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5 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 6 WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT SEATTLE 7 8 RANDALL MEYER, CASE NO. 2:22-cv-00232-JHC 9 Plaintiff, ORDER 10 v. 11 GEORGE W. BUSH, et al., 12 Defendant. 13
14 This matter comes before the Court sua sponte. Pro se Plaintiff Randall Meyer filed a 15 complaint against Defendants, a number of politicians, government officials, organizations and 16 their leadership, and educational institutions and their leadership.1 Dkt. # 4-1. Magistrate Judge 17 Brian A. Tsuchida granted Plaintiff’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”) and 18 19
20 1 Defendants include: Former Presidents George W. Bush and Donald J. Trump, U.S. Senator Bernie Sanders, U.S. Congressman Peter Welch, U.S. Attorney General Merrick Garland, Vermont 21 Attorney General T.J. Donovan, the Honorable William K. Sessions III, William Barr; presidents and faculty of Harvard University, University of Vermont, University of Rhode Island, and Tufts University; 22 and individuals associated with the Federalist Society, American Civil Liberties Union, American Philosophy Society, National Academy of Sciences, Educational Testing Service, New England 23 Association of Schools & Colleges, U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, United Nations High Commission for Refugees, The Fellowship at The International Foundation Inc., American 24 Association for the Advancement of Science, and Stone and Browning Property Management, LLC. Dkt. # 4-1 at 2–5. 1 recommended the Court review the complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) prior to the 2 issuance of a summons. Dkt. # 3. 3 The Court must dismiss an IFP complaint if the action is frivolous or malicious, fails to 4 state a claim, or seeks relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C.
5 § 1915(e)(2)(B). “[A] finding of factual frivolousness is appropriate when the facts alleged rise 6 to the level of the irrational or wholly incredible, whether or not there are judicially recognized 7 facts available to contradict them.” Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992); see also 8 Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989) (“[A] complaint, containing as it does both factual 9 allegations and legal conclusions, is frivolous where it lacks an arguable basis either law or in 10 fact.”). Also, a complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that 11 the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). The statement should give the 12 defendant fair notice of the plaintiff’s claims; provide sufficient factual matter and “to raise a 13 right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 14 (2007); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 663, 678 (2009). When a petitioner proceeds pro se, the
15 Court must “construe the pleadings liberally,” but may not “supply essential elements of the 16 claim that were not initially pled.” Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010); Ivey v. 17 Board of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). 18 Defendants are federal, state, and private individuals. Without specifying which 19 Defendants, the complaint appears to allege that certain of them conspired to suppress Plaintiff’s 20 constitutional freedoms of speech, religion, and expression, and deprived him of life, liberty, and 21 property. Dkt. # 4-1 at 4–5, 7–8. Under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal 22 Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), a plaintiff may bring a claim “for violations of 23 constitutional rights committed by federal officials acting in their individual capacities. In a 24 paradigmatic Bivens action, a plaintiff seeks to impose personal liability upon a federal official 1 based on alleged constitutional infringements he or she committed against the plaintiff.” 2 Consejo de Desarrollo Economico de Mexicali, A.C. v. United States, 482 F.3d 1157, 1173 (9th 3 Cir. 2007). Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff may bring a cause of action against persons 4 acting under the color of state law. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983. While the complaint alleges
5 Defendants conspired to suppress a number of Plaintiff’s constitutional freedoms, it makes 6 neither Bivens nor § 1983 allegations against the federal and state Defendants. And Plaintiff 7 does not provide a legal basis for a constitutional action against Defendants who are private 8 individuals. Even liberally construed, Plaintiff’s allegations do not raise his “right to relief above 9 the speculative level.” See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. 10 The complaint says Defendants conspired to violate his rights by “disallow[ing] the 11 Plaintiff’s publishing and expression of scientific theories and hypotheses.” Dkt. # 4-1 at 7. 12 However, the complaint does not explain how or when the alleged violations occurred, nor does 13 it provide facts connecting Defendants to the harm alleged. Plaintiff requests “reinstatement as 14 an academician in good standing and/or 9,999.99$ damages.” Dkt. # 4-1 at 10. However,
15 Plaintiff does not explain where he seeks such reinstatement. And although Plaintiff specifies 16 that Defendant “Stone and Browning LLC, specifically, [should] be tasked with replacing 17 [Plaintiff’s] academic library,” he admits that it could “exceed the [$]9,999.99[] limit” and does 18 not explain why Stone and Browning should bear that burden. Dkt. #4-1 at 10. 19 Plaintiff requests a writ of mandamus to compel Attorney General Merrick Garland to 20 arrest former President Donald Trump and to “drop[] the charges and/or issuance of pardons to 21 the illegally jailed reporter, Julian Assange, and the illegally persecuted and excited 22 whistleblower, Edward Snowden.” Dkt. # 4-1 at 8. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1361, the Court has 23 “original jurisdiction of any action in the nature of mandamus to compel an officer or employee 24 of the United States or any agency thereof to perform a duty owed to the plaintiff.” However, 1 “[a]n order pursuant to § 1361 is available only if (1) the claim is clear and certain; (2) the 2 official’s or agency’s ‘duty is nondiscretionary, ministerial, and so plainly prescribed as to be 3 free from doubt’; and (3) no other adequate remedy is available.” Agua Caliente Tribe of 4 Cupeno Indians of Pala Rsrv. v. Sweeney, 932 F.3d 1207, 1216 (9th Cir. 2019) (quoting Patel v.
5 Reno, 134 F.3d 929, 931 (9th Cir. 1997)). Plaintiff does not clearly explain why he is entitled to 6 a writ of mandamus nor does he address the unavailability of another adequate remedy. 7 Citing 8 U.S.C.
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5 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 6 WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT SEATTLE 7 8 RANDALL MEYER, CASE NO. 2:22-cv-00232-JHC 9 Plaintiff, ORDER 10 v. 11 GEORGE W. BUSH, et al., 12 Defendant. 13
14 This matter comes before the Court sua sponte. Pro se Plaintiff Randall Meyer filed a 15 complaint against Defendants, a number of politicians, government officials, organizations and 16 their leadership, and educational institutions and their leadership.1 Dkt. # 4-1. Magistrate Judge 17 Brian A. Tsuchida granted Plaintiff’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”) and 18 19
20 1 Defendants include: Former Presidents George W. Bush and Donald J. Trump, U.S. Senator Bernie Sanders, U.S. Congressman Peter Welch, U.S. Attorney General Merrick Garland, Vermont 21 Attorney General T.J. Donovan, the Honorable William K. Sessions III, William Barr; presidents and faculty of Harvard University, University of Vermont, University of Rhode Island, and Tufts University; 22 and individuals associated with the Federalist Society, American Civil Liberties Union, American Philosophy Society, National Academy of Sciences, Educational Testing Service, New England 23 Association of Schools & Colleges, U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, United Nations High Commission for Refugees, The Fellowship at The International Foundation Inc., American 24 Association for the Advancement of Science, and Stone and Browning Property Management, LLC. Dkt. # 4-1 at 2–5. 1 recommended the Court review the complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) prior to the 2 issuance of a summons. Dkt. # 3. 3 The Court must dismiss an IFP complaint if the action is frivolous or malicious, fails to 4 state a claim, or seeks relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C.
5 § 1915(e)(2)(B). “[A] finding of factual frivolousness is appropriate when the facts alleged rise 6 to the level of the irrational or wholly incredible, whether or not there are judicially recognized 7 facts available to contradict them.” Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992); see also 8 Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989) (“[A] complaint, containing as it does both factual 9 allegations and legal conclusions, is frivolous where it lacks an arguable basis either law or in 10 fact.”). Also, a complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that 11 the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). The statement should give the 12 defendant fair notice of the plaintiff’s claims; provide sufficient factual matter and “to raise a 13 right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 14 (2007); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 663, 678 (2009). When a petitioner proceeds pro se, the
15 Court must “construe the pleadings liberally,” but may not “supply essential elements of the 16 claim that were not initially pled.” Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010); Ivey v. 17 Board of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). 18 Defendants are federal, state, and private individuals. Without specifying which 19 Defendants, the complaint appears to allege that certain of them conspired to suppress Plaintiff’s 20 constitutional freedoms of speech, religion, and expression, and deprived him of life, liberty, and 21 property. Dkt. # 4-1 at 4–5, 7–8. Under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal 22 Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), a plaintiff may bring a claim “for violations of 23 constitutional rights committed by federal officials acting in their individual capacities. In a 24 paradigmatic Bivens action, a plaintiff seeks to impose personal liability upon a federal official 1 based on alleged constitutional infringements he or she committed against the plaintiff.” 2 Consejo de Desarrollo Economico de Mexicali, A.C. v. United States, 482 F.3d 1157, 1173 (9th 3 Cir. 2007). Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff may bring a cause of action against persons 4 acting under the color of state law. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983. While the complaint alleges
5 Defendants conspired to suppress a number of Plaintiff’s constitutional freedoms, it makes 6 neither Bivens nor § 1983 allegations against the federal and state Defendants. And Plaintiff 7 does not provide a legal basis for a constitutional action against Defendants who are private 8 individuals. Even liberally construed, Plaintiff’s allegations do not raise his “right to relief above 9 the speculative level.” See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. 10 The complaint says Defendants conspired to violate his rights by “disallow[ing] the 11 Plaintiff’s publishing and expression of scientific theories and hypotheses.” Dkt. # 4-1 at 7. 12 However, the complaint does not explain how or when the alleged violations occurred, nor does 13 it provide facts connecting Defendants to the harm alleged. Plaintiff requests “reinstatement as 14 an academician in good standing and/or 9,999.99$ damages.” Dkt. # 4-1 at 10. However,
15 Plaintiff does not explain where he seeks such reinstatement. And although Plaintiff specifies 16 that Defendant “Stone and Browning LLC, specifically, [should] be tasked with replacing 17 [Plaintiff’s] academic library,” he admits that it could “exceed the [$]9,999.99[] limit” and does 18 not explain why Stone and Browning should bear that burden. Dkt. #4-1 at 10. 19 Plaintiff requests a writ of mandamus to compel Attorney General Merrick Garland to 20 arrest former President Donald Trump and to “drop[] the charges and/or issuance of pardons to 21 the illegally jailed reporter, Julian Assange, and the illegally persecuted and excited 22 whistleblower, Edward Snowden.” Dkt. # 4-1 at 8. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1361, the Court has 23 “original jurisdiction of any action in the nature of mandamus to compel an officer or employee 24 of the United States or any agency thereof to perform a duty owed to the plaintiff.” However, 1 “[a]n order pursuant to § 1361 is available only if (1) the claim is clear and certain; (2) the 2 official’s or agency’s ‘duty is nondiscretionary, ministerial, and so plainly prescribed as to be 3 free from doubt’; and (3) no other adequate remedy is available.” Agua Caliente Tribe of 4 Cupeno Indians of Pala Rsrv. v. Sweeney, 932 F.3d 1207, 1216 (9th Cir. 2019) (quoting Patel v.
5 Reno, 134 F.3d 929, 931 (9th Cir. 1997)). Plaintiff does not clearly explain why he is entitled to 6 a writ of mandamus nor does he address the unavailability of another adequate remedy. 7 Citing 8 U.S.C. § 1481, Plaintiff requests relief in the form of “severance from the United 8 States government, through renunciation, free of cost, of his citizenship,” and a letter 9 recommending Plaintiff for permanent residence in Canada. Dkt. # 4-1 at 10. The complaint 10 says Plaintiff is willing “to throw an egg at the U.S. Border gate” to relinquish his citizenship. 11 Dkt. # 4-1 at 10. And it says Plaintiff’s “hypothetical egg-treason would be moot if judge finds 12 that Defendants have re-enslaved Plaintiff” because, as a “slave,” he might not be a citizen and 13 therefore might not be capable of treason. Dkt. # 4-1 at 10. However, Plaintiff has not shown 14 that he made “a formal renunciation or nationality before a diplomatic or consular officer of the
15 United States in a foreign state” or an officer designated by the Attorney General during “a state 16 of war,” or that he has “committed any act of treason,” as required by § 1481(a)(5)–(7). And it is 17 his burden to establish loss of nationality. See § 1481(b) (“[T]he burden shall be upon the person 18 or party claiming that such loss occurred, to establish such claim by a preponderance of the 19 evidence.”). 20 In light of the foregoing, the Court concludes that the complaint is frivolous, as it lacks 21 basis in law or fact. The complaint also does not allege facts sufficient to provide Defendants 22 with fair notice of Plaintiff’s claims, and thus fails to state a claim upon which relief can be 23 granted. 24 1 Therefore, under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), the Court DISMISSES Plaintiff's complaint 2 as frivolous and failing to state a claim with leave to amend within fourteen (14) days of the 3 filing of this order. See Lucas v. Dep’t of Corr., 66 F.3d 245, 248 (9th Cir. 1995) (when a court 4 dismisses a pro se plaintiff's complaint, the court must give the plaintiff leave to amend “[uJnless 5 it is absolutely clear that no amendment can cure the defect” in the complaint). If Plaintiff's 6 amended complaint fails to correct the noted deficiencies or fails to meet the required pleading 7 standard, the court will dismiss the complaint will be dismissed with prejudice. The Court 8 DIRECTS the Clerk to send a copy of this Order to Plaintiff. 9 Dated this 2nd day of May, 2022. 10 C]ot. 4. Chua 11 John H. Chun United States District Judge
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