Meyer v. Austin Independent School District

167 F.3d 887, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 2038, 1999 WL 61618
Procedural entryThis page is a short order in Meyer v. Austin Independent School District. Read the opinion of the Court — 161 F.3d 271
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit·Decided February 10, 1999·No. 97-50561·Published

Opinion

ON PETITION FOR REHEARING

Before KING, Chief Judge, and GARWOOD and HIGGINBOTHAM, Circuit Judges.

PATRICK E. HIGGINBOTHAM, Circuit Judge:

The appellants seek rehearing, contending we held that a principal would “lose qualified immunity simply because he mistakenly assumes that a parent’s defense of his or her child reflects the child’s side of the story,” and that “if a school administrator gives a parent an opportunity to defend his or her child, but later the child contends he or she would have told a different story, that school administrator will be personally liable for money damages.” We did not hold that. To the contrary, we held that procedural due process is satisfied where there is a meaningful opportunity to tell the child’s side of the story. Of course, an administrator’s speaking with a parent will not create a meaningful opportunity in every case. Thus, for example, here plaintiffs contend that various administrators merely informed the parents of what had happened and the discipline already imposed and gave the parents no meaningful opportunity to explain or seek a different result. Whether such a meaningful opportunity existed here we do not assess. This we leave to the district court, as we must given the limited nature of our interlocutory review.

PETITION FOR REHEARING DENIED.

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Meyer v. Austin Independent School District, 167 F.3d 887, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 2038, 1999 WL 61618 (5th Cir. 1999).

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Meyer v. Austin Ind School
167 F.3d 887 (Fifth Circuit, 1998)