Meyer v. Kurz

Appellate Court of Illinois

Meyer v. Kurz

184 Ill. App. 596, 1914 Ill. App. LEXIS 1231

CourtAppellate Court of Illinois

DecidedJanuary 22, 1914

DocketGen. No. 18,813

StatusPublished

This text of 184 Ill. App. 596 (Meyer v. Kurz) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Court of Illinois primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Meyer v. Kurz, 184 Ill. App. 596, 1914 Ill. App. LEXIS 1231 (Ill. Ct. App. 1914).

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Opinion

Mr. Presiding Justice Fitch

delivered the opinion of the court.

2. Execution, § 295*—when record of action for slander conclusive on petition for discharge under Insolvent Debtors’ Act. Where a default judgment is entered against the defendant in an action for slander for words spoken which are actionable per se, the words spoken are admitted to be false by the default, and that they were maliciously uttered is conclusively presumed from the facts thus admitted and from the absence of any plea of justification or excuse. 3. Libel and slander, § 21*—when malice presumed. In an action for slander if the words charged to have been falsely uttered are not actionable per se, it is necessary to prove malice in fact; but if the words spoken are actionable per se then the law conclusively implies malice from the use of such words if false and uttered without legal justification or excuse. 4. Libel and slander, § 31*—when imputation of theft actionable per se. The words, “this woman has stolen the watch and chain belonging to my son,” are actionable per se.

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Mr. Presiding Justice Fitch

delivered the opinion of the court.

2. Execution, § 295*—when record of action for slander conclusive on petition for discharge under Insolvent Debtors’ Act. Where a default judgment is entered against the defendant in an action for slander for words spoken which are actionable per se, the words spoken are admitted to be false by the default, and that they were maliciously uttered is conclusively presumed from the facts thus admitted and from the absence of any plea of justification or excuse. 3. Libel and slander, § 21*—when malice presumed. In an action for slander if the words charged to have been falsely uttered are not actionable per se, it is necessary to prove malice in fact; but if the words spoken are actionable per se then the law conclusively implies malice from the use of such words if false and uttered without legal justification or excuse. 4. Libel and slander, § 31*—when imputation of theft actionable per se. The words, “this woman has stolen the watch and chain belonging to my son,” are actionable per se.

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Bluebook (online)

184 Ill. App. 596, 1914 Ill. App. LEXIS 1231, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/meyer-v-kurz-illappct-1914.