controlled the income. He was a heavy drinker. It cannot be reasonably presumed that the liquor was all presented to him. It cannot be presumed that no part of the funds would be used for the support of the two boys who remained on the farm. There is no direct evidence of any substantial portion of the farm income being used for the mother’s support.

One of the family (a married sister) wrote plaintiff on September 16,1945, in reference to plaintiff’s monthly check, “It is the only check that she [the mother] receives. She sure needs the money. She uses it to pay for groceries, medicine and fuel. She should have more medical care. * * * She tries to do too much.” Letters and papers through later years reflect the same story. (See exhibits.)

The mother made an affidavit in 1954 from which we quote: “For years I have had to depend * * * mostly on Anton for all the things I have had. He sends money regularly. * * * I don’t know what my husband did with his money, but I know we never had anything. * * * I don’t know how I would have gotten along without my son Anton.

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Bluebook (online)
157 Ct. Cl. 141, 1962 U.S. Ct. Cl. LEXIS 97, 1962 WL 9322, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/meyer-v-united-states-cc-1962.